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THE ETHICS OF PRIVATISATION 
by Charles Yeats 
Abstract 
The main aim of the thesis is to provide an ethical evaluation of privatisation. 
We begin by sketching a history of privatisation in order to give an initial impression of 
how it has dramatically re-drawn the economic borders of the state in Britain and in many other 
countries across the world. We also show how privatisation has come to challenge the post-war 
Christian consensus which was supportive of the mixed economy. 
We men explain why we find a qualified Aristotelian-Thomist tradition offers us the best 
moral resource for our enquiry. To this end we set out Alasdair Maclntyre's project which seeks 
to respond to the interminable disagreement in ethics and to reinstate the classical and medieval 
tradition of the virtues. Then, while engaging with some of his interlocutors, we show why we 
are in basic agreement with the three main coordinates of his method: human wisdom, the 
Christian revelation, and rival moral traditions. 
Next, as the basis for our evaluation, we assemble as many diverse perspectives as the 
scope of this study allows by pursuing three main lines of enquiry. The first explores the 
political, economic and moral justification for the nationalisation programme of 1945-51, in 
order to identify the principal arguments used at the time for and against public ownership. The 
second explores the experience of public ownership from 1951-79, in order to test the negative 
case for privatisation which claims mat the nationalised industries failed and therefore there was 
no practical alternative to privatisatioa The third explores the abandonment of public ownership 
from 1979 in order to explore the positive case for privatisation in economic liberalism. 
Having indicated why we are not persuaded by either of these cases for privatisation, as 
the final part of our evaluation we look at privatisation from the perspective of a broad Christian 
vision of the common good In the light of this moral tradition, we argue that privatisation fails 
our two basic tests of social justice, freedom and social equality. On the understanding that in 
the context of the modern global market i t is no longer practicable to restore public ownership, 
we end by outlining, as a postscript, a new project which looks to build on the strengths of both 
nationalisation and privatisation while avoiding their weaknesses. 
T H E ETHICS OF PRIVATISATION 
Charles Yeats 
1998 
The copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotation from 
it should be published without the 
written consent of the author an 
information derived from it should 
be acknowledged. 
A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of 
the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
the University of Durham 
the Department of Theology 
September 1998 
2 h AUG 1999 
Declaration 
I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for a 
degree in this or any other university. 
Signed €-0 / *» 
Date 
Copyright 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without bis prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgement i i i 
P A R T I : INTRODUCTION AND METHOD 1 
Chapterl. "A Major World Revolution" 2 
A Brief History of Privatisation 4 
The Impact of Privatisation on Christian Social Ethics 7 
Outline of Enquiry 16 
Literature Survey 18 
Chapter 2. Ethics as a Patchwork Quilt 22 
Alasdair Maclntyre's Project 24 
Human Wisdom 39 
The Christian Revelation 50 
Rival Ethical Traditions 59 
P A R T E : A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF NATIONALISATION 64 
Chapter 3. The Nationalisation Programme (1945-1951) 65 
The Politics of Nationalisation 67 
The Economics of Nationalisation 70 
The Christian Ethics of Nationalisation 79 
An Evaluation 104 
i 
Chapter 4. The Experience of Nationalisation (195M979) 106 
The Start-up in the Fifties 109 
The Heyday of the Sixties 111 
The Turbulent Seventies 28 
The Lessons of Experience 150 
Chapter 5. The Abandonment of Nationalisation (1979-1989) 156 
Harold Wilson 1S9 
Edward Heath 161 
The Rise of Economic Liberalism 166 
The Economic Liberal Case Examined 190 
PART m: THE ETHICS OF PRIVATISATION 204 
Chapter 6. Privatisation and the Common Good 205 
The Common Good 205 
The Christian Understanding of Property 212 
Social Order 219 
Social Justice 225 
Postscript A New Project 237 
The Renewal of Civil Society 238 
The Re-distribution of wealth 239 
The Stakeholder Corporation 240 
Global and Regional Governance 242 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245 
i i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I am grateful to University College, Durham, for giving me the 
opportunity for this study. My Supervisor, Dr. Alan Suggate has been 
painstaking in bis reading and correction of my text and has been invaluable in 
the advice he has given. I am also grateful to my wife, Alison, and my children, 
Katie and James, for their patience and support. 
i i i 
PARTI INTRODUCTION AND METHOD 
Chapter 1 
A MAJOR WORLD REVOLUTION' 
2 
Not a had record for something we were constantly told was "just not on". 
(Margaret Thatcher)1 
From the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 until the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, 
the world was witness to a great social experiment It sought to turn society on its head by 
forcing the state to serve the interests of the working class. A crucial part of the experiment was 
nationalisation: the taking into public ownership of economic enterprise. This was the means of 
wresting economic power from the former rulers and of consolidating the political power of the 
new. So radical was the experiment that it led to a state of continuous but undeclared war 
between East and West: the Cold War. 
In post-war Britain another experiment with similar objectives was tried. It was less 
radical man communism, drawing its inspiration mainly from nineteenth century romanticism, 
the Fabian idea of incremental social change, democratic socialism, and Christianity. 
Nevertheless, it too entailed an ambitious programme of nationalisation. A great list of major 
industries were taken into public ownership on the public corporation model. The result was a 
mixed economy, a hybrid of state socialism and capitalism. This compromise avoided the glaring 
moral failures of both communism and fascism by holding on to a commitment to parliamentary 
democracy. It also enabled the British working class movement to sustain their political 
challenge for over three decades and to improve working conditions in the nationalised 
industries. 
The early successes of these social experiments caught the imagination of the developing 
countries. In those struggling to emancipate themselves from colonialism or the legacy of 
colonialism, nationalisation came to be widely espoused by the liberation movements as a means 
of ending control of their economies by foreigners. It was also widely adopted as a means of 
promoting development through the public corporation. Indeed so popular was the public 
corporation, with its impressive social and moral purpose, mat John Redwood described it as one 
'Thatcher, M. The Downing Street Years (Harper Collins: London, 1993), p 687 
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' o f the most remarkable intellectual exports of all funs' . 2 
By the 1970s, however, the world had moved on. The great socialist experiments were 
everywhere deeply in trouble as, ins response to economic decline, an emphasis on wealth 
creation took over from that of distributive justice. Then, in 1983, Britain's first big 
privatisation, that of British Telecom, was to prove a startling success. It provided a means for 
the impecunious state to lay its hands on a new source of "ready cash". If also provided 
governments beleaguered by militant trade unions the hope that they could buy of f the workers 
by offering them the bribe of popular capitalism: a shareholder democracy. Soon Margaret 
Thatcher's political, economic and social revolution was to be emulated and envied throughout 
the world And it was not long before the great Berlin Wall was to com© tumbling down in 1989, 
bringing with if the ful l revelation of the economic failure of public ownership in the former 
Soviet Union. 
In this radically new world privatisation, understood as an ideology which provides a 
justification of the sale of public enterprises on wider grounds than the selective and mainly 
microeconomic approach called denationalisation, has swept everything before i t 3 If has 
launched what Redwood has called 'a major world revolution , and any politician who has 
resisted has been thrust aside.4 In what follows, in order to give a fuller impression of the scale 
of this revolution, we shall begin by describing how privatisation has not only dramatically 
redrawn the economic boundaries of the British state, but has also commanded the support of 
all three main political parties, and how from Britain, privatisation has been exported to the rest 
of the world 
We shall then review the confused state of Christian social ethics in the wake of 
2 Redwood, J. Popular Capitalism (Routledge: London, 1988), p 48 ff. 
'This definition of privatisation draws on Christopher Foster, Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation 
of Natural Monopoly (Blackweil: Oxford, 1992), p. 108, who tentatively dates the change in outlook of the 
Conservative party leadership under Margaret Thatcher from denationalisation to privatisation to 1977. He 
writes: 
To detect the change in official Conservative policy one needs a nose for 
ambiguity worthy of a nineteenth-century biblical scholar or civil servant. The 
key difference, perhaps between denationalization and privatization, lies 
between:' In some cases ("nw underiminal H mav also be appropriate to sell back 
to private enterprise assets or activities where willing buyers may be found' 
(1976), and the long-term aim must be to reduce the preponderance of state 
ownership and widen die basis of ownership in our community. Ownership by 
the state is not the same as ownership by the people. 
4 Redwood, J. Popular Capitalism, p. 157. 
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privatisation. This is in order to show the extent to which privatisation has not only overturned 
the post-war Christian consensus for the mixed economy, but has also succeeded in winning 
Christian approval for itself. We shall then give an outline of our enquiry into the ethics of 
privatisation. Finally, we shall end the chapter with a survey of the literature which has been 
especially useful for our interdisciplinary study. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATISATION 
Privatisation is an amalgam of ideas old and new. It draws on Adam Smith and George 
Orwell, as well as more recent liberal theorists, such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, 
Robert Nozick, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. 9 I t presented itself as a radical alternative 
to the Wilsonist socialism of the Labour Parry, which appeared to have shut the Conservative 
party out of power in the 1970s. With the help of right wing think tanks, such as the Institute 
of Economic Affairs (TEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), it 'captured' the 
Conservative Party, under the leadership of Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher, in a rolling 
programme of massive asset sales. The programme built up an unstoppable momentum and 
succeeded in privatising not only potentially competitive industries, such as British Telecom, 
but also some of the major natural monopolies, such as British Gas.6 By the time Margaret 
Thatcher left office, on the 28 t h. November, 1990, privatisation had reduced the state-owned 
sector of British industry by some sixty percent As she described the achievements of 
privatisation in her memoirs, 'it constituted the greatest shift of ownership and power away from 
the state to individuals and their families in any country outside the communist bloc' ? 'Not a 
bad record', as she boasted. Tor something we were constantly told was "just not on".' 8 
Margaret Thatcher can well boast because, in addition to redrawing the economic 
boundaries of the state, she changed the political landscape through privatisation. One 
consequence is that it is easy to forget how many of those in her own party she called 'wets' 
opposed her on privatisation and just how strong was the Conservative party's commitment to 
5 Representatives of the four distinct schools of the New Right; see further Helm, D ed.( 77K Economic Borders 
of the State (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), p. 4 f t 
6 For the list of principal asset sales for the period 1979-1987, see Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. 'Privatization in 
Britain', in MacAvoy, P., Stanbury, W., Yarrow, O., and Zeckhauser, R., Privatization and State-Owned 
Enterprises (University of Rochester: New York, 1989), p.211. 
7 Thatcher, M . , op. cit., p.687. 
• Ibid., p.687. 
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the mixed economy in the post-war period. Until her revolution, the dominant party political 
philosophy was the One Nation Toryism of R A Butler and the Middle Way of Harold 
Macmillan. This was forged in the years of depression and shaped by the experience and 
sacrifices of wartime. It accepted the necessity of steering between the extremes of communism, 
which looked to be the direction history was pushing Britain before 1945,9 and capitalism. 
The contrast with the modem Conservative party could not be greater, for now 
privatisation is an ongoing policy commitment Even potential privatisations, such as the Royal 
Mail, which Margaret Thatcher held back from, evidently only because of the connection with 
Royalty, cannot be ruled out should the Tories be returned to power. Indeed, much of Norman 
Macrae's A Future History of Privatisation 1992 - 2022,10 in which he predicts the almost total 
withering away of the state - including the end of politicians - had already come to pass by the 
time the Conservatives were ousted from power in the 1997 general election. A l l of which 
represents a firm repudiation of Macmillan's famous plea to Mrs. Thatcher not to sell the family 
silver. 
Privatisation has of course changed the Labour Party almost beyond recognition. 
Accepting that the Party's commitment to the social ownership of enterprise, enshrined in Clause 
IV of its constitution in 1918 by the Fabians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, has been the subject 
of revision at least since Anthony Crosland advocated control in place of ownership,11 the 
ethical socialism of the new party leadership now accepts mat privatisation should not be 
reversed. Moreover, in a symbolic and decisive break with what Tony Blair calls the ' socialism 
of Marx and state contror1 2, the party has now redrafted its constitution to exclude the 
controversial commitment to nationalisation. With Clause IV the only section of the constitution 
to be printed on the party's membership cards until the recent change, it is perhaps not surprising 
that some party stalwarts have had to found a new party, Old Labour, in order to keep then-
political integrity. 
And not to be left behind, the third main political party in Britain, the Liberal Democratic 
9 Porto-, P. Britannia's Burden, The Political Evolution of Modern Britain 1851-1990 (Edward Arnold: 
London, 1994), p.349; see also p.269. 
'"Macrae, M. "A Future History of Privatisation, 1922-2022 in The Economist, 21 December, 1991, p. 17 
1 1 Crosaland, A. The Future of Socialism (Redwood Burn: Trowbridge, 1956), p.64 ff 
1 2 Quoted in White, M'Delegates Warm to 90'a Socialism' in The Guardian, 
5 October 1994. 
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Party, has also responded to the challenge of privatisation. In a policy paper in May 1986, it 
proposed to give away shares in privatised companies so that all adults would have an equal 
share in them. There would also he tax incentives for employee shareholding and profit sharing 
schemes.13 This was another dramatic break with the past, for in 1945 the Liberals had 
campaigned on a similar programme to Labour's: ' ful l implementation of the Beveridge Report, 
and government takeovers of national monopolies/14 
Reflecting on these changes, Gillian Peele concluded her review of contemporary 
conservatism at the end of the 1980s with the telling remark: 
The last decade has seen an intellectual shift which has caused a redrawing of 
the borders of the British State. Whether the new borders are permanent or 
temporary only time will tell. It would be surprising, however, if they were ever 
again drawn in the same place as in 1979." 
Looking beyond our borders to the global impact of privatisation, Margaret Thatcher can 
also justifiably claim privatisation as one of Britain's most successful exports.16 In the former 
Soviet Union, in Russia, for example, the end of communism has been greeted with a rush to 
privatise. In Western Europe, governments have been slower in following the British example. 
However, prompted by a mix of motives and pressures, including that of reducing public 
expenditure ahead of planned European Monetary Union, some seventeen years after the launch 
of the Thatcher revolution, governments across continental Europe have started what has been 
described as a mega sell-off of state assets.17 
The developing world has also become a major new mission field for privatisation. John 
Redwood writes that in 'February 1986 Secretary of State George Schultz announced that US 
AID would encourage the idea of privatisation in each of its missions in developing countries 
with the hope of encouraging two privatisations in each mission territory every year. This was 
one of the most important decisions in spreading the message throughout the Third World. ' 1 8 
Many governments have seized the opportunity of raising much needed funds and have 
1 3 Wiltshire, K. Privatisation, The British Experience (Longman Cheshire: Melbourne. 1987), p. 120. 
"Porter, op.crt, p.260. 
1 5 Peele, G. Contemporary Conservatism and the Economic Borders of the State \ in Helm, D. ed., The 
Economic Borders of the State (Clarendon. Oxford, 1989), p. 179. 
" Thatcher op.cit., p.687. 
1 7 Rowe, M. "Europe's Mega Sell-off in MBA, Vol.1 No.2. January 1998, p . l l . 
1 1 Redwood, J. op.cit, p.73. 
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voluntarily embarked on their own privatisation programmes. For instance, the government of 
the new South Africa has shelved the extensive programme of nationalisation promised in the 
African National Congress' foundation document, the Freedom Charter.19 
Seen in this light, privatisation has to be judged a huge political success. In its global 
outreach it dwarfs the communist revolutions in the first part of this century. And like those 
earlier revolutions, privatisation already has had and still wil l have enormous consequences for 
ordinary human lives because it radically alters the political, economic, and social structures of 
society. 
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION ON CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS 
In bringing about this global revolution, privatisation has also had a major impact on 
Christian social ethics. In order more fully to appreciate the extent of the challenge, it wil l be 
helpful to begin with an outline of the Christian support for the mixed economy in the main 
traditions of Christian social ethics in the post-war period. Then, against this background, we 
shall explore the confusion which privatisation has left in its wake. 
In English Christianity, the nature of the support for the mixed economy was always 
more complex and its extent more difficult to measure than that suggested by the popular 
description of the Anglican clergy as having ' pinkish' tendencies. Here the dominant tradition 
of social Christianity, represented by William Temple and Ronald Preston, has always been 
cautious in lending its support to any particular economic model. In contrast, the radical 
tradition, represented by Richard Tawney and Kenneth Leech, has been more forthright in its 
advocacy of government intervention in the economy. Nevertheless, while it must be 
acknowledged that there has never been uncritical support for public ownership from the 
leadership of the British churches, the leadership of the Church of England in the post-war 
period has generally represented a social Christianity which has relied on a dialogue with secular 
expertise mat has been sympathetic to the mixed economy. As a consequence, and not forgetting 
the goading of the radical tradition, English Christianity was generally supportive or at least 
accepting of the mixed economy. There was undoubtedly substance, therefore, to the description 
by Giles Ecclestone, for many years General Secretary of the Church of England's Board for 
1 9 See further the report of on interview with South Africa's Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and 
Broadcasting: Naidoo, J. 'Restructuring for Success', in Anderson Consuhrngs' Outlook, Vol. 8,1997, 
pp. 12-14. 
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Social Responsibility (BSR), that 'the typical ecclesiastical leader is a mixed economy man'. 2 0 
In the United States, the prospect of public ownership has never been very likely. 
Nevertheless, even there it may be possible to claim a strong following for democratic socialism 
among leading Christian social ethicists. There the roots of a Protestant opposition to capitalism 
can also be traced to the influences of a radical tradition, represented by the Social Gospel 
Movement, with its reaction to the individualism and the economic realities of the Industrial 
Revolution, and a tradition which is more appreciative of the ambiguities of capitalism, as 
represented by the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr. The American Protestant social 
ethicist, J. Philip Wogaman, who has written extensively on economic issues, and whose 
thinking draws on both the radical and realist traditions mentioned above,31 provides a good 
example. After acknowledging that it is possible that social market capitalism, democratic 
socialism, and economic conservationism may all be compatible with a Christian social ethic,22 
he expressed a clear preference for democratic socialism. As he put this in his book, The Great 
Economic Debate (1977): 
My own inclination, over the long run, is more toward democratic socialism 
than toward the other two. I would at least agree with John Bennett that we live 
at a time when the socialist question needs to be pressed. I take it this means 
that, up to a point, other alternatives are forced to bear the burden of proof For 
example, why should not the oil companies be nationalized or, at least, placed 
under very tight supervision in an overall energy policy? And why should there 
not be a comprehensive public health and medical care programme in countries 
like the United States as there is in countries like Great Britain?23 
Turning next to Roman Catholicism, like English social Christianity, this tradition has 
never come out unequivocally for a particular economic model. Nevertheless, the claim may also 
be made for the development of this tradition until the present Pope, John Paul n, started 
something of a reaction, mat, in its championing of a hypothetical middle or third way between 
economic liberalism and socialism, it was also supportive of the mixed economy in practice, for 
there was no other real alternative to either socialism or capitalism. It certainly accepted a 
2 0 Quoted in Clark, H. 77K Church Under Thatcher (SPCK: London, 1993), p.34. 
2 1 Wogaman, J.P. The Great Economic Debate An Ethical Analysis (SCM London, 1977), p. 134. 
2 2 Ibid., p. 156. 
2 3 Ibid., p. 158. 
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measure of nationalisation in the interests of promoting social justice, although it must be 
admitted mat mis was very cautiously given. Thus Donal Dorr can write of catholic teaching on 
public ownership that 'the state should not intrude unduly in the economic sphere; therefore 
nationalisation of industry or of the economic services such as banking should never go beyond 
what was proved to be strictly necessary/34 
This cautious note, however, does not adequately capture the radicalism of catholic 
social teaching, which in places can be highly critical of free market capitalism, ha tins 
connection, Dorr maintains by the choice of title for his book, Option For The Poor, A Hundred 
Years of Vatican Social Teaching, that whatever the motives underlying the teaching of a 
particular encyclical, the contents of Roman Catholic teaching on economic life in encyclicals 
such as Quadragesimo Anno (1931), Mater et Magistra (1961), the Conciliar teaching in 
Gauditan et Spes, and the encyclical, Populorum Progressio (1967) are supportive, with a few 
interruptions, of a progressive option for the poor in the hundred years since Rerum Novarum 
(1891). While this may be something of a revisionist account of papal social teaching, such is 
the strong criticism of capitalism in some of the encyclicals that there is considerable 
justification for Alistair Kee's thesis that the stimulus for the inclusion of Marxist themes in 
what was to become Liberation Theology can be traced to the post-Conciliar movement and, in 
particular, to Populorum Progression with its radical call for the replacement of the present 
international structures of capitalism.25 As Kee provocatively put this: 'The stimulus to use 
Marx's critical philosophy in the service of God's demand for justice and peace came to Latin 
America from the pope himself. 2 6 
A similar highly critical stance against capitalism marks the radical element within the 
Ecumenical Movement, represented by some officials of the World Council of Churches 
(WCC). This tradition was influenced by the political theology of the 1960s, such as Jurgen 
Moltmann's Theology of Hope (196S), which sought to recapture Christian eschatology from its 
secular version in Marxism, and then, through its involvement with its member churches in the 
developing countries, was exposed to Latin American Liberation Theology, which built on the 
2 4 Dorr, D. Option For The Poor, A hundred years of Vatican Social Teaching (Orbis: New York, 1983), p. 109 -
110. 
2 3 Ibid., p.257 ff . for a discussion of the encyclical. 
2 6 Kee, A. Marx And The Failure of Liberation Theology (SCM: London, 1990), p. 162. 
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earlier political theology in its own context. In addition, the WCC had become heavily engaged 
in the development debate of the 1960s and 1970s. This had witnessed a growing disillusionment 
with the kind of optimistic capitalistic development theory, which suggested that, provided Third 
World countries followed the development pattern of the industrialised countries, their economic 
development was assured. In the face of little or no economic growth, and, in some cases, 
negative growth, building on themes from earlier conferences, such as the Oxford Conference 
(1937), officials of the WCC chose to champion a prophetic theology. This went beyond earlier 
criticisms of capitalism to repudiate laissez faire capitalism in its entirety. 
One of the first clear signs of the radicalisation of the Ecumenical movement was the 
Geneva Conference (1966X whose stance was broadly endorsed by the official Assembly of the 
WCC meeting at Uppsala two years later. Writing of the Geneva conference, Charles West 
describes it as a watershed for, amongst other reasons, its role as a marker for the ensuing 
bifurcation in ecumenical social ethics, with one group continuing the dialogical method 
championed by William Temple, and a new group embracing a liberationist analysis, which 
called for a new social ethics derived from a participation with the poor in confrontation with 
their oppressors.27 One of the best known exponents of this new method is Ulrich Duchrow, who 
became a consultant to the WCC following the Vancouver Assembly (1983). He believes that 
capitalism is heretical and, therefore, is a credal issue for the churches which calls for a 
confessing church movement As he put this: 
I f it is correct that * laissez faire' capitalism and monetarist capitalism of national 
security are, in principle, the worship of idols and lead to an increase of wealth 
and power for the few at the cost of the lives of many, the church is presented 
not only with an ethical question but a question of faith This is even more so 
when attempts are made at a theological justification of these death dealing 
mechanisms. Confronted by a totalitarian fascist state Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
established two criteria for a church confronted by a question of faith, a 'status 
confessionis' where a church must give a dear answer, 'yes' or no', and when 
she must become a confessing church (eine bekennende Kirche) 
1. When a socio-political institution notoriously fails to fulfil its God-given duty, 
2. When it tries 'too much' to be and to do, ie. when it becomes absolute. 
The first argument against the capitalist economic order is that the economy 
2 7 West, C. "Ethics in the Ecumenical Movement', in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics (SCM: London, 
1986), p. 181 ff. 
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systematically fails to fulfill its mandate, which is the satisfying of the basic 
needs of all its people. The second argument is that the economy aimed solely 
at the increase of money and which destroys people and the environment 
describes itself as autonomous and seeks its own theological justification. The 
consequence is that each church must, according to its own tradition, examine 
the economic structures and in the case of results similar to those related here, 
must repudiate them in the strongest possible form at its disposal, both 
theoretically and in practice.28 
Duchrow's call from the WCC for capitalism to be made an issue of the * status 
confessionis* for the churches marks a kind of high-water mark in the Christian opposition to 
capitalism. Although his was an extreme position, in the light of the review of the main 
traditions above, it should be clear that all shared, along a spectrum, deep misgivings about the 
capitalist model. And, because they were all also critical of Marxist totalitarianism, they tended, 
i f not always in theory, then in practice, to opt for the middle ground of the mixed economy. It 
is against this background, that we need to view the confusion which privatisation has helped 
bring about in Christian social ethics by encouraging a Christian justification for capitalism. 
For this new project, we need to turn to the revival of Christian conservatism. This 
tradition, represented in the Nineteenth Century by Archbishop John Bird Sumner29 and in the 
first part of this century by Bishop Hensley Henson of Durham, was in the shadow of the 
dominant social Christianity of Temple and Preston since the war, so much so that it could be 
described as having been subject to an eclipse. Of the diverse group of writers who have 
contributed to the tradition's renewal, three are deserving of particular mention because of the 
extensive academic recognition and general publicity they received in the late 1970s and 1980s: 
Edward Norman, Brian Griffiths, and Michael Novak. 
The first of these to mount a challenge to social Christianity was the Cambridge 
historian, Edward Norman. His massive history of Church and Society in England 1770-1970 
(1976), with its sharp criticism of the leadership of the Church of England for accommodating 
its teaching to the secular attitudes of society, established his academic reputation. And there it 
might have remained were it not for the even-handedness of the BBC, which chose him to follow 
2 8 Ouchrow, U. "The Witness of the Church in contrast to the Prevailing Ideologies of the Market Economy', in 
Atherton, J. Social Christianity, A Reader (SPCK: London, 1994), p.296. 
2 9 The early stage of Christian conservatism has been rightly called Christian political economy. See further 
Atherton, J. ed. Social Christianity, A Reader, p.334. 
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the left-wing sociologist A.H. Halsey as the BBC's Reith lecturer for 1978. It was these lectures 
which propelled him into the vanguard of public debate, which was then just beginning to turn 
on the post-war settlement under the pressure of continuing relative economic decline, high 
inflation, mounting unemployment, and industrial unrest The lectures were published under the 
title, Christianity and the World Order (1979). This was provocative because, while repudiating 
much of his legacy, the title called to mind Archbishop William Temple's great tract for the 
reconstruction of the post-war social order with the title, Christianity and Social Order (1942). 
The theme of the lectures addressed Norman's claim that the ecumenical movement had 
politicized Christianity, and, in the process, had uncritically accepted Marxist assumptions. As 
he explained this charge: 
By the politicization of religion is meant the interna] transformation of the faith 
itself, so that it comes to be defined in terms of political values - it becomes 
essentially concerned with social morality, rather than with the ethereal qualities 
of immortality. Christianity today is, in this sense, being reinterpreted as a 
scheme of social and political action, dependent it is true, upon supernatural 
authority for its ultimate claims to attention, but rendered in categories that are 
derived from the political theories and practices of contemporary society. There 
are several versions of mis tendency, and there are varying degrees of coherence 
in the extent to which it is accomplished; but all start from a rejection of 
preceding Christian attitudes, from a belief that Christians in the past have been 
too concerned with spirituality. Religious engagement with the world was seen 
to be an affair of charitable palliatives. In its place, contemporary Christians seek 
a corporate reaction to what are increasingly regarded as collective sins: racism, 
economic or cultural exploitation, class division, the denial of Human Rights, 
and so forth. This concept is itself a clue to what has happened. Christians are 
responding sympathetically to die creation of collectivist state structures, and 
to the secular moral assumptions which sustain their authority. The attitudes of 
Christians are, therefore, like those of society in general.30 
I f Norman helped initiate a process of undermining social Christianity in Britain, then 
it is Brian Griffiths who succeeded in re-establishing the tradition of Christian conservatism, 
with its Christian advocacy of the market economy. As a distinguished academic economist and 
an evangelical Anglican, Griffiths was invited to give the 1980 London Lectures in 
Contemporary Christianity, later published as Morality And The Market Place (1982). In these 
3 0 Norman, E. Christianity and World Order (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979), p. 2-3. 
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lectures, Griffiths was careful to provide a biblical critique of both socialism and the secular free 
market thinking of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, before advocating a conservative 
Christian political economy which is opposed to the mixed economy on the basis of principles 
deduced from the bible. These principles include the biblical mandate to create wealth, private 
properly, and the relief of poverty. Although he stopped short of advocating privatisation in these 
lectures, his call for a more vigorous competition policy to include public sector monopolies, 
taken with his general opposition to the corporatist welfare state, can be interpreted as preparing 
the way for privatisation.31 As he expressed his opposition to this model, he argued that it 
reflected a mistaken 'humanist philosophy in which the creation of wealth is of less concern and 
morally inferior than its distribution, in which the pursuit of equality has become the dominant 
economic philosophy and in which the state rather than the individual has come to be held 
responsible for solving our problems' , 3 2 Griffiths' pro-market approach attracted the attention 
of Mrs. Thatcher, who appointed him to head her Policy Unit in 1985. From this position, from 
his evangelical constituency, which by the 1980s had come to dominate the Church of England, 
and from his place on the Church's Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee, Griffiths 
established himself as 'the leading Christian moralist of the market-place in Britain/ 3 3 
Across the Atlantic, the Roman Catholic, Michael Novak, came to epitomise the spirit 
of the reaction against democratic socialism. So influential was his brand of Christian liberalism, 
that he is widely held partly responsible for the shift in the political economy of John Paul n. 
Novak dedicated his book, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Democratic Socialism (1993), 
to the Polish Pope, and in it interpreted the encyclical Centesimus Annus (1991) as expressing 
a clear appreciation of the free market34 Although bom in America, Novak's family ties with 
Eastern Slovakia may have helped him form his deeply hostile view of socialism and, like many 
emigres from Central and Eastern Europe, helped sharpen his awareness of what he believes is 
the Christian spirit of democratic capitalism. After a varied academic career, he joined the neo-
conservative American Enterprise Institute in 1978. There he wrote possibly the most widely 
1 1 Griffiths, B. Morality And The Market Place, Christian alternatives to capitalism and socialism (Hodder and 
Stoughton: London, 1982), p. 121. 
"Seefiirther Ibid , p. 124. 
3 3 Atherton, J. ed., Social Christianity, A Reader (SPCK: London, 1994), p.354. 
M Novak, M. The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (The Free Press: New York, 1993), 
p. l l4ff . 
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read Christian polemic on political economy in modem times, The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism (1982). It appears to have done for American Christianity what Griffiths' London 
Lectures did for British Christianity, provide a Christian apologetic for the market at a time 
when the general climate of Christian opinion had for a long time been deeply suspicious i f not 
hostile. As Irving Kristol commented: 'Incredible as it may seem, this is the first book to provide 
us with a critical appreciation of democratic capitalism from a theological point of view. It is 
undoubtedly a major work of our times/33 
At the heart of the Novak's advocacy of democratic capitalism is the idea of political, 
economic, and cultural pluralism. The state, for instance, is held to exercise a legitimate political 
role when it legislates for the economy. However, when, as in the mixed economy, the state 
becomes a player' in the economy by owning economic enterprise, then it is held to be abusing 
its power. He claims that it is this respect for pluralism which explains why it is that democratic 
capitalism protects individual freedoms and promotes wealth creation better than any other 
system. As he extols what he calls its genius: 
Democratic capitalism is neither the Kingdom of God nor without sin. Yet all 
other known systems of political economy are worse. Such hope as we have of 
alleviating poverty and for removing oppressive tyranny - perhaps our last, best 
hope - lies in this much despised system. A never-ending stream of immigrants 
and refugees seeks out this system. Peoples who imitate this system in faraway 
places seem to do better than peoples who don't Why can't we put into words 
what attracts and what works 7* 
Novak's project certainly looked superficially persuasive in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
In contrast with the state-sponsored capitalist economies in the developing world, such as the 
so-calledx Asian Tigers', with their men impressive rates of economic growth, the growth rates 
of the Western European mixed economies looked lack-lustre indeed. Then, later, when the 
' suppry-side' structural changes of Reagonomics in the United States and Thatcherism in Britain, 
of which privatisation was a major part, were seen to be succeeding in controlling the rate of 
inflation and in bringing unemployment down, the superiority of a market approach looked even 
more secure. As a result it looked as i f Novak at least had pragmatism on his side in the great 
economic debate of the eighties. 
3 5 Novak, M The Spirit of Democratic Capitation (YEA. London, 1982), quoted on the dustcover. 
3 6 Ibid., p.28. 
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Then came the tall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and with that the full disclosure of the 
political, economic and moral bankruptcy of the great communist experiment as it had been 
conducted behind the Iron Curtain. Although the two socialist experiments, the one in the East 
and the one in the West were as different as chalk from cheese in their commitment to 
democratic freedoms, the tendency to elide the two following the militant labour unrest in the 
sixties and seventies in the West, has added the weight of principle to pragmatism by supplying 
the other half of what David Jenkins calls the mantra of the market: it not only works but it also 
promotes freedom.37 This apparent vindication of Novak's project has combined with the 
remarkable political success of privatisation with the result that those who continue to defend 
the mixed economy tend to be dismissed as either having been plainly wrong or as being unable 
to concede that the world has moved on. 
In this connection, John Atherton deserves to be mentioned as one of those who has 
accepted the need for a new theological-ethical method in the light of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the challenges brought about by privatisation. His new pluralistic method both reflects and 
engages with the present state of confusion in Christian social ethics.38 He is an important 
English scholar because, as a disciple of Ronald Preston and as a distinguished social ethicist 
in his own right, it has been widely regarded as significant that he should accept the need to 
change his method.39 Certainly his admission mat he had changed his mind, after engaging in 
a dialogue on the economy between the established Church and the Conservative Party, has 
served only to underline the picture of a very confused discipline, which no longer trusts its 
former ways of conducting theological-ethical enquiry.40 
In the light of all the above, it should be clear that privatisation is not a subject on which 
Christian social ethics can remain silent Not only has it radically redrawn the economic borders 
of the state in Britain, but it has also commanded the political support of all three main British 
3 7 Jenkins, D The Economic Context: The Market As Providence, Fate Or Just The Way Of The World { a 
lecture delivered in the University of Durham on 19*. February 1998). 
M Atherton, J. Christianity and the Market, Christian social thought for out times (SPCK London, 1992), p.3 ff. 
3 9 Ibid., pp 284-5 for a fuller account of his personal quest. 
4 0 Brown, M. Some Thoughts On Theological Method' in Unemployment and the Future of Work, An Enquiry 
for the Churches (CCBI. London, 1997), p.293, writes of That generalised sense of unease - that the 
theological methodology which had served the churches well enough through the years of the post-war consensus 
could not seamlessly accommodate the ideological upheavals and uncertainties of the Thatcher years.1 
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political parties. It has also been exported world-wide, posing enormous consequences for 
humankind. And not content with leaving a state of confusion in Christian social ethics in its 
wake, where the former ways of conducting theological-ethical enquiry are no longer trusted, 
it has encouraged a Christian justification of itself. 
OUTLINE OF ENQUIRY 
In the next chapter, given the confusion we have referred to above, it is important that 
we should begin our enquiry into the ethics of privatisation by setting out our method This is 
also necessary because of the wider confusion resulting from the challenges of modernity and 
post-modernity to Christian ethics. Here we encounter not only the now standard questions, such 
as how the Bible can be authoritative for Christian ethics, but also the more recent insistence 
mat, as everything is a matter of perspective, there is no way we can stand outside a particular 
moral tradition from which we can judge it to be right and all others to be wrong. In this 
postmodern light, for instance, provided they can argue consistently from some moral tradition, 
there may be no way of judging between Margaret Thatcher's view of privatisation as a triumph 
for the forces of freedom41 and that of Tony Benn, who judges privatisation to be "a plunder of 
national assets' . 4 2 Clearly, in this confused new world, i f we are to maintain any kind of integrity 
for our moral enquiry, it is essential mat we should come clean and show who' we' are and what 
is 'our working'.43 
Then, in Part I I of our thesis, because everything in this new world is understood to be 
a matter of perspective, in the hope of getting as close to what really happened as is possible, we 
shall tell the story of the great experiment of public ownership, as it was conducted in Britain, 
as a narrative history by drawing on the diverse perspectives of as many of the main characters 
as the scope of this study allows. In the course of assembling these perspectives, we shall pursue 
three main lines of enquiry: 
In chapter 3, The nationalisation programme (1945-51), we shall explore the political, 
economic and moral justification for the programme in order to identify the principal arguments 
used at the time for and against public ownership. As part of this study, we shall pay particular 
4 1 Thatcher, M. op.ch., p.676. 
a Plender, J. The Big Setoff (BBC, 26 January 1997). 
* Brown, M op.cit, p.298. 
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attention to the diverse Christian thinking of the time in the Social Christianity of William 
Temple, the Radical Christianity of Richard Tawney, and the Christian Conservatism of Hens! ey 
Henson. 
In chapter 4, The experience ofnationalisation (1951-79), we shall explore the negative 
case for privatisation, which claims that because the nationalised industries failed there was no 
practical alternative to privatisation. Here we shall be looking to determine how public 
ownership worked in practice along two main subsidiary lines of enquiry: The first is an 
economic and social evaluation of the performance of the nationalised industries. The second 
involves the public policy approach which attempts to discover to what extent it was possible 
to effectively regulate public enterprise. 
In chapter 5, The abandonment of nationalisation (1979-89), we shall explore the 
positive case for privatisation in the dominant intellectual framework of our time, economic 
liberalism. Here we shall show how economic liberalism came to capture' the Conservative 
party and to provide a justification for ending public ownership. In mis connection, we shall 
explore the influence of Right Wing think-tanks on the leadership of the party and also the part 
played by Selsdon Man, Edward Heath's proto-Thatcherism, which appeared to present the only 
hope of defeating the Labour Party's pragmatic socialism under Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan. In the course of this exploration, we shall identify the important economic liberal 
arguments used to justify privatisation as the basis for an evaluation of this case in the light of 
its own standards. 
In Part III , The Ethics of Privatisation, having at this stage indicated why we are not 
persuaded by either the negative case for privatisation, which claims public ownership failed, 
or the positive case for privatisation in economic liberalism, we shall evaluate privatisation in 
the light of a broad Christian vision of the common good Hence the title of this chapter, 
Privatisation and the Common Good As the basis for the evaluation, we shall first justify our 
choice of the two principles of social order and social justice. We shall also set out the 
traditional Christian understanding of property, which will inform the evaluation. We shall then 
apply these principles in dialogue with the relevant political, economic, and social circumstances 
in order to support our conclusion that privatisation is a morally flawed programme. 
Finally, as a postscript, in the brief space left us, on the understanding that in the context 
of the modem global market it is no longer practicable or necessarily desirable to restore public 
ownership, we shall outline A new Project. This looks to foster the common good by building 
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on the strengths of both nationalisation and privatisation while avoiding their weaknesses. 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
The literature on privatisation was something of a growth industry in the 1980s. The 
ferment in moral theology has also spawned a voluminous literature attempting to shed light on 
the subject As a consequence we have had to be selective and engage with the main books. The 
ones we have found especially helpful for the different parts of this inter-disciplinary enquiry 
are the following: 
PART L INTRODUCTION AND METHOD. 
Margaret Thatcher's The Downing Street Years (1993) is of course indispensable reading 
for the background to the 'major world revolution" which she led by her support for 
privatisation. A short, accessible introduction to privatisation is Kenneth Wiltshire's 
Privatisation, The British Experience (1987). For the impact of privatisation on British politics, 
Dieter Helm's The Economic Borders of the State (1989) is a useful text. Henry Clark's The 
Church Under Thatcher (1993) provides a general account of the somewhat confused response 
of the Church of England to Thatcherism. As we have indicated above, for the revival of 
Christian conservatism, which has greatly added to present state of confusion in Christian social 
ethics by its challenges to the previously dominant Social Christianity of William Temple's 
Christianity and Social Order (1942) and the Radical Christianity of Richard Tawney's classic, 
Religion and the rise of Capitalism (1926), the important texts are Edward Norman's Church 
and Society in England 1770 - 7970, Brian Griffiths' Morality and the Market Place (1982), and 
Michael Novak's The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982). 
For our chapter on method we have found Alisdair Maclntyre's corpus indispensable. 
His After Virtue (1981), with its communitarian critique of the Enlightenment project, presents 
a focal point in recent scholarship and has had a major impact on Christian Ethics. His 
development of a response to the problem of interminable disagreement in modern liberal 
society and his reinstatement of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in the sequels: Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? (1988) and Three Rival Versions of Rationality (1990) have provided the 
foundation for our approach. Of his many interlocutors, we have found Jeffrey Stout's Ethics 
After Babel (1988), with its more pluralistic and eclectic approach the most helpful. Our method 
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can be summarised as positioning itself between Maelntyse and Stout 
We have also drawn on a number of theological sources. The posfcConcMiar moral 
theology of John Maitoney, Richari MeCoraiick's emphasis of experience, and B a w d HSring's 
emphasis of responsibility, have provided a helpful balance to Maclntyire's conservatism. Our 
main source tare has been Mahoaey's The Making of Moral Theology (1987). Mahoney's 
inaugural lecture, The Ways of Wisdom (1987), with its strong defence of a natural theology, has 
also been valuable for our response to John Mlbank's Theology and Social Theory, Beyond 
Secular Reason (1990), and Michael Banner's dogmatic Christian ethics in his inaugural lecture 
Turning the world upside down (and some other tasks for dogmatic Christian ethics (1996). 
The main Anglican contributors to the dialogical method of Social Christianity have also 
informed our approach. Of these Alan Suggate's exposition of Temple's method in his William 
Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today (1987) has provided a major resource. John 
Atherton's Christianity and the Market, Christian social thought for our times (1992) has been 
helpful in its Christian encouragement to "live" provisionally in rival ethical traditions in order 
to learn their idiom and critique them from within. 
PART E A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF NATIONALISATION. 
For the background to the post-war nationalisation programme, Norman Chester's The 
Nationalisation of British Industry 1945-51 (1975) is indispensable. Bernard Porter's Britannia's 
Burden, The Political Evolution of Modern Britain 1851-1990 (1994) provides a helpful recent 
history. For the particular background to the Labour Party's adoption of Clause IV, Gareth 
Stedman Jones' article Labour can learn from Victorian values (199S) is useful for the way it 
sheds light on the electoral appeal of nationalisation, which, at least in this respect, makes it not 
mat dissimilar to privatisation. Herbert Morrison's Socialisation and Transport (1933), with its 
penetrating economic analysis provides the classic defence of nationalisation. For the diverse 
Christian social thought of the time, we have drawn on William Temple's Social Christianity, 
particularly his famous appendix in Christianity and Social Order (1942), R.H. Tawney's 
Radical Christianity, particularly his Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926), and Hensley 
Henson's Christian Conservatism, in his Gifford lectures, Christian Morality (1936). 
For our exploration of the experience of nationalisation (1951-79), in addition to the 
relevant reports of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries and the 
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Government White Papers, we have substantially drawn on the studies of Richard Pryke and 
Christopher Foster. Pryke's two studies of the economic performance of the nationalised 
industries: Public Enterprise in Practice (1971) and The Nationalised Industries, Policies and 
Performance since 1968 (1981) are important because Pryke revises his earlier optimistic view 
in the later book. Foster's public policy approach provides a helpful insider view of the 
complexity of public ownership, from the perspective of a senior civil servant His Politics, 
Finance and the Role of Economics (1971) is useful as a balance to the Select Committee's 
criticism of Government Ministers, whose interference they blame for the poor performance of 
nationalised industry. His later book, Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of 
Natural Monopoly (1992), written from the perspective of a post-privatisation world is important 
for its defence of the view that public ownership was reformable without a change of ownership. 
For the political and economic background to our chapter on the abandonment of 
nationalisation (1979=89), we have drawn extensively on the biography of Harold Wilson by Ben 
Pimlott and mat of Edward Heath by John Campbell. Richard Cockett's study, Thinking the 
Unthinkable, Think-tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983 (1994), provides 
an invaluable resource for tracing the revival of economic liberalism and its influence on the 
Conservative Party. John Gray's corpus is another valuable resource for understanding economic 
liberalism. We have drawn in particular on his critique in Beyond the New Right, Markets, 
Government and the Common Environment (1993). Of the many exponents of the economic 
liberal case for privatisation, we have found John Redwood's Popular Capitalism (1988) the 
most enlightened and challenging. John Vickers and George Yarrow's Privatization, An 
Economic Analysis (1989) is indispensable as a critical economic analysis. 
PART ffl. THE ETHICS OF PRIVATISATION. 
For the evaluative framework of our penultimate chapter, Privatisation and the Common 
Good, we have drawn substantially on John Firmis' exposition of the theory of the common good 
in his Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980). The teaching of the Catholic Bishops' 
Conference of England and Wales in their document, The Common Good (1996), provides a 
helpful supplementary source. L.T. Hobhouse, 'The Historical Evolution of Property in Fact and 
Idea' (first published in 1913), in Charles Gore ed, Property, Its Duties and Rights (1922) is 
still an indispensable text for the Christian understanding of property. 
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For the dialogue we set up between our broad Christian vision of the common good and 
the political, economic and social circumstances surrounding privatisation, we have found the 
discussion of globalization and the emergence of a new underclass in John Gray's False Dawn, 
the delusions of global capitalism (1998) an invaluable source. Stein Ringen's response to the 
current debate about class in his review article, The Great British Myth, Why the claims of 
continuing class inequality fail to take account ofsocial change (1998) provides an important 
critical perspective on social inequality. We have also found Christopher Rowland's Radical 
Christianity {19%%), Duncan Forrester's Theology and Politics (1988), and Oliver O'Donovan's 
The Desire of the Nations, Rediscovering the roots of political theology (1996), valuable 
theological sources for our critique of privatisation. 
For the new project we sketch in our postscript, we have found David Held's Democracy 
and the Global Order (1995), Anthony Giddens The Third Way (1998), and John De Gruchy's 
Christianity and Democracy (1995) important for our discussion of the renewal of civil society. 
For the debate over the Stakeholder Capitalism advocated by Will Hutton in his The State We 're 
In (1995), Gavin Kelly, Dominic Kelly, and Andrew Gamble ed., Stakeholder Capitalism 
(1997) is a basic text Lastly, for the section on regional and global governance, in addition to 
John Gray's False Dawn, which we have already mentioned, we have found Nicholas Boyle's 
Who Are We Know?, Christian Humanism and the Global Market from Hegel to Heaney (1998), 
an important resource. 
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Chapter 2 
ETHICS AS A PATCHWORK QUILT 
The tower of Babel, for all its antiquity, continues to exert its power over the 
imagination. Whenever we desire to penetrate the strangeness of alien speech 
or dispel the confusion of tongues, the image of the ruined tower recurs. 
(Jeffrey Stout) 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, in the tight of the confusion in Christian social 
ethics, it is important that we should 'come clean1 by revealing who 'we' are and what is 'our 
working'. However, immediately we attempt to set out our method, we encounter all the 
challenges of modernity and post-modernity which defy us to give a rational account of our 
choice of an ethic and to defend our moral judgements against other perspectives. As we also 
mentioned, these challenges are especially highlighted by the issue of privatisation because 
privatisation is defended and attacked in terms of rival, incommensurable ethical traditions. 
Indeed, the rival ethical pronouncements people make about privatisation makes it an especially 
apposite example of this problematic. Despite the heat of the public debate, there appears to be 
no compelling reason why one side should give way to the other, for both appear to ground then-
case in seemingly impregnable moral argument 
This crisis in ethics, which is at least as old as the Sophists of classical Greece, has been 
highlighted in recent years by a number of scholars, of which Alasdair Maclntyre is a leading 
figure. In his A Short History of Ethics (1967), he explains the present crisis as the outcome of 
the indrvidualism unleashed by the Reformation and the Enlightenment search for a secular basis 
for ethics in a universal reason. He claims these have combined to replace the unitary moral 
tradition of medieval Catholicism by a 'number of well integrated moralities'. As he describes 
the 'fundamental moral situation of our society: 
1 Stout, J. Ethics After Babel, The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (James Clark: 
Cambridge, 1988), p. 1. 
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Between the adherents of rival moralities and between the adherents of one 
morality and the adherents of none there exists no court of appeal, no 
impersonal neutral standard. For those who speak from within a given morality, 
the connection between fact and valuation is established in terms of the meaning 
of the words they use. To those who speak from without, those who speak from 
within appear to be merely uttering imperatives which express their own liking 
and their private choices.2 
This, some would say, very pessimistic view of our moral situation was further defended 
in Maclntyre's After Virtue (1981). In this widely acclaimed book he went on to reveal that his 
disenchantment with modem liberal society is matched by his disillusionment with its arch rival, 
Marxism. This posed for him a dilemma for the reason that Stalinism, which he had come to 
understand as the inevitable outworking of Marxism, seemed only capable of being rebutted by 
the arguments of liberal individualism, which Marx had already discredited This impasse, 
together with his understanding of the moral predicament of liberal society, forced him to draw 
the radical conclusion that the only way forward and out of the confusion in Ethics required the 
rejection of the ethos of the distinctively modern and modernizing world',3 of which Marxism 
and liberalism are by-products, and the recovery of the classical and medieval tradition of the 
virtues which the Enlightenment project had sought to replace. 
The sequels to After Virtue , namely, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) and 
Three Rival Versions Of Moral Enquiry (1990) provide elaboration and development of 
Maclntyre's thinking. In what follows, drawing for the most part from his latest book, we shall 
first set out what for our purposes are the main lines of his seminal and hugely influential 
project4 Secondly, we shall consider some of the main criticisms of this project, and a number 
of alternative projects, which we think need to be brought alongside of it. Then, with this 
background, we shall give the reasons why we think Maclntyre's defence of the Thomist ethical 
tradition, with some qualifications, offers the best resource we have for our enquiry into the 
ethics of privatisation. 
2 Maclntyre, A. A Short History of Ethics (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1967), p.266. 
3 Maclntyre, A. After Virtue, a study in moral theory (Duckworth: London, 1981/1990), p.x. 
4 For Maclntyre's influence on Christian ethics see further Hauerwas, S. Community of Character, toward a 
constructive Christian social ethic (Notre Dame: Indiana, 1981). And see also Bayer, 0. and Suggate, A. ed., 
Worship and Ethics, Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1996). p.24-25. 
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MACINTYME'S PROJECT 
Maclntyre begins his project of reinstating the pre-modern tradition of the virtues by 
drawing on a life-time of study and teaching of me history of moral philosophy to show that the 
Enlightenment project has failed. For him the' crucial historical event' was the proclamation of 
what G.E. Moore, in his Principia Ethica (1903), called the 'naturalistic fallacy': the 'No 
"ought" conclusion from "is" premises' principle. This is usually linked with Hume, who 
certainly expressed it as a doubt in his Treatise: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning when of a sudden I am surpris'd to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses 
some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and 
explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it 3 
What the enunciation of mis principle and its general acceptance signalled for Maclntyre 
was not only a final break with the classical tradition',6 but also the 'epitaph to the 
Enlightenment project'7 As he explains its destructive impact with respect to the classical 
tradition, this worked with a functionalist understanding of man as having a meaning and a 
purpose which was crucially defined in relation to a set of socially established roles: 'member 
of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant of God'.8 This teleology gave a rational basis 
for statements of value based on statements of fact because the good man was accepted to be one 
who fulfilled the roles he was called on to perform. It followed that within 'this tradition moral 
and evaluative statements can be called true or false in precisely the way in which all factual 
statements can be so called. But once the notion of essentially human purposes or functions 
disappears from morality, it begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgements as factual 
statements.'9 
5 Quoted in Flew A. ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy (Pan: London, 1979; mis ed. 1984), p.240. 
* After Virtue, p.59. 
7 Ibid., p.56. 
'Ibid., p.59. 
'Ibid., p.59. 
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With respect to the Enlightenment project, Maclntyre maintains that the progress of 
analytic philosophy has confirmed the failure of what the is - ought distinction made implausible 
by establishing that 'there are no grounds for belief in universal necessary principles - outside 
purely formal enquiries - except relative to some set of assumptions. Cartesian first principles, 
Kantian a priori truths and even the ghosts of these notions that haunted empiricism for so long 
have all been expelled from philosophy/10 There is not the space here to report tins progress in 
relation to his detailed critique of the Enlightenment thinkers he calls encyclopaedists, who 
attempted to found ethics on universal rational first principles after Descartes, 'for whom the 
essence of rationality was that it should be universal.'11 In any case, repeating his detailed 
critique of each of these thinkers may not be necessary in so far as the disagreements amongst 
them, which has resulted in the emergence of liberalism as a moral tradition, provides a 
powerful argument in support of his claim that the Enlightenment project has failed. As he 
makes this supporting argument: 
Yet the thinkers of the Enlightenment and their successors proved unable to 
agree as to what precisely those principles were which would be found 
undeniable by all rational persons. One kind of answer was given by the authors 
of the Encyclopedic, a second by Rousseau, a third by Bentham, a fourth by 
Kant, a fifth by the Scottish philosophers of common sense and their French and 
American disciples. Nor has subsequent history diminished such disagreement. 
It has rather enlarged it. Consequently the legacy of the Enlightenment has been 
the provision of an ideal of rational justification which it has proved impossible 
to attain.12 
Having rejected the Enlightenment project, Maclntyre then advances his alternative 
project of the virtues. He explains that this mode of moral enquiry was initiated by Plato in the 
tradition of Socratic dialectic in the Georgias and the Republic. Its recovery in modern times he 
traces to the encouragement of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in the encyclical letter of Pope 
Leo XHJ, Aeterni Patris (1879). He also acknowledges a massive personal debt to John Henry 
Newman's account of tradition in his An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1878). 
What, in essence, his reconstruction of these sources does is to conceive ethics as a 
1 0 Ibid., p.266. 
1 1 Maclntyre, A. Three Rival Versions of Rationality (Duckworth: London, 1990), p. 59. 
a Maclntyre, A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality (Duckworth: London, 1988), p.6. 
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craft-tradition, which, in contrast with the 'exclusive and exhaustive alternatives'13 posed by 
encyclopaedia and its critics, who he calls genealogists, initially accepts the authority of a moral 
community and learns from the experience of the past in order to 'progress towards a genuinely 
universal and impersonal reason'.14 
The concept of a craft or a practice is crucial to the success of this project. By a practice 
he means: 'any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that 
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended'.15 In the light of this 
definition, Maclntyre would include as examples such complex social activities as a game of 
chess, a school, the polis or city-state, which was the historical context for Aristotle's ethics, and 
of course moral philosophy. This concept enables Maclntyre to escape the criticism that the 
Aristotelian tradition, which he champions, is grounded in the ethics of the Athenian city state, 
a project which cannot conceivably be revived today. Furthermore, by employing the concept 
of a craft, he distances his reconstruction from any proto-scientific theory of the human telos, 
such as Aristotle's metaphysical biology, the abuse of which in the natural law tradition he 
acknowledges partly led to the Enlightenment reaction against the tradition of the virtues.16 
The virtues then follow from this definition of a craft Drawing on Aristotle, for whom 
the virtues were defined socially and ideologically as those attributes, such as courage, 
friendship, and practical reason, which allow a citizen to contribute to the flourishing of the 
polis, Maclntyre's virtues are those human qualities which allow a person to contribute to the 
ends of a craft In his own words, they are those human qualities 'the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack 
of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods'.17 For example, strategic 
thinking in a chess player counts as a virtue because it is required to achieve excellence in the 
game of chess. Self-promotion, on the other hand, does not count as a virtue, even though this 
quality may succeed in making the player a millionaire, because a million pounds is not a good 
13 Three Rival Versions, p.59 
u Ibid., p.60. 
"After Virtue, p. 187. 
1 6 See further Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. Liberals andCommunitarians (Blackwell: Oxford, 1992), p.80 ff 
17 After Virtue., p. 178. 
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internal to chess but one that is external to i t 
Accordingly, with ethics conceived as a craft, just as any chess player has to begin by 
accepting the established rules of chess, so it is expected of participants that they will begin by 
accepting the rules of moral enquiry of a particular moral community. This entails the 
recognition, or at least initial recognition, of a rational teaching authority. As Maclntyre puts 
it, we have 'to learn from that teacher and initially accept on the basis of his or her authority 
within the community of a craft precisely what intellectual and moral habits it is which we must 
cultivate and acquire i f we are to become effective self-moved participants in such enquiry/18 
Consequently, the master teacher, who has acquired the virtues and the expertise, the techne to 
instruct others how to take the tradition further, plays a fundamental role in this form of moral 
enquiry; no valid claim to progress can be made without first engaging as a participant with his 
or her teaching. 
Maclntyre justifies this positive view of authority, which is out of step with the anti° 
authoritarian outlook of modernity and post-modernity,19 on account of his understanding of 
human nature. Here he follows Plato who taught that 'it is a precondition of engaging in rational 
enquiry through the method of dialectic that one should already possess and recognize certain 
moral virtues without which the cooperative process of dialectic would be impossible'.20 As 
Maclntyre explains, 'A prior commitment is required and the conclusions which emerge as 
enquiry progresses will of course have been partially and crucially predetermined by the nature 
of this initial commitment'21 Furthermore, and this is crucial for understanding Maclntyre's 
anthropology, he points out that 'the enquirer has to learn how to make him or herself into a 
particular kind of person i f he or she is to move towards a knowledge of the truth about his or 
her good and about the human good. What kind of transformation is required? It is that which 
is involved in making oneself into an apprentice to a craft, the craft in this case of philosophical 
enquiry.'22 In other words, only those persons who are prepared to make a prior commitment to 
11 Three Rival Versions, p.63 
1 9 Ibid., p. 64, Maclntyre describes genealogy as having 'no way of understanding such authority except as one 
more form of domination imperfectly disguised by its mask of rationality, a mask necessarily worn with a self-
distorting lack of self-knowledge.' (p 66) His deferential attitude towards authority also contrasts with 
encyclopaedia, which he points out is similarly opposed to recognising the role of a teaching authority because it 
has 'learned from Kant that to be rational is to think for oneself, to emancipate oneself from the tutelage of 
authority.' 
"Ibid., p.60. 
2 1 Ibid., p.60 
n Ibid., pp.60 -61. 
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a particular moral community and who are willing to submit to a teaching authority in order to 
gain the necessary virtues qualify to engage in moral enquiry. 
Maclntyre's second main line of defence against the charge of conservataa is his theory 
of a moral tradition. Essentially what he claims here is that a moral tradition can lbs developed 
in a rational way by the progressive development and connection of both the virtues it recognises 
and the standards of rational justification it employs to judge virtue. By way of illustration he 
explains mat a moral tradition can be developed in a rational way that corresponds with how 
progress is made in modem science, arguably the most powerful of our modern systems of 
rationality, where it is always theoretically possible to correct or build on existing knowledge. 
Consequently, while acknowledging mat such an ethics must be historically contingent, he does 
not allow that the standards of rational justification and the virtues thus set are fixed in the past 
or decided arbitrarily, because, while they are always decided in relation to previous theory, just 
as in modern science, they are always open to correction in the light of new moral insights. As 
he explains: 
the standards of achievement within any craft are justified historically...They 
have emerged from the criticism of their predecessors and they are justified 
because and in so far as they have remedied the defects and transcended the 
limitations of those predecessors as guides to excellent achievement within that 
particular craft. Every craft is informed by some conception of a finally 
perfected work which serves as the shared tolas of that craft. And what are 
actually produced as the best judgements or actions or objects so far are judged 
so because they stand in some determinate relationship to that telos which 
furnishes them with their final cause.21 
It follows from mis understanding of a moral tradition that, while Maclntyre expects of 
participants that they begin as apprentices, he hopes they will progress to the level of a master 
craftsman when they will have gained the techne or expertise to take their craft further i f either 
its standards of rationality or the virtues it recognises stand in need of correction. For example, 
he refers to the way Aristotle disregarded women and slaves in his ethics for the reason that they 
were not in a position to contribute to decisions affecting the polls. He comments that while this 
omission was understandable it was not morally justifiable, and that in this respect it was 
necessary for the Aristotelian tradition to be corrected and developed in the light of the 
Ibid., p.64. 
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universalism of the Christian tradition.24 
Maclntyre's project would further claim to escape the charge of conservatism on account 
of its understanding of what makes for a moral tradition that is in good order. This is a tradition 
which is not in epistemological crisis. He again illustrates what he means in relation to the 
natural sciences. There Newton's physics exposed the limitations of the physics of Galileo, 
forcing the latter to give way, as more recently Newton's physics has had to give way to more 
recent advances, such as relativity theory. It follows that a moral tradition in good order is one 
which is fully open to the challenges of rival traditions and either has the resources to dismiss 
rivals or integrate them within its own enlarged story. Maclntyre would maintain that the 
adherents of such a moral tradition are perfectly rationally entitled to stay with it until they are 
presented with a better. 
It is on mis understanding of moral enquiry conceived as a craft tradition that Maclntyre 
advances his solution to the problem posed by incommensurable moral traditions, thereby 
providing a way out of the interminable disagreement in ethics. Just as it is possible to 
demonstrate the rational superiority of Newton's physics over that of Galileo, so, he argues, it 
may be possible to demonstrate the rational superiority of a particular moral tradition by 
subjecting rival and incommensurable traditions to the test of whether they contain a systematic 
and coherent development of their foundational ideas such that, judged by their own standards, 
they offer a better resolution of their difficulties than do their rivals.23 
Maclntyre's exemplar here is Aquinas, who at the University of Paris in the thirteenth 
century was himself presented by the dilemma of incommensurable ethical traditions posed by 
the University Augustinian tradition, with its derivation of ethics from divine wisdom, and the 
recent re-discovery of Aristotelianism, with its derivation of ethics from human wisdom. As 
Maclntyre explains, what Aquinas was faced with was not merely two rival arguments but rather 
two rival traditions; each one shared the characteristics that it had a particular historical point 
of departure, had come to be developed in the face of challenges brought about by some 
theoretical or practical questioning, it looked back and justified itself in terms of its development 
out of earlier stages, and it had come to be preserved in a distinct institutional form. 2 6 Aquinas' 
signal achievement, according to Maclntyre, is that he, alone among the students of Albertus 
u After Virtue, p. 7. 
25B>id>p.5. 
26 Three Rival Versions., p. 116. 
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Magnus who had made the new Aristotelian corpus available to his students, was able to live 
within both traditions, thoroughly master their idiom, and to overcome each of their difficulties 
in a new synthesis. In defence of his theory against the argument that rival incommensurable 
traditions, on account of the problem of recognising them to be such, must perforce be an 
illusion, he writes of a person such as Aquinas: 
It can only be recognized and characterized by someone who inhabits both 
alternative conceptual schemes, who knows and is able to utter the idiom of 
each from within, who has become, so to speak, a native speaker of two first 
languages, each with its own distinctive conceptual idiom. Such a person does 
not need to perform the tasks of translation in order to understand. Rather it is 
on the basis of his or her understanding of both conceptual idioms that the 
respects in which untranslatability presents barriers around or over which no 
way can be discovered can be acknowledged. Such persons are rarely numerous. 
They are the inhabitants of boundary situations, generally incurring the suspicion 
and misunderstanding of members of both of the contending parties.27 
How Aquinas achieved his complex reconciliation can only be sketched here. According 
to Maclntyre it involved firstly, the interplay of retrospective and prospective reasoning, which 
he explains 'cannot but be dialectical, exploratory, inventive, and provisional, formulating 
hypotheses as it moves towards a new set of first principles and fundamental conceptions'.28 
Secondly, it involved the power of imagination, a reminder that any ethics worth anything is 
always also a work of art in which abroad vision shapes and is shaped by the artist's engagement 
with the detail of his work. In this connection, he comments that, 'It is by such uses of the 
imagination that one can come as i f to inhabit another alien culture and in so doing recognize 
how significant features of one's own culture to which one has hitherto been, and could not but 
have been, blind can be discovered and characterized from that other culture's point of view1.29 
Finally, Maclntyre maintains that crucial to the whole reconciliation was the fact that the 
Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions shared a fallibilist conception of moral enquiry within 
a larger metaphysics. This understood truth, not as 'warranted assertability1, which would prevent 
the imaginative leap into a rival tradition to explore the possibility of truth lying between two 
positions, but rather as a metaphysical reality from which all other derivative truths flow and that 
2 7 Ibid., p. 114. 
2 8 Ibid., p. 120. 
2 9 Ibid., p. 120. 
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' it is from the derivative that we have to begin'.30 As he describes this achievement: 
an Aristotelian account of nature, both theoretical and practical, was not merely 
harmonized with an Augustinian supernatural theology but shown to require it 
for its completion, if the universe is to be intelligible in the way in which parts 
relate to wholes. And Augustine's account of the relationship of the human 
being, as natural intelligence and agent, to the objects of enquiry, both 
theoretical and practical, was rendered in terms of distinctions unfamiliar to the 
tradition of Augustinian textual interpretation, so that Aristotle's account of the 
rational world became recognizably the prologue required for an Augustinian 
theology.31 
Despite his conversion to Thomism, Maclntyre holds back from making any triumphant 
claim that Thomism has defeated its rivals in encyclopaedia and genealogy. He regards the 
disagreements between mem as still' struggles in progress'. As he puts this conclusion himself, 
'It is therefore the case that in the tripartite hostilities between the heirs of encyclopaedia, post-
Nietzschean genealogy, and Thomistic tradition neither argument nor conflict is yet terminated. 
These are struggles in progress, defining in key part the contemporary cultural milieu by the 
progress of their dissensions'.32 In this reserve, he follows Aquinas by never asserting more for 
his position man that it is the best position yet; there is always the possibility that it can be 
bettered, and therefore mere is every incentive not to foreclose debate, and to remain in dialogue 
with other traditions. 
Nevertheless, despite his acknowledgement of the inconclusive nature of the present 
debates within Ethics, he is clearly firmly of the opinion that it is possible for the Aristotelian-
Thomist tradition to include its rivals within its unified narrative history in such a way that it 
avoids having to give way to them. As he sees it, mis narrative includes encyclopaedia by 
describing it as having been founded on an understandable reaction to the abuse of the natural 
law and the mistake that it is possible to discover a universal reason. It then includes genealogy 
as a reaction to the rational pretensions of encyclopaedia. In this connection he contrasts the 
narrative structure of encyclopaedia, which 'is one dictated by the progress of reason'33 and that 
of genealogy whose 'narrative is designed to disclose what its authors take the encyclopaedists 
"Ibid., p. 122. 
"Ibid., p. 123. 
3 2 Ibid., p.215. 
»Ibid., p.78. 
Ethics as a Patchwork Quilt 32 
narrative to conceal'34 with what he would clearly see as the superior narrative of the craft-
tradition. This he explains: 'treats the past neither as mere prologue nor as something to he 
struggled against, but as that from which we have to learn i f we are to identify and move towards 
our selos more adequately and that which we have to put to the question i f we are to know which 
questions we ourselves should next formulate and attempt to answer, both theoretically and 
practically'.35 
Emerging out of this response to the present crisis in Ethics, what Maclntyre's Thomism 
offers our modern world as a practical ethical programme has variously been labelled as 
communitarian. This derives from the essentially social interpretation of the virtues embodied 
in the definition of a craft or practice as a social activity and in the understanding of the self as 
supported in its self-identity by the social inheritance preserved in a tradition.36 Doubtless, were 
it possible, Maclntyre would want to resurrect the project of the Athenian city state, suitably 
modified to include the Christian virtues, or Christendom. It is not surprising therefore that he 
is deeply pessimistic about the role of the modern liberal state, with what he claims to be its 
encouragement of an asocial and emotivist self, which lacks any rational criteria for choosing 
between conflicting moral positions, and, despite its professed moral neutrality, its far from 
neutral conception of the human good. In After Virtue, this social pessimism led him to 
advocate, in the stark apocalyptic terms which must account for part of the impact of the book, 
mat in the light of the exhaustion of Marxism and every other political tradition in our culture, 
mere is now no ahemative but to turn our backs on the state and to begin the task of constructing 
'local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be 
sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.'37 
Not surprisingly, the apocalyptic message of After Virtue, was to provoke a vigorous 
response. After the initial widespread acclaim, Maclntyre's moral philosophy has been subjected 
to searching criticisms which have left his approach to the problem of interminable disagreement 
in ethics looking more vulnerable than it first appeared; certainly his sequels have been less 
favourably received. At the more superficial level he has been accused of improper exegesis of 
his texts and historical inaccuracy.38 At the more serious level, he has been criticised for 
3 4 Ibid., p. 79. 
3 5 Ibid., p.79. 
3 4 See further MulhalL S. and Swift, A. op.cit., p.89 ff. 
37 After Virtue, p.263, 
M See further Song, R 'Alasdair Maclntyre and the Gifford Lectures' in Edinburgh Review: 85, 1991. 
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exaggerating the level of moral disagreement in Western society and, as a consequence, of 
painting a too pessimistic picture of the new 'dark ages'. As we have mentioned above, for 
pursuing the question of whether there is a good for man and claiming to find the answer in an 
authoritative tradition, he is also criticised for encouraging a communitarianism which threatens 
the repression of many of the hard-won individual freedoms of modern liberal society, which 
wants to keep open the question. This criticism becomes the more serious to the extent mat his 
theory of traditions is vulnerable to the criticism that it collapses into the liberalism he reacts 
against David Fergusson, for one, has shown the considerable convergence between Maclntyre's 
communitarianism and liberalism in the extent to which his theory of traditions relies on the 
values of tolerance and reasoned disagreement that occupy so central a place in liberalism.39 In 
a similar vein, John Milbank has argued mat Maclntyre represents no better than a mild version 
of the Enlightenment project, because his theory of traditions relies on the dialectical method 
of reasoning and is therefore a form of liberalism with its roots in and beyond Aristotle in 
Socrates.40 
In addition to these criticisms there is the explicit or implied criticism of those who are 
not ready to concede to Maclntyre that the Enlightenment project has failed. The supporters of 
John Rawls' celebrated A Theory of Justice (1972) present one such set Soon after its 
publication this book was hailed as having broken the chains of analytical philosophy that had 
prevented philosophers from making any substantial contribution to political philosophy in this 
century.41 Since then it has come to be regarded as 'the paradigm statement of contemporary 
liberal theory' . n One reason for this acclaim is that it presents an alternative to one of the most 
enduring eighteenth and nineteenth century moral theories, that of utilitarianism.43 Another 
reason for Rawls' following is that his theory appears to offer a credible liberal response to 
aspects of the Marxist critique of liberal capitalist society, which many, including Maclntyre, 
" See further Fergusson, D. Communitarianism and Liberalism: Towards a Convergence, in Studies in Christian 
Ethics, Vol. 10, No. 1. (T&T. Clark: Edinburgh, 1997). 
4 0 See further Milbank, J. Theology and Social Theory, Beyond Secular Reason (Blackwell: Oxford, 1990), 
p.329. ff. 
4 1 See further Mahoney, J Teaching Business Ethics in the UK, Europe and the USA, A Comparative Study, 
(Athlone: London, 1990), p.7. 
4 2 See further Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. op.cit, p. vii. 
4 3 Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1972), p.3. Utilitarianism has been discredited 
on account of the way it can be used to justify the suppression of the rights of minorities in the interests of 
maximising total welfare, or as Rawls puts this criticism, 'justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made 
right by a greater good shared by others' 
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would soil want to affirm.4 4 
Another celebrated book, following close on the heels of A Theory ofJustice was Robert 
Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). This libertarian critique of Rawls is regarded by 
Nozick's supporters as the classical defence of liberalism. Against Rawls, in opposition to the 
idea that fairness or equality is intrinsically linked with the idea of justice, he asserts an 
entitlement theory of justice in which individual rights are foundational. As we shall explore 
later in chapter 5, this procedural view of justice, which excludes the traditional notion of justice 
as desert, which we also find, amongst others, in Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, has 
provided a libertarian defence of the New Right Although perhaps less widely acclaimed than 
Rawls's egalitarianism, there is no denying the persistence of this kind of liberalism, the 
importance of its emphasis of individual freedom and personal responsibility, and the way it 
tends to be resorted to at times of economic decline. 
More critical of the Enlightenment project but still not ready to reject liberalism per se 
is Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self (\9B9). Commenting on the polarised positions taken up 
in recent debates, he writes: 
Some are upbeat, and see us as having climbed to a higher plateau; others show 
a picture of decline, of loss, of forgetfulness. Neither sort seems to me right; 
both ignore massively important features of our situation. We have yet to 
capture, I think, the unique combination of greatness and danger, of grandeur 
et misere, which characterize the modern age.'45 
Despite this more conciliatory view of modernism, there is considerable convergence 
between Taylor's project and mat of Maclntyre. Indeed, Taylor is clearly indebted to Macintyre 
as he takes up many of his central ideas to produce what can be read as a communitarian critique 
of liberalism. This begins with a notion of the self which, in agreeing with Jurgen Habermas' 
idea of the self being 'constituted through exchange in language',46 and therefore as crucially 
dependent on a particular linguistic community, is close to Maclntyre's understanding of the 
self in relation to a tradition. Taylor also employs Maclntyre's notion of a person's self-identity 
as being worked out in relation to a substantive theory of the good and a narrative quest He also 
shares the goal of practical reasoning as providing us with the best or most plausible account 
4 4 See further After Virtue, p.262. 
4 5 Taylor, C. Sources of the &//• (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989), p. ix-x. 
4 6 Ibid., p.509. 
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of moral reasoning and accepts Maclntyre's theory of the development of a moral tradition. He 
also repeats much of Maclntyre's critique of genealogy, principally its incoherent view of the 
self, of which we shall have more to say later. 
However, there are a number of major differences. The chief one has to do with 
naturalism, with its foundations built on the arguments against the 'naturalistic fallacy'. This 
theory, which is at the heart of all the subjectivist or non-realist ethical projects, makes all moral 
values to be the mere projection of our preferences into a morally neutral world As we have 
noted above, Maclntyre accepted the arguments against the' naturalistic fallacy' as marking not 
only the final break with the classical tradition but also the epitaph to the Enlightenment project. 
For Taylor, this is false move. In order to circumvent the hold naturalism has on modern life, 
which he puts down to the illusion and error whereby natural science models have gained an 
ascendancy over other models of reality, he advances a theory of morality which is founded on 
instinctual spiritual and moral intuitions, such as respect for human life. These intuitions, he 
claims, are as real a part of the natural world as any other part of it; they are as objective as the 
reaction of, say, nausea to an unpleasant meal. In defence of this view, he points to the way they 
invariably elicit a moral theory or an ontology and, as such, stand in some objective sense over 
against the individual. Furthermore, against the idea of an autonomous self, which is held to have 
the power to choose its moral orientation independently of a particular community and whose 
choices can be held to be the mere expression of subjective preference, Taylor argues that to 
conceive of the self as separate from an independently existing moral and social space, which 
provides an essential part of a person's identity or capacity for self-interpretation, is as 
unrealistic as denying the extent to which a person's identity is affected by physical space, in the 
sense that without a clearly worked out idea of up and down, right and left, the individual would 
be without essential bearings with which to negotiate life. With this view of the status of 
spiritual and moral intuitions and of the self as crucially dependent on a moral map, Taylor can 
claim that the articulation of these intuitions in a moral theory or ontology does not amount to 
a mere fiction, as the naturalists would have it, but rather provides the basis for a rational 
discussion of truth claims from which, in opposition to procedural theories of the right, it is 
perfectly plausible to defend a substantive theory of the good. Linking this foundationalism with 
his critique of genealogy, he would doubtless claim for his project, with its three axes of respect 
for human life, what makes for the good life, and what constitutes human dignity, the most 
plausible or the best account of morality yet 
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The second crucial difference between Taylor and Maclntyre, as we have noted above, 
is that while the latter despairs of the claims of modernity, the former is more hopeful that 
modernity can be redeemed, provided its central claims' can be detached from various erroneous 
or incoherent ways of elucidating or defending them."47 In support of this view of what he calls 
the 'cramped' or 'spiritually lobotomised' theories of modernity, Taylor argues that all liberal 
theories have implicit or suppressed strong moral ideals, such as freedom, altruism, and 
universalism, which provide the motivation for their moral theory. However, the very nature of 
these 'hypergoods' or' strong evaluation', by which he means those foundational values which 
allow for a relative ranking of a range of other goods or the denial of other hypergoods, drives 
the theorist to attempt to keep them out of the way on account of all the criticism of substantive 
theories of the good. As a result he claims that: 
They are caught in a strange pragmatic contradiction, whereby the very goods 
which move them push them to deny or denature all such goods. They are 
constitutionally incapable of coming clean about the deeper sources of their own 
thinking. Their thought is inescapably cramped.41 
The point of Taylor's criticism of liberal theories is best elucidated in relation to two 
prominent theories, utilitarianism and Rawls' theory of justice. In the case of utilitarianism, 
Taylor argues that its implicit or suppressed hypergood is the affirmation of ordinary life; this 
he claims modernity has rightly asserted against the hypergoods of past ages, such as the 
celebration of the hero in the Homeric age or the primacy of philosophy in Aristotetialism and 
the spiritual in Christianity, over other more ordinary human pursuits, such as the family. In 
Rawls' case, Taylor points out that, although Rawls claims they are not necessary for the 
development of his theory, he acknowledges the importance of intuitions by agreeing that we 
recognize his two principles of justice 'are indeed acceptable principles of justice because they 
fit with our intuitions.'49 He then draws on Michael Sandel's critique of Rawls to argue that 
were we to articulate what lies behind these basic intuitions,' we would start spelling out a very 
thick theory of the good...The theory of justice which starts from a thin theory of the good turns 
out to be a theory which keeps its most basic insights inarticulate'.90 
Taylor, therefore, both in his own moral theory and in his response to other liberal 
4 7 MuQiall, S. and Swift, A. op.ctt., p. 101. 
48 Sources of the Self, p.88. 
4 9 Ibid., p.89. 
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projects, is still hopeful that through a process of retrieval and rearticulation of the moral goods 
suppressed, it may be possible to rejuvenate the Enlightenment quest, which, mired in the 
present state of confusion, has lost its power to inspire the moral life. Significantly, however, 
he ends his book by linking his hope to Judeo-Christian theism, with its 'central promise of a 
divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain unaided.'51 
Mention should also be made of those who continue to defend a universal basis for the 
natural law in the first principles of practical reasoning. John Finnis, for instance, claims for his 
impressive reconstruction of the natural law tradition that his arguments do not appeal to the 
' authority of any person or body' but' stand or fall by their own reasonableness or otherwise.'52 
In this confidence he insists mat scepticism about a basic form of the human good knowledge 
is indefensible, and he proceeds to deduce seven basic forms of good in all. Another noteworthy 
reconstruction of the natural law is that of Keith Ward. He bases his ethics in an argument 
derived from the Kantian notion of value. From this foundation he asserts that there is a 
universal value system overlaid by diverse cultural forms, which can be unearthed by inspecting 
all existing sets of values and seeing what they have in common. And, not unlike Finnis, Ward 
would argue that it is indefensible to be sceptical about the notion of value because all people 
have desires and, because some are felt to be stronger man others, values emerge as soon as 
choices have to be made.33 
In addition to these recent leading theorists, all of whom can be described as 
foundationalists, on account of their claim to have founded their ethics on a universal reason, 
those who have accepted that this project is no longer possible and yet who proceed to defend 
a political or pragmatic form of liberalism also deserve mention. Jeffrey Stout is a good example 
because he engages directly with Maclntyre. While sharing many of Maclntyre's criticisms of 
the Enlightenment project, he nevertheless claims that Maclntyre has exaggerated the level of 
moral disagreement in modern liberal society. He further denies that Aquinas achieved anything 
more than moral bricolage or the 'selective retrieval and reconfiguration of available moral 
languages.'54 This he claims any good modern ethicist must resort to, given our 'babel* of moral 
languages, which reflect the multiple social practices and institutions of the modern, pluralistic 
"Ibid., p.521. 
5 2 Finnis, J. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980), p.vi. 
5 3 See further, Ward, K. A Vision to Pursue, Beyond the Crisis in Christianity (SCM: London, 1991), p. 181 ff. 
5 4 Stout, J. Ethics After Babel, the languages of morals and their discontents (James Clark: Cambridge, 1988), 
p.76. 
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society. 
Using Maclntyre's categories, Stout defends this alternative understanding of our current 
moral situation on similar lines to that of Michael Walzer,55 by claiming mat each of our moral 
languages has evolved in response to the need to express the distinctive virtues of the social 
practice to which it relates. As a consequence, he argues that the diversity of moral languages 
is necessary and does not mean that there is no moral consensus in modem liberal society. On 
the contrary, this he believes is united in opposition to a religious vision of the human good on 
account of the religious wars that seem inevitably to follow. As he points out,' Where Maclntyre 
sees the social embodiment of emotivism, I see implicit commitment to a provisional, self-
limiting conception of the good. This commitment helps explain, as Maclntyre's view does not, 
why people of various philosophical and religious persuasions are so reluctant to discard the 
arrangements, institutions, and vocabularies we have'.* Stout concludes by opting for a form 
of pragmatic liberalism, derived from John Dewey and Henry James and championed today by, 
among others, Richard Rorty. As he summarises this eclectic project, with which we are in 
considerable sympathy: 
Our task, like Thomas Aquinas's, Thomas Jefferson's, or Martin Luther King's, 
is to take the many parts of a complicated social and conceptual inheritance and 
stitch them together into a pattern that meets the needs of the moment. It has 
never been otherwise. The creative intellectual task of every generation, in other 
words, involves moral bricolage. It is no accident that Aquinas, Jefferson, and 
King were as eclectic as they were in using moral languages - and no shame 
either.57 
There is therefore a substantial body of ethicists who disagree fundamentally with 
Maclntyre's project and whose criticisms and alternative projects deserve to be brought and held 
alongside that of Maclntyre. Nevertheless, along with many others, we recognise Maclntyre as 
the teacher with whom every new scholar must engage if he or she is to master the craft of moral 
theology and hope to take it further, he has certainly had an immense impact on Christian ethics 
and, with his conversion to Thomism, his project has provided a bridge between philosophy and 
theology which has opened up the possibility for modem Christians to rediscover their past For 
mis reason we find him a much more fruitful philosopher to engage with than, for example, a 
" See further his Spheres of Justice: A defence of Pluralism and Equality (Blackwell: Oxford, 1983). 
5 6 Ibid., p.238. 
"Ibid., p.292. 
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philosopher such as Habermas, who may well have a theology lurking in his thought, but for 
whom theology is now deemed marginal." Furthermore, without necessarily accepting the 
whole of Maclntyre's thesis, because of its vulnerability to some of the criticisms and rival 
projects mentioned above, we are in broad agreement with his analysis of the moral predicament 
of modem liberal society and the method he sets out for the resolution of the problem posed by 
incommensurable ethical traditions.59 With some qualifications, we are also in agreement with 
his defence of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition as the 'best example we possess of a tradition 
whose adherents are rationally entitled to a high measure of confidence in its epistemological 
and moral resources'.60 We shall now give the main reasons for this agreement as we comment 
on the three coordinates of Maclntyre's method: human wisdom, the Christian revelation, and 
rival moral traditions: 
HUMAN WISDOM 
Rightly, to our mind, Maclntyre locates the point of departure for ethics in the historical 
situatedness of a craft-tradition, rather man in abstract first principles of reason. Here we follow 
him in his acceptance of the force of the naturalist arguments, which make it implausible to 
treat statements of value as i f they were derived from statements of fact for the reason that there 
always has to be another layer of justification.61 As another moral philosopher of distinction, 
Bernard Williams, supports this finding of analytic philosophy: "There is one clear truth to be 
found in the is - ought distinction, ...the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning cannot be 
logically deduced from the premises that support it..there is still a step beyond the input' 6 2 
Furthermore, in support of Macintyre's contention mat the progress of analytic philosophy has 
established that there are no grounds for belief in universal necessary principles - outside purely 
formal enquiries - except relevant to some set of assumptions',63 mere is also the linguistic turn 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein. As Anthony Kenny explains the significance of his philosophy of 
5 8 See further Forrester, D. Christian Justice And Public Policy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), 
p. 191 for a helpful discussion of Habermas and theolgy. 
5 9 This is put most starkly in the debate over abortion. 
40 After Virtue, p.277. 
" Flew, A. A Dictionary of Philosophy (Pan: London, 1979), p. 240, concedes that the naturalistic fallacy is not 
universally agreed is always a mistake. 
a Williams, B. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana: London, 1985/1993), p. 126. 
"After Virtue, p.266. 
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language, Wittgenstein showed that the descriptions of private experience which the Cartesian 
epistemologist takes as a datum are much more problematic than the public, communal 
disciplines and institutions which he attempts to justify and set on sound foundations. I f 
Wittgenstein was right, philosophy had been on a wrong track since the time of Descartes and 
should alter course in a way which would make it more sympathetic to medieval 
preoccupations/64 Indeed, in the light of this philosophy and all the criticisms of the 
genealogists, such as Karl Marx and, more recently, Michel Foucault, although Descartes's 
suspicion of all inherited ideas may be highly commendable, bis idea that the individual can 
somehow 'peel off all extraneous influences on the self leaving only a thinking tiling' now 
looks highly implausible.65 
In addition to the force of naturalistic philosophy and the philosophy of language, there 
is Maclntyre's supporting argument against the Enlightenment project that 'the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment and their successors proved unable to agree as to what precisely those principles 
were which would be found undeniable by all rational persons.'66 Here one need only point to 
the disagreements between widely acclaimed recent thinkers, such as Rawls and Nozick, to 
demonstrate the continuing, and seemingly futile, quest for a set of universally acknowledged 
rational first principles. Indeed, the way these two authors begin from different premises, 
respectively, the original position and the inalienable rights of the individual, from which they 
derive incompatible principles of justice, one which makes the past irrelevant to a judgement 
of a particular distribution in the present, the other which makes the past a crucial determinant 
in so far as justice is held to be a matter of how goods have been acquired, well demonstrates 
the fundamental importance of the initial choice of a premise, and the extent to which a serious 
choice seemingly cannot be made outside one or other moral tradition. 
In the light of all the above, and given the present state of disagreement in Ethics, which, 
as we have noted, Maclntyre has described as consisting in the 'struggles in progress' or 'the 
tripartite hostilities between the heirs of encyclopaedia, post-Nietzschean genealogy, and 
Thomistic tradition', where' neither argument nor conflict is yet terminated' , 6 7 it would appear 
too much to claim to hold an Archimedean point outside a moral tradition from which we can 
6 4 Kenny, A. Aquinas (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980), p.28. 
6 5 See further Kerr, F. Theology after Wittgenstein (SPCK: London, 1986), p. 3 f t 
66 Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p.6. 
a Three Rival Versions, p. 215. 
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either stand and judge ours to be right and all others to be wrong or to claim to be sceptical of 
moral knowledge altogether.68 Therefore there is good reason for opting for Maclntyre's 
alternative of a craft-tradition in preference to the foundationalism of those who, in their 
different projects, may be described as labouring to keep alive the Enlightenment project. In any 
case, few liberal theorists today continue to see themselves as somehow tradition free. As 
Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift have pointed out, 'Even i f past liberal theorists have explicitly 
thought of themselves in Archimedean ways, and even i f contemporary theorists needed a little 
prodding in order explicitly to disown such self-images, there can be no reason for thinking that 
there is any fundamental contradiction between the content of a liberal theory of justice and an 
explicit acknowledgement of the elementary truth that this theory (like any other product of 
human intellectual endeavour) emerged from a tradition of enquiry.'69 
Before giving further reasons for supporting Maclntyre's point of departure for ethics, 
we ought briefly to comment on Taylor's alternative project, which, in contrast with Maclntyre's 
recourse to a craft-tradition as a way out of the present state of disagreement in ethics, attempts 
to circumvent the naturalist challenge and the resulting post-modernist claim that everything 
is merely a matter of perspective, by calling into play the role of spiritual and moral intuitions. 
We cannot but find this project appealing for its realist understanding of the spiritual and the 
moral. However, we cannot entirely go along with the reliance Taylor places on fundamental 
spiritual and moral intuitions as distinct from 'other moral reactions which seem very much the 
consequence of upbringing and education',70 because we are not convinced that this distinction 
between instinctual and learnt moral reactions can so easily be upheld. Moreover, the instinctual 
and fundamental intuitions, such as respect for human life, on which his theory rests, are too 
widely disregarded, not only in pre-modern societies but also in modern societies such as our 
own, with its high incidence of abortion, poverty, and tolerance of long-term unemployment, to 
name some of the more glaring abuses of our fellow human beings, to support the plausibility 
of bis theory. Indeed, in the light of the evils which modem liberal society so easily tolerates, 
we find Taylor's claim, mat 'We are all universalists now about respect for life and integrity',71 
not only misleading, for the way it obscures the very wide disagreements which exist between 
6 8 For a discussion of ethical skepticism, such as that of John Mackie, see further Dworkin, R.' Objectivity and 
Truth: You'd Better Believe It', in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.25 No.2, Spring 1996. 
0 Mulhall, S. and Swift, A op.cit, p. 291-292. 
n Sources of the Self, p.5. 
nJbid, p.6. 
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those who would claim to subscribe to a universalis ontology, but also complacent, for its 
seeming lack of awareness of the depths of this disagreement We therefore think it best to 
accept the force of the arguments against the 'naturalist fallacy' and to stick with Maclntyre's 
project, which does not have to rely on the rather shaky ground of intuitions and instead 
circumvents the problem posed by naturalism on the stronger ground of a craft or practice, which 
has been refined over a course of time in a moral tradition. 
We also mink Maclntyre right to found his ethics on the historical situatedness of a craft-
tradition because it respects the sense in which a craft and a tradition can embody the hard-won 
wisdom of a community, which it has acquired by experience and on which it can rely for its 
very survival.72 As such it can avoid the danger of imposing an alien and ill-fitting ethical 
system, with all the disastrous consequences mat can follow. Here John Mahoney's history of 
business ethics is worm mentioning for its account of the way philosophers in the United States, 
when they first started to take an interest in business ethics in the 1970s, tended to impose on 
business their alien and ill-fitting ethical systems;73 the result was not only that they failed to 
convince but they also brought the new discipline into disrepute by laying it open to the charge 
that they were merely repeating the mistakes made by those who had attempted to foist Marxism 
on business. 
In reaction to this early business ethics, Mahoney has developed a method which starts 
from reflection on actual business practice. As he describes it: 'a good way forward for business 
ethics is to start from inside various typical business situations in which certain moral values 
characteristically come into play and compete for ethical attention.74 From this point of 
departure, Mahoney sees the work of the ethicist in the perspective of a Christian humanist who 
seeks 'to find and bring to light and show in their full moral beauty the values which are latent 
in God's creation and of human endeavour'.73 He calls this 'value prospecting1. To assist this 
project he spells out a model whereby the collective wisdom of the business community, 
represented by the values operating within the multiple relationships in the modern business 
corporation, can be systematically identified, and only then used alongside the more traditional 
7 2 See further Williams, B. op. at., p. 168 ff. for his comments on the value of traditional knowledge which allows 
us to make our way about our social world. 
7 3 Mahoney, J. op.cit., p.6 ff. 
7 4 Mahoney, J. Christian Perspectives on Business Ethics', in Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol.2, No. 1 (T&T. 
Clark: Edinburgh, 1989), p.28. 
7 5 Ibid., p.38. 
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Christian values in a conflict of values approach to the resolution of ethical disagreements in 
business. 
In addition to the support it receives from Mahoney's business ethics method, the craft-
tradition mode of moral enquiry is more widely supported by the increasing ecumenical 
emphasis on the value of experience in Christian ethics. Commenting on the Roman Catholic 
tradition, Richard McCormick writes of the new age of experience' in moral theology. This he 
compares with a Catholic moral theology which' proceeded as i f its responsibility was to form 
and shape experience, but hardly ever to be shaped by i t ' 7 6 He claims the "new broom" of 
Vatican n for this development for the way it promoted the role of lay experts in the formulation 
of the Church's moral policies. As he quotes from the Council: "She [the Church] must rely on 
those who live in the world, are versed in different institutions and specialities, and grasp their 
innermost significance in the eyes of both believers and unbelievers." 
The Anglican tradition of Christian social ethics, exemplified by Ronald Preston, has 
consciously been working with these insights since at least the time of Temple. As Alan Suggate 
has pointed out, there is an ambivalence or incoherence in Temple's ethics between an 
allegiance to a Christian method, which works from the top-down by seeking to apply universal 
Christian principles to the particulars of a situation, and his use of the method of dialectic, which 
works in the opposite direction by beginning with the particulars of experience.77 In the 
refinement of the Anglican tradition in Preston, we find the tension in Temple's thought between 
the role of Christian values and human experience developed into his reciprocal method, which 
seeks to hold together the human wisdom of lived experience with the divine wisdom of the 
Bible and Christian traditioa This essentially Thomist method, which we earlier described using 
the analogy of a work of art, in which the artist's vision gives shape and is shaped, in a reciprocal 
relationship, by the detail of his work, insists that the Christian ethicist has to work at both levels 
and to treat mem equally seriously by allowing that even the level of moral principle should be 
open to revision in the light of experience. As Preston describes and justifies this approach: 
The further question is how we relate the two elements needed in ethical 
decision-making: the Bible and the doctrinal tradition on the one hand, and the 
data of the contemporary world on the other. How much detail can we derive 
n McCormick, R. Moral Theology 1940 • 1989: An Overview', in Theological Studies, Vol. SO, 1989, p.21. 
7 7 See further See further Suggate, A William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today (T&T Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1987), p.207 ff 
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from them? Certainly the former give us an understanding of human life and 
destiny (or, put another way, of nature, humanity and God), which then has to 
be brought alongside our analysis of what is going on' in our contemporary 
situation. 
I suggest that there is a reciprocal relationship between the two. The Christian 
sources give us the criteria which are important in selecting and interpreting 
from the mass of contemporary data. These criteria are not necessarily peculiar 
to Christianity, but may overlap at times with those of other faiths, religious and 
humanist. But the data may also reflect back on our understanding of the 
Christian sources and lead us to reflect on them anew, instead of inheriting them 
as a fixed and unchangeable deposit from the past 7 8 
By way of caution, however, it needs to be said that the exploration of experience is 
fraught with pitfalls. It is unavoidably subjective, and is always mediated through an ideology. 
Here, ideology is used in its neutral sense as an amalgam of ideas: moral, economic, political and 
philosophical, that allow the observer to make sense of experience and help in making decisions. 
It follows that documented experience is always an interplay between the bed-rock of experience 
and ideology because both are always involved in the interpretation of reality. Separating the one 
from the other is always difficult, especially over an issue such as public ownership, where 
competing ideologies, in their striving for hegemony, attempt not merely to colour but make 
impossible their opponents' version of reality. But while the approach is bound to be messy, 
disregarding the lessons human experience has for moral theory is, as McCormick warns, to 
disregard one of the richest and most indispensable sources of moral knowledge'.79 
Needless to say, however, it is of course precisely this human wisdom which the 
Augustinian tradition in Christian ethics, on account of its understanding of human sinfulness, 
will not recognise as true wisdom. And it is here that we encounter the dividing line between 
catholic and evangelical Christian ethics which has taken on the status of a confession,80 which 
even the most responsible and restrained evangelical treatises on Christian ethics seems 
incapable of bridging. For instance, Oliver OTtonovan's ethics, which seeks to base the point 
of departure for Christian ethics exclusively on divine law, which he interprets as the creation 
7 8 Preston, R. Religion and the Ambiguities of Capitalism (SCM: London, 1991), p. 96. 
"McConnick, op.cft., p.21. 
n See further Gustafson, J.M. Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, Prospects for Rapprochement (University 
of Chicago: 1978; this edition SCM: London, 1979), p.6ff. for his account of the shift in paradigm from the 
Roman Catholic understanding of sin as a moral problem to the Protestant understanding of sin as a religious 
problem and the consequent difference in the significance and function of ethics within theology'. 
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order vindicated by the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and which therefore goes some considerable 
way to bringing closer together the traditional catholic emphasis on creation and the traditional 
Protestant emphasis on redemption, still appears to deny that wisdom can be found outside the 
Christian tradition.81 The same, but even more so, is the case with the recently emergent 
triumphalist Christian Ethics, such as that of John Milbank, which appears to preen itself on 
having survived the Enlightenment challenge and to dismiss virtually all ancient wisdom and 
modern ethical and social theory at variance with its distinctively Christian point of departure 
as either crypto-theologies or paganism. 
Here, rather than respond directly to Milbank's hugely complicated and provocative 
thesis, we shall briefly consider the dogmatic ethics of Michael Banner, Mahoney's successor 
in the F.D.Maurice Chair of Moral and Social Theology at Kings College, London, because we 
suspect he is something of a disciple of Milbank and his criticism of the Church of England 
Board of Social Responsibility (BSR) report on the family, Something to Celebrate, is perceived 
to be an attack on the whole post-war Anglican tradition of public theology, with which we are 
sympathetic. In his critique of the report, Banner reveals the aggressively Christian focus of his 
ethics by denouncing the authors for what he takes to be their 'betrayal' of Christian theology. 
He also writes that,' The voice that has been lost is the voice of the Church which sees the world 
in the light of what it knows to be the decisive Word of God, Jesus Christ'.82 
In responding to this dogmatic ethics, we cannot help but envy its strong sense of 
Christian identity. As Banner argues in his inaugural lecture, this gives it the advantage of a 
strong base from which to negotiate in a pluralistic society on issues of public policy. "However, 
we find this advantage is gained at too great a cost Not only does it alienate those who view 
such a dogmatic ethics as sectarian, but also it would appear only to be able to defend itself 
against the charge of sectarianism by capitulating to genealogy and accepting to play by its rules, 
as i f this tradition has defeated its rivals in encyclopaedia and in a craft-tradition such as 
Thomism. Thus Banner ends a section of his lecture devoted to fending off the charge of 
sectarianism by going on the offensive and declaring that 'dogmatic ethics is truly sectarian -
that is, that it can and does speak to the world of the 'genealogists', to use Maclntyre's label 
1 1 See further O'Donovan, O. Resurrection and Moral Order, An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (TVP: Leicester, 
1986), p.82 ff. 
n Banner, M. Nothing to declare (Church Times, 16 June 1995) p.7. 
° Banner, M Turning the world upside down (and some other tasks for dogmatic Christian ethics) (Kings 
College, London, inaugural lecture, 1996), p.59. 
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for them, the world which has shaped irrevocably the modem mind...'84 
In this connection, it is helpful to be reminded mat this dogmatic ethics can be 
umtetood as originating in the attempt by Karl Barm to insulate Christian theology and ethics 
from the challenges of bom encyclopaedia and genealogy by the formulation of a free-standing 
theological system founded exclusively on the unique revelation of God in Jesus Christ. We 
cannot however accept that Earth succeeded. To our mind, Ms project is an impressively 
disguised literalism, which, as Stout describes it 'rigorously avoids making a systematic apology 
for its acceptance of biblical authority.'83 As such it has no satisfactory defence of its own 
canon within the Biblical canon and therefore no satisfactory answer to give to the kind of 
criticism made by David Hart, who writes from the non-realist perspective of the Sea of Faith 
movement: 
Once the documents of any faith are understood and reviewed as human 
creations, no single idea to be found within them can be accorded the type of 
unique status that Barth stall attempted to afford the doctrine of the incarnation. 
It is within the text as a dogmatic idea, but cannot be read as critically 
determinative of the whole text. Thus Earth's attempt to discover a biblical 
view was really a cul-de-sac, since its basic premise, the decisive action of God 
in Christ, is a pre=€ritical dogmatic position, rendered suspicious by the detailed 
work of the biblical critics.86 
Here it is instructive to compare Barth's ethics with the post-modernist ethics of Don 
Cupitt. Where Barm refuses to justify revelation, on account of his rejection of the 
Enlightenment assumption that divine wisdom can be questioned, Cupitt refuses to justify 
reason, on account of his rejection of the realist assumption that 'knowledge copies an objective 
world' , 8 7 To our mind, both these positions betray a similar dogmatism which denies, on the one 
hand, human experience of moral truth which can at least to some extent be discerned in the 
created order, and, on the other, human experience of moral truth which is encountered as 
coming from without and which seizes and compels the believer. The admission of both facets 
of human experience undoubtedly complicates ethics, but the denial of either one is simply not 
true to the reality we and others have experienced for most of Christian history. 
8 4 Ibid., p.59-60. 
w Stout, J. op.cit., p. 185. 
8 6 Hart, D. 'Non-realism and the universe of faiths', in Crowder, C. ed. God and Reality, Essays on Christian 
Non-Realism (Mowbray: London, 1997), pp.43-44. 
8 7 In Crowder, C. ed., God and Reality, Essays on Christian Non-Realism (Mowbray: London, 1997), p. 17. 
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In addition to these criticisms of Banner's dogmatic ethics, we cannot go along with the 
extremely pessimistic view of the ethical resources of humanity in Neo-orthodox theology on 
the grounds of the now standard theological argument reported by Alan Suggate in his defence 
of the ethics of William Temple. This points out that the denial of a natural morality would 
suggest that the image of God in man was totally extinguished in the Fall; it logically follows 
from such an interpretation that man would have no consciousness of sin, yet, as John 
Macquarrie argues,' unless he had some such idea it is hard to see how Christ could ever become 
Christ for him' 8 8 Suggate goes on to report that much the same point was made by N.H.G. 
Robinson, who after conducting a very thorough investigation of neo-Protestantism concluded 
that the idea of a natural morality cannot be dispensed with: 'The doctrine of the image of God 
implies that man always stands in the presence of his Creator, and the symptom of this is the 
elusive challenge of his moral consciousness. Even though the Christian is in some sense a new 
creature, he is basically a man transformed or renewed, and that presupposes an understanding 
of his existence independent of that renewal. Redemption is not just a second instalment of 
creation 8 9 On the strength of these scholars' arguments and his own study of William Temple, 
whose theological investigations brought him back to the natural law towards the end of his life, 
Alan Suggate concludes: 
Temple, Macquarrie and Robinson all agree that natural morality can form a 
bridge between Christian and non-Christian, enabling them to make moral 
contact with each other, to communicate and co-operate. This conviction that 
it is possible, if at times hard, to find common ground on the basis of rational 
discussion, is of vital importance, both in a pluralistic world where hard-line 
ideologists deny it, and in a Church tempted to fill back on unreflective appeals 
to the authority of Scripture.90 
Furthermore, in our judgement, the denial of a natural morality also exaggerates the level 
of our human fallenness in a way which would appear to ignore the enormous cooperative 
achievement of human society. This cannot be adequately explained as the product of some 
imposed order but is more plausibly understood as undergirded by a shared natural morality.91 
It would also appear to deny the many examples of selflessness and of human association which 
8 8 In Alan Suggate, op.cit, p. 108. 
"Ibid., p. 109. 
8 0 Ibid., p. 109. 
n See further Ridley, M The Origins of Virtue (Viking: 1996; this edition the Softback Preview, 1997.), p.4 ff. 
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we observe in persons who now largely inhabit a post-Christian culture. Indeed it can be very 
humbling for the Christian to discover the depth of human commitment in such secular 
associations as sports clubs, literary societies and the like, when he or she ventures beyond the 
confines of the divided Christian churches with their often fissile local fellowships. 
Coming at the end of a century of unprecedented human conflict, and at a time when, 
according to Maclntyre, we have entered a new dark ages, these sentiments will not persuade 
everyone. Nevertheless they are worth mentioning as a balance to the extremely pessimistic 
theological view of the total fallenness of humanity in Neo-Orthodoxy. Furthermore, while on 
the subject of dark times, it is also worth pointing out that the Neo-orthodox view, with its 
correspondingly exclusive ethical focus on the grace and command given in Jesus Christ, has 
tended to receive emphasis in a theology of crisis when times are abnormal, as in Augustine, 
when the Roman Empire was disintegrating, or as in Luther, when Christendom was collapsing, 
or as in Barth, when the end of Western European civilisation appeared imminent, and again 
now, at The End ofHistory,92 when the Enlightenment project appears to have come to an end. 
Ironically for a Protestant approach to Christian ethics, Neo-orthodoxy also appears to 
deny much of the witness of Holy Scripture itself.93 In his inaugural lecture with the title, The 
Ways of Wisdom, John Mahoney pointed this out in his criticism of ODonovan for having a far 
too narrow understanding of the working of God's grace: 
There is then, a continuity to be recognised from the beginning in God's wise 
dealings with his creatures. As Aristotle perceived, wisdom is a godlike 
attribute; but God is not jealous. Or as Karl Rahner writes in a similar vein, 
there is a "tacit assumption that grace would no longer be grace if God became 
too free with it". And if there is a cumulative continuity in the imparting of 
God's wisdom to his human creatures, then we cannot conclude with Professor 
ODonovan, that "knowledge of the moral order is a grasp of the total shape in 
which, if anything is lacking, everything is lacking". For this appears to ignore 
the canonical status and the significance of the Wisdom literature. It also incurs 
the risk of moral Arianism, by considering that it is only the Word-made-flesh 
9 2 From the title of Fukuyama, F. The EndOf History AndThe Last Man (Penguin: London, 1992). 
5 9 See further Barr, J. Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Clarendon: Oxford, 1993), p. 200 for his view that 
the rejection of natural theology for a revealed theology leads theology to 'stand rather aloof from the Bible.' See 
also Barton, J. Ethics And The Old Testament (SCM: London, 1998) for his defence of a natural law ethic which 
he argues is to be found alongside the dominant divine command ethic of the Old Testament in, for example, the 
Wisdom literature. 
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who addresses a word of wisdom to humankind.94 
There is also the further irony that when the attempt is made to follow this alternative 
approach in applied ethics and to read Christian social ethics directly off from the Bible or from 
Christian doctrine, the attempt often seems to arrive at the conclusions that a wise Christian 
social theorist might be expected to arrive at. Donald Hay's Economics Today (1989),95 which 
he offers as an alternative to the Prestonian dialectical approach, is a good example. As Preston 
points out, after laboriously identifying eight Biblical principles for use in a distinctively 
Christian analysis of economic issues, Hay's analysis then fails to make much direct use of them 
(possibly because of the difficulty of relating the historical context from which they were derived 
to our modern industrial world).96 Nevertheless, he still manages to end up supporting the 
respectable but fairly predictable conclusions of a middle class academic economist; it would 
seem the method confronts the impossible task of having to unlearn what one already knows of 
ethical and social theory and consequently often ends up merely re-inventing the wheel. 
It follows from all these arguments that, despite the valiant but, in our view, misguided 
effort to vindicate a distinctively Christian Ethics,97 we cannot accept that it is enough simply 
to preach at the world in an attempt at out narrating' other rival narratives, as Banner and 
Milbank would have us do. As Malcolm Brown points out, the approach of Milbank and Banner 
is essentially aggressive, and therefore is not very promising in a multi-cultural and non-
consensual world.98 Furthermore, to fail to listen to what the world has to say is to run the risk 
of missing what God may be saying through the world As Rahner puts this: 'Who is to say that 
the voice heard in earthly philosophy, even non-Christian and pre-Christian philosophy, is the 
voice of nature alone (and perhaps of nature's guilt) and not also the groaning of the creature, 
who is already moved in secret by the Holy Spirit of grace, and longs without realizing it for the 
glory of God?" We must therefore insist that the task of Christian ethics has to treat human 
wisdom seriously, in the way Maclntyre does, and, therefore, has to include apologetics i f it is 
9 4 Mahoney, J. The Ways of Wisdom (Kings College: London, 1987), p. 14. 
9 5 Hay, D. Economics Today, A Christian Critique (Apollos: Leicester, 1989). 
9 8 See further Preston, R. op.cit., p. 100 - 101. 
9 7 See here the comment by Nitszche, F. Daybreak, Thoughts on the prejudices of morality, translated by R. J. 
Hollingdale (CUP: Cambridge, 1982), p.69, para.70 on the eclectic background of Christian thought. 
9 8 Brown, M 'Some Thoughts on Moral Method' in Unemployment and the Future of Work, An Enquiry for the 
Churches (CCBI: London, 1997), p.294. 
9 9 Quoted in Mahoney, J. The Making of Moral Theology, A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford 
University Press/Clarendon: Oxford, 1987/1989), p. 115. 
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not to be left aggressively punching thin air. As Mahoney wisely urges in & passage which 
deserves to be quoted in full: 
At least part of the response, then, of Gospel or Christian wisdom to human 
wisdom should not be, if I may so put it, of the "yes but" variety, but more of 
the "yes and" variety. To a Christian ethics of radical opposition, then, I should 
prefer a Christian ethics of the a fortiori type. For this was the approach of Paul 
to the Greeks at the Areopagus, which despite his disappointment won some 
response (Acts 17:22-34), and which appears as evangelical as the prophetic 
proclamation of Peter to the Jews at Pentecost (2:16-18). It is the ethical 
approach which seeks common ground, on which God's transcendental Wisdom 
may continue to build. And as we near the end of a century in which 
post-Enlightenment confidence may be faltering or wearing thin in some 
respects (though Churchmen are ever prone to wishful thinking), the Christian 
ethical approach dare not be one of condemnation or pent-up recrimination at 
what Reinhold Niebuhr termed the modern "pride of knowledge". This sounds 
too much like advocating a return to Kant's pre-Enlightenment nursery, and the 
cautionary couplet of Hilaire Belloc: 
And always keep a hold of Nurse 
For fear of finding worse. 
Perhaps what we need most today is not an admonitory theology of pride or sin, 
but a prophetic theology of consolation, less dependent on Augustine, and more 
akin to Julian of Norwich as it seeks to penetrate Christ-like through disillusion 
or desolation to a richer and wiser discernment of what God is about.100 
THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION 
But for all our insistence that human wisdom has its rightful place in moral enquiry, as 
we have already indicated above, we cannot support an exclusively Aristotelian ethics which 
ignores the contribution of an Augustinian epistemology. Here we believe Maclntyre is right to 
defend the Thomist synthesis of the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions as the best 
alternative we have for moral theology, although we suspect Aquinas' real achievement was 
more of the nature of the moral bricolage Stout describes rather than the reconciliation of two 
100 The Ways of Wisdom, p. 14-15. It is also worth briefly reporting here Peter Sedwick's defence of the method 
underlying the BSR report on the family for its eloquent affirmation of our understanding of the task of Christian 
ethics. Echoing Mahoney, he commended the report for the way it ' seeks to gather the fragments of human 
wisdom back to their source in God, and to find a unity which is elusive but not to be ignored: the work of the 
Holy Spirit.' Taken from his defence of Something to Celebrate, Church Times, 23 June, 1996. 
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incommensurable traditions which Maclntyre claims for Aquinas. We value in particular the 
fallibilist character of this synthesis (if it can be called such) and the sense in which it can be 
described using the analogy of a work of art in which divine wisdom provides the overall vision 
of the artist and human wisdom the detail of the artist's materials. In this light, the final work 
can be understood as the product of the creative tension between them - vision shaping detail -
detail shaping vision - as the human artist struggles to capture the vision by filling in the detail. 
We believe it necessary for Christian ethics to work with these two moral traditions 
because, in addition to what we have argued above about the need to take human wisdom 
seriously, we need also to take account of human experience of revealed truth and the reality of 
moral error. Here we acknowledge that, while the Socratic method of dialectical reasoning 
accords with our experience of how it is through conflict and debate that we are mainly led to 
grasp and to test truths hitherto unknown to us, what it does not sufficiently account for is the 
experience of illumination, of truth seeming to come from the 'outside', and also the problem 
of moral error or bad faith, which prevents our perceiving the truth, no matter how hard it might 
be staring us in the face. These too are an undeniable part of human experience; they are left 
unaccounted for without the recognition of our need for the help of a divine grace, not to abolish 
human nature but, as Aquinas put it, to perfect i t 1 0 1 
For this reason we cannot go the whole way with the post-modernist New Christian 
Ethics of Don Cupitt His approach rightly draws on Nietzsche's harsh criticism of Christianity 
to bemoan the debasement of the Christian's sense of the self in so much of the tradition 
deriving from Augustine. He accordingly sees as one of his main tasks that of curing people of 
the 'the old masochistic sense of sin, restoring their self-esteem and vindicating Christian 
action.'loa To mis end he urges mat we should not think of ourselves as a soldier under authority, 
'but as an artist who has chosen to work within a particular tradition.'103 However, given our 
understanding of the way human sinfulness clouds moral judgement, we cannot accept that we 
have the same freedom of choice in the matter or morals as we have in choosing a particular 
tradition of art to work within. For mis reason we recognise the virtue of obedience to a received 
tradition of wisdom which has supported (albeit imperfectly) the moral life up till now, 
m Thomas Aquinas wrote, 'Grace does not abolish Nature but perfects it'. Quoted in d'Entreves, Natural Law 
(Hutchinson, London, 1951), p. 44. 
1 0 2 Cupitt, D. The New Christian Ethics (SCM: London, 1988), p.23. 
m In Crowder, C. ed., op.cit., p. 15. 
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provided, as we will explore further later, that this is joined with a critical sense, an acceptance 
of responsibility and respect for the primacy of individual conscience. Something of what we 
are labouring to say is better said by John Robinson where he qualifies his support for the 
situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher by insisting that 'Such an ethic cannot but rely, in deep 
humility, upon guiding rules, upon the cumulative experience of one's own and other people's 
obedience. It is this bank of experience which gives us our working rules of ' right1 and' wrong', 
and without them we could not but flounder/104 
The genealogist will of course deride this concession to authority as weakness, as 
deriving from the "grovelling" virtues of Christianity which merely mask the will to power or 
prevent one from thinking through things for oneself. As Nietzsche put this, 'most of us are our 
whole lives long the fools of the way we acquired in childhood of judging our neighbours (their 
minds, rank, morality, whether they are exemplary or reprehensible) and of finding it necessary 
to pay homage to their evaluations/105 He might also point out that such a recourse to authority 
cannot escape a Christian version of the paradox of Plato's Meno : i f it is only by submission to 
the authority of a particular text that one can come to recognise the authority of its particular 
conception of the virtues how can one recognise its authority in the first place. He might also ask 
how such an ethic can guard against ethical complacency, and specifically point to how 
Thomism, for all its claim to be informed by both a human and divine wisdom, nevertheless 
sanctioned the evil of slavery. Against mis kind of subversive reasoning there may be no finally 
conclusive intellectual defence as to why we should choose to derive an ethic from this social 
practice and not mat, these particular texts and not those, and, therefore, why the 
Aristotelian-Thomist conception of the virtues rather than the heroic virtues of Frederick U. 
That conceded, as Maclntyre has argued, the notion of accountability, understood in 
terms of Socratic dialectic or Augustinian rhetoric,106 presents problems for genealogy; in order 
to discredit its rivals from its own position, it has inescapably to claim an authority for genealogy 
which must come from somewhere. But this it cannot do because, with its notion of the fissured 
self which lacks an identity, unity and continuity, there is no means of holding an individual 
accountable for their earlier actions. As Nicholas Boyle explains in his commentary on 
Maclntyre's critique, 'all genealogy, all unmasking of intellectual and moral perspectives as 
Robinson, J. Honest to Gorf (SCM: London, 1963), p. 119-120. 
Nitszche, F. op.cit, p. 106. 
Three Rival Versions, p.20S ff 
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derivative from the will to power, involves a disowning of past illusion. But you cannot tell the 
story of your emancipation from deception and self-deception unless there is an "identity and 
continuity of the self that was deceived and the self that is and is to be".107 The genealogical 
project therefore ends by being foisted on its own petard. As Maclntyre puts it, "Behind the 
genealogical narrative there is always a shadow self-congratulatory narrative.'108 
On the strength of this critique of genealogy, and in the light of human experience of a 
revealed moral truth which comes, so to speak, from 'outside' to challenge our inclination to bad 
faith, we cannot see a better alternative man to follow Maclntyre when, in the second of the two 
sequels, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, his once atheistic moral philosophy takes an 
Augustinian turn: 
The self-revelation of God in the events of the scriptural history and the 
gratuitous grace through which that revelation is appropriated, so that an 
individual can come to recognize his or her place within that same history, 
enable such individuals to recognize also that prudence, justice, temperateness, 
and courage are genuine virtues, that the apprehension of the natural law was 
not illusory, and that the moral life up this point requires to be corrected in 
order to be completed but not displaced. So a Pauline and Augustinian account 
retrospectively vindicates that in Aristotle which had provided a first 
understanding of the core of the moral life.m 
It does not follow from the above, however, that we accept without qualification 
Maclntyre's claim that Thomism offers the 'most adequate tradition available for resolving the 
moral problems of modernity1110 for, while Nietzsche's assault on Christianity as the enemy of 
freedom and authentic life may not have succeeded in sinking Thomism, at least not that of 
Thomas the moral theologian, the genealogy of Feurbach, Nietszche, Marx, Darwin, Freud and 
Foucauh1" has caused permanent damage by showing up the potentially repressive tendencies 
of mis tradition. In recognition of mis side to Thomism, some post-Vatican n moral theology has 
expressed a measured unease at its revival in recent decades. Mahoney, for example, adapts 
Gilson's remark that some people appear to be born Augustinian in order to make the point that 
1 0 7 Boyle, N. Who Are We Now, Christian Humanism and the Global Market from Hegel to Heaney (University 
of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1988; this ed. by T&T Clark), p. 150. 
108 Three Rival Versions., p.209. 
*" Ibid., p. 140. 
1 1 0 Fergusson, D. op.rit, p.38, comments that this claim 'has left even his most sympathetic commentators 
awaiting further clarification'. 
1 1 1 Banner's world of genealogists; see further his inaugural lecture p.60. 
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'for most of this century it would not be inappropriate to conflate Gilson with Shakespeare's 
Malvolio and conclude mat some theologians are bom Thomists, others acquire a love for 
Thomism, and some had Aquinas thrust upon them/1 1 2 
In the light of this Roman Catholic experience and the challenge not only of genealogy 
but also of encyclopaedia, we are persuaded of the need to qualify our support for Maclntyre's 
Thomism, with its total assault on modernity, in favour of the new emphasis on the freedom of 
the human person under God in the post-conciliar renewal of the Roman Catholic tradition. This 
renewal reflects a serious engagement with both genealogy and encyclopaedia and has 
consciously or unconsciously attempted to draw some of their valid insights into moral theology 
by a process of rearticulation, much as we described Taylor as attempting to do in his 
conciliatory project In his magisterial account of this Roman Catholic renewal, Mahoney 
identifies three elements in particular a drive towards totality, an attempt to recognise diversity, 
and, for their completion and understanding, a recovery of mystery. As each element is important 
for our method, we shall briefly comment on them and explain how we shall incorporate them 
into our method: 
The drive to totality needs to be viewed in the context of the crisis for moral theology 
posed by Humanae Vitae (1968), the papal encyclical on contraception; in line with pre-conciliar 
teaching, with its rigid understanding of the natural law, and disregarding the majority opinion 
of a papal commission on contraception, the encyclical condemned the use of artificial means 
of contraception as being intrinsically evil. In responding to this crisis, Mahoney explains that 
what the drive to totality attempts to do is to widen the focus of ethical enquiry from an 
exclusive concentration on the act to take into account both the circumstances in which an act 
is committed and the consequences of the act, and to place the whole in the context of God's 
divine purpose for his creation in which human beings are understood in their totality as persons 
endowed with a sacrosanct freedom. As justification for what he calls this necessary' assault on 
the theory of moral absolutes', he claims that it 'may be seen as an unconscious move towards 
the recovery of the Augustinian and Thomist idea of divine ordo in creation, which for those 
founding fathers of moral theology constituted the very basis and context of all moral 
theology/113 But whatever the justification in traditional Roman Catholic sources of authority, 
112 The Making of Moral Theology, p.331 
1 W Ibid., p.342. 
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it is difficult not to see the influence of that enduring ethical legacy of eighteenth century 
liberalism, utilitarianism, at work and, in more recent years, the force of general consequentialist 
and contextual ethical theories in shaping this post-conciliar moral theology. 
The recognition and respect for diversity that Mahoney observes in post-conciliar moral 
theology at first sight appears to conflict with the drive to totality. However, as he takes pains 
to explain 'diversity in this context does not have to do with viewing the several parts of the 
whole, but refers to viewing the whole, or the totality, in a diversity of different ways'.114 In other 
words, what is envisaged is a pluralistic moral theology which allows for different 
methodological frameworks, each of which is held equally validly to view the whole through 
different lenses and from different angles. Mahoney justifies this development not only in terms 
of the pluralism found in theology's normative sources, including the Bible, and by the mistaken 
view mat Christian teaching, employing as it does analogical concepts, can deliver detailed and 
unquestionable conclusions, but also by the way the diversity of modern languages and human 
experience can lead to different cultures perceiving the relationships between things in subtly 
different ways. As an illustration, he refers to way Eskimos have many terms to differentiate the 
phenomenon which we call snow. 
Mahoney also offers the further justification for respecting diversity that moral theology 
must accommodate the phenomenon of change. In the context of a discussion on contraception, 
which many women in particular would perceive to have ushered in a whole new world, he 
refers to Rahner's view that within the Church there is an unavoidable 'process of interaction 
between changeable and unchangeable factors which cannot fully be distinguished', and 
consequently, ' i f there is a historical shift, through improvement in scholarship or knowledge, 
or through an entry of society into a significantly different age, then what that same fidelity 
requires of the Church is that it respond to the historical shift, such that it might be not only 
mistaken but also unfaithful in declining to do so'.115 All of this suggests a much more 
evolutionary view of human nature and consequently a more dynamic view of natural law than 
that traditionally associated with Thomism. It also suggests the need for a greater recognition 
of freedom of conscience as a means of bridging 'the gap between 'objective' and 'subjective' 
moralities and thereby respecting legitimate personal diversities.'116 
1 . 4 Ibid., p.321. 
1 . 5 Ibid., p.327. 
"*Ibid., p.330. 
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It is the recovery of mystery in moral theology, according to Mahoney, which completes 
and makes understandable the drive to totality and the recognition and respect for diversity. As 
he warns his fellow moral theologians in the context of moral theology's dialogue with 
philosophical ethics, where it is concerned to demonstrate its rationality, and, on the other hand, 
with non-catholic Christian Ethics, where it is concerned to show that it is not simply 
authoritarian: 
much modern writing in moral theology is in danger of forgetting that it is a 
branch of theology. As such it is concerned primarily with mystery: the mystery 
of a loving God and his dealings with, and destiny for, his creation. The artistic 
medium in which God is fashioning and crafting his human creatures is the 
medium of their personal freedom; and the stuff, or material, of moral theology 
is the sheer wonder of man's being as it responds in freedom to the design of 
God. 1 1 7 
The recovery of this understanding of moral theology as a branch of theology, and 
therefore of it being unavoidably tied up with the mystery of God, has clearly helped 
post-conciliar moral theology break out of the too narrow rationalism of traditional natural law 
into a far more impressionistic mode. Supporting this break with legal categories, and 
demonstrating the new seriousness with which post-conciliar moral theology treats the biblical 
resources, Mahoney links the drive to totality and respect for diversity with mystery by the 
doctrine of creatioa Here he uses the Old Testament idea of the imago dei to assert that human 
beings share in the mystery of God by virtue of our creation in the image of God; we thus share 
in both the unity and diversity of the trinitarian God and as such have within us a yearning both 
for community and for freedom. 
Mahoney goes on to deepen the link between moral theology and mystery by bringing 
into discussion the role of the Church with the use of the important New Testament Pauline idea 
of koinonia or 'the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.'118 This idea denotes not only the community 
Christians share with each other, because of the distinctive gifts the Spirit bestows on each 
member for the good of the whole, but also the community Christians share' with the Father and 
his Son',119 in which they 'become partakers (koinonoi) of the divine nature'120 itself. On the basis 
1 , 7 Ibid., p.339. 
1 1 8 2 Corinthians 13:14. 
1 1 91 John 1:13. 
1 2 0 2 Peter 1:4. 
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of this mystery he teaches that a renewed Church, one mat in its totality includes all who share 
in the fellowship of the Spirit: the saints of old, ordained and lay, catholic and non-catholic 
Christian, and all anonymous Christians, is properly the locus and agent of moral theology. And, 
furthermore, on account of the comprehensiveness of such a Church, he explains that the 'first 
and overriding, or architectonic, task of moral theology', to further the koinonia of all humanity, 
is not 'an introspective or colonialist programme for the Church' because 'the concept of 
koinonia is not simply a Christian addition to human destiny, but responds to the deepest 
aspirations of God's human creatures, who are made in his image.'121 
The implications of this post-conciliar renewal of moral theology for our method are 
several: 
In keeping with the attempt to use a "wide-open lens" as part of the drive to totality, our 
method will strive to take into account all relevant circumstances and consequences in our 
evaluation of privatisation. Of course we are not unaware of the dangers associated with this 
kind of ethical reasoning; and as Bernard Williams, in his criticisms of consequentialist theories 
has pointed out, we are never in a position to consider all the possible consequences of an 
action.122 However, in our view, a failure to attempt to take consequences into account, would 
be a failure to build the concept of responsibility into our ethics, and so to repeat the mistake of 
Pope John Paul I I in his encyclical on moral theology, Veritatis Splendor (1993), which Peter 
Hebblethwaite described as a return to the 'timeless' ethics of pre-war Thomism.123 We are 
supported here by the doyen of Roman Catholic moral theologians, Bernard Haring, who writes 
movingly of his conversion from a rigid interpretation of the natural law by bis experience as a 
chaplain in the German army in the Second World War: 
Unfortunately I also experienced the most absurd obedience by Christians - God 
have mercy - toward a criminal regime. And that too radically affected my 
thinking and acting as a moral theologian. After the war I returned to moral 
theology with the firm decision to teach it so that its core concept would not be 
obedience but responsibility, the courage to be responsible. I believe that I have 
remained true to this decision - of course not to the damage to genuine 
obedience, that is to an obedience mat is responsible and joined to openness and 
121 The Making of Moral Theology, p.345. 
m Williams, B. op.cit., p.77. 
m The Tablet, 9 October 1993, p. 1286 ff 
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a critical sense.124 
In keeping with the new recognition and respect for diversity, which encourages the use 
of a diversity of methodological frameworks, we shall bring alongside our Thomist framework, 
with its synthesis of reason and revelation and its social theory, central to which is the idea of 
the common good, a number of other relevant theological-ethical frameworks in the kind of 
bricolage which Stout explains no good modem ethicist can entirely do without in our plural 
society. Liberation Theology, with its undeniable synthesis of Christian and Marxist elements, 
but which Mahoney nevertheless describes as 'a particularly cogent and articulate choice of 
moral method as an illustration of moral pluralism',123 presents one example of a framework 
which cannot responsibly be ignored. Nor can we afford to ignore the resurgence of the tradition 
of Christian conservatism in the 1980s, with its strong emphasis of personal freedom and the 
rationality of the market. 
Linked with this respect for a diversity of inputs to our ethical analysis, and in keeping 
with the greater emphasis of freedom of conscience in this post-Conciliar moral theology, we 
recognise that our method needs to accept that persons working in the same ethical tradition can 
arrive at legitimately different conclusions about the ethics of privatisation. This is for the reason 
that, in the absence of an unquestionable teaching authority, such as that vested in the notion of 
papal infallibility, our application of general moral principles combined with our reliance on 
the disputable theories and data of the social sciences, means that there is no alternative but to 
view a particular ethical evaluation as no more but no less than one contribution to an ongoing 
conversation. Fortunately, unlike the case of incommensurable ethical traditions where there 
is no shared basis on which to build agreement, at least in this case there is the basis for 
constructive debate and therefore the potential for a resolution of disagreement 
The recovery of mystery is difficult to programme into our method in any practical way 
because it enjoins more an over-all attitude. However it does practically warn against an 
exhaustive systematisation', which Mahoney judges to be Just too neat to be true to reality."m 
The element of mystery in post-conciliar moral theology also serves to remind us not only of 
human finitude, of the limits of human language and human intelligence, and the complexity of 
1 2 4 Raring, B. My Witnessfor the Church (Paulist: New York, 1992), p.23. See further Yeats, C. ed., Veritatis 
Splendor: A Response (The Canterbury Press: Norwich, 1994) for a response to the encyclical from various 
Anglican contributors. 
125 The Making of Moral Theology, p.335 
1 2 6 Ibid., p.342. 
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human life but also of the fathomlessness of God. Accordingly, we are also practically enjoined 
to observe a due humility in our conclusions. 
RIVAL ETHICAL TRADITIONS 
This call to humility, which reminds us that though we are the fortunate recipients of a 
revelation of the good in Jesus Christ, we still hold this treasure in earthen vessels, helpfully 
leads on to a discussion of what we have identified as the third coordinate in Maclntyre's ethical 
system, rival ethical traditions. 
The contribution Maclntyre's approach makes here is that, if we are to have any 
confidence that our moral tradition is in good working order and can deliver sound moral 
judgements, it insists rival ethical traditions be taken seriously. Otherwise we stand to miss what 
John Habgood calls those new truths which' emerge from new facts, a new interpretation of old 
facts, or a new willingness to face old facts that have hitherto been ignored.'127 Here we 
recognise that there is more than a germ of truth in what his critics find of Maclntyre's inability 
fully to shed his liberal clothes, for, as Fergusson has pointed out, rival ethical traditions are an 
integral part of Maclntyre's theory of moral traditions; without them it would not be possible 
adequately to judge whether a moral tradition is in good health. Consequently, we would agree 
that in this aspect of his thinking there is a convergence between Maclntyre's communitarianism 
and liberalism in their mutual reliance on the great liberal virtues of tolerance and reasoned 
disagreement. 
hi this connection, on account of its respect for the liberal virtues, the interactive model 
of the Anglican social ethicist, John Atherton, has much to commend it Atherton urges a radical 
openness to rival secular ethical traditions as a way of avoiding the danger of railing to recognise 
a legitimate challenge to a traditional Christian ethical tradition. He claims to draw inspiration 
from the heirs of the social gospel movement, of whom he writes that they were prepared 'to 
undertake the investigation even if it led them beyond the recognised boundaries of Christian 
truth and even if it called into question their own virtues and the virtues of the people they 
sought to help'.128 In keeping with their approach, he calls for a 'living1 within 'provisional 
1 2 7 Habgood, J. Making Sense (Clarendon. Oxford, 1993), p.206. 
m Atherton, J. Christianity and the Market, Christian Social Thought For Our Times (SPCK: London, 1992), 
p.271. 
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frameworks and dynamics', even if it leads beyond our 'traditional enclosures'.129 And in a 
similar way to Mahoney's conflict of values model, Atherton insists that it is only when one is 
in a position to describe a rival tradition from the inside that one is in a position to bring into 
play what he calls the 'challenges' of the more traditional Christian ethical frameworks. 
Atherton further justifies his approach on a reading of the "signs of the times". These 
signs, or what he also calls "disclosure points", include the end of the post-war consensus in the 
1970s and the exposure of the myth of soviet central planning in the collapse of communism in 
the "annus mirabilis" of 1989. Although he does not address the issue of privatisation in his 
book, in conversation with ourselves he includes privatisation as one more "disclosure point". 
He sees these signs as heralding a distinctly new age for Christian social ethics, much as the 
advent of modern methods of contraception appears to have ushered in a wholly new world for 
Christian sexual ethics. More specifically, he sees them as demanding the 'recognition of the 
importance for human living of market economics as well as liberal democracies.'130 They also 
lead him to advocate a degree of autonomy for the secular discipline of Economics which 
probably goes far beyond even the most sympathetic traditional Christian framework.131 
In the light of this reading of recent political and economic history, which suggests that 
privatisation may place before us a challenge which cannot be looked at only through the lenses 
of the traditional Christian ethical frameworks, and the encouragement both Maclntyre and 
Atherton's thinking gives us to take rival ethical traditions seriously, we shall attempt to "live" 
within the rival ethical framework of economic liberalism in order to learn its idiom and, as 
Macintyre would have us do, judge it according to its own standards. This is important for, as 
we shall show, economic liberalism presents us with what may be the strongest justification for 
privatisation. It also deserves to be taken seriously as the dominant intellectual framework of the 
modem world. Furthermore, although we find it inadequate, there is no denying that liberalism, 
as Michael Novak has argued, works with its own procedural conception of the common good 
and mounts a challenging case for not relying on the unified conception of the common good 
associated with the catholic tradition, which it criticises for not taking fully into account the 
diversity of human goods in the modern world.132 
1 7 9 Ibid., p.262. 
1 3 0 Ibid., p.95. 
m Ibid., p.279. 
1 3 2 See further here the critique of Michael Novak in Harries, R. Is There A Gospel For The Rich? (Mowbray: 
London, 1992), pp. 96-97. 
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SUMMARY OF ©TO EMCOLAGE METHO© 
In the light of all the above, while it is clear that our choice of a moral framework, with 
its recourse to both reason and revelation, is a broadly Thomist one, we are not conservatives 
merely seeking to defend the catholic moral tradition without qualification, as if this tradition 
can remain untouched by the challenges of modernity and post-modernity, and as if we do not 
need to look at privatisation through other frameworks as well. In any case, as we have 
mentioned, we suspect Maclntyre's theory of moral traditions is too refined to fit reality and that, 
as Stout maintains, the task of the ethicist unavoidably involves a measure of moral bricolage, 
the weaving together of multiple and diverse ethical resources, in the way Aquinas did in his 
synthesis' of Christianity and Aristotelianism, and therefore the catholic moral tradition has 
always been a broad tradition. As a result our ethics is bound to look more like a patchwork quilt 
than the fine weave of Maclntyre's Thomism. Furthermore, if we are to be called Thomists, then 
we would wish to be associated with those who stand for a renewal of catholic moral theology, 
such as McCormick, who emphasises the importance of taking account of experience, Baring 
with his emphasis on responsibility, and Mahoney, who wants to move away from an absolutist 
and timeless ethics by looking at the act in its totality, including the surrounding circumstances 
and consequences, from a diversity of moral perspectives, and by leaving room for mystery, 
because we think these emphases essential for the integrity of moral theology in the modern 
world. Accordingly, 'we' might best be described as liberal catholics, whose method is best 
summarised, using the analogy of a work of art, as involving a broad Christian vision which 
shapes and is shaped by the detail and complexity of human life. 
With mis summary of our bricolage method, we can now fruitfully return to the outline 
of our enquiry, presented in the previous chapter, and briefly elaborate on why we have chosen 
to conduct our enquiry in the way we have set out: 
We shall begin in the following chapter, The Nationalisation Programme (1945 -51), in 
order to explore the diverse political, economic, and moral arguments for public ownership 
which were made at the time. Although many of these have been superseded by subsequent 
history, we expect there is still much to gain for our enquiry from taking cognisance of the 
different frameworks used by leading politicians and economists, such as Herbert Morrison, and 
Christian social ethicists of the time, such as Richard Tawney, William Temple, and Hensley 
Henson. 
In Chapter 4, The Experience of Nationalisation (1951 -1979), as its title suggests, we 
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shall explore the British experience of public ownership in order to take account of the factor 
of experience as a source of moral knowledge. Although, as we have discussed, experience 
always involves an interpretation of reality, and therefore needs to be treated with caution, were 
it possible to show convincingly that the nationalised industries had failed by the end of the 
seventies and could not be reformed, we would be forced to acknowledge that there is little point 
in taking the evaluation further because, on the basis of experience, there was no moral 
alternative to privatisation. 
After exploring this essentially negative case for privatisation, in Chapter 5, The 
Abandonment of Nationalisation (1979-1989), we shall turn to an examination of the positive 
case for privatisation in economic liberalism. Here, lest we overlook them, we shall explore the 
challenges to our more traditional Christian framework in the dominant ideology of our time. 
Keeping these challenges and the earlier enquiries in mind, in our final chapter, 
Privatisation and the Common Good, we shall then evaluate privatisation in terms of our liberal 
catholic moral tradition. Here our bricolage method will lead us to interpret catholic social 
teaching, with its central idea of the common good, together with the insights of other Christian 
traditions, such as Christian conservatism and Liberation Theology. The results of this enquiry, 
together with the conclusions to the enquiries conducted in previous chapters, will then form the 
basis for an overall judgement of the ethics of privatisation. 
Finally, as a postscript in the brief space we have left, in the hope that we might be able 
to take the debate over nationalisation and privatisation a step forward, we shall outline a new 
project which looks to promote the common good by building on the strengths of both 
nationalisation and privatisation, while avoiding their weaknesses. 
Before proceeding, as the concluding note to our method, we ought perhaps to declare 
in advance that our findings can only be provisional and exploratory for several reasons: 
Firstly, our narrative history of nationalisation in a thesis of this length is unavoidably 
selective. Although we have assembled a great many authoritative perspectives, our findings 
would be belter supported by more detailed research into the performance of each of the former 
nationalised industries. 
Secondly, our experience of privatisation is relatively recent. Although a fuller picture 
is beginning to emerge of the post-privatisation world, it is still too early to rely too much on this 
experience. A later study would not be at such a disadvantage. 
Thirdly, this study claims to be neither more nor less than an essay in discernment We 
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make no greater claim for the outcome of our enquiry than that it represents one person's 
supervised contribution to an ongoing conversation about the ethics of privatisation. A more 
authoritative understanding of privatisation is likely only to emerge as the Church, the principle 
locus of moral theology, engages with the ethics of privatisation from its multiple and diverse 
perspectives. 
Finally, and related to the previous point, an inter-disciplinary study of this kind would 
be better done by a group of researchers. As Ronald Preston advises on the methodology of 
Christian social ethics, 'progress is best made by working in groups, in which relevant but 
differing experiences are checked against one another and expert opinion evaluated. No one is 
wise enough on his or her own to arrive at a cogent conclusion." 1 3 3 
See further The Future of Christum Ethics p. 2. 
PART n A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF NATIONALISATION 
65 
Chapter 3 
THE NATIONALISATION PROGRAMME (1945-1951) 
They shall not grow old as we thai are left shall grow old: 
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn them. 
At the going down of the sun and in the morning 
We will remember them.1 
The annual Remembrance Sunday service is a good place to begin a narrative history of 
nationalisation. Like no other, the service is a reminder of the reality of human sacrifice in two 
world wars which marked virtually every community in the United Kingdom. After the Second 
World War the united sense of grief, the experience of having successfully "pulled together" 
against a common enemy, and the challenge of reconstruction created the conditions for a less 
divided society which was more sympathetic to the idea of public ownership. Bernard Porter 
writes here of an 'ethical transformation' which weaned 'people away from the politics of 
selfishness and on to what Clement Attlee called 'a higher conception of social obligation' . 2 
But war was not the only factor making for a society more receptive to the idea of public 
ownership. Another was the failure or perceived failure of free market capitalism. The instability 
of this economic system had created the world-wide depression of the early 1930s. The great 
slump also provided fertile ground for the rise of Nazism, and therefore free market capitalism 
could partly be blamed for the war. In this connection, commenting on the immediate and 
immense popular support for the Beveridge report's plan for what came to be called the' welfare 
state', Porter writes: The reason for this was partly the war, but only because the war had come 
at a particular time. It followed continuous failure - or perceived failure = for the freer forms of 
capitalism in Britain, especially with regard to employment; and another 50 years of decline 
before that Laissez-faire had had its day.'3 
1 From the service for Remembrance Sunday: 'Act of Remembrance' (SPCK: London, 1968/1984). 
2 Porter, B. Britannia's Burden, The Political Evolution of Modem Britain 1851-1990 (Edward Arnold: 
London, 1994), p.261. 
'Ibid., p.248. 
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However, despite its poor record, there was no clear blueprint for replacing capitalism 
at the end of the war. In contrast to the implementation of the plans for a welfare state, which 
had been completed and published in the coalition "white paper chase" between 1942 -1945, 
Peter Hennessy describes the immediate post-war nationalisations as an 'almost entirely 
unplanned scramble'.4 He explains that Public ownership of this kind was outside the Coalition 
consensus, so the civil service had not worked on it during the war. Nor, give or take the odd 
pamphlet, had Labour's own research staff/3 The programme was therefore not fully thought out 
and, as we shall show, did not have the complete backing of the then Labour parry leadership. 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of planning, in the space of only five years, the Labour Parry took 
into public ownership a great list of enterprises: 
Table 1. The main UK state-owned industries nationalised in the period 1945-51, with their dates 
of nationalisation.6 
Industrv/Firm p^g nf ^ ntirtnaliaatir.11 
Airlines 1946 
Bank of England 1946 
Coal 1947 
Cable and Wireless 1947 
Railways 1947 
British Waterways 1948 
Electricity Generation 1948 
Scottish Electricity 1948 
Electricity Distribution 1948 
Road Haulage 1948 
Buses 1948 
Ports 1948 
Gas 1949 
Steel 19S1 
4 Hennessy, P. It won't be all right on the night unless Blair prepares now\ The Guardian, 11 August 1994. 
5 Ibid. 
6 In Floud, R. and McCloskey, D. ed., The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, V ed. (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1994), p. 171. 
The Ncstiomiisaticm Programme (1943 -1951) 67 
As is clear from the table, the nature of the industries nationalised varied enormously. 
They included a major financial institution in the Bank of England, a complex manufacturing 
industry in British Steel, all the politically sensitive public utilities, such as British Gas, and also 
all the crucial transport networks, such as British Rail. By any account the programme was a 
remarkable legislative feat Despite me lack of planning and the differences in the Labour party 
over public ownership, it appeared to have succeeded in making the newly nationalised 
industries such a permanent feature of the British economy mat any reversal of public ownership 
looked to be virtually impossible. 
However, it would be a mistake to leave the impression that the success of the 
nationalisation programme can be explained merely as a rather unthought out, gut reaction to 
the war and to the failures of pre-war free market capitalism. Indeed, what may be surprising 
for those of us who live in a post-privatisation world, is just how justifiable the programme was 
in terms of the political, economic and moral arguments voiced in its favour. In what follows, 
we shall explore these arguments with a view to laying some of the groundwork for our later 
evaluation of privatisation. We shall also show how the origins of privatisation can be traced to 
the reaction against the ideological excesses of nationalisation, which was as dominant an 
ideology after the war as privatisation is in our day. 
THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISATION 
Beginning with the political factors that influenced the public reception of 
nationalisation, the historian Eric Hobsbawm would have us begin with 'the steamroller of 
coUectivism' which had been set in place by Bismark's welfare reforms in 1870.7 The adoption 
of these reforms, which were intended to cut the ground from under socialist agitation', * led to 
the abandonment in Britain of the liberal ideal of state non-intervention and to the rapid increase 
in Government employment mat followed. The recent experience of two world wars then added 
to this steamroller' by so conditioning the whole of British society to extensive state 
intervention in the economy mat extending public ownership was not the radical step one might 
be led to think it was, given Britain's strong liberal tradition and deep social and economic 
divisions. 
7 Quoted in Heimessy, P. Whitehall (Fontana: London, 1989), p. 55-56. 
»Ibid.,p.55. 
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The average upper class Tory was not in any case greatly interested in industry.9 The 
debt of gratitude he owed the patriotic British working class who, under his command, had 
willingly sacrificed all for king and country in me two wars may have helped mute his objections 
to the nationalisation of industry. But the more likely explanation for his acceptance of the post 
war settlement was that it was a lot better than the soviet style communism which he feared 
would nationalise his land The commitment of Labour leaders to parliamentary democracy also 
left open the possibility that the programme might be reversed at a later date. And their 
acceptance of the principle of paying compensation helped. It showed some respect for the right 
of private property and allayed fears mat nationalisation was to be used to effect a radical 
redistribution of income and wealth 
hi the case of the working class, the trade union movement had been won over from their 
traditional hostility to the state by the corporatism of the First World War. This had given them 
a respected partnership alongside industrialists and civil servants in the state direction of 
industry. As Stedman Jones, in his reconstruction of the background to the Labour Parry's 
adoption of Clause IV, makes this point, the wartime experience of the labour movement was 
both 
formative and seductive. It removed much of their traditional hostility to the 
state, and thenceforth shaped what they meant both by "common ownership'' 
and by "the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each 
industry or service". In other words, the union conception of Clause IV was 
collectivist and corporatist. It was to be a peacetime version of the wartime 
control of industry established under emergency regulations.10 
This understanding of public ownership did not however apply to all the politicians 
representing the labour movement Some of them had the foresight that they would ultimately 
be called to account for the performance of nationalised industry. And suspecting that some of 
the industries were not good candidates for nationalisation, they preferred greater control over 
these industries than state ownership. Accordingly, their understanding of Clause IV could be 
more corporatist than collectivist, depending on the industry in questioa Indeed the evidence 
suggests that some in the Labour leadership were pushed into adopting a more radical 
9 See further Weiner, M. English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1981). 
1 0 Stedman Jones, G. 'Labour can learn from Victorian values', The Independent, 24 April 199S. 
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programme of nationalisation than they might otherwise have chosen. 
This historical judgement is supported by the historian of nationalisation, Sir Norman 
Chester. He points out mat after the Labour Party's adoption of Clause IV in 1918 had appeared 
to foreclose the Party's internal debate, considerable disagreement continued between those who 
favoured extending public ownership and those who merely wanted more state control of 
industry. For instance, he commented that in the policy statement, For Socialism and Peace, 
adopted at the annual conference of 1934: 'though the wording seemed very forthright, it 
appeared from other parts of the statement that public control was seen as an alternative to 
public ownership. It was therefore not clear which industries were envisaged for 
nationalisation/11 Then in the particular debate over whether Iron and Steel should be 
nationalised, Chester noted that disagreement was especially strong. In this connection he 
reported that whereas in Labour's Immediate Programme of 1937, in which it was claimed that 
the steel unions had lost interest in nationalisation, the industry was left out of the 'shopping list*. 
However, despite the influential opposition of both Emmanuel Shinwell, who chaired Labour's 
Central Committee on Reconstruction Problems, set up in 1941, and Herbert Morrison, who was 
chosen to head up the policy committee in advance of the 194S election, by the time of the 
adoption of Let us Face the Future, the basis of the Parry's election campaign in 1945, pressure 
from the annual parry conference had forced its inclusion. On the basis of these disagreements, 
Chester concluded: 
Undoubtedly there were deep differences of opinion among the leaders of the 
Labour Party as to the wisdom of pledging the Party to nationalise the industry 
The doubters ranged from those who believed in nationalisation but thought a 
pledge might be an electoral handicap to those who would probably have 
preferred some form of public control short of complete nationalisation.12 
The understanding of Clause IV was therefore not as strongly collectivist amongst all 
Labour politicians as their radical legislative programme might have suggested Nevertheless, 
the more pragmatic ones were clearly in a minority that was overwhelmed by the extent of the 
support for nationalisation in both the Cabinet and in the rank and file of the Labour Party. This 
majority understood nationalisation, in the roily socialist sense used by Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, as a means of taking 'the commanding heights' of the British economy into the control 
1 1 Chester, N. The Nationalisation of British Industry 1945-51 (HMSO. London, 1975), p.4. 
"Ibid., p.8. 
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of the labour movement in order to' secure for the producers by hand and brain the full fruits of 
their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof mat may be possible'.13 In mis light, 
public ownership was viewed as an essential adjunct to the welfare state proposed by Beveridge 
to combat what he called the five giant evils of 'Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and 
Idleness." 
For a political explanation for the middle class support for nationalisation, there was the 
Fabian belief that the professional and salaried middle class possessed a "class interest" in public 
ownership (much as they were held to have a class interest in privatisation in the 1980s). This 
became more credible after the massive victory won by Labour in the 194S election. It is 
supported by Stedman Jones who claims mat, after the extension of the franchise in 1918 to all 
men and women over 28, the reason for the inclusion of the Webb's more comprehensive clause 
in preference to the more restrictive one of the Party Secretary, Aurthur Henderson, was 
electoral.13 As Stedman Jones points out, It was, after all, the middle class who would provide 
the salaried professionals to manage the state.'16 
THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONALISATION 
The politics of nationalisation, however, gives us only a part explanation for the 
widespread public support for the post-war programme. For another part of the background we 
must turn to the economics of nationalisation. This offered a further level of justification for 
public ownership which won over many non-Socialists and many of the key operators in or close 
to the industries themselves. As Foster makes this point. 
Nationalization is widely considered to be a Socialist policy, and its advocacy 
has been in the constitution of the British Labour Party since 1918. Much of the 
opposition to public ownership from the Right has indeed been that it was 
Socialism or would lead to it. But during the inter-war period especially, many 
non-Socialists, Liberals and even Conservatives, came to support it, particularly 
among those in, or dose to, the industries that were the prime candidates, 
1 3 In Pelling, H A Short History of the Labour Party (Macmillan: London, 1993), p 44. 
1 4 Quoted in Floud, R. and McCloskey, D. op.ctt, p.287. 
1 5 Henderson's formulation referred only to 'the common ownership of all monopolies and essential raw 
materials' .In the Webb's alternative this became 'the common ownership of the means of production'. 
1 6 'Labour can learn from Victorian values'. 
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mainly tfa@ public utilities, many of which were municipal.17 
71 
Wasteful Competition 
At the tame, mmk of this cross-party support for istiosMteation rested ©m the belief m 
She wastefulness of competition and the gams to be ted from consolidation. In this connection 
it is worth H®ssllmg that the pre-sffltionalisstion stete of amy of the iisdsssteies was the result of 
n i y local, regional, private, municipal and Government initiatives exploiting the technologies 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.18 In the energy sector, there were 369 
municipal and 200 private electricity undertakings; there were 300 power stations, operated by 
130 separate generating authorities. In coal, there were 1,500 collieries, owned by 746 colliery 
undertakings, of which 640 were limited companies and the rest were in the hands of 
partnerships or individuals. Gas was the most complicated of all. There were 269 municipal 
operations, 5 joint boards, 264 non-statutory organizations which in total supplied less than 2 
percent of the market, and 509 public utilities. Such was the complexity, i f not outright 
confusion, of the patterns of ownership and control that all the impartial investigatory 
commissions, such as those of me Heyworth Committee for gas (1945), the Reid Committee for 
coal (1945), and the McGowan Committee for energy (1936), all reported that some form of 
Government intervention was needed in the interests of promoting greater efficiency.19 As Foster 
comment: Whatever one's view of nationalisation now, it then seemed impossible for the free' 
market - which was in fact subject to many legislative and other regulatory restrictions - to bring 
about needful concentrations in many industries.'20 
The failure of market competition was also highlighted at the time by the massive 
challenge of reconstruction. This called for extensive new investment to repair air-raid damage 
and to make up for me running down of maintenance and the putting off of major replacements 
and repairs during the war. Although a matter of dispute between the Labour Government and 
some of the companies marked down for nationalisation, it was widely feared that the required 
level of investment would not be forthcoming from what Will Button has recently called the 
1 7 Fost@*, C. Privatisation, Ptsbisc OwasTship ami ihs Regulation of NaturalMonopoly (Blsckwell: Oxford, 
1992), p.70. 
1 8 This description of the state of pre-nattonaiisation industry draws on Foster, op.ch., p. 73 ff. 
1 9 See further Chester, N. op.cit, p. 19 if. 
2 0 Foster, C. op. cit, p.73. 
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"gentlemanly capitalism" of the City.21 This concern suggests that already by then it was known 
mat the City was reluctant o invest in British wdtistry and mam^^ 
far better mlmm from investing in me vast resources that had opened up for investment abroad. 
In {he light of mis perceived failure of competition, by taking over Britain's strategic industries 
and backing them with state finance, nationalisation presented an opportunity to provide the 
controls over investment needed for reconstruction. In these straightened circumstances it was 
understandable that many came to 'regard competition as unimportant or wasteful or 
demonstrably wrong, a relic of the past'22 
Natural Monopoly 
A second major argument for nationalisation arose in the special case of natural 
monopoly. The need for some form of government regulation of mis type of industry was 
relatively free from political controversy on the understanding that without regulation a natural 
monopolist could exploit barriers to entry to make excessive profits and provide an inferior level 
of service.23 For example, the owner of a local electricity grid, or railway line, or gas pipe-line, 
which constituted the sole means of supply in that region, could deter any potential competitors 
by temporarily exploiting this advantage; for instance, he could lower prices below cost, 
knowing that the loss could be made up at a later date. In order to prevent this type of antisocial 
activity and to provide adequate public services, many public utilities had been brought under 
municipal control or ownership by the end of the nineteenth century. In this case, on the grounds 
of the economies of scale thought to obtain from unifying local and regional units under a 
national management structure, nationalisation presented itself as a logical rationalisation or 
extension of municipal ownership. 
Regulatory Failure 
A third main economic justification for nationalisation, closely linked with natural 
monopoly and the complex patterns of ownership and control existing at the time but helpfully 
kept as a separate argument, was the cost of regulatory failure. This was pervasive throughout 
2 1 Button, W. The Slate We 're In (Jonathon Cape: London, 1995), pxi. 
2 2 Morrison, H. Socialisation and Transport (Constable: London, 1933). 
2 3 See farther the National Economic Development Office, A Study of UK Nationalised Industries (HMSO: 
London, 1976), Appendix p.75. 
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the British economy. Drawing on his extensive theoretical and practical knowledge of regulation, 
and in particular railway regulation, Foster claims that such was the regulatory tangle that it was 
threatening to suffocate the economy.34 In the case of the railways, for example, he estimated 
that ' I f British railway and capital costs and other overheads could have been kept down to 
European levels ...it does not seem extreme to suppose that British transport fares and charges 
might have been from a third to a half of what they were, quite enough on its own to have 
enhanced the competitiveness of British exports to the point where Germany, Belgium and 
France may not have been able to establish an effective international rivalry'.23 
As an explanation for this regulatory failure, Foster pointed out that the attempt to 
regulate by Act of Parliament had resulted in extensive regulatory capture, and that, in the case 
of die railways, so powerful was the railway lobby that this early form of regulation had to be 
abandoned in the 1870s and replaced by more regular and interventionist regulation by 
(Commission. However, by 1943, even this more 'hands on' form of regulation had largely been 
defeated. Interestingly, he notes mat regulation by commission had experimented with a sliding 
rate of return regulation = prefiguring the modem RPI-X formula - as early as before the First 
World War.26 In the light of this brief history of regulation, nationalisation presented itself as an 
opportunity to sort out the regulatory tangle and introduce a more effective model of regulation 
than had been tried before. 
Economic Planning 
A fourth major justification for nationalisation on economic grounds was found in the 
belief in economic planning along the lines advocated by John Maynard Keynes shortly before 
the war in his celebrated General Theory? In the immediate post-war context it was widely 
feared that the First World War pattern of a short boom and then a slump would be repeated. 
With this fear dominating the White Paper on Employment Policy of 1944, agreed to by both 
Labour and Conservative members of the Coalition Government, and with the nation facing the 
challenge of demobilisation and converting a wartime economy back to civilian use, Chester 
2 4 Foster, C. op.cit, p.73. 
2 3 Ibid., p.64. 
2 6 Ibid., p. 17-64 for a fuller discussion of early railway regulation. 
2 7 Keynes, J.M. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (Harcourt, Brace: New York, 1936). 
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explains that nationalisation of Hie major capital using industries with ministerial control of 
borrowing was seem as a means of controlling the level of investment and therefore of 
employment, and also of prices.28 
Industrial Relations 
As a fifth economic reason for nationalisation, the hops that public ownership would 
bring about improved working conditions and better industrial relations in some of the 
industries, especially coal, deserves a mention. It was of course not expected, except by the most 
naive, that industrial unrest would be eliminated. It was always recognised by the Labour 
leadership, for instance, mat the workers in a nationalised industry must retain the right to strike. 
Nevertheless, it was not unreasonable to hope mat the wartime corporatist experience, which had 
proved the economic potential of a close working relationship between labour, civil servants and 
management, could be continued in the nationalised industries in peace time and, even i f not 
perfect, that this would be an improvement on the pre-war industrial relations record 
The Arms' Length Model 
In connection with the economic arguments for nationalisation, the conciliatory 
organisational model chosen for nationalisation deserves to be mentioned because it may have 
helped win over those who may not have been entirely persuaded by offering a form of public 
ownership that was less threatening than alternative models. According to Foster, Morrison 
'deliberately chose it as the model most likely to appeal to non-Socialists'.29 
In order to appreciate just how conciliatory Morrison's model was it is helpful to set out 
the radical socialist alternatives.30 There were two main contenders reflecting the old debate in 
the Labour Movement between those who favoured state ownership and those who were opposed 
to extending the power of the state. The former tended to support the Fabian model, which 
involved the full integration of state enterprises into government departments, along the lines 
of the Post Office. The latter, whose main objective was direct worker's control of industry, 
favoured a form of Guild Socialism or Syndicalism whose object was to transfer ownership of 
2 8 Chester, N. op.cit, p.23. 
2 9 Foster, C. op.cit., p.77. 
1 0 Ibid., p. 76 ff. for a fuller discussion of the Morrisonian model and its alternatives. 
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an enterprise to a worker's ijnion. 
In contrast with these statist and syndicalist models, the Morrisonian model of 
nationalised industry presented a distinctively pragmatic third way. It was a model he hied taken 
over ffiosn the Central Electricity Board (CEB), set up in 1926, and which he had used as the 
blueprint for the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB), set tap in 1933. What it amounted 
to was a public corporation, "at arms length" from government, responsible for managing the 
assets of the sorporatioa in the interests of the common good, while ensuring that it paid its way 
taking one year with the next In this way it sought to appeal to both those who wished the 
resources of industry to be used for social ends and those who needed reassuring that the 
nationalised industries would not be a drain on the public purse. 
As it turned out, nationalisation on the lines of this model was relatively uncontroversial. 
For the feme conservative, it had in its flavour that it had evolved out of the experience of the past 
and thai all the pre-war nationalisations (by Conservative governments) had employed the same 
model. On account of this familiarity, Morrison was able to tease the Conservative Opposition 
by saying that, 'despite their being the Party of privilege, they really should not claim the 
exclusive privilege of being permitted to introduce Socialist legislation, and that they might 
permit mis particular piece of Socialist work to be undertaken by a Socialist Government'31 For 
liberals, like Keynes, the arms' length public corporation was consistent with his belief that 
social progress lay in the growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the state -
'bodies whose criterion for action within their field is solely in the public good as they 
understand it' * For the strict socialist, its most controversial aspects were that it accepted that 
the profit motive was a necessary economic discipline and that the corporation, to use the words 
of Lord Denning in his definitive judgement on the legal status of public corporations, was "its 
own master".33 Although this meant that they were not altogether happy with the model, in the 
light of the disastrous experience of direct worker control of industry in Russia immediately after 
the Bolshevik revolution, which Morrison used to defend himself against the Syndicalists in the 
Labour Party, their criticism could not be too strident 
It is also worth pointing out that Morrison commanded a great deal of personal authority 
3 1 Morrison, H, op.cit., p.213 
3 2 See Foster, C. op.cit, p.77, footnote 36 for the Liberal support for a public trust model. 
3 3 Quoted in Foster, C. op.cit., p.77. 
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on flhs subject of public owngrship. This he had acquired, in the first instance, from many years 
working on the problems of London Transport as Secretory ©f the London Labour Party. There 
the vexed problem of the capital's teanspoirt offered plaudits to any politician who could solve 
i t Later, as Minister of Transport in the Labour Aclministeation of 1929=31, it was he who had 
pioneered the bill for the London Passenger Transport Board. The achievement of having Ms 
bill, admittedly with amendments, passed by a Conservative Government, attests both to his 
personal authority and also to the persuasiveness of his advocacy of the bill in his Socialisation 
and Transport. This book presents the classical defence of nationalisation and is worth 
reviewing for its shredding of the arguments of those who at the time liked to chime the merits 
of tree competition. 
Socialisation and Transport. 
In the chapter with the title, The Case for Competition Examined, Morrison began his 
examination of competition by exploring the impact of competition on workers. From his links 
with the trade unions in me transport industry, he was able to show that where there was genuine 
competition leading to lower feres, the owners tended to take it out on the men'.34 For example, 
he cited the conditions of employment of coach drivers that were so bad that they presented a 
danger to the travelling public. Indeed, such was this danger that the government passed the 
Road Traffic Act of 1930, which limited the hours coach drivers could work. 
Then he turned his attention to customers. From his municipal experience, he could 
authoritatively pronounce on the impact of competition on the quality of service. He argued that 
the threat of competition driving down profits simply scared investment away, leading either to 
failures to improve and expand services or to a deterioration in service. In the case of the 
planned new tube railway network, for example, he pointed out that the threat of competition 
from other forms of transport meant that the Government had had either to guarantee or to 
provide some of the finance needed for the project; in his own words' competition has not kept 
London transport out of public funds: it has pushed it on to public funds' . 3 } Similarly, in the 
case of the desperately needed electrification of the metropolitan lines, he was able to support 
his case against competition on me ground of the owner's disclaimer that' i f electrification is to 
* Morrison, H op.cit, p.60. 
"IbiA, p.61. 
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be achieved it must either be subsidised or protected against competition.36 Then, on the related 
issue of the provision of a universal service, Morrison pointed out that it would only be possible 
to cross-subsidise socially deserving services i f there were sufficient profits. It was this last 
argument mat the railway Combine used to defend its private monopoly. He conceded their case 
for a monopoly, but then turned on their record of excessive profits to argue that this supported 
his case for a public monopoly. 
On the basis of the detailed evidence for extensive market failure he had assembled, 
Morrison concluded that 'the whole economic and political history of London transport 
constitutes a striking repudiation of competition by its theoretical advocates'.37 But not content 
with a purely negative argument, Morrison then proceeded, in the following chapter, to build a 
case for consolidation. He began with the needs of consumers. He argued that in their interests 
there is clearly a case for a central agreement on inter-connections, through-booking and the 
pooling of receipts, and that agreement could not be forthcoming from so many independent 
operators. 
He then turned his attention to the right of management to manage. His contention here 
was that anything less than total consolidation of both management and ownership would not 
give management sufficient "elbow room"; management would be for ever involved in 
negotiating agreements between the owners and the inevitable compromises arrived at, apart 
from the waste of time and energy, would prove inefficient As he bluntly put it: 'The 
management of one undertaking which owns the lot can say, "This is ours, and we will do with 
it what we will in the interests of efficiency, public service, and the well-being of the 
workpeople in our employment"' .3* 
He raised the issue of finance next Interestingly, this received brief treatment, perhaps 
because he had not sufficiently worked it through or because he was not totally convinced. 
Whatever the reason, the short space it received is curious given that one of the central themes 
of Socialist economics is that by eliminating the need to make a profit in order to pay dividends 
the enterprise is enabled to pay its workers more, reduce prices and raise investment in the 
3 6 Ibid., p.61. 
"Ibid., p.66. 
"Ibid., p.76. 
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interests of consumers.39 While Morrison followed this Socialist orthodoxy to an extent, 
claiming that there were advantages to public ownership even when shares were replaced by 
loans, because the rate of interest charged on the relatively secure loans of a public monopoly 
would be lower than the rate of return demanded by shareholders, he does not appear to want 
to rely on mis argument Instead, the argument which appears to have had more weight for him 
(at any rate he gives it by far the greater space) was that the pressure from shareholders to pay 
excessively high dividends would demand such a level of public regulation and supervision of 
a private monopoly that it would stifle the enterprise. In support of this argument about 
regulatory failure, he was able to cite the complaints of the four existing railway managements. 
They complained of the existing regulation that they were already 'not free to manage, and that 
the cost involved in statistical returns and reports to the Ministry of Transport, and in legal 
argument and the provision of expert evidence before the Railway Rates Tribunal, is great' To 
this he responded, 'Great as it is, it would be greater still i f the competition between the four 
undertakings were ended by the establishment of a statutory private transport monopoly.'40 
The final part of Morrison's case rests on the merits of replacing a regulated private 
monopoly with a public monopoly run by an able management and supervised by a publicly 
spirited Board, representing the various stakeholders of the industry. Given all that has come to 
light in more recent years about the general level of incompetence of the "gentlemanly 
management culture" of British industry, which Correlli Barnett, in his devastating book, The 
Audit of War, blames for so much of Britain's relative economic decline,41 the idea of an able, 
publicly spirited and professional management that could be trusted to get on with the job 
without detailed regulation and supervision was appealing. As Morrison put this part of the case 
for nationalisation: 
A targe pubHc concern employing able officers with good status, supervised by 
8 Board of able ami public spirited people, is much more likely to resist 
improper influence, corruption, and jobbery and to insist upon clean 
administration ami the supremacy of the public interest, than a private monopoly 
which has no real responsibility to the public.42 
5 9 See further Redwood, J. Public Enterprise in Crisis (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980). 
4 0 Morrison, H. op rit, p. 79. 
4 1 Barnett, C. The Audit of War (Macrrrillan: London, 1986), see p.206 ff. And also Weiner op.cit., pl45 ff. 
4 3 Morrison, H. op.cit., p.80. 
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There was much else to Morrison's apologia. But let it suffice here to say mat it presented 
an impressively argued case for the superior economic efficiency not only of a publicly owned 
London Transport but also of public ownership in general. It was also impressive for the way it 
succeeded in combining a high moral tone with a realistic business outlook, as is evident in the 
following passage in which he lectured his fellow socialists on the importance of economics: 
The high moral purpose of Socialism does not and must not prevent the 
Socialist in public affairs carrying a sound business head on his shoulders, nor 
must he feel it in any way a treachery to his ideals if he must elaborate in a 
realistic spirit the organisation and management of socialised industries. The 
Socialist Minister of the future must try to be as good a man at business for 
public ends as the ablest of the capitalists or managing directors are for private 
ends. Certainty his mental and emotional outlook must comprise the visions, the 
ideals and the whole comprehensive policy of Socialism, for otherwise he might 
get lost in a mass of practical business details. But it is essential that Socialism 
should be sound public business as well as being healthy in its social morality. 
Socialism must stand the double test of being ethically sound and economically 
sound; for man cannot live by abstract ethics alone, while the establishment of 
a human society that h ves by bread alone, - even though there be plenty of it -
is an object to which it is not worth devoting one's life.143 
THE CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF NATIONALISATION 
In addition to the persuasiveness of the political and economic case made for public 
ownership, nationalisation received strong support directly and indirectly from the moral 
leadership of the nation. Of course this moral leadership was not confined to the representatives 
of Christianity. However, as the moral influence of Christianity (and in particular Methodism) 
on the Labour movement was strong,44 and as we are limited by the length of this study as to how 
many different perspectives we can include, in what follows we shall confine ourselves to an 
exploration of three of the leading Christian moralists of the inter-war and post-war years. A 
study of these three, William Temple, representing Social Christianity, R.H. Tawney, 
representing Radical Christianity, and Hensley Henson, representing Conservative Christianity, 
will show something of the diversity of Christian approaches to public ownership and will also 
4 3 Ibid., p.281. 
4 4 This is reflected in Morrison's lecture (and sermon) quoted above with its reference to a life not to be lived by 
bread alone. 
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give some indication of the extent of the Christian support for the nationalisation programme 
of 1945-51. 
William Temple 
Of the Christian leadership which was broadly supportive of the ideals of the Labour 
Party, William Temple deserves first mention. Although he died in October 1944, before the end 
of the war, and after only two and a half years as Archbishop of Canterbury, his premature death 
only added to the stature of his teaching on social issues, which was already great in his 
life-time.43 As a son of a former Archbishop of Canterbury, then as a brilliant Oxford don, he had 
gone on to play a leading role in the Ecumenical Movement. His translation from York to 
Canterbury therefore brought to the head of the established church a figure who commanded 
considerable moral authority in both Church and State. 
Alan Suggate's account of the development of Temple's social thinking places Temple 
in the tradition of the Victorian Christian Socialists, notably Thomas Arnold and F.D.Maurice, 
and of the Christian Social Union (CSU) formed in 1889.46 The spiritual core of this movement 
and of Temple's whole social outlook was an incamational theology. This emphasised the 
fellowship of all human beings in Christ, who is believed to have assumed all humanity into 
himself in the incarnation. Temple liked to express this profound theological truth in the 
acronym BOMFOG (the Brotherhood of man and the Fellowship of God). His devotional classic, 
Reading/s in St John's Gospel (1939-40), suggests that this incamational theology was the main 
source of his theological inspiration throughout his life. However, as we will show from 
Suggate's study, Temple's war experience was to challenge his great incarnational synthesis and 
move him towards more of a theology of redemption in his last years. 
Temple believed himself to have represented this social Christianity throughout his life. 
He also understood it to be the dominant teaching of the Church in earlier centuries. In one of 
his last utterances on economic affairs to members of the Bank Officer's Guild, he said of this 
tradition that though it has been obscured - never completely obliterated - during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, and rather fitfully revived in the nineteenth. I think it is going pretty 
* See further Welsby, PA A History of the Church of England, 1945-1980 (OUP: Oxford, 1984), p.4. 
" Suggate, A. William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today (T&T. Clark: Edinburgh, 1987), p.». 
The Nationalisation Programme (1945 -1951) % 1 
strong again now' f He contributed to mis tradition from a number of different sources, of which 
the philosophical idealism of T.H. Green, the dialectical method of Edward Caird, the teaching 
of Jacques Maritain on personality, and the liberal Catholicism of Charles Gore were the most 
important 
Temple wrote of Gore mat he was the one from whom I have learnt more than from any 
other now living of the Spirit of Christianity and to whom more than to any other...I owe my 
degree of apprehension of its truth' . 4 8 Of Gore's publications, two volumes of essays which he 
edited deserve special mention for their influence on Temple's social ethics. Lux Mundi (1889), 
subtitled 'A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation', helped shape Temple's 
incarnational theology and his life-long sympathy for a reformed natural law ethic. The paper 
contributed to the collection Property: its Duties and Rights (1913), by the liberal humanist 
social philosopher L.T.Hobhouse may have been especially formative for Temple's response to 
the debate over public and private ownership of industry. It developed and defended the 
understanding of property in the Aristotelian - Thomist tradition that property should be privately 
owned but common in use. On the basis of this apparent paradox, Hobhouse insisted that 
everyone should have private property, it should be widely distributed, and that it should be 
under the control of the democratic state.49 
In Maritain's teaching on persons, Temple found a resource to help him steer a course 
through the two competing ideologies of his time: social collectivism, which he rejected for its 
denial mat 'every man is always more than can be expressed in all his social relationships taken 
together1,50 and liberal capitalism for its denial of the essential solidarity human beings share 
one with another by its treatment of the human being as a means and not also as and end. In 
Maritain's view capitalism stood condemned for its contempt of the poor man, who is held only 
to exist' as an instrument of production, a 'hand', not as a person.'5'It was this careful balance, 
with its insistence that means and ends should not be confused in the treatment of the human 
person, which helped Temple formulated his three moral constants of individual freedoms 
4 7 Temple, W. The Church Looks Forward (Macmillan London, 1987), p. 141. 
* In Suggate, A. op.cit., p. 19. 
** Hobhouse, L.T. The Historical Evolution Of Property, In Fact And Idea in Charles Gore ed, Property Its 
Duties and Rights (Macmillan: New York, 1922). 
5 0 Temple, W. Christianity and Social Order (Penguin/Shepheard Walwyn: London, 1942/1976), p. 104. 
5 1 Maritain, J. True Humanism (The Centenary Press: London, 1938), p. 107. 
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exercised in a fellowship of persons serving the common good and led to his approval of 
Aquinas' defence and limitation of private property.52 
Edward Caird was Temple's Master at Balliol when he was an undergraduate there. His 
social concern inspired Temple, as it did many other Balliol students. But an equally important 
influence was Caird's dialectical method of acquiring knowledge. This sought to overcome the 
inadequacies of both the inductive and deductive method by modelling how we actually arrive 
at human knowledge by an interactive process of living, theorising and reformulating our 
theories in the light of experience. As Temple explained and defended the dialectical method: 
All actual thinking proceeds in circles or pendulum swings. We approach a group of facts; they 
suggest a theory; in the light of the theory we get a fuller grasp of the facts; this fuller grasp 
suggests modifications of the theory; and so we proceed until we reach a systematic 
apprehension of the facts where each fits into its place. In the end we have not one universal and 
unquestioned proposition with other propositions deductively established from it, but a whole 
system - a concrete universal - in which each element is guaranteed by the rest, and all together 
constitute the whole which determines each.'93 
Green's distinctive Hegelianism, which emphasised God's immanence in both individuals 
and society as the principle of reason and morality, supported Temple's belief in the essential 
rationality of reality. Its teaching that God realises himself progressively in society and in 
individuals, allied with Green's dismissal of the notion of original sin as barbaric, also helped 
shape the young Temple's optimism about the possibility of social and individual progress and 
his striving for a synthesis of reason and revelation.34 
The incamational synthesis of these major intellectual influences on his thought served 
Temple for most of his life. However, as we have mentioned, in the last ten years, and especially 
after 1937, the gathering clouds of war and the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr rocked his 
confidence in this synthesis. These later influences forced him to take fuller account both of the 
pervasiveness of sin in all individuals and society and of the reality of power. The shift in his 
thinking, from a theology of creation to a theology of redemption, is reflected in the following 
passage from his opening address at the Malvern Conference, which he called in 1941 to begin 
5 2 See further Suggate, A. op.cit., p. 11 If. 
"Ibid., p.l7ff. 
5 4 Ibid., p.!6ff. 
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the task of helping Church and society understand the causes of the war and to prepare for the 
reform of the post-war order. Temple's comment on Maritain can be read as a repudiation of 
much of bis own work as a theologian and philosopher: 
There is a second main point at which the scholastics fail to satisfy; and hers I 
find in Maritain no advance upon St. Thomas. There is in that theological 
tradition no adequate appreciation of the hideous power of sin. Of course it is 
mentioned, and formally the description of sin is sound. But it is soon left behind 
and attention is fastened on particular sins which are the outward manifestation 
of sin itself. I lately read in close conjunction Maritain's last book to appear in 
English - Scholasticism and Politics - and Remhold Niebuhr's last book -
Christianity and Power Politics. Maritain's book is systematic and, though 
handling its subject only in outline, magnificently coherent. Niebuhr's book is a 
collection of articles, essays and sermons. Yet it is this and not the other which 
gives the impression of a deeply Christian mind grappling with the realities of 
today, and this is due to the fact that Niebuhr's whole mind is possessed by the 
sense of that aboriginal sin of man which consists in putting himself at the centre 
where God alone ought to be, thus claiming in effect to be the God of his own 
world. That fact is the source of power politics, and there can be no politics 
which are not in part power-politics until all citizens of all nations, and their 
niters, are wholly redeemed out of self-centredness into perfect fellowship with 
God made known in Christ. If that consummation can ever be reached on earth, 
as I presume it cannot, it is certainly so remote that it may be left out of 
consideration except as the standard of judgement whereby we are all 
"concluded under sin."35 
In Suggate's judgement, Temple's response to the extraordinary circumstances of the 
last years of his life helped in overcoming some of the weaknesses of the tradition of social 
Christianity which he had inherited and provides a resource for a methodological framework for 
Christian social ethics for today. At the heart of this framework is the method that Temple 
started to apply as early as the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship 
(COPEC), held in 1924. This began by accepting that the Bible can not provide us with a 
detailed programme of Christian social action. Instead, it understands the Bible as offering the 
direction of a Christian social ethic, in the sense of providing us with a broad Christian vision 
55 Malvern 1941, The Life of the Church and the Order of Society, the proceedings of the Archbishop of York's 
conference, (Longmans, Green and Co.: London, 1941), p.IS. 
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made up of the primary principles, such as love, peace and justice, which all Christians can agree 
upon. From these primary principles he then derived social principles, such as fellowship and 
freedom, from which he went on to form middle axioms. While he accepted mat these may not 
receive the same degree of acceptance amongst all Christians, he nevertheless held that they 
ought to allow a group of Christians to begin working out the details of a programme of social 
action together with recognised experts in me social sciences. In order to complete this last step, 
Temple's method required mat middle axioms be held together with the concrete circumstances 
surrounding a particular ethical decision, in the process of dialectical reasoning, or interplay 
between fact and value, which he had learnt from Caird. As Temple summed up this method, 
the right thing to do is the thing that is the best in the circumstances.'36 
With mis brief background to both the man and his thought, we can begin by turning to 
the Malvern Conference of 1941 for his specific teaching on public ownership. During the 
conference, two Anglican laymen, Sir Richard Ackland and Kenneth Ingram, put a radical 
motion on private property. It appeared to imply that private property and Christianity were 
incompatible. Temple responded in a letter to Ackland by asserting what he understood to be the 
traditional Christian doctrine of property that it required' a full recognition of private property 
combined with an insistence that it must always carry responsibility/ As he went on to elaborate, 
' The property without function is the thing that is condemned. Now this condemns a very large 
amount of property which exists today: to some extent in land, to an enormous extent in stocks 
and shares/37 While making clear Temple's defence of private property with social obligations, 
what it left open was what he thought should be done about the property which stood 
condemned. 
Temple's appendix to Christianity and Social Order (1942), which contains his suggested 
programme for the reconstruction of British society after the war, confirmed and developed this 
somewhat inadequate response. In order to understand him we need to begin with the method 
he had proposed for COPEC and which he used, all-be-it inconsistently, from that time onwards. 
Applied to industry, this involved the use of the two derivative social principles of fellowship 
and freedom. These he had applied since as early as the First World War when he wrote that The 
5 4 Suggate, A. op.cit., p.221. 
9 7 Quoted in Kent, J. William Temple (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992), p. 159. 
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Labour point of view is iiradamemtaiy Christian' . 3 8 When he mow applied these in the context 
of the Second World War, he used ten to distance himself from the nationalisation plans of the 
Labour Party on the ground that rationalisation, by restricting economic freedoms in society, 
would have the consequence that it would also limit political feeedomss. As he argued, 'no one 
doubts that in the post-war world our economic life must be •planned' in a way and to an extent 
that even Mr.GJadsttone would have regarded, and condemned, as socialistic'. But 'We can so 
plan for efficiency as to destroy freedom; Fascism does this.'39 
The influence of Niebuhr's Christian realism here is more clearly apparent in the lesson 
Temple went on to draw that, 'The art of Government is not to devise what would be the best 
system for saints to work, but to secure that the lower motives actually found among men prompt 
mat conduct which the higher motives demand....We must go on to seek to provide such outlets 
for self-interest while it remains - t i l l Kingdom come' whether here or hereafter - as well as 
harness it to the cause of justice and fellowship'. ^ Niebuhr's influence is also evident in the way 
Temple supported this principled pragmatism with a realist interpretation of self-interest by 
allowing that it need not always be bad: Moreover, not all forms of self-interest are bad. A man 
is right to demand for himself and his children what is needed for the fullness of personal life, 
though it may be noble that when he has it he should sacrifice i t Our need is to find channels 
for right self-interest which do not encourage exaggeration of it as our present order does'. 
Nevertheless, despite his new found Christian realism, Temple did not altogether 
abandon his Christian socialism. He continued to hold together the derivative principles of 
freedom and fellowship by insisting that freedom be exercised in fellowship. Then holding these 
principles together with the economic circumstances of his time in the dialectical method, he 
proposed a number of reforms of industry. His industrial fellowship translated, firstly, into 
genuine industrial democracy. Criticising the exclusion of labour from decision making in 
industry he complained that The lack of any participation by labour in the conduct of the actual 
work of production is a manifest sign of the broken fellowship of our economic l i fe ' . a 
3 0 In Suggate, A. op.cit, p.79. 
59 Christianity cmd Social Order, p.99. 
2 0 Ibid., p. 100. 
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Secondly, it required the extension and institutionalisation of aspects of the existing corporative 
relations of the war. In this connection he proposed a change in the Articles of Association of 
limited liability companies to secure mat workers are effectively represented as directors on the 
board of directors of their company. He also proposed that the State be empowered to nominate 
one or more directors 'to represent the public interest, that is to say the interest of the consumer 
who should always be paramount'Thirdly, he proposed that the surplus profits earned by a 
limited liability company, calculated in relation to a stipulated maximum level of dividends, be 
used for social purposes, such as 'a wage equalisation fund, for the maintenance of wages in bad 
times'.64 Fourthly, in his suggestions for the reform of financial institutions, he proposed a 
limited programme of nationalisation in the interests of the common good. In this case he 
accepted mat mere was a strong case for nationalising the Bank of England and the Joint Stock 
Banks on the ground mat 'it is wrong in principle mat finances should control production'.65 But 
even in these cases, his aversion to any extension of the power of the state led him to express a 
clear preference for the Morrisonian arm's-length model of the public corporation. 
As revolutionary as these reforms still are today, it is clear from the above that Temple 
merely advocated the reform of industry within a capitalist framework; he wanted 'no breach 
of continuity', and 'transformation by adaptation, not by destruction'.66 He also distanced 
himself from those Christians who advocated a kind of half-way house between capitalism and 
socialism in what he called the corporative state or, as it is more commonly known, the 
corporate state. This he argued, 'swings the pendulum too far' 6 7 on account of its denial of the 
individual. As he put this: 
No citizen expresses through his activity in various fellowships the whole of his 
significance. It is true that to be a person is more than to be an Individual; but 
it is necessary to be an Individual; and indeed the fundamental doctrine that each 
man is a child of God, capable through Christ, the true Son of God, of rising to 
the height of that status, implies that every man is always more than can be 
expressed in all his relationships taken together. The scheme of the Corporative 
°Ibid., p. 103. 
"Ibid., p. 196. 
"Ibid., p. 111. 
"Ibid., p.113. 
wIbid., p. 104. 
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State is therefore as unsatisfactory as either Individualism or Communism.*8 
In the light of this exposition of the appendix to Christianity and Social Order we can 
conclude that Temple stood with the minority in the Labour Party who wanted more state 
control, rather than more state ownership, of industry, but that he nevertheless proposed a 
limited programme of nationalisation. However, this conclusion should not overlook the extent 
to which the influence of the early Temple's public membership of the Labour Party, bis 
promotion of industrial democracy and an early version of the stakeholder corporation, and his 
condemnation of excessive holdings of land and shares, gave indirect support for the post-war 
nationalisation programme. It is also worth pointing out that there is an inconsistency in his 
cautious approach to nationalisation and the radical nature of his programme of reform, because 
his reforms had no hope of ever being implemented without something like nationalisation to 
break the power of the owners. In this connection, it is worth speculating whether Temple's 
gradualism reflected a personal weakness on his part which made him want to avoid conflict at 
all costs. This is in fact suggested by Adrian Hastings' portrait of Temple where he detects, as 
early as Temple's Repton appointment, someone who voiced views which promised a revolution 
in public school education but who really had no stomach to see through radical change.69 
Richard Henry Tawney 
In contrast to Temple, his life-long friend R.H. Tawney uncompromisingly advocated 
nationalisation as part of his Christian socialism. In this he stood in a radical tradition 
represented by the Chartism of William Lovett, the industrial socialism of Robert Owen, and the 
political economy of John Ruskin rather than in the reforming tradition of the Victorian 
Christian Socialists of Temple. Tawney's moral influence on the post-war settlement cannot be 
underestimated. As an editorial in The Times put it, on the day after his eightieth birthday was 
celebrated at a dinner in the House of Commons (November 28,1960): 'No man alive has put 
more people into his spiritual and intellectual debt than has Richard Henry Tawney' . 7 0 
Tawney's influence as a social ethicist rested squarely on his work as an economic 
"Ibid., p. 104-105. 
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historian. He combined this academic commitment with a life-long involvement with the 
Workers Educational Association (WEA); he was on the WEA executive for foray-two years, and 
president from 1928-1945. This selfless involvement brought him close to the working class 
person. It led to his gaming the reputation that he had taken the time to listen to workers, and 
therefore could speak authoritatively on their conditions. And such was his reputation, both as 
an economic historian and a saint of the workers education movement, that he was invited to 
conoibute to a number of Government commissions. Of particular importance for our study was 
his membership of the Royal Commission on the Coal Mines, chaired by Justice John Sankey, 
which was called in response to a threatened miners' strike in February 1919. It turned him into 
a national figure and provided the laboratory for much of his thinking on nationalisation. 
For Tawney's teaching on nationalisation, we need to begin with the general case he built 
against capitalism. The central argument of his classic, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism is 
mat the emergence of capitalism marks a radical break with the medieval tradition of Christian 
social ethics, such that not only is it impossible to provide a moral defence of capitalism from 
within Christian tradition but also that capitalism is directly opposed to Christianity. In support 
of this thesis, he began by pointing out that in the medieval Christian tradition's understanding 
of the natural law as divinely given, ethics 'starts from the position mat there is a moral authority 
to which considerations of economic expediency must be subordinated*.71 It therefore follows 
in this tradition that economics is understood to be a branch of ethics, and ethics, in turn, a 
branch of theology. As Tawney pointed this out: The distinctive feature of medieval thought is 
that contrasts which later were to be presented as irreconcilable antitheses appear in it as 
differences within a larger unity, and that the world of social organization, originating in 
physical necessities, passes by insensible gradations into that of the spirit7 2 
He went on to explain mat in mis seamless religious, ethical and social framework, 
Christian teaching had a direct application to the whole of economic life: Prices were to be set 
according to standards of natural justice. The rules of extending credit were subject to the 
strictures against usury. Serfdom was acceptable in a hierarchically ordered society, but 
employment imposed on the employer bom rights and responsibilities. Similarly ownership 
carried the responsibilities of a trustee, and therefore was viewed as a service. Profits, generally 
7 1 Tawney, R.H. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Harcourt Brace/Mentor: New York, 192671947), p.41. 
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frowned upon, were treated as a special case of wages, in that the trader was only allowed to 
make a profit sufficient to satisfy his wants. Provision for the poor was a primary social 
responsibility. Particularly odious was the sin of avarice, which resulted in taking for oneself 
what is due one's neighbour. Permeating the whole was the notion of social solidarity, of a 
Christian commonwealth. 
Tawney traced the abandonment of this comprehensive Christian social and ethical 
framework to the Reformation He taught that in England, the dissolution of the monasteries 
unleashed such a flood of avarice that it set in motion a social upheaval that could not be 
contained by the political and religious authorities. In the teaching of the Continental reformers 
on justification by God's grace alone, material was provided for the growth of a religious 
individualism. Together these forces combined to overwhelm the traditional teaching of the 
Church such mat by the Restoration, the progressive erosion of the authority of the established 
church by the growth of Nonconformity and the progressive secularisation of society, had 
contributed to an attitude of indifferentisrn. This repudiated the right of religion to advance any 
social theory distinctively its own. Then the huge social changes wrought by the Industrial 
Revolution further stimulated the abandonment of the Church's traditional teaching. Finally, in 
the eighteenth century, the established church itself abandoned its traditional social teaching 
with the consequence that into the ground vacated by Christian morality stepped secular 
theorists, such as John Locke and Adam Smith. In the development of their thought in political 
and economic liberalism, self-interest, previously condemned as the sin of avarice, came to be 
reinterpreted as a natural right and, in the "invisible hand" of the market, as part of God's 
providential work. Summing up this revolution, Tawney writes: 
The law of nature had been invoked by medieval writers as a moral restraint 
upon economic self-interest. By the seventeenth century, a significant revolution 
had taken place. "Nature" had come to connote, not divine ordinance, but 
human appetites, and natural rights were invoked by the individualism of the age 
as a reason why self-interest should be given free play/73 
In the same vein, in his concluding chapter, he writes: 
The rise of a naturalistic science of society, with all its magnificent promise of 
fruitful action and of intellectual light; the abdication of the Christian Churches 
from departments of economic conduct and social theory long claimed as their 
"Ibid., p. 152. 
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province; the general acceptance by thinkers of a scale of ethical values, which 
turned the desire for pecuniary gain from a perilous, if natural, frailty into the 
idol of philosophe?s and the mainspring of society - such movements are written 
large over the history of the tempestuous age which lies between the 
Reformation and full light of the eighteenth century. Their consequences have 
been written into the very tissue of modern civilization.74 
Over the course of his long teaching life, Tawney added to this historical critique of 
capitalism further criticisms. He was especially critical of the way capitalism had succeeded in 
overturning what he believed was the proper relationship between labour* and 'capital', in which 
'capital' should serve labour'. This meant for him that capitalism was intrinsically evil1 whatever 
its economic consequences', and that The true descendant of the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas 
is the labour theory of value. The last of the Schoolmen was Karl Marx'.75 As he put this 
indictment: 
'Capital', as industry is organized today, hires labour' It rubs its hands i f labour1 
is 'cheap' and 'docile'. It cries and cuts itself with knives i f labour' is 'dear* or 
'restive'. It allows the workers as much initiative and responsibility as pit-ponies, 
and scraps mem, with other worn-out tools, when they have served its purpose. 
Such an industrial order, and the social system which reposes on it, whatever its 
economic consequences, is essentially servile. It involves the treatment of human 
beings as part of the apparatus of production, instead of as the end for which 
alone it is worth while to carry on production at all. It means that the working 
lives of whole populations are dependent upon the will of half a dozen directors. 
It is, in short, the enemy of freedom76 
Tawney was also highly critical of the capitalist's insistence that private property is an 
absolute right. He countered by explaining that as the concept of private property has evolved, 
'Ownership is not a right, but a bundle of rights the right to interest as the price of capital, the 
right to profits, and the right to control,..'77 Unbundling these, Tawney sought to refute the 
arguments commonly advanced to defend private ownership which claim that shareholders 
provide a service to industry by providing capital, accepting risk, and regulating management, 
for which they deserve to be rewarded. On the first claim, he accepted that a payment is due for 
7 4 Ibid., p.227. 
"Ibid., p.39. 
7 6 Tawney, R.H. The Radical Tradition (George Allen & Unwin: London, 1964), p. 136. 
7 7 Ibid., p. 100. 
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the provision of capital. However, in Ms ideal reordering of industry,, in wMch labour employs 
capital, sad not the other way around, he insisted that capital should only be hired at the lowest 
possible cost. Consequently, he would change all shareholders into debenture holders, paid at 
the cheapest rate their capital can be had. 
On the question of whether there is a proper right to share in any profit as a reward due 
the capitalist for his acceptance of risk, Tawney' answer was complex. It began with an analysis 
of business risk First, there is risk of natural disaster, such as earthquake, which arise from 
causes outside the control of industry. Second, there is ordinary business risk, which arises from 
the necessary experimentation and unavoidable change experienced by any industry. Tawney 
insists that both these kinds of risk should be treated as costs of production and therefore ought 
to be covered by a charge on profits, with the charge being set by a joint body on which the 
workers, the consumers and the State would be adequately represented. Furthermore, the trust 
fluids hereby ©rested must not bs liable to be raided for the payment of dividends. The third type 
of risk, Tawney described as "competitive risk". They are not due to "the act of God"' nor are 
they the price of economic progress. They arise primarily from the manner in which industry is 
organized, and diminish or increase as that organization changes. They are normally at their 
greatest when competition is perfectly free; they are normally diminished when free competition 
is replaced by some kind of agreement'.78 In other words, this third type of risk arises from the 
nature of a competitive capitalist system; change the system for one of public ownership, and 
the risk falls away. 
On the question of the right to control, Tawney raised the objection we have referred to 
earlier, namely that the absolute right of the owners to use their property as they pleased, and 
therefore to hire and fire workers at will placed workers in a servile relationship to the owners. 
In addition, he made the point that the function of control can better be exercised by a system 
of public costing and audit In the light of this analysis, he concluded that private property was 
a pretence: 'Rights without functions are like the shades in Homer, which drank blood but 
scattered trembling at the voice of a man.'79 
To these criticisms of the values and ideas which lie at the heart of the capitalist 
7 8 Tawney, R.H. The Acquisitive Society (G. Bell: London, 1921), p. 105. 
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economic order, worth briefly mentioning are a number of his other important criticisms.80 He 
believed mat capitalism was opposed to religion. He saw in its acquisitiveness a blasphemous 
exploitation of nature. He taught mat capitalist society was prone to making war. He claimed 
that the inequalities it produces undermines democracy. On account of the wastefulness of 
competition he was not prepared to admit that it could be an efficient economic system. On the 
basis of mis comprehensive analysis, he concluded that Christianity was fundamentally opposed 
to capitalism. Furthermore, unlike the ever conciliatory Temple, he insisted that no compromise 
with capitalism is possible for the Christian. As he stated this challenge: 
What is certain is that it is the negation of any system of thought or morals 
which can, except by a metaphor, be described as Christian. Compromise is as 
impossible between the Church of Christ and the idolatry of wealth, which is the 
practical religion of capitalist societies, as it was between the Church and the 
State idolatry of the Roman Empire.81 
Against the background of this general indictment of capitalism, it is clear why Tawney, 
unlike Temple, was willing to countenance the radicalism of the post-war programme of 
nationalisation. Whereas Temple was content with reforming capitalism, for Tawney, because 
no compromise was possible, capitalism demanded to be repudiated in its entirety, whatever 
its economic consequences' , 8 2 This principled objection to capitalism was not however the 
whole of the picture, and it is easily possible to make the mistake of thinking Tawney more of 
a radical than in fact he was by forgetting his experience as a member of the commission which 
had investigated the coal industry, and which had persuaded him mat public ownership was a 
viable economic alternative to private ownership of industry. In Tawney's eyes, the 
commission's report had successfully made the case for nationalisation. After its publication, 
he firmly believed that public ownership could no longer be dismissed as a remote possibility, 
something too impractical to be seriously contemplated, because the report soundly disproved 
the capitalist's claim, on the grounds of superior economic efficiency, to be the guardian of the 
interest of the consumers against that of the workers.83 As he described the report in terms that 
made it out to be a watershed in the rejection of capitalism: 
* See Terrill, op.cit.,p.250 ff. 
81 Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, p.235. 
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For the first time, the evidence for and against capitalism in one great industry 
has been marshalled and presented to the public, not by private individuals, but 
by a public body appointed by Act of Parliament. For the first time, its economic 
wastefulness has been remorselessly laid bare, not by reformers, but by technical 
experts, administrators, men of science and officials, including two blameless 
baronets whom the mine owners found it hardest to forgive. For the first time, 
all the business men on a Commission, not directly concerned in the industry 
under investigation, have affirmed that the present system of ownership and 
working....stands condemned, and some other system must be substituted for 
it.** 
But, as important as the economic advantages of public ownership might be, it must 
finally be said mat the heart of Tawney's case for nationalisation was not an economic argument 
Rather it is to be found in the way public ownership will replace what he took to be the 
unchristian, servile relationship between owner and worker in capitalism, with one which would 
give the worker the status, and with that the conditions of work, of an equal partner in industry. 
In this connection he wrote mat the benefits to the mine-worker would not be 'so much in the 
direct additions which would make to his income, as in the cessation of petty tyrannies, the 
increase in the provision for health and safety, and in the greater freedom and security offered 
by his new status as a partner with the State in the conduct of industry'.85 He felt the flawed 
relationship in capitalism was so wounding to the human dignity of the worker that: It is 
impossible to exaggerate the significance of that change of status. It is the difference between 
freedom and something like serfdom' . 8 6 
Not content only with raising the status of the worker, Tawney also saw public ownership 
as an opportunity to raise the whole status of work in industry on a par with that of the other 
professions, such as medicine. He believed public ownership could do this by adopting as its 
main purpose the goal of providing a service to society rather than that of maximising the profit 
of shareholders: The work of making boots or building a house is in itself no more degrading 
than that of curing the sick or teaching the ignorant It is as necessary and therefore as 
honourable. It should be at least equally bound by rules which have as their object to maintain 
the standards of professional service. It should be at least equally free from the vulgar 
"Ibid., p. 119. 
"Ibid., p. 125. 
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subordination of moral standards to financial interests'In this connection, he accepted that 
internal pressures could bring about the restructuring of certain industries as professions, but that 
in most kinds of industry structured along the lines of the joint stock company, where 
management is divorced from ownership, nationalisation was a necessary first step in breaking 
the power of the shareholder. Of this conviction he wrote: The blow needed to liberate them 
from the property-owner must come from without' . w 
The radical rhetoric employed above suggests something of Marx's influence on 
Tawney's socialism, which is undeniable. However, Tawney could never be accused of 
supporting anything like communism on account of his belief in democracy and also on account 
of his sensitivity to the objection that public ownership would inevitably suffer from the 
inefficiency of centralization and bureaucracy. In this connection, on the question of an 
appropriate administrative model, he insisted that because nationalisation is simply "a problem 
in constitution-making" that it is compatible with several different types of management He 
pointed out that various options exist between the poles of a "unitary" constitution, like that of 
the Post Office, and a "federal" constitution, like that proposed by Justice Sankey for the coal 
industry. Having pointed out the range of options available, however, he followed Temple, 
Morrison and Keynes in their preference for the public corporation model by emphasising the 
desirability of removing control of nationalised industry from government As he put this, there 
appears to be general agreement among all contemporary supporters of the policy of public 
ownership that, although the State must intervene to carry out the act of expropriation by due 
process of law, the administrative body which succeeds the private proprietor must not be a 
department directly dependent on the Government of the day/89 
In the light of mis review of Tawney's Christian socialist case for nationalisation, there 
is little doubting from what source Labour politicians responsible for the post-war 
nationalisation programme, like Morrison, drew on for their moral inspiration. They found in 
his writings, as well as those others writing in the radical tradition, the moral indignation against 
capitalism mat inspired mem to seize the challenge of post-war reconstruction as an opportunity 
to build die "New Jerusalem". 
57 The Acquisitive Society, p.92 
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Hensley Henson 
The extent of the political, economic and moral support for public ownership we have 
traced ought not to give the impression that there were no strongly dissenting Christian voices 
raised against the post-war nationalisation programme. On the contrary, there was a small and 
vociferous Christian opposition, the force of whose arguments may have contributed to the 
Christian realism of Temple's last years and to the beginning of an ideological opposition to 
public ownership in the Conservative Party which we shall trace to the Steel debate of 1948. 
Although this opposition to the Christian socialism of Tawney and Temple was isolated from 
the main political and economic currents of the time, their arguments have endured to inform 
the resurgence of conservative Christianity in our time which is supportive of privatisation. For 
this reason it is important that we should give an account of their social thought 
Prominent in this opposition group were Arthur Headlam, the former Regius Professor 
of Divinity at Oxford and Bishop of Gloucester, Ralf Inge, the former Lady Margaret Professor 
of Divinity at Oxford and Dean of StPauls, and Hensley Henson, the Bishop of Durham. 
Although Henson had resigned his bishopric shortly before the outbreak of the Second World 
War, the legacy of the social thinking he left in his voluminous writings made him the most 
formidable of this Christian opposition. Unlike most of his fellow bishops, who tended to be 
drawn from the upper middle-class and upper-class, he had come from a middle-class 
nonconformist background; at Oxford he was too poor to belong to a college. Edward Norman 
claims mat it was this social background that 'is the key to Henson's conservatism';90 it helped 
him understand the values of working-class people in a way that was denied most of the other 
bishops, and it allowed him to escape the class morality and guilt Norman maintains was behind 
much of the agitation for a social gospel. 
In this connection Norman draws attention to the view, popular among the clergy at the 
turn of the century, that there was no social thinking in the Victorian Church; in this mistaken 
view, Victorian Individualism was not regarded as social thought at all.91 For Henson, such 
cavalier dismissal of his whole social outlook could produce some extreme denunciations of his 
fellow Christian leaders whom he suspected of toadying to the new power of Labour. As he put 
this: "The wheel has gone full circle, and the clerical toadies of the age do not flatter princes but 
9 0 Norman, E. Church and Society m England 1770-1979 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1976), p, 364. 
9 1 Ibid., p. 233. 
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mobs....They worship the possessors of power',92 
Though undeniably extreme, such savage criticism carried weight from a man whose 
ministry displayed a consistent and fearless opposition to the ever increasing power of organised 
Labour while at the same time insisting that 'Labour does not receive its due reward in England 
today'.93 From his youthful days as Vicar of Barking, when, in 1899, he opposed the Gasworkers 
Union, to his later conflict with the coal miners, when, in the General Strike of 1926, he risked 
personal injury at the hands of the striking miners, his detractors could never claim that he 
lacked moral courage. 
Nor could they dismiss his intellect He studied Modern History at Oxford, where he was 
elected a Fellow of All Souls, and later was offered the Chair in Ecclesiastical History, which 
he turned down. He was therefore a historian of the equal of Tawney, and it is his historical 
perspective mat gives his defence of conservative Christianity its distinctive character. At the 
time it presented a formidable response to the social Christianity of Temple, whom it is possible 
he viewed as his main rival for the leadership of the Church of England; COPEC he described 
as the Christian Socialist's "Nicaea", with Temple "its Pope".94 He refused to send any delegates 
from the Diocese of Durham because he regarded it as "the worst conceivable method of arriving 
at me truth'.93 And immediately after the conference, he set about devoting part of his "Charge" 
to criticism of its main assumption: "that the Christian Revelation includes adequate instruction 
on political and economic matters'.96 
Rather than review the "Charge" at any length, we shall instead explore the chapter in 
his Gifford lectures of 1936, where we find the most systematic account of his conservative 
Christianity. However, before moving to his "Giffords", it is important to note that his "Charge" 
of 1924 contains important arguments lost or no longer presented as clearly by the time Henson 
came to give his lectures in 1936. The main ones reported by Norman include:97 
1. The paradox that, while social Christianity disallows the motives and methods of capitalism, 
the welfare schemes of social Christianity requires the wealth creation of a capitalist economic 
9 2 Ibid., p. 231. 
" I b i d , p. 229. 
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order. 
2. The ideal man supposed by COPEC would be one deprived of personal responsibility and 
personal liberty. 
3. The identification of Christianity with Labour would lead to a position where the Church 
could not bring any criticism to bear on politics. 
4. The redemption of society must be effected through the redemption of individuals. 
Returning to the Gifford lectures, we find Benson first asserting and then defending the 
central message of his "Charge" that Christianity 'has no essential association with any specific 
type of economic organization' . w The clear inference to be drawn is that there can be no such 
thing as a Christian socialism, and certainly no Christian advocacy of a detailed programme of 
nationalisation. The remainder of the lecture is devoted to defending this thesis against the 
implicit criticism that such a position is a denial of Christianity's call to transform the social 
order. This goal, he argued, is rightly undertaken, not by the attempt to replace the existing 
economic order by another, but rather by a process of assimilation whereby whatever morally 
sound elements in it are strengthened and it is brought *by insensible degrees within the lines of 
Christian morality'." 
In support of his understanding of how Christianity ought to be left to influence the 
economic order through a process of gradual assimilation, Henson drew on Church History to 
argue that the power of Christianity to transform the social order from within is very effectual 
indeed. He began with the reminder that Christianity was originally introduced into what to the 
modern liberal mind must be the worst possible case: 'a world economically ordered on the 
foundation of slavery'.100 And yet, despite this worse case, he pointed out that, 
The Church made no attempt to change it, but by bringing into it a new spirit 
did in fact affect it very potently. The influence of Christianity was felt in raising 
the general tone of society, discouraging the harsher features of slavery, 
enlarging the horizon of human thought and silently but surely destroying the 
assumptions on which ancient society rested. (The transition form the imperial 
economy based on slavery to the medieval based on serfdom was effected 
9 8 Henson, H Christian Morality (Oxford University Press. London, 1936), p.271. 
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gradually, and, so to say, unconsciously).101 
Similarly, in the case of feudalism, he observed that the same gradual process of Christian 
transformation had undermined the feudal order until it imploded from within. Here he pointed 
out that,' once serfs were baptised in Christendom, it was inevitable that their status be raised 
to where it would subvert the hierarchical feudal order/102 
Henson believed that exactly the same process of Christian transformation was at work 
in the present economic order, capitalism, or what he prefers to call industrialism. In this case 
he argued that whereas the Christian emphasis of freedom had successfully subverted slavery, 
and the Christian emphasis of equality had subverted feudalism, the Christian emphasis of 
individuality will have a similar subversive influence on capitalism: 
History is again repeating itself. The same capacity of almost limitless 
acquiescence, which enabled the religion of freedom to tolerate slavery and the 
religion of equality to tolerate feudalism, is being exhibited in the modern world 
in the case of industrialism. The religion which interprets, develops, and protects 
human individuality acquiesces in an economic system which so dwarfs and 
depresses individuality as to threaten its total destruction. The paradox is 
persistent and perplexing but its significance is not entirely hidden. 
History provides the key to the enigma which it presents. In every case 
acquiescence is seen to be the weapon by which the Christian religion conquers 
the hostile forces in its secular environment, and slowly but surely introduces its 
own transforming spirit. Slavery disappears but it enriches Christian morality 
with that conception of service as something inherently great which was burnt 
into the Christian mind by the long association of servile status and spiritual 
achievement. Feudalism disappears, but it bequeaths to Christian morality that 
sensitive loyalty and high chivalry which were shaped by the long discipline of 
feudal subordination. Christianity ever stoops to conquer.1M 
Having defended the gradualism which he understood to be the way Christianity has 
historically influenced the economic order, he proceeded to make a moral defence of an ideal 
capitalist system, which he understood as the economic expression of his individualism. Unlike 
bom slavery and feudalism, he argued that there is no radical falseness of ultimate assumption 
Ibid., pp. 273-274. 
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to be reckoned with'.104 And, he argued further: 'Unlike slavery which embodies a false 
principle, and feudalism, which implies a false conception of society, industrialism does not 
necessarily do violence to any moral truth, nor run counter to right reason'.105 He defended this 
moral claim with a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms of a capitalist system: 'industry 
is obviously good in itself;106 there is a Christian duty to work;107 commerce 'is an inevitable 
inference from the social character of man';108 wages and profits are morally legitimate;109 
inequality is justified on the basis that 'equity itself authorises a large inequality of 
recompense'110 for persons who undertake different risks and make unequal contributions; 
dismissing the traditional Christian teaching on usury, he argued that Interest on capital cannot 
be morally distinguished from wages and profits, being indeed a form of the latter';111 and lastly, 
'all the subsidiary features of industrialism - banking, advertisement and speculation - can be 
justified to reason and conscience' because they 'are indispensable to the conduct and expansion 
of industry'.113 Furthermore, Henson argued, not only are the basic mechanisms of a capitalist 
system morally unquestionable, but Christian morality emphasises precisely those virtues which 
make for commercial success. In this connection he praised nonconformists, such as the early 
Quakers, for their business acumen. However, he was careful to distinguish their commercial 
spirit from the excessive individualism and materialism, which he associated with the Reformed 
Protestantism he held responsible for the 'monstrous Mammon-cult of modern America.' This 
he rejected on account of the way ft has 'secured success in business at the price of a certain 
moral lop-sidedness.'113 
Henson was also careful to distinguish between industrialism, which he could not fault 
on moral grounds, and its development The latter, he allowed, 'flows from certain monstrous 
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exaggerations , which he recognised can produce very great 'mischiefs1.114 In this connection, 
he mentioned in particular the way the unprecedented size of modern communities and the new 
means of communication between them had 'so deranged perspectives and so complicated 
procedures as to obscure or contradict the very principles of legitimate industry'.115 He also 
castigated the development of capitalism for the way it had resulted in what he described as the 
'monotonous and even brutalizing labour, the destruction of the family under the influence of 
congested slums, the servility of spirit bred by abject dependence, and, along with these, the 
abounding wealth, sensuality and arrogance of plutocratic society . 1 1 6 However, he always 
denied that these social evils were intrinsic to capitalism. 
Moreover, he was also optimistic that what appeared to be the intractable problems of 
capitalism would in time be ameliorated, even if that meant that they would only be replaced by 
other problems. For instance, the excessive division of labour in standardization he expected was 
merely a 'passing phase' which would be overcome by the inherent resourcefulness of the human 
mind' aided by the Divine Wisdom'.117 He also expected the worst excesses of capitalism to 
be corrected by democracy. As he put this faith: for though democracy has formidable risks and 
disadvantages of its own, it has ever this supreme merit that it cannot ignore the wrongs and 
hardships of the people'.118 In any case, as he viewed it from his historical perspective, he did 
not see these social problems as permanent ones because he expected that capitalism was itself 
a passing phase. Indeed, at the time, he thought it was Visibly disintegrating',119 leaving 
Christianity its age old task old task of assimilating whatever new order was to replace it and of 
transforming that from within. In the meantime, he pointed out the wisdom that the material 
advantages of a capitalist system cannot be done without by a civilised society, and, therefore, 
that capitalism cannot be abandoned without finding a demonstratively superior alternative. In 
this connection he commented dryly, the ethical problem is presented in an economic 
framework which leaves little freedom to the Christian moralist Neccessitas non habet 
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legem.120 
Henson concluded mis defence of Christian conservatism with a pointed attack on social 
Christianity. As a Church Historian he declared himself to be 'quite sure that Christian history 
demonstrates the incapacity of the church authorities to enter directly into political and 
economic affairs . 1 2 1 He then stressed, presumably with Christian leaders like Temple and 
Tawney in mind, the extreme complexity of modern economics and sociology. And, he pointed 
out that, even if Christians were fully understanding of all the forces at work in modem society, 
Christians themselves are not free from all the faults and limitations of human nature that make 
the project of radical social transformation an enormous presumption.122 Finally, and most 
pointed of all, he quoted Christopher Dawson on the clangers of well-meaning but ignorant 
clergy confusing Christian morality with the social fashion of the day and of dressing in colours 
which they should not: 
There is no longer any danger of Christians attempting to force their beliefs on 
others at the point of the sword or of their trying to make men religious by act 
of Parliament. The danger today is rather that well-meaning people are apt to 
reduce Christianity to the level of secular idealism by identifying it with 
whatever social or political course is most popular at the moment, whether it be 
National Socialism in Germany or humanitarian socialism in England.123 
This last criticism of the church leadership for merely following the intellectual fashions 
of the day, was to appear later as one of the main theses in Edward Norman's massive defence 
of conservative Christianity in the nineteen-seventies.124 However, its warning in Henson's 
Gifford lectures appears to have gone largely unheeded by Church leaders seeking to influence 
the Government's programme of nationalisation. One of those who may have remembered 
Henson's individualism was Cyril Garbett, Archbishop of York (1942-55). He even gave specific 
warning, which Henson would no doubt have applauded, about the dangers inherent in all 
large-scale organisation of a loss of personal responsibility and initiative: 
The weakening of personal responsibility has been hastened by central planning 
1 2 0 Ibid., p. 282. 
m Ibid., p. 288. 
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and industrial organisation. Local firms and industries in which the employers 
were personally acquainted with the conditions of work have been replaced by 
vast industrial machines with far-flung organisation worked from central offices 
which issue their directions to all subsiduary branches. The nationalisation of the 
mines, the railways and other industries, however justifiable, has resulted in the 
undermining of local responsibilities. From Whitehall, or wherever the 
headquarters of the industry is situated, there 
an unending stream of regulations and orders which choke all attempts at 
initiative.12' 
The lingering influence of Henson's individualism may also have had an impact on the 
important House of Commons' debate on the nationalisation of Steel in 1948. But here we can 
only speculate. As we have previously mentioned, the case for nationalising Steel was 
recognised to be different from all the others by senior figures in the Labour party even before 
the war. Their misgivings continued after Labour's election victory, and therefore were not 
merely misgivings based on the fear that the nationalisation of Steel would prove an electoral 
liability. Herbert Morrison, for example, is recorded as saying, during 1946, that steel 
nationalisation was 'a matter of business', and 'not really a political matter at all'. 1 2 6 This suggests 
he understood that Steel was a manufacturing industry, not a public utility, and was dependent 
not only on national but also on international markets for its profitability. As such, it was 
inevitably going to be a much more difficult industry to manage, because it would be subject to 
all the vagaries of the trade cycle and, in order to survive, it would need to remain internationally 
competitive. Also labour relations were good, with the Steel workers' leaders reputedly 
lukewarm about nationalisation Furthermore, the industry was making a profit and a recent 
investment programme augured well for the future of the industry.127 
However, whoever controlled Steel could exert an enormous influence on the whole of 
British industry, from car making, ship building to the construction sector. And, after the Bank 
of England, the utilities, coal, and transport were added to the pre-war nationalisations, only 
Steel was left to be captured for Labour to claim total control of the "commanding heights" of 
the British economy. In the circumstances, it is perhaps understandable that the nationalisation 
1 2 5 Garbett, C. The Church of England Today (Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1953), p. 114. 
1 2 6 Hodgson, G. The Steel Debates, in Sissons M. and French, P. Age of Austerity (Hodder and 
Stoughton/Penguin: London, 1963/1964), p.313. 
1 2 7 Ibid., p.312ff. 
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of Steel, whatever its merits on economic grounds, became what Morgan Phillips, Secretary of 
the Labour Parry, described as the supreme test of political democracy - a test which the whole 
world will be watching'.m And, try as they may to evade the challenge of taking Steel into public 
ownership, the minority within the Labour leadership opposed to nationalisation was bound to 
be overruled, as they were by Bevan and other radicals in the Cabinet 
In opening the debate, George Strauss, the proposing Minister of Supply, did not help 
matters by provocatively concluding his speech with the words the Bill was designed to make 
the steel monopoly the servant, not the master, of the people'.129 It was clearly this overtly 
political challenge that pressed the already seriously questionable case for nationalisation a step 
too far in the eyes of the Opposition. The reaction was not slow in coming from Oliver Lyttelton, 
representing the previously acquiescent Whig tradition in the Conservative party, who led for 
the Opposition: They give the whole thing away.... they believe in the doctrine of centralization 
of power in the hands of the State.. .it has long been our doctrine that, in a democracy, power 
should be dispersed'.130 
Winston Churchill took up this baton. He was not new to nationalisation, having been 
responsible for the nationalisation of British Petroleum in 1914 and the Carlisle pubs in 1918. 
In the earlier debate about the nationalisation of the Bank of England he had declared that 'it 
does not, in my opinion, raise any matter of principle'.131 But now, in this debate, the revered 
wartime leader succeeded in expressing such strong opposition to nationalisation that the debate 
had to be adjourned. In the heat of debate, as Hodgson claims, the Opposition 'evolved almost 
without noticing it an ideological opposition to nationalization that had been no more than a 
vague jumble of interests and prejudices in 1945'.132 
But even then, despite the short-lived history of the first British Steel Corporation, 
denationalised in 1932, and Labour's retreat from full scale nationalisation in 1949,133 there 
remained overwhelming public support for the radical redrawing of the economic borders of the 
1 2 8 Ibid, p.311. 
1 2 9 Hodgson, G op.cit., p.318. 
1 3 0 Ibid, p.318. 
1 3 1 Pelting, H. op.cit, p.96. 
1 3 2 Hodgson, G. op.cit, p.329. 
1 M Ibid, p. 328, Labour's policy document of 1949, 'Labour Believes in Britain', stated: Unless there is 
economic necessity, there is no reason for always socializing whole industries.' 
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state. Therefore whatever the merits and influence of Henson's conservative Christianity, its 
criticism of public ownership was barely recognisable. At most it stood for an exhausted 
Victorian legacy, only capable of supporting an opportunist parliamentary opposition almost 
accidentally discovering an ideological opposition to public ownership in the Steel debate. 
Indeed, it is highly significant that it was only the nationalisation of Steel and none of the other 
nationalisations which aroused genuine controversy between the parties. And, as Hodgson points 
out, the Steel Bill was only debated in 1948, after Labour's political honeymoon had ended, and 
the huge strains of its over-ambitious legislative programme, added to all the other pressures of 
post-war reconstruction, had eroded Labour's hold on Government134 In mis light the debate over 
Steel saw a revitalised Opposition exploiting its first real opportunity rather than expressing 
strong ideological opposition to public ownership as such. This had still to grow. The coming 
years would prove fertile ground as public ownership was tested in practice. However, at the 
time mere was no denying mat such was the political, economic and moral support for the post-
war nationalisation programme that the extension of public ownership had about it 'an air of 
massive permanence'.135 
AN EVALUATION 
Looking back now, after nearly fifty years has elapsed, it is of course extremely difficult 
to evaluate the nationalisation programme of 194S-S1 from an ethical perspective. In order to 
be in a belter position to do so one would have had to have lived through the experience of the 
two world wars and the great economic depression, and to know from the inside what it was like 
to live in a society which was much more dependent on industry than is our own. Nevertheless, 
in the expectation that some of the arguments for and against public ownership we have 
assembled will be of enduring value, even though the much altered circumstances of the 1970s 
and 1980s makes any uncritical transference of arguments used in the 1940s and 1950s to the 
debate over privatisation hazardous, we shall list below what we think are the main points 
arising from this historical study. 
From our discussion of the politics of nationalisation, it would appear that public 
ownership had in its favour the interests of all three social classes. For the working class, 
Ibid.., p.306. 
Hennessy, P. op.ctt, p. 156. 
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nationalisation promised a strong political base from which to negotiate and campaign for a 
redistribution of wealth and income. For the middle class, economic planning and the expanding 
state bureaucracy promised more secure employment and political influence. For the upper class, 
it was a case of second best for it was worth conceding a mixed economy in order to avoid the 
communism which threatened to nationalise their land. With the possible exception of the 
former owners of the nationalised industries, most people therefore had an interest in supporting 
the post-war social order and of making a mixed economy work. 
Our study of the economics of nationalisation suggests that there were a number of strong 
economic arguments for public ownership. In the context of post-war reconstruction, the 
consolidation of the industries under a single management promised to end wasteful competition 
and deliver economies of scale. Government control of investment would allow for the planning 
of how best to utilise scarce investment resources and would provide a means of encouraging 
full employment through the use of demand management of the economy. The improvement in 
industrial relations would improve productivity. The elimination of monopoly profits would 
release resources to be channelled back into the industries in increased investment and improved 
customer services. Nationalisation also promised rationalisation of the confused and costly 
patterns of ownership and regulation. On the strength of these arguments, although in retrospect 
the nationalisation programme was far too ambitious and included one very unsuitable industry 
in British Steel, it is difficult to deny that a substantial programme of public ownership looked 
a very plausible way forward for the British economy. Indeed, saddled then as much as it is today 
with the "gentlemanly capitalism" of the City, with its reluctance to invest in British 
manufacturing given the new markets opening up overseas, there is a case for arguing that the 
private sector could not be relied upon to provide the necessary investment needed for 
reconstruction.136 
From the leading Christian social ethicists we have examined, Tawney's Christian 
socialist case for public ownership stands out for its advocacy of nationalisation as a means of 
emancipating the worker from the servile relationship between worker and owner in capitalist 
society and of raising the status of work in industry to a level with the other professions. His 
criticisms of the notion of an absolute right to private property, the acquisitiveness of capitalism, 
"* Offer, A. The State We're In', in Oxford Today, Vol.7. No.3. Trinity, 1995, p. 12, responds to Will Hutton's 
criticism of the "gentlemanly capitalism" of the City for its failure to invest in manufacturing by pointing out that 
'Given the virgin resources overseas, it is not clear that this was not a bad choice for such wealthy individuals'. 
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which he saw as undermining religion, and the inequality of capitalist society, which he saw as 
undermining democracy, are also all of enduring value. On account of these criticisms, he 
believed Christians ought to repudiate capitalism in its entirety. He was also convinced that 
public ownership could be economically superior to private ownership of industry. Although we 
are in sympathy with much of his critique of capitalism, we are forced to concede that 
experience has shown him to have been too optimistic about the prospects for public ownership. 
As we noted by way of contrast, Temple, under the influence of the Christian realism of 
his later years, drew back from endorsing a radical programme of nationalisation. He advocated 
a gradualism, which looked to reform industry within a capitalist framework because he wanted 
'no breach of continuity'. This older Temple, under the influence of Niebuhr, and responding 
to the spiritual darkness of war had come to shrug off some of his earlier influences, such as that 
of Maritain, whose condemnation of capitalism for its denial of persons was close to that of 
Tawney. Temple also justified his reticence about extending public ownership in terms of the 
traditional Christian defence of private property, and on account of the danger of extending the 
power of the state over the individual. However, he was prepared to accept a limited amount of 
public ownership in the interests of the common good. While this may have been too cautious 
in his own context, given the enormous task of reconstruction and the extent of social inequality, 
we nevertheless find Temple's caution about extending public ownership too far to have been 
vindicated by experience. 
In addition to examining the contribution of social Christianity to a justification of public 
ownership, for completeness, we also looked at the criticism of public ownership from the 
perspective of a Christian conservative. In our view, Henson's defence of some of the capitalist 
virtues provides a helpful balance to Tawny's repudiation of capitalism in its entirety. In 
particular we approve of his emphasis of personal freedom and responsibility. We can also take 
seriously his warning about the danger Christian socialism poses for the Church by allying 
Christianity with the monopoly power of labour, thereby rendering the Church incapable of 
effectively challenging the Labour movement when it seeks not social justice but power for its 
own sake. However, in the post-war context, we find that Henson's individualism was badly out 
of touch with the pressing political, economic and social realities which demanded of individuals 
that they surrender more of their autonomy than he would ever have sanctioned Given the 
impressive achievements of the welfare state, we also remain unconvinced by his pessimism 
about how much it is possible for human beings to achieve in improving the social condition of 
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society. Therefore, while we can fault the architects of the post-war nationalisation programme 
for being too ideological in their advocacy of public ownership, in the absence of any real 
experience of a mixed economy, we can only admire their generous and hopeful spirit. 
108 
Chapter 4. 
THE EXFlfflENOE OF NATIONAOSAHON (H9S1-1979) 
"Anyone who argues in the light of nearly forty years' experience that there must be a way of managing State 
monopolies that will increase their efficiency, satisfy their consumers, and yield a return on the taxpayer's 
investment instead of being a burden on the taxpayer must believe in fairies.' (Patrick Jenkin)1 
The heady hopes vested in the New Jerusalem established after the war, where 
Morrison's public corporation stood proudly alongside Beveridge's social security system, were 
to be short-lived. Less than half a century later, the disparagement of public ownership is now 
so complete that me negative case for privatisation, which claims that because the nationalised 
industries failed there was no practical alternative to privatisation, has largely triumphed Indeed, 
this case has been so persuasively argued that it is easy to forget how many declared 
nationalisation a success in 1970, at the end of its first two decades. At that point there was 
fulsome praise of the nationalised industries. Some even judged public ownership to have fully 
realised the hopes of Tawney. 
In what follows, on the suspicion that the change from success to failure was unlikely to 
have been so dramatic, we shall examine the record of public ownership. As we explained when 
setting out our method, this line of enquiry is consistent with what Richard McCormick has 
called the new age of experience* in Moral Theology, in which it is now recognised that to 
disregard the lessons of experience is to disregard one of the richest and most indispensable 
sources of moral knowledge. As Leslie Hannah puts this point in his assessment of the economic 
consequences of public ownership: 
Idealists of left and right now - as in the past - wul continue to by-pass evidence 
from the reality of capitalism and socialism Their Utopian dreams may 
ultimately be conducive to human improvement; certainly such hopes have 
sustained Utopians in the past. Practical men may, however, benefit from 
learning some of the lessons of twentieth century experience as a discipline on 
their dreams.2 
1 Quoted in Fry, G. The Path to the Privatization of Public Enterprises in Britain: A Public Policy Analysis', in 
Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 9, No. 3 Winter 1994, p. 20. 
2 Hannah, L. 'The Economic Consequences of the State Ownership of Industry, 1945-1990', in RFloud and D 
McCloskyed., The Economic History of Great Britain Since 1700, Vol. 3,1939-1992 (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 1994), p. 168. 
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With McCormick and Hannah in mind, and also bearing in mind that the interpretation 
of experience is always fraught with difficulty and is bound to be messy, because experience is 
itself always a personal interpretation of reality, we shall draw on a wide range of documented 
experience of nationalised industry in order to shed light on the record of public ownership from 
as many angles as possible. Our study will pay especially close attention to the quality of the 
relationship between Parliament and the public corporations, as this is reflected in the bipartisan 
reports of the Select Committee On Nationalised Industry (SCNI). While it may be placing too 
much trust in Parliament as an alert "watchdog" of nationalised industry, Parliament developed 
a more continuous and thorough scrutiny of nationalised industry in its bipartisan Select 
Committee than any other form of scrutiny we have record of. We shall also draw on the views 
of politicians, ministers and civil servants, as these are reflected in the relevant Government 
White Papers and parliamentary debates on the nationalised industries, and the "hands on" 
experience of nationalised industry chairmen. And last but not least, we shall take account of 
the leading academic studies of the nationalised industries. 
For ease of reference we will divide the period of our study into three calendar decades. 
We begin with the start-up in the fifties. Then we consider the hey-day of the nationalised 
industries in the sixties. And lastly we explore the turbulent decade of the seventies. We end the 
study in the year 1979 for the reason that this year marks the beginning of the new Conservative 
Government of Margaret Thatcher, which was to abandon public ownership and therefore marks 
a 'decisive breakpoint'. As John Vickers and George Yarrow put this: "Until that year there was 
a clear, i f erratic, trend in the direction of bringing greater numbers of enterprises under public 
ownership; since 1979, the privatization programme has produced a sharp movement in the 
opposite direction . 3 
THE START-UP OF THE FIFTIES 
Most sources support the view that the experiment of public ownership did not get off 
to a good start. But this was to be expected given the formidable task of consolidating the 
previously separately owned companies in one organisation, forming new management teams 
and a new public enterprise working culture.4 For this reason, because it was a starting up 
3 Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. Privatization, An Economic Analysis (MTT Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989), 
p. 139. 
* Pryke, R. Public Enterprise in Practice (Granada: London, 1971), p. 435. 
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period, the fifties are not very revealing about the experience of public ownership. 
Nevertheless, the speed with which some of the nationalised industries ran into 
difficulties, which rendered them unable to meet their statutory requirements of paying their way 
'taking one year with the next1, does reveal something of the optimism of Morrison's arms' length 
model. This asserted that the public corporation was best run as an independent organisation by 
a publicly spirited management, who could be relied upon to get on with the job of achieving 
the three main objectives of public enterprise: economic efficiency, financial probity, and public 
service. Accordingly, the Morrisonian statutes had put in place only a minimum of regulatory 
controls; there was no statutory provision making Chairmen directly accountable to Parliament 
and the power of Parliamentary scrutiny was limited to debates on the annual reports and 
accounts of the corporation. Morrison had opposed further powers of scrutiny on the grounds 
that' it would result in taking the Chairman and principal members of Boards away from their 
business, and would make them nervous of appearing at any time before a half-circle of 
Members of Parliament, all having their pet views and putting them through a certain amount 
of cross^xarninatioa'5 For mis reason, as well as the theoretical difficulties involved in arriving 
at an acceptable definition of efficiency, the idea of an efficiency unit for nationalised industry, 
originally proposed by the Webbs, had come to nothing. 
However, once some of the industries had fallen into deficit and had to be bailed out at 
the taxpayer's expense, it was widely considered unthinkable to continue to exclude them from 
Parliamentary scrutiny. Consequently, in 19SS, despite the implacable opposition of the Board 
Chairman, one of whom complained that' Frequent lifting of the young plant to examine its roots 
inevitably stultifies growth',6 the Conservative Government bowed to pressure and set up the 
SCNI as a cross-party committee, comprising six members of the Government, six from the 
Opposition, and a Chairman who was a member of the Government; later specialist advisors 
were admitted. It was empowered to send for persons, papers, and records', thereby 
considerably widening Parliament's powers of scrutiny. 
The creation of this committee was the first major departure from Morrison's arms' length 
model of public enterprise. From this time onwards, the history of the gradually evolving 
9 Quoted in Cockerill, A. Parliamentary Scrutiny and the Nationalised Industries: The Select Committee on the 
Nationalised Industries, 1974-1979 (Unpublished paper of the specialist economic adviser to the SCNI), p. 1. 
6 Quoted in Foster, C. Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (Basil 
Blackwell Oxford, 1992), p.80. 
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economic and financial framework, set out in successive White Papers, reflects an increasing 
concern that Government ministers and Parliament should be able to exercise greater strategic 
control of nationalised industry in order to ensure that scarce national resources were being 
employed in the most economically efficient and socially optimum way. As such, these White 
Papers are especially revealing of the snuggle to balance the primary commercial obligation of 
nationalised industry with their social responsibilities. 
THE HEY DAY OF THE SIXTIES 
After the settling down period of the Fifties, the experience of the Sixties was 
increasingly dominated by a concern to promote the competitiveness of British industry in the 
context of mounting international competition. It was understood that mere was an opportunity 
cost to any inefficient use of resources: they could have been invested elsewhere in the economy 
or could have been used to provide some other social service. This concern was linked in 
particular with a tendency for the nationalised industries to over-invest. It was also a response 
to the concern that government ministers were using their formal and informal powers over 
nationalised industry for social purposes at odds with the economic objectives of public 
ownership. For example, by holding down prices, they could encourage over-demand and 
therefore over-supply. 
Here it is worth commenting that despite the theoretical arms' length relationship 
between government and the industries, the formal and informal powers of Ministers were 
considerable. Their influence on prices derived primarily from an informal arrangement whereby 
the Chairmen of the Boards agreed to consult with the appropriate Ministers on any significant 
change they wished to make. This "Gentleman's agreement" also gave Ministers the power to 
delay price increases. Ministers could also thwart any price increase by varying the financial 
objective. Consequently, while the Ministers had no formal power to fix prices, the consultative 
process involved tended to inhibit unilateral price changes by the Boards and generally worked 
to keep them down. The Government justified these powers on the ground that 'they must 
interest themselves in the prices of these goods and services which are basic to the life of the 
community and some of which contain a monopolistic element'.7 
Ministers' control over external finance, for investment or loan, mainly derived from the 
7 Cmnd. 1337, The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries (HMSO, 1961), para. 31. 
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Government's decision, in 1956, to withdraw the possibility of a nationalised industry raising 
funds directly from the market on its own credit. In this case the justification given was that the 
amounts needed were 'too large to be raised in the open market without Government support and 
the industries are, of necessity, closely associated in the public mind with the Government, so 
that it would be difficult for the market to regard them as independent financial concerns.'8 This 
ruling made those nationalised industries especially dependent on new investment captive to 
Ministers who could, for various reasons, delay or refuse to grant the funds for investment 
Concern about the possible abuse of these formal and informal powers contributing to 
a mis-allocation of scarce resources, prompted the Government to respond by issuing its first 
White Paper in 1961 with the title, The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised 
Industries. 
1961 WHITE PAPER (CMND 1337) 
The White Paper began by clarifying the relationship between the Government and the 
nationalised industries to assert the industry's primary commercial responsibility. It insisted that 
'although the industries have obligations of a national and non-commercial kind, they are not, 
and ought not, to be regarded as social services absolved from economic and commercial 
justification*9 It men went on to lay down a new financial framework. This included, on revenue 
account, the requirement mat the nationalised industries should pay their way, by covering their 
costs, including interest and depreciation on the historic cost basis, over a five year period. In 
support of this basic financial discipline, the Government accepted that the industries must have 
freedom to make upward price adjustments especially where their prices are artificially low/ 1 0 
It also expected that they would earn a commercial rate of return on capital employed at least 
higher than the cost of money to the Exchequer. To help them meet this expectation, and this is 
regarded as the principal innovation of the White Paper,11 each of the industries was to be set 
a financial target, which, where appropriate, would be a required rate of return. Where 
non-commercial obligations were imposed from outside, the Government accepted mat Boards 
* Ibid., para. 27. 
9 Ibid., para. 3. 
l0Ibid,para.30. 
1 1 See further Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G., op.cit., p. 130. 
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would petition for a change in their financial target. 
The balance struck between the commercial and non-commercial objectives of the 
industries appears to have worked tolerably well for much of the 1960s. However, by 1967, the 
Select Committee was increasingly dissatisfied with the way financial targets were still being 
frustrated by Ministers' exercise of their formal and informal powers over prices and investment. 
They wanted to introduce some further "fine tuning" of the existing economic and financial 
framework in order more closely to define managerial discretion in the attainment of financial 
targets. In this connection it was recognised that the targets could be reached by various routes, 
such as by lowering standards of service, and therefore were not necessarily a good measure of 
efficiency. At their instigation the Government issued a second White Paper with the title, A 
Review of Economic and Financial Objectives. 
1967 WHITE PAPER (CMND 3437) 
The new circumstances calling for this White Paper included the prices and incomes 
policy that the Labour Government had resorted to in their attempt to stave off devaluation of 
the pound in the financial crisis of 1966. As part of this policy the Government had announced 
that all future major price increases in the nationalised industries would be referred to the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI). This added another layer of consultative 
procedure to hold price increases and therefore also profits down. There had also been vastly 
more investment that had come about in response to important technological changes, 
discoveries of new natural resources, and an increase in demand that had not been foreseen six 
years previously. Steel had also been recently re-nationalised and further nationalisation in the 
docks was planned On an annual basis, all this new investment was equivalent to the whole of 
that for private manufacturing industry. With so much of the nation's economic resources at 
stake, the need was more pressing than ever to allocate resources upon an 'economically and 
socially rational basis/12 
In pursuit of this objective, the White Paper proposed the use of a uniform test discount 
rate of return of 8% on new investment. This rate was broadly consistent with the rate of return 
expected on low risk projects in the private sector. However, it accepted that there were projects 
12Cmnd. 3437, NationalisedIndustries, A Review of Economic andFinancial Objectives, (HMSO, 1967) para. 
4-5 for the new economic circumstances. 
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which could not be justified purely on a commercial basis and that the Government must take 
a wider view than that of the industry itself, since the Government's objective is to secure the 
maximum social return on the capital invested, while the industry's concern is properly with the 
financial return.113 For this type of project it proposed the use of social cost/benefit analysis as 
a means of putting investment decisions on a rational basis. 
On prices, in the interests of allocative efficiency, the major new proposal was for the 
adoption of a flexible pricing system This sought to reflect the true cost of the particular goods 
and services provided. But here again the White Paper attempted to strike a balance between the 
commercial and social obligations of the industries. While it encouraged marginal cost pricing, 
and discouraged cross-subsidisation of loss making services which were not part of the industry's 
statutory requirements, it allowed that wider social or economic considerations might justify 
cross-subsidisation in price. It also stressed the need for price stability in the public enterprise 
sector as part of the prices and incomes policy adopted in 1966. As previously mentioned, in 
pursuit of mis policy, the Government was committed to referring all major price increases to 
theNBPI. 
The 1967 White Paper tends to be remembered for the introduction of marginal cost 
pricing. What tends to be forgotten is that it also introduced a new approach to the control of 
costs, which it understood to be at least as important as the control of prices. As it emphasised: 
To make the best use of resources, it is not enough merely to ensure that prices 
properly reflect costs, important though this is. Continuous and critical 
attention has to be paid to costs themselves in order that an industry may play 
a full part in bringing about a more efficient and faster growing economy.14 
To mis end, the White Paper introduced a form of efficiency audit by empowering the NBPI to 
enquire into the efficiency of the industries whose proposals for price increases were referred 
to i t In addition, it required each of the sponsoring Departments to develop, in consultation with 
the industries, indicators of performance for use by the Government at the annual investment 
review. It also drew attention to the need of public enterprise to play a responsible part in the 
national incomes and prices policy by meeting the cost of pay increases out of improved 
productivity. It also called for all possible labour savings, the elimination of inefficient 
restrictive practices, and the effective consultation and collaboration between management and 
1 3 Ibid., para. 14. 
1 4 Ibid., para. 27. 
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the shop floor to promote better productivity. As an overall indicator of performance, the White 
Paper further emphasised the importance of the financial target Without such a target, usually 
measured as a rate of return on net assets, and therefore providing a means of comparison with 
rates of return earned in other industries, both public and private, it made the point that there 
'would be an indefensible lack of control over the return achieved on a very substantial public 
investment'15 
The White Paper's concluding paragraphs returned to the basic Morrisonian principles 
in its definition of the role of the industries and the role of the Government: the industries were 
to be managed as primarily commercial concerns, without sacrificing satisfactory conditions of 
employment Where an industry was required to act against its own commercial interests, the 
Government accepted the principle of explicit subsidies by agreeing that it should take 
responsibility, and would either make a special payment, or would adjust the financial objective. 
The Government in return, agreed not to interfere in the day-today management of the industries. 
However, it justified its indirect controls over price and costs as being a necessary part of its 
economic management of the economy through the prices and incomes policy. And it justified 
its role as the sole banker of public enterprise and its control over investment, through the 
mechanism of the annual investment review, on the grounds of needing responsibly to allocate 
the scarce investment resources of the economy. 
By the introduction of these then relatively new management theories and controls, the 
Select Committee appeared to have succeeded in placing within Parliament's grasp the means 
of effectively regulating public enterprise. Christopher Foster makes this point: 
A satisfying framework seemed within Parliament's grasp. Although also 
expressed with the ambiguity that parliamentary draftmanship and ministerial 
prudence seems to require, these ideas become known to, and understood by, 
a much larger circle of informed opinion than is common for economic ideas. 
The acclaim for them was much less than for Keynesian notions of demand 
management in the 1940s and 1950s or for privatization today, but was still 
widespread.16 
However, despite the acclaimed new framework and the attempted clarification of the 
respective roles of the industries and of the Government, the first report from the SCNI for the 
1 5 Ibid., para. 33. 
1 4 Foster, C. op.cit., p.82. 
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season 1967-68 continued to reflect concern about the relationship. While endorsing the general 
economic and financial framework set out in the 1967 White Paper, the Select Committee was 
especially concerned about the way Ministers continued to confuse their responsibility for 
efficiency and their responsibility for the wider public interest in their use of their formal and 
informal powers over prices and investment. In order to keep these two potentially conflicting 
responsibilities separate, the report proposed that they be exercised by different departments. 
For this purpose, and in order for Government to build up the required expertise, the Select 
Committee proposed the creation of a Ministry of Nationalised Industry which would exercise 
the Government's responsibility for efficiency. 
1969 WHITE PAPER (CMND 4027) 
The Government responded to this report in the 1969 White Paper CMND 4027, 
Ministerial Control of the Nationalised Industries. While accepting the need to keep its 
responsibility for economic efficiency distinct from its responsibility for distributive justice, it 
rejected the report's organisational conclusion of a separate Ministry. There were several 
grounds cited, of which the most important was the argument that such a Ministry would not 
reduce intervention in the management of the industries, as the Committee hoped, but would add 
to pressures towards greater intervention. As the report put it: ' I f Parliament were invited to 
regard the new Minister as having the general efficiency of the industries as his main 
responsibility, they would tend to expect him to answer on many aspects of the management of 
the industries, especially in view of the powers recommended.'17 For the same main reason, the 
Government rejected the proposal that Ministers be given powers of issuing specific directives 
on any subject which appears to be in the national interest; it feared that such powers would 
involve the creation of a new climate which would' inevitably lead over the years to a gradual 
encroachment by Ministers on the managerial responsibilities of the industries, so undermining 
their efficiency and reducing their capacity to recruit and keep capable top management'18 
At this point, in the light of the three major White Papers published in the 1960s, it is 
worth reflecting that the dialogue between the SCNI and the Government on the appropriate 
relationship between Ministers and the Public corporations had reached something of an 
1 7 Cmnd. 4027, Ministerial Control of the Nationalised Industries (HMSO, 1969), para. 10. 
1 1 Ibid., para. 16. 
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impasse. The SCNI was clearly concerned mat the level of ministerial intervention was excessive 
and threatened the efficiency of nationalised industry. Hence its proposal for a separate Ministry 
responsible for the efficiency of nationalised industry. The Government, on the other hand, was 
concerned that the organisational reform proposed would not improve efficiency but would 
merely lead to further encroachment on the autonomy of the public corporations, and responded 
by publicly endorsing the original Morrisonian ideal, modified by the refinements introduced 
by the 1961 and 1967 White Papers. In retrospect this was a grave mistake because a separate 
ministry would have strengthened the hand of the nationalised industry chairmen in their 
dealings with sponsoring departments, particularly when the going was getting rough and appeals 
were being made to sacrifice the interest of their industry to the greater national interest, as 
became commonplace in the seventies. 
However, in fairness to the Government's position over against that of the SCNI, at this 
time most of the nationalised industries were performing satisfactorily, even well. 1 9 Those that 
were performing badly, like British Rail, British Coal, and British Steel, could be explained by 
special circumstances that had little to do with the basic administrative model of public 
enterprise; coal was an industry facing a contraction in demand that posed all the intractable 
problems associated with scaling down an industry, in particular, reducing employment; British 
Rail despite all the progress made under the Beeching reforms, had suffered intense competition 
from road haulage and laboured under social obligations that made an ongoing subsidy 
necessary. British Steel had relatively recently been renationalised By contrast, the other major 
public industries looked to be in blooming health. The Electricity industry was very profitable; 
prices in the Telecommunications industry had declined by 13% since 1963; British Gas, stood 
poised to reap the benefits of cheap natural gas supplies from the North Sea. Faced with this 
largely favourable record, the Government's reluctance to introduce a separate Ministry 
responsible for the efficiency of nationalised industry is perhaps understandable on the maxim 
that it is better not to tamper with something that appears to be working perfectly well. 
RICHARD PRYKE (1971) 
The Government's response to the Select Committee was soon to be supported by what 
1 9 This section draws on Pryke, R. The Nationalised Industries, Policies and Performance since 1968 (Martin 
Roberts. Oxford, 1981). 
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is often quoted as the authoritative study of the first two decades of nationalised industry, that 
of the economist, Richard Pryke. 
Pryke was highly critical of the Select Committee. He regarded the public policy 
approach, which fbcussed attention on the administrative model, as pointless, because, confident 
as he was that the performance of nationalised industry could be measured, he believed that 'the 
excellence or otherwise of administrative machinery can only be judged by its result'2 0 He also 
claimed that the Committee had exaggerated the strains in the relationship between the 
government and the industries and was selective in the evidence it brought to support its 
warnings.2' Furthermore, from the observations of the way the Government had increasingly 
come to accept paying the cost of the nationalised industries' social obligations and the evidence 
mat the Boards were increasingly standing up and refusing to pay the price themselves or to take 
responsibility for Government decisions, he was confident that the relationship was in good 
working order. He could even write glowingly that1 It is not only in years but also in spirit mat 
the nationalised industries have come of age.'22 Even where he acknowledged failure, he 
believed that 'in the main these failures were due to factors beyond the control of the 
nationalised industries and that, although there was little to show on the surface, their 
transformation was already well under way.'23 He further added in an unmistakable reference 
to the SCM, 'this can only have been obvious to the most perceptive, dispassionate and 
industrious investigations and these were notable by their absence.'24 
Pryke's study cannot be faulted on the grounds of industry. Whether it was sufficiently 
dispassionate or perceptive we shall have more to say later. The main conclusion of his 
exhaustive research into the performance of each of the nationalised industries was that, after 
a disappointing first decade, when a management deficit was the main drag on performance, 
public ownership had realised the hope of greater economic efficiency.25 He also found that, as 
foreseen by Tawney, whom he quotes, public ownership had achieved economic success in a 
superior way to that of private ownership. As he put these findings: 
2 0 Pryke, R. (1971), op.ctt, p.457. 
* Ibid., p. 456^457. 
n Ibid., p.464. 
* Ibid., p.464. 
u Ibid., p. 443. 
2 5 Ibid., p. 435. 
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That the nationalized industries have in fact earned their profits by what on 
balance have been superior means, in terms of die national welfare, to those 
employed by private industry, has been the central thesis of this book.26 
In support of his thesis, Pryke distinguished between technical and al locative efficiency. 
By the former he referred to the cost of producing a given level of output, by the latter, to 
whether output and price are at the right levels. The distinction is a little misleading because 
technical efficiency, as Pryke defines it, also has implications for allocative efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the distinction is helpful in so far as it allows one to distinguish management 
responsibility for productivity as separate from its responsibility for setting price and output 
With this clarification in mind, with respect to technical efficiency, on the evidence of his 
figures of rapidly rising productivity in the public sector, Pryke was sufficiently optimistic to 
conclude that 'there is no reason to believe that the large productivity gains of the last decade 
are a once-and-for-all phenomenon.127 
On allocative efficiency, which he viewed to be the less important of the two, he made 
the important point that what mis-allocation there may have been might not have been prevented 
anyway, because investment plans depended on estimates of future demand which had turned 
out to be impossible to predict38 In this connection, he made the point that one should not 
assume that normal commercial behaviour will ensure that resources are allocated in the best 
possible way. Also, he insisted that one should not disregard the impact of social costs on the 
national welfare. In discussing these in the context of the losses recorded by the National Coal 
Board, and the government's protection of this industry, he made special reference to the loss 
to the national economy of the contribution that could be made by those rendered unemployed, 
and to the hardship to communities affected by the rapid contraction of an industry. When all 
the relevant costs were taken into account he concluded that there had been' remarkably little 
mis-allocation.'29 
Pryke put this economic success down to several factors: One was the "new broom" of 
the management teams introduced.30 Another was the way the unified ownership had made it 
2 6 Ibid., p. 473. 
2 7 Ibid., p. 437. 
2 4 Ibid., p. 439. 
"IUd.,p.442. 
3 0 Ibid , p. 446. 
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possible to realise economies of scale.31 For those industries, such as coal, where a contraction 
was necessary, he pointed out the advantage that the unified enterprise could minimise social 
costs by a careful control of recruitment, making it possible for workers threatened with 
redundancy at uneconomic pits to be offered work in more profitable pits. Linked with these 
gains, he included the improvement in industrial relations following the introduction of 
collective bargaining on an industry-wide basis. He further claimed mat the improved industrial 
relations had encouraged progress in the field of productivity bargaining.32 
But as impressive as these gains were to Pryke, he did not regard them as the best 
arguments for the superiority of public ownership. Although it is doubtful whether the industries 
would ever have been unified without nationalisation, he accepted the theoretical possibility that 
unification and the introduction of new management could have come about without 
nationalisation. It is therefore only where he moved on to explore the beneficial effects of public 
ownership which, in his view, must be regarded as the direct consequences of nationalisation, 
mat we find his main arguments for nationalisation. Here it is highly significant that, in the face 
of those who now claim that the main reason for public enterprise having failed is that it lacked 
adequate incentives for good performance, Pryke discusses a whole list of incentives which he 
regarded as the main contribution of public ownership to superior economic performance: 
The first of these was what he believed to be the strong incentive to reduce costs. This 
he argued derived from the more stringent financial constraints existing under public ownership. 
These included the formal and informal controls on prices, which to all intents and purposes held 
them down, and the requirement that the public corporations, with the exception of BO AC and 
British Steel, be financed entirely by fixed interest stock that must be serviced annually, rather 
than share capital that need not pay dividends in bad years. As he explained: 
It would be surprising if the strong incentive which the nationalised industries 
have to pay their way and meet their financial targets without raising their prices 
did not result in their searching more vigorously for ways to cut their expenses. 
Cost reduction is the only way of escape from the difficult position in which 
they find themselves. This may help to explain the success which most of the 
nationalised industries seem to have had in increasing their productivity, the 
emphasis which so many of them have placed on work study and productivity 
* Ibid., p. 447. 
"Ibid., p.447. 
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bargaining, and the rapid rate at which most cost-reducing innovations have 
been adopted." 
The second main incentive was that resulting from the detailed scrutiny to which the 
nationalised industries had been subjected. As he pointed out, 'There can be no doubt that the 
nationalised industries have been inquired into far more thoroughly than any other part of the 
economy.'34 He argued that with this scrutiny taking place at a number of levels, including mat 
of sponsoring departments, the SCNI, the NPBI, ad hoc investigations, and the occasional 
Parliamentary debate, the industries had ample reports on their operations to help them promote 
greater efficiency. Furthermore, he claimed that the existence of all this scrutiny, combined with 
the general publicity which the nationalised industry tended to receive, meant that there was 
always pressure on recalcitrant Boards to make their industries more efficient 
The third main incentive had to do with the different purpose and motivation he claimed 
for public enterprise. Although he qualified this claim by admitting that no hard evidence had 
been produced, he argued that a prima facie case could be made to support a belief in the 
superior motivation of public enterprise managers. This he believed explained much of the 
contrast between the performance of public and private enterprise. In this connection, 
anticipating some of the arguments for a stakeholder theory of the firm, he argued that the 
broader aims of public service were far more likely to enrich the nation than the single-minded 
aim of maximising the profit of shareholders. He justified mis belief on the ground that, because 
profit was merely one of the rules of the game and not the object of the exercise, public 
enterprise managers were free to take fully into account the interests of all the stakeholders in 
seeking to meet the needs of consumers at the lowest possible price, to be model employers, and 
to ensure the continuing modernisation and rationalisation of their industries by adequate 
investment in new machinery and working practices. 
In addition to this important discussion of the various incentives likely to be operating 
under public ownership, Pryke's study is also important for his arguments against 
de-nationalisation.33 Here the core of his case against those who, at the time, were advocating 
this solution to the problems experienced by some of the industries, was that they had not taken 
sufficient account of welfare considerations and the evidence for the great strides in efficiency 
3 3 Ibid., p. 450. 
3 4 Ibid., p. 450. 
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made by the nationalised industries. And, furthermore, that there was no plausible belief that the 
private sector could do better. In this connection, it should be recalled that he wrote before 
"Thateherism" and global competition had forced a new enterprise ethos on the private sector, 
which then did not present the "lean and hungry look" of today. The contrast between an 
inefficient private sector and an efficient public sector was then only too plausible, as we are 
reminded where Pryke writes, I n theory the main aim and driving force of private enterprise 
is to make a profit, although in practice many firms seem content to jog along, hoping for a quiet 
life and pursuing a policy of live and let live/ 3 6 
In concluding this review of the main findings of Pryke's study, while the tone of his 
writing betrays, in places, an enthusiasm for public ownership that suggests mat he was not an 
entirely dispassionate observer himself, this ought not to detract too much from the overall 
integrity of his favourable view of public enterprise. This was based on a record of rising 
profitability, at a time when profitability in the economy generally was declining, and on the 
evidence for a rapidly improving productive performance for nationalised industry, which has 
never been seriously challenged.37 However, in retrospect, his dismissal of what the public policy 
approach of the Select Committee had to contribute to an evaluation of nationalisation betrays 
a serious misperception, because it was precisely the shortcomings of the administrative model 
which handicapped public enterprise more than he cared to allow, and which partly accounts for 
the difficulties which many of the industries fell into in the 1970s. The strength of Christopher 
Foster's study, to which we now turn, was that, with the Select Committee, it was sufficiently 
perceptive to see that, already, by the end of the 1960s, the lack of precision in the statutory 
relationship between Parliament, Ministers, and Boards, posed a serious threat to the future 
effectiveness of nationalised industry. 
CHRISTOPHER FOSTER 
Foster's 1971 essay on the control of public enterprise was written from the perspective 
of his experience in the Ministry of Transport It gave a penetrating analysis of the reality behind 
what he called the various fictions making up the public perception of public enterprise. His 
objective was to help clarify the triangular relationship between Parliament, Ministers, and the 
3 6 Ibid., p. 459. 
3 7 See further Hannah, L op.cit., p. 181, and his tables for labour productivity growth rates and total productivity 
growth rates for the period 1958-68 on p. 177. 
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Boards of nationalised industries because he believed that the original statutes were not clear 
where the authority of the Minister ends and the independence of the Board begins, and that the 
muddled triangular relationship prevented effective strategic control of public enterprise.38 
Foster's essay is also important for the way it gave another perspective on the question 
of whether ministerial intervention had grown excessive. In this connection he needs to be 
understood as writing in response to the Select Committee report on ministerial control, which 
sided with the Board Chairmen, by complaining of too much interference from Ministers. As 
a former civil servant, Foster's essay is a defence of Ministers against the criticism levelled at 
mem by the SCNI, from one who had first hand experience of the complex task facing Ministers. 
Foster was especially critical of the way the SCNI was attempting to uphold a distinction 
between policy making and the implementation of policy, and its assignment of responsibility 
for the former to Ministers and the latter to Boards. While possible in theory, he attacked this 
distinction between strategic and tactical command as being impossible in practice. The reason 
he gave was mat for it to work, it would require a level of trust that had Ministers setting policy 
and then showing no further interest in whether the policy had been implemented. But, as he 
explained, the third actor in mis drama, Parliament expected more of Ministers than this because 
it expected them to promote both the efficiency of the nationalised industries and the social 
policy which was to be enacted through them: 
Thus the ample distinction between the Minster's job of laying down policy and 
the Board's job of implementing them, collapses. The question then becomes 
one of trying to settle how far a Minister may go to see that his own and 
Parliament's policies are being carried out efficiently." 
In addition to drawing attention to the complexity of the triangular relationship between 
Parliament, Ministers, and Boards, and the special complexity of the role of Ministers, Foster 
went on to defend Ministers against the charge that their policies had not been stated clearly 
enough. He accepted that the lack of clear objectives, and the confusion of commercial and 
social objectives, posed great difficulty for public enterprise. However, he made the point that 
there was a limit to how far it was possible to clarify policy, especially when this involved the 
use of abstract criteria, such as economic efficiency. As he made this point in his criticism of 
the Select Committee: 
3 8 Foster, C. Politics, Finance and the Role of Economics (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1971), p. 11. 
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They are almost eighteenth century in their belief in the power of reason and the 
possibility of persuasion. They are of the enlightenment too, in believing that 
there are certain economic (and other) policies which can be set out as criteria 
at a high level of abstraction without involving detail, and yet can be tight 
enough for the purpose of public accountability.40 
But this, according to Foster, was not the whole of the problem; even i f greater clarity 
was possible, there were many constraints, some of them statutory, on the ability of Ministers 
to lay down binding statements of policy. Foster even went so far as to argue that such was the 
independence of the Boards' strictly there has been no nationalization and no public ownership 
i f by them is meant ownership by the state. In a sense, nationalization or public ownership is a 
myth.'41 In support of this claim he referred to Lord Denning's judgement that' in the eyes of the 
law the corporation was its own master/ Consequently, according to Foster, even i f Ministers 
could clearly lay down statements of policy, because, legally, it was up to the Boards to 
determine their duties, these statutes could only have persuasive force and, therefore, could be 
disregarded: the exception was in the limited cases where statutes allowed Ministers to make 
specific directions to Boards. The outcome of all this, according to Foster, was deeply ironic 
because what limited powers the Ministers had, for example, mat of opposing investment, tended 
to do with the commercial aspects of the corporation; over social policy, where one might 
reasonably think they had more interest and expertise they had very few powers. Furthermore, 
as he pointed out, whereas, in theory, nationalisation had been expected to give the State greater 
powers to respond to social needs, in reality, the State had acquired very little power.42 
Foster also sought to dismiss what he believed to be the myth of the sponsoring 
Minister's power over his industry's financial policy. In a detailed analysis of the 1961 and 1967 
White Papers, which, it will be recalled, had attempted to bring greater precision into the 
statutory powers of Ministers over financial policies, he argued that the interpretation and 
application of the Discount Cash Flow and Marginal Cost Pricing principles is often a very 
complex matter and is open to considerable difference of interpretatioa43 Thus, while these 
White Papers appeared to have extended the financial powers of ministers by the inclusion of 
4 0 Ibid., p. 19. 
4 1 Ibid., p. 27. 
4 2 Ibid., p. 29. 
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these criteria, he argued that the reality was that the Boards could choose what interpretation 
suited their ends. Further, he explained that Ministers were very vulnerable to Boards when it 
came to deciding financial policy because the Treasury, at the time, although in a powerful 
position to exercise influence and to back Ministers up, had not taken a systematic interest in 
controlling the finances of the nationalised industries; it had not done so because the 
nationalised industries were, in general, not expected to be unprofitable and, therefore, were still 
expected to pay back their loans.44 
From his experience of advising Ministers, Foster was also able to helpfully explain the 
personal constraints on Ministers exercising their veto on investment decisions. In this 
connection, he refers to his astonishment when first entering the Ministry of Transport to 
discover that no railway investment had been turned down despite the Railways having run a 
large deficit for many years and that there were widespread doubts about the financial viability 
of much of mat investment43 He explained the pressure on Ministers, firstly, by the way Boards 
tended to claim that any new investment was crucial to their industry's commercial viability. 
This put sharply the conflict of interest faced by the Minister, because should he decide to refuse 
the request on the ground of his responsibility for the public interest, this placed him in the 
unenviable position of having provided an alibi for the Board, which could at some future date 
blame poor financial or economic performance on the Minister for refusing their request.46 
Secondly, any Minister wishing to exercise his financial powers against the wishes of the Board 
faced the problem of bis, and his department's lack of expertise and experience of the industry. 
While the former tended to inhibit the Minister from trusting his advisor's use of the still 
relatively new appraisal techniques, the latter tended to pressure him into giving the experienced 
and publicly spirited businessmen running the nationalised industries the benefit of the doubt.47 
Thirdly, the Minister, in contrast with the position of a merchant banker appraising a private 
sector investment proposal, who knows that i f the request is turned down it can always be put 
to another merchant bank, felt his responsibility keenly because he knew he held powers of 
4 4 Ibid., p. 55 
4 5 Ibid., p. 57. 
4 6 Ibid., p. 58. 
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decision over the only means of finance open to the industry.48 In the light of these pressures, 
and the way the Chairman of the nationalised industries could apply pressure by publicly 
expressing their irritation with a Minister, when questioned too closely by him, to the ever 
sympathetic Select Committee, Foster writes of how he came to understand why it was not 
surprising that few demands for new investment were ever turned down. 
Even the power of appointment, according to Foster, was less potent in reality than it 
appeared. Here his analysis struck at the heart of the Morrisonian, arms' length model of 
nationalised industry, because, as he correctly recalled, 'Herbert Morrison seems to have 
believed that the most important thing was to choose the right man and then let him get on with 
the job . 4 9 Firstly, his inside experience suggested that the best men for the job were proving 
difficult to recruit from the private sector, which not only paid more but where the exercise of 
power was much more clear cut 3 0 Secondly, even i f it was possible to get the right man, his 
experience had led him to suspect that the Board culture and senior management culture of any 
particular industry tended to frustrate any individual Board member, even a Chairman, from 
striking out in an independent direction.51 Thirdly, he had found mat, once an appointment had 
been made, the resort to dismissal would be resisted i f the same Minister was involved because 
it would amount to a mistake in recruitment And, i f another Minister was involved, which was 
the more likely, because mere was no guarantee that a replacement would be any better, 
dismissal tended to be used only as a last resort, and so was really quite ineffectual.52 
On the basis of this insightful and very plausible view of the actual working of 
nationalised industry, Foster men went on to conclude that the widespread complaints about too 
much ministerial intervention were the result of a combination of the inadequacy of their powers 
and the pressure on Ministers from Parliament, which wanted greater control of both the 
finances and social policy of the nationalised industries. These pressures, he argued, forced 
Ministers to appear to be more interfering than in reality they were. Even in the instances where 
Ministers had resorted to pressure rather than persuasion, Foster argued that the confusion of 
"Ibid., p.61. 
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powers and duties made it difficult to substantiate charges of illicit pressure or "arm-twisting," 
and that, in any case, these charges were likely to be exaggerations.53 As he sought to explain: 
What the Select Committee does not seem to have seen is that the growth of 
intervention has not been an exercise of power (except in the very limited sense 
of having the authority to get some, but not all, of the information one wants 
and the right to be listened to) but the alternative to the exercise of power.54 
But as defensive of Ministers as he undeniably was, Foster did not entirely exonerate 
them of blame. He admitted that there were two areas in which they appeared to have intervened 
without the necessary powers and mat these were a possible cause for worry, because i f allowed 
to become general practice they would have serious implications for financial discipline and 
efficiency. The first of these related to the pressure used to get the Air Corporations to buy 
British aircraft against their commercial interests. In this case it appeared that the Minister, in 
addition to issuing a directive, had applied pressure through the mechanism of the annual 
investment review. To Foster, while he conceded that it might be argued that the Minister had 
stayed within his statutory powers, because the statutes 'did not specify that the purpose of a 
Minister's financial powers was exclusively financial,'55 the use of financial powers for social 
ends, in this case, to subsidise the aviation industry, suggested at the very least confusion 
between their financial and social powers. Accordingly, he wanted their statutory powers to 
approve capital expenditure amended to exclude social considerations. He also complained 
about the way Ministers had used the Gentleman's Agreement to delay price increases and how, 
even more seriously, delays in approving capital expenditure had affected the financial 
performance of certain industries.56 
The second case of improper intervention to which Foster drew attention was that over 
prices and wages. In this case, as we have earlier explained, although there were a number of 
avenues, such as the "Gentleman's Agreement", open to them to exercise influence, except under 
Prices and Incomes legislation introduced by the Wilson Government between 1967 and 1969, 
ministers had no statutory powers over prices and wages. But despite the lack of powers, Foster 
conceded that 'here intervention had almost been ceaseless.' When the intervention was to 
5 1 Ibid, p. 102. 
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combat inflation, he accepted that the issue of whether intervention was justified was complex. 
However, he insisted that at the very least Governments should be aware of the cost to the 
nationalised industries, in terms of the erosion of their financial discipline, of being made the 
"loss leader" of any anti-inflation campaign.37 
Despite these concessions to the case made out by the Select Committee of too much 
ministerial intervention, Foster's overall conclusion was that the nationalised industries enjoyed 
a far greater practical independence than either their Chairmen or the Select Committee made 
out. He urged that strategic control of Parliament over nationalised industry needed to be 
tightened up by extending the powers of Ministers where this was necessary to effect greater 
strategic control, and by clarifying the limits of their powers, particularly with regard to pricing 
and investment decisions, where there was confusion and, consequently, the appearance of too 
much ministerial intervention. But, while he saw the administrative model of public enterprise 
as being flawed, in his eyes it was still reformable. As he put this: 
At present we have the wrong system, used wrongly and despite their great 
qualities, with, in the past, the wrong people operating the financial aspects of 
it Yet an efficient system is neither in terms of its statutory description nor its 
operation, so far from the present situation that it could not be achieved by a 
small number of definite steps.18 
THE TURBULENT SEVENTIES 
The arresting feature of the experience of the early seventies is just how rapidly the 
enthusiasm for public ownership and the critical optimism that its controls could be made to 
work better, reflected respectively in Pryke and Foster's studies, were lost. Looking back on the 
period, it seems as i f almost overnight the relations of the nationalised industries with their 
customers, trade unions, and government became severely strained. 
We shall begin with the relationship of the nationalised industries with the public, 
because mis had already become a sufficient cause for concern to prompt an investigation by the 
Select Committee, and, in response to their subsequent report, the Government issued its White 
Paper of 1971. 
5 7 Ibid., p. 117. 
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1971 WHITE PAPER (Cmnd.5067) 
The Select Committee found that, although all the industries they had examined 
recognised that Publicly owned bodies, not exposed to the full consequences of commercial 
failure, and possessing in some degree a monopoly position, must deliberately cultivate a proper 
responsiveness to their customer's needs',59 the reality was that many were not sufficiently 
responsive to their customers. Further, it found that the consultative machinery that had been set 
up for each of the industries was not seen to be effective by the public. It also found that there 
was a general perception that the Government, in the person of the sponsoring department, 
which, in highly technical matters was in the best position to safeguard consumer interests,' does 
not always appear to the consumer as his champion.'60 The consequence of these perceived 
failures was that the nationalised industries were subjected to a 'seemingly continuous criticism 
from the public which is far more captious than anything to which the private sector is liable'.61 
In the light of these and other more detailed findings, the Select Committee sought to 
empower the consultative councils as the 'consumer's watchdog' by declaring that 'they have an 
essential part to play in reconciling the public to the operations of the great industries it owns/6 2 
Its report went on to make detailed recommendations as to how the councils could more 
effectively fulfill this role. For instance it recommended that their independence from the 
industries be promoted by the provision of council offices separate from the industries, funding 
from the sponsoring departments rather than the industries, the means to hire specialist advisers 
when the complexity of the issues at stake warranted them, and the exclusion of Council 
Chairmen from a seat on the board of the industry. More controversially, in the case of the 
Transport Users' Consultative Council, it proposed that it be given a role in deciding on charges, 
be involved in investment planning, and to be fully informed about and to be consulted on 
planned reduction of services. 
In reply, the White Paper accepted the main themes of the Select Committee report. 
What it declined to accept were some of the more controversial recommendations, which 
appeared to want to make consumer councils equal partners with boards and sponsoring 
59 Nationalised Industry Relations with the Public (HMSO, 1971), para.3. 
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departments in the regulation of nationalised industry. The Government was opposed to such 
a development on the main ground that it would erode the 'principle of commercial freedom' 
of the nationalised industries.63 This revealed the Government's view that the consumer councils 
merely had a consultative role; they were an important but junior player in the regulation of 
nationalised industry. 
But while customers may have been justified in complaining about the service they 
received from the nationalised industries, they had to some extent been compensated by price 
restraint. However, price restraint, good for customers, was soon to wreck havoc with the 
financial disciplines of the public corporations. Heath's misfortune was to impose price restraint 
and an incomes policy at the same time as the nationalised industries were rocked by labour 
unrest and the disruption caused by the oil crisis of 1973. The impact of all these shocks was to 
send the finances of the nationalised industries into "free fall". Their financial targets had to be 
suspended in 1973, and by 1974-75 the Government was forced to make £1,725 million available 
to them in revenue support64 
In response to the financial crisis, the Select Committee recommended, as early as 
December 1973, mat mere should be a wide-ranging inquiry. This was eventually implemented 
by the Labour Government, which announced, in 1975, that the National Economic 
Development Office (NEDO), an independent national forum for economic consultation 
between government, management and unions, was to undertake an enquiry. The NEDO 
published its report in 1976. It deserves to be considered in some detail for the reason that, after 
subjecting the arms' length model to thorough scrutiny, it proposed an alternative model which 
its authors and others would doubtless still see as a valid alternative to privatisation. 
THE NEDO REPORT 
After a preamble, which emphasised the importance of the nationalised industries for the 
whole economy, the report's Chairman, Sir Ronald Mcintosh, stated the main conclusion: 'the 
existing framework of relationships, developed under governments of both main political parties, 
is unsatisfactory and in need of radical change.'65 As he went on to justify a complete overhaul 
° Cmnd. 5067, Nationalised Industry and the Public (HMSO, 1971), para. 13 ff. 
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of public ownership: 
We accept that with goodwill and intelligent human relationships, individuals 
can make almost any system work. But our studies have shown that the present 
system is ill-fitted to withstand the strains and pressures which arise when the 
going is difficult; and that in many respects it acts as positive deterrent to mutual 
understanding. We are convinced that a completely new approach is needed.66 
The report found that there was considerable confusion about the role and aims of the 
corporations, and especially about the extent of their public service obligations. Further that this 
confusion was exacerbated by the changeableness of sponsoring departments, which, when 
faced with severe financial pressure, were wont to try and force their own interpretation of a 
corporation's statutes. The report also found that while boards understood and accepted the roles 
of the Treasury, in controlling levels of investment and loans, and the Department of 
Employment, in controlling levels of pay, the price restraint policies of the Department of Prices 
and Consumer Protection were much resented as being inconsistent with the policies pursued 
by the other government departments. It concluded mat 'The resulting uncertainties are rarely 
resolved in rational discussion of priorities; they can deteriorate into mutual recrimination and 
loss of confidence and leave a decision making vacuum.'67 
The report then went on to discuss the uncertainties at the strategic policy level. Here it 
found that, as is common with most private sector companies, the Boards see it as their 
responsibility to decide on their strategies. However, it found this to be unrealistic in the case 
of public enterprise, with its inescapable public responsibilities. These included the 
responsibility to take account of government sector planning, government intentions regarding 
any subsidies mat it was paying, and government involvement in major technological decisions. 
The report also drew attention to the general lack of trade union involvement at the level of 
strategic policy making. Here it warned that the trade unions' increasingly are in a position to 
delay or prevent implementation of strategies on which their views have not been adequately 
canvassed nor their prior agreement sought'68 In the light of these findings it encouraged joint 
strategic plans, involving government and trade unions, such as the 1974 Plan for coal, and 
emphasised that 'the issues of public policy involved are so large and politically sensitive that 
"Ibid., p. 10. 
6 7 Ibid., p.24. 
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it is not realistic to suppose that they would ever be left for long to management alone to 
determine, subject only to periodic checks on their financial performance/69 
As far as the more short term and medium term corporate planning level was concerned, 
the report noted that, while in most of the corporation's statutes there was no specific statutory 
requirement to submit plans to sponsoring departments for scrutiny, the lack of joint consultation 
on the corporate plan was again a problem in many industries. It found that when these plans 
were eventually submitted, conflicts could arise because by then the corporations were 
effectively committed to mem, whereas the sponsoring department expected to consider strategic 
options at this late stage. A linked problem was that where the original statutes did give 
government a role in the planning process, in the annual investment review, sponsoring 
departments tended to be denied sufficient information on which to base their decisions. The 
consequence was mat, as Foster noted earlier, individual investment projects were seldom turned 
down. A further consequence was found to be that sponsoring departments tended to react to 
financial stringency by across the board cuts, and that, in anticipation of these, boards tended to 
add a measure of padding into their investment plans. Lastly, as a further frustration of the whole 
regulatory role of the sponsoring department, the report found that the' information which would 
be required for effective monitoring of performance trends is not usually requested from or 
provided by the corporations.'70 
On the attempt to ensure efficient allocation and use of resources by means of the widely 
acclaimed framework published in the 1961 and 1967 White Papers, the report found that the 
policies of price restraint had frustrated the use of these guidelines in most industries. It also 
found that the guidelines were1 inappropriate except in very specific circumstances'.71 In this 
connection, with respect to the principle of long run marginal cost pricing it found that there 
are many factors that prevent implementation of such action in practice/72 On the use of the 
test discount rate of return principle, it found that much investment can not or can not easily be 
dis-aggregated, because it relates to a total system, such as a gas distribution grid. On social cost 
benefit analysis, the report found little evidence of it having been tried. On the use of financial 
"Ibid., p. 10. 
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targets, in the light of price restraint, it declared that 'they will be irrelevant i f artificial 
constraints on economic pricing or other commercial functions are not fully and accurately 
compensated. ' 7 3 It was equally dismissive of their value in stimulating management to further 
efficiency in a monopoly situation or where competition is constrained because the targets can 
be achieved either by price changes or changes in levels of service. Lastly, in connection with 
the lack of any consistent rationale for the different ways in which individual nationalised 
industries were financed from loan capital and reserves, and, in the case of British Steel and 
British Airways, public dividend capital, on which there was no requirement to pay a fixed 
annual interest charge, it noted that the 'incentive effect of financial targets is severely 
reduced'.74 
In reporting on appointments, the NEDO found that, despite civil servants believing 'that 
the power of appointment is the most important single mechanism for effecting changes in 
corporations performance', there was widespread dissatisfaction with the appointments system 
and mat mere was' little publicly available evidence that reappointment is linked to a chairman's 
or corporation's performance.'75 It also found that there were serious problems of recruitment 
In this connection, while the report cited inadequate pay, pension arrangements and related 
conditions as being partly to blame, the frustration of government interventions was held to be 
'a major deterrent to successful managers in private industry seeking a public career.'76 
On the thorny question of the scale of government intervention, the report steered a safe 
course. It reported the view of many industries that government was guilty of illicit intervention 
on an excessive scale. It supported the plausibility of this view by noting how the pressures on 
government from major interest groups, particularly consumers and trade unions, had increased 
over the past decade at the same time as the role of the nationalised industries in a low growth 
economy had become even more strategic. And it did not evade fully stating the depth of the 
resentment: 
From the boards' viewpoint the trend towards more frequent and ad hoc 
interventions has delayed decisions, disrupted previously agreed plans, 
invalidated criteria for planning and assessing performance, resulted in financial 
7 3 Ibid., p. 33. 
7 4 Ibid., p. 33. 
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deficits, and damaged the corporate morale of management and other 
employees. The level of decision making tends to be raised with resultant 
increased burden on senior management. The lack of prior consultation, the 
inconsistency with agreed procedures and guidelines and the apparent 
unwillingness of governments openly to carry the responsibility for then-
interventions give rise to particular resentment at board level.77 
However, the NEDO also reported the opposing, "Foster", view that denied an excessive 
level of government intervention. In support of this view it cited how many civil servants 
believed that 'boards and management tend to 'play up' the consequences of interventions in 
order to obscure managerial shortcomings.' But, while insisting that it was 'undeniable that 
relationships between the nationalised industries and government have deteriorated', it 
maintained impartiality by concluding that the present structure of systems of accountability 
obscure the validity of these different points of view1.78 
The report then went on to consider the consequences of specific interventions, beginning 
with prices. Here it drew attention to the way that, while not all nationalised industries were 
affected to the same extent, price restraint had been particularly damaging not only because of 
the effect on financial viability - the expectation that the corporations would pay their way taking 
one year and the next - but also because of its economic consequences - the inefficient use of 
resources resulting from the distortion of levels of demand and investment On pay restraint, the 
report singled out the confusion introduced into collective bargaining by government entering 
into separate negotiations with trade unions; boards claimed that the consequence was that 
eventual settlements were higher than necessary. On the tendency for government to impose 
across the board cuts on investment, boards complained of major disruption for themselves and 
for their equipment suppliers, while civil servants sought a justification in the widely held 
suspicion mentioned earlier that the corporations pad their investment plans. Of other 
interventions reported, of special interest in the light of the post-privatisation behaviour of some 
of the industries, was the complaints about the way government had prevented diversification. 
On the subject of the accountability of both Boards and Ministers to Parliament, the 
NEDO drew attention to tile practical consequences of the considerable ambiguity in these 
relationships. In the case of the Boards, after analysing the formal position which required the 
"Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
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Boards to submit annual reports and accounts to Ministers, and to cooperate with investigations 
initiated by the Select Committee, it reported that confusions concerning 'to whom they are 
responsible, for what functions and dimensions of performance, and over what time scale' had 
led to a situation in which they were' not effectively required to account for their performance 
in a systematic or objective manner - whether it be to Parliament, to Ministers, to other 
legitimate interest groups or to the wider public' 7 9 In this connection, it noted that, despite its 
continuous efforts, the Select Committee had 'not been able to reassure itself, the general public 
or individual interest groups about the performance of the nationalised industries.80 The report 
also drew attention to the way the ill-defined responsibilities and powers of ministers, in 
particular those to do with the power of issuing directives, meant that they tended to rely on 
persuasion and other informal means rather man use a general or specific directive. As a 
consequence, they were also not being held accountable to Parliament for their interventions. 
The NEDO also pointed out some significant differences between the public ownership 
in the UK and that in France, West Germany and Sweden. It noted that there was no external 
audit institution for the nationalised industries in the UK. In contrast with their concerted 
approach, it described the British arms' length model as embodying a conflictual rather than 
cooperative relationship between the industries and government. In this connection the report 
drew attention to the way the short-term commitments of Ministers and senior civil servants to 
particular industries and the private sector attitudes of managers heightened the conflictual 
relationship involved. 
Significantly, the report contradicted Pryke's defence of the adequacy of the incentives 
operating under public ownership. It described the system of controls as a 'rmnimising 
environment', characterised by a lack of any effective incentives for improved performance. As 
it put this in a passage that sums up the overall thrust of the report: 
The evidence we have accumulated points overwhelmingly to the need to base 
the nationalised industries' relationship with government on three basic concepts 
- trust, continuity, and accountability. The present structure of relationships has 
manifestly failed to provide these. The lack of any assurance that when 
objectives and strategies have been agreed they will remain unchanged for long 
7 9 Ibid , pp. 38-39. 
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discourages any sense of commitment. Confusion over the respective roles of 
Ministers, civil servants and management means that no one can be properly 
held accountable for performance; those who do well cannot prove it objectively 
and those who want alibis for their mistakes can find them without difficulty. 
This has led to widespread resentment, cynicism and loss of morale among the 
people most involved.81 
However, despite its rejection of the Morrisonian model, the NEDO did not want to 
replace the arms' length approach with a fully concerted approach, which would directly involve 
all the interest groups in decision making. It rejected this alternative on several grounds: 
decisions would be less effective and more subject to delay; management motivation and morale 
would be weakened; the scope for outside intervention in management would be increased; 
procedures would become more bureaucratic; and accountability would be more obscured. 
Instead, it proposed a balanced approach which sought to draw on the strengths of both the arms' 
length and concerted approaches while avoiding their weaknesses by making a clear distinction 
between strategic decision making, which would be done in concert, and other management 
functions, which would be the responsibility of management. The proposed alternative was 
therefore a more collectivist and corporatist model man the one it sought to replace, but still one 
which stopped short of giving government executive powers. 
At its head there was to be a Policy Council, responsible for strategic planning. This was 
intended to be essentially a "half-way house" between the sponsoring department and the 
corporation board. Under this arrangement, the board would be expected to contribute to the 
formulation of policy, but once this was agreed, the board would be expected to implement the 
policy within the framework of the agreed goals and performance criteria. Similarly, ministers 
were expected to be involved in the formulation of policy, and to abide by agreements reached. 
Where it was not possible to reach agreement, the NEDO accepted that government ministers 
should be given new powers of specific direction, which would enable them, after failing to 
persuade their fellow council members and only in extreme circumstances, to override Policy 
Council decisions. The directives were to be published at the time they were issued, and 
Ministers would be accountable for the use of these powers. 
Drawing on the French, West German and Swedish practice, the Policy Council was to 
include civil servants and representatives of employees. Consumer representatives were 
H Ibid., p. 10. 
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excluded, although it was proposed that the Council' should be required to take full account of 
the interests of consumers'.82 In addition to its responsibility for setting policy, it would take over 
the responsibility of board appointments and the remuneration of board members from the 
sponsoring departments. It was also to have the functions of establishing performance criteria, 
and of monitoring performance. In connection with these performance criteria, in place of the 
economic and financial framework set out in the 1961 and 1967 White Papers, the NEDO 
proposed an approach which would take account of the individual circumstances of the 
industries. Accordingly, subject to certain broad principles, such as those in previous White 
Papers which sought to ensure the most efficient allocation of resources in pricing and 
investment decisions, it left it up to Policy Councils, to 'agree and publish the targets appropriate 
for its particular industry/83 Significantly, it also accepted that they should pursue a blend of 
objectives: social, service, efficiency and financial' on the understanding that the concept that, 
i f only its' social requirement1 can be isolated, a nationalised industry can be left to operate on 
a wholly commercial basis, is much too simplistic/84 
NATIONALISED INDUSTRY RESPONSES TO THE NEDO 
Before issuing its White Paper in response to the NEDO report the Government, 
respecting the "hands on" experience of the managers running the industries, asked the 
corporation chairmen to respond to the report The Select Committee published their comments 
in the 1976-77 session. While they divided on the NEDO analysis, they were largely united in 
opposition to its main recommendations, particularly that of a Policy Council. 
British Gas, for example, questioned the report's claim that there had been a long-term 
deterioration in the relationships of Government and the nationalised industries. On the contrary 
they claimed, as surprisingly did many of the other corporations, that relations with the 
sponsoring department had always been good. Consequently it saw no need to change the arms' 
length model. In the Corporation's words: 
Although, as the Study points out the philosophy of Government towards the 
nationalised industries has developed since the original statutes of 1946-49, and 
although the industries are being increasingly used as a means of implementing 
8 2 Ibid., p. 48. 
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economic policy, the Corporation does not believe that the "arms-length" 
approach has been discredited: the gas industry's generally good relationship 
with Government has developed because much of the time this method has been 
allowed to work. 8 5 
British Gas also rejected the view that their monitoring of performance and investment 
review procedures were inadequate, blaming any difficulties experienced entirely on fluctuating 
Government economic policy, particularly on prices. In this connection they complained bitterly 
that 'in little more than two years we have seen a change in Government requirements from a 
severe restraint on prices to the bringing forward of a price increase to reduce the Corporation's 
long-term indebtedness and thus increase their net contribution to the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement'.86 They could not however see how the NEDO proposals would eliminate future 
interference of this kind, because, as they put i t ' The difficulties that arise are not in the process 
of discussion and agreement of strategic plans and investment programmes, but in absorbing the 
subsequent changes dictated by Government economic policy/8 7 Further on, in response to the 
reports finding mat the economic and financial guidelines set out in the 1967 White Paper were 
not an effective basis for the Government's control of the nationalised industries, they responded: 
'The Corporation do not accept this view, but believe that the failure of the White Paper to 
achieve all that had been hoped for it is due more to the superimposition of price controls and 
to other Government interventions than to the shortcomings of the White Paper itself/ 8 8 
On the specific proposal of a Policy Council, the Corporation was emphatically opposed. 
The main reason given was that the Council would' slow the decision making process on matters 
of strategic importance. 8 9 It is also possible that British Gas was opposed on the ground that 
the Policy Council presented something of a "Trojan horse" for those who wanted to impose 
greater industrial democracy on nationalised industry. In this connection it may be significant 
that the Corporation devoted a considerable part of their response to describing the extent to 
which the board of British Gas already comprised members who had been promoted from the 
8 5 Second Special Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Session 1976 - 77, Comments by 
Nationalised Industries On the National Economic Development Office Report (HMSO, 1977), p.xi, para.6. 
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ranks of former workers and consequently, in their view, were "worker directors", and the extent 
to which the Corporation was making progress at all levels in developing employee participation. 
British Gas did not express an opinion on the proposal that ministers should be given 
additional powers of issuing specific directives. But other corporations produced a range of 
responses to this recommendatioa British Steel, for example, accepted the recommendation' on 
the basis that the power would be exercised only in extreme circumstances ( as the Report 
proposes ) and should be the subject of announcement in Parliament, and a debate i f Parliament 
desires/90 British Airways, on the other hand, was opposed on the ground that' Such powers 
would certainly introduce the possibility of Government intervention in the day-to-day 
management of the business and it is difficult to see how the concept of Board or management 
integrity could survive such a development/ 9 1 
I f a general conclusion must be risked which sums up the nationalised industries' very 
varied and detailed responses to the NEDO report, it would have to be that they were united in 
their opposition to the general direction of change which they feared amounted to a dilution of 
the arms' length relationship. They were not however hostile to some regularisation of the 
relationships between the Government and the nationalised industries. All would have welcomed 
the bipartisan approach proposed by British Gas, which called for a more' stable environment' 
in which the industries "can pursue agreed objectives including the achievement of realistic 
financial targets'. This, rather than any radical overhaul of the model chosen for public 
ownership, about sums up what they believed to be the root of the problem facing nationalised 
industry. As British Gas put this: 
Ideally, the long-term plans for the industries should be the subject of a 
reasonable degree of party consensus - a bipartisan approach - while leaving 
day-to-day political responsibility with current Ministers. It is in this area that 
the Corporation believe the real lesson is to be learnt from a study of 
Government/nationalised industry relationships in other European countries, and 
particularly in Austria, rather than in the field of distinguishing between the 
"arms length" and "concerted" approaches to control.92 
9 0 Ibid., p.xix., para. 2. 
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THE STEEL DEBATES 
It was at this stage in the whole process of reviewing what was to done about the 
problems of the nationalised industries that the crisis in the Steel industry intervened to shatter 
any realistic hope of a bipartisan approach. The immediate cause of the crisis was a world-wide 
collapse in demand for steel. The resulting over-supply forced British Steel to request additional 
external finance, which had to be approved by Parliament. This must have been acutely 
embarrassing for Labour, because not only had they re-nationalised the industry as recently as 
1967, but the crisis also came hard on the heels of an election in which they had campaigned 
against the closures proposed in the Conservative Government's White Paper of 1973. In power 
Labour had then accepted the Beswick Agreement with the trade unions, which committed the 
Government to a much more gradual restructuring of the industry. 
Given this political history, the parliamentary debates were bound to provoke fierce 
exchanges. As happened in that much earlier debate of 1948, they were to waken the slumbering 
ideological opposition to public ownership in the Tory party. They are also an important part of 
the story of privatisation because they provided the opportunity for some of the leading 
politicians to air their views on public ownership. Furthermore, they reveal something of the 
complexity of the task of regulating nationalised industry and of the limits of public ownership. 
Here it will be recalled that British Steel, being a complex manufacturing industry forced to 
compete in international markets, had always been recognised, by politicians of both main 
parties, to have been a nationalisation too far. 
The then Secretary of State for Industry, Eric Varley, introduced the 1976 debate by 
attacking the Achilles heal of British capitalism, its lack of investment in British manufacturing. 
He argued that part of the blame for British Steel's difficulties must be placed on a lack of 
investment by the private sector after the industry had been denationalised in 1952. As he 
charged: 'many opportunities were missed in the 1950s and 1960s, when our main competitors 
were re-equipping themselves with modern plant and equipment while the private owners of the 
United Kingdom industry preferred to go on taking profits from existing and ageing plant We 
are still suffering from the legacy of that chronic imder-investmemV93 His further justification 
for seeking to raise the amount of external finance needed by the industry was based on a 
commitment to the full-employment policy, which had dominated macro-economic policy since 
9 5 Iron and Steel Amendment Bill, Hansard, Vol. 910. No. 92. 
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the war, and on the avoidance of the social costs to local communities of running down the 
industry, along the lines proposed by the former Conservative Government. 
Michael Heseltine, leading for the Opposition, countered the first of these charges by 
quoting the levels of investment in the early 1960s. These he claimed, in real terms, were more 
man double those in the late 1960s after Steel had been renationalised. He also argued that, in 
contrast with international competitors who had concerned themselves with the real questions 
of industrial efficiency and strategy1, the British steel industry had laboured under the threat of 
nationalisation.94 He then went on to accuse Labour of worsening the plight of the industry by 
pursuing the Party's narrow interest at the expense of the national interest by having made an 
electoral issue out of the Heath's White Paper. Going further, he blamed the ills, not only of the 
steel industry, but also of the whole of British industry, on Labour's politicising of industry. As 
he put this, 'We need to look no further than the record of political treatment of the steel 
industry over the last 25 years to understand why Great Britain's industrial capacity has been so 
tragically debilitated. 9 5 
This exchange set out the parameters of the debate. It also reveals something of the 
difficulty of untangling cause and effect, and therefore of the inconclusiveness of the debate. 
Before apportioning blame on either side, one should also bear in mind the recent bruising the 
Conservative Party had experienced at the hands of the unions. This had made everyone aware 
of the constraints on political action, for the dilemma faced by both parties was that they needed 
to introduce more internationally competitive manning levels but could not afford to risk another 
confrontation with the unions. In this political and economic context, it appeared that 
Parliament had little choice but to follow what virtually every other major European steel 
producing country was doing at the time, which was to bail out its steel industry. 
But even the state's coffers can run dry. This alarming prospect was posed by the 
deepening crisis in the steel industry, which, by 1978, was to see the corporation lose one sixth 
of its total capital in one year and a call for its Chairman, Sir Charles Villiers, to be sent to the 
Tower, on account of his alleged failure to act on industry forecasts of much higher losses than 
he had publicly acknowledged or had communicated to ministers. This crisis, which could not 
be allowed to continue indefinitely, was the occasion for a much fiercer debate, involving a 
9 4 Ibid., p. 42. 
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number of the political "heavy weights" of both parties. The debate was called for by the Select 
Committee, which played a central role informing Parliament about the extent of the crisis 
through a series of reports, in face of opposition by both the Chairman of British Steel and 
Government ministers. 
When the debate eventually took place, it was introduced by Sir Keith Joseph, for the 
reason mat the Opposition made one day available, doubtless seeing an opportunity in the Select 
Committee's recommendation of a debate which the Government was unwilling to make time 
for. It was clear from the note he sounded early in his speech, that he intended to play the role 
in this debate which Oliver Lyttelton had played in the steel debate of 1948. As he declared, in 
what was only slightly more than a half-truth: 'As the House knows, Conservatives are not in 
favour of nationalisation, especially of an industry producing internationally traded goods such 
as steel/ 9 6 He then went on to make three main points: Firstly, on the evidence that the House 
had been misled by ministers on the extent of the crisis, he affirmed the role of the Select 
Committee and the powers given them by insisting that, because Parliament is the banker* of 
nationalised industry and represent the owners', Parliament was entitled to be informed both 
directly and through the Select Committee'. Secondly, he argued that to have a competitive 
industry was a higher national priority than to save jobs. He later elaborated on this point by 
explaining that the loss paid by the taxpayer may save jobs in steel but only at the cost of jobs 
elsewhere, because subsidies from the taxpayer simply shift unemployment generally from the 
less to the more efficient enterprises in the economy. There is no costless way out. 9 7 Thirdly, 
with particular reference to the alleged failures of the Department of Industry to press for 
information and to take urgent action to limit the crisis, he made the point against public 
ownership in general that' When nobody owns or when everybody owns, nobody at least in the 
Department, seems to care/98 
The reply of the Secretary of State is chiefly of interest for what it reveals about the 
regulatory role of Ministers and Boards and the difficult decisions they faced. In response to the 
Select Committee's allegations about a lack of ministerial responsibility involving the projected 
loss of £466 million, Varley explained that this forecast was a leaked internal BSC working 
9 6 British Steel Corporation, Hansard, Thursday 9*. March 1978, p. 1625 
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document, which, because it was at the time only a working document had properly not been 
communicated to the Department of Industry. He also exonerated the Corporation Chairman for 
not having communicated the earlier, slightly lower forecast of a £443 million loss on the ground 
that this was also merely a working document. In further support of the Chairman, he quoted 
from the statement of a senior partner of Coopers and Lybrand, an international firm of 
Chartered Accountants, which declared that an adequate disclosure of the deteriorating 
condition of the Corporation was given. " 
Varley also denied that no urgent remedial action had been taken in response to the crisis. 
On the basis of evidence, such as the deferral of the Port Talbot development, he insisted that 
British Steel had undertaken 'a considerable and continual process of retrenchment to meet the 
trading position."100 For those who thought a more radical programme of retrenchment was 
called for, and who may have forgotten the recent humbling of the Heath administration by the 
unions, he drew attention to the sensitive relationship British Steel had with the unions. In this 
connection he pointed out the danger of asking the unions to accept the abandonment of the 
Beswick Agreement on the basis of a forecasted annual loss, only one month into the financial 
year, and claimed that the unions would not believe the forecast and therefore would not 
cooperate. In support of this claim he referred to the 1975 steel crisis, when BSC had warned of 
a prospective loss of £375 million but only incurred an actual loss of £255 million, which led 
to the accusation from correspondents that 'that was the year you tried to frighten the unions 
with an over-heavy loss/101 He also spelt out the cost of the massive industrial action that might 
have followed. He gave, as the cost to the industry, the figure of £150 million a month. The cost 
to the balance of payments he put at £50 million a week. In addition he pointed out that 
industrial action would set-back the Corporation's effort to regain market share. Lastly, he 
defended the Government's overall commitment to the rescue of British Steel by referring to the 
similar action being taken by other European governments in the face of the world-wide collapse 
in the market for steel. 
Varley's speech received unexpected support from the next speaker, the former 
Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who represented the middle, post-war social 
9 9 Ibid , p. 1641. 
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consensus on public ownership in the debate. Although he undeniably took the opportunity of 
his speech to make a defence of the economic policies he had followed when in power, he rose 
above scoring mere personal political points against his opponents, both in the Opposition and 
amongst Ms own party, to give a magisterial treatment of the subject of nationalised industry. 
This began with a survey of the decline of British industrial power since the war, when out of 
an increase in the total world output of steel of 250m tonnes, Britain had succeeded in 
contributing only 4m tonnes of the increase. He declared that this decline alarmed him terribly. 
In these circumstances, he argued, again directly contradicting Keith Joseph, there had been no 
alternative to the state rescue of "lame ducks"; the alternative would have been to let many 
essential industries, such as coalmining, shipbuilding, carmaking, and toolmaking, and steel "go 
to the wall", with disastrous consequences for the balance of trade and for jobs. He went on to 
question the theory that other industries would arise to replace the lost jobs. Here he referred to 
the experience with agriculture, where the loss of 500 000 jobs over the last 15 years had not 
been made up anywhere else in the economy. He also referred to his experience with regional 
policy, which had shown him the huge obstacles in the way of creating new employment. In the 
light of this industrial experience he was emphatic that, while he was absolutely opposed to any 
extension of public ownership for its own sake, 'because it had completely failed to answer any 
of our problems',102 the debate should not be about ownership, whether it should be private or 
public, but rather about how to help Britain's ailing publicly owned industries work better by 
focussing on the main problems facing the industries of a long-term lack of investment, 
overmanning, effective management, and a system of monitoring performance. 
For reasons of space it is not possible to report the other speeches. But sufficient of the 
debate has been reported to reflect the different perspectives on public ownership of major 
politicians from bom sides of the House. In the course of describing the various responses to the 
crisis facing British Steel, we have also disclosed something of the ongoing struggle to gain 
effective control over nationalised industry. Given that similar crises could be repeated in other 
industries, the Government accepted the urgency of again reviewing the controls over 
nationalised industry and of responding to the NEDO proposals. 
Ibid., p. 1657. 
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1978 WHITE PAPER (Cmnd.7131) 
The Government issued its response in the 1978 White Paper with the simple title, The 
Nationalised Industries. It is an important document for our purposes because not only is it the 
last official response to nearly three decades of public ownership but it also sets out a regulatory 
framework that is comparable with the regulatory frameworks created for the privatised utilities. 
Indeed, in the light of the 1978 White Paper, i f governments continue to levy windfall taxes on 
the privatised utilities, there is a case for arguing mat they are nationalised industries in all but 
name. 
The White Paper began by placing the blame for the deterioration in the relationship 
between the Boards and their sponsoring departments, the suspension of the economic and 
financial framework set out in the 1967 White Paper, and the collapse in the morale of 
management and the workforce squarely on Heath's price restraint policies. In response to this 
analysis, it declared the Government's intention that in future' When help was to be given to the 
poorer members of the community it will be given primarily through the social security and 
taxation systems and not by subsidising nationalised industry prices.'103 Furthermore, it declared 
mat An adequate level of nationalised industry profits is essential to the continuing well being 
of the industries and their customers and of the economy as a whole/1 0 4 
It went on to reject the NEDO proposal of a policy council, where strategic decisions 
could be made in concert, on the main ground that it would slow down decisions by adding 
another layer of administration. It also pointed out that as the policy council's role and 
responsibilities could not be exactly defined, it would not overcome the problem of 
accountability. Linked with this objection was that the Government was unwilling to delegate 
powers to a policy council which it felt it should retain for itself, given that government would 
ultimately be held accountable. 
As an alternative to wider representation in strategic decision making in a policy council, 
the White Paper encouraged greater industrial democracy at Board level and throughout the 
organisatioa In this connection, it made specific mention of the Post Office experiment with a 
new board comprising, in addition to the Chairman, seven management and seven union 
Members, and five independent Members. It also gave notice of the Government's intention to 
Cmnd. 7131, The Nationalised Industries (HMSO, 1978), para. 54. 
Ibid., para. 55. 
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publish a further White Paper on industrial democracy. On the inclusion of civil servants, 
referring to the precedent set by the Boards of the British National Oil Corporation and of the 
Atomic Energy Authority, it stated that, after consultation with Chairmen, in some industries 
civil servants from the sponsoring department, and in a few cases from the Treasury too, would 
be appointed to Boards. In the case of consumers, while it saw a role for some consumer 
representation on boards, it declined to empower consumer councils in the belief that existing 
procedures were adequate. 
On the question of how best to monitor performance, the White Paper proposed that the 
corporate plan should have a central place in the relationship between the nationalised industry 
and their sponsoring departments. It wanted the broad objectives of this plan to be published in 
the annual reports, together with the main points of any major review, to better inform the public 
and the SCNI. And as part of its commitment to allowing the corporate plan to play this key role, 
the Government undertook to regularise any intervention over investment decisions through its 
control of external sources of funding. Furthermore, in future, when the Government found it 
necessary to involve the nationalised industries in an overall programme of cutting public 
expenditure, as an alternative to across the board cuts, the White Paper allowed the nationalised 
industries the flexibility to implement cost savings or vary their price, subject to any 
counter-inflation policy, instead of cutting their investment programmes. 
In addition to the corporate plan and a statement on how the industry was performing 
according to plan, the White Paper called for the publication of a variety of performance 
indicators. In this connection, while it upheld the validity of the general system of accountability 
set out in the economic and financial framework of the 1967 White Paper, which it wanted to 
reintroduce and reinforce',105 in keeping with the NEDO call for the framework to take account 
of the individual circumstances of the industries, it made some important modifications: 
On investment appraisal, while insisting on a 5% required rate of return on new 
investment as a whole, it left the test discount rate of return for individual projects to be 
determined by the nationalised industries themselves. Therefore, while the required rate of return 
on investment was roughly in line with the rate of return on loans in the private sector, the 
industries were left with considerable discretion in evaluating investment projects. 
On pricing, it accepted the' serious difficulty of interpreting1 the practical application of 
Ibid., para. 57. 
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long run marginal cost pricing in particular cases. However, it agreed with the NEDO that the 
practice of setting prices to cover total costs was not sufficient and insisted that charges for peak 
and off-peak usage be properly related to demand. It also required that arbitrary 
cross-subsidisation between consumers be avoided. Apart from these considerations and a 
reference to the Price Commission's continuing responsibility to investigate whether proposed 
price increases could be substituted by cost savings, it left each industry to work out the details 
of its own prices in relation to its individual circumstances. 
On financial targets, the White Paper allowed that they should be based on a wide range 
of factors, including market prospects, the scope for improved productivity and efficiency, and 
the implications for the PSBR. And, responding to the NEDO criticism of financial targets that 
they are not necessarily a sufficient inducement to greater management efficiency, since they 
can be achieved without greater productivity by manipulating price or service levels, it required 
them to be supplemented by other performance indicators. In this connection, in addition to valid 
international comparisons, the White Paper cited labour productivity and standards of service 
as being desirable indicators of performance. But recognising the diversity of the industries, it 
left the choice of indicator to each of the boards to determine for themselves in consultation with 
their sponsoring department 
On methods of financing the industries, it rejected the NEDO call for proportionately less 
loan finance and upheld the distinction between industries which were eligible for risk capital, 
because they operate in internationally competitive markets, and those which do not, in which 
case it regarded capital structure as irrelevant and the obligation to pay interest on loans as a 
necessary financial discipline. The only concessions it made involved the possibility of a review 
of the terms on which an industry could borrow, which allowed for the conversion of part of the 
long term borrowing to medium term loans, and the capitalisation of interest in certain rare 
cases, such as when a major expansion would not yield revenue over a long construction period. 
On cash limits, while accepting that the limit was not immutable, for the reason that the 
borrowing requirement of an industry would vary according to its trading conditions, which 
might be affected by factors outside the control of management, the White Paper emphasised 
the role of the cash limit as a proper discipline on the industries financial management. In this 
emphasis it was merely stating the reality of the Government's elevation of cash limits, originally 
intended merely as a Treasury instrument for the control of the industries' short-term 
indebtedness, as an instrument for the medium and long-term control of the Public Sector 
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Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). With the increasingly monetarist slant of economic policy, 
financial controls and, in particular, cash limits had therefore already supplanted the economic 
controls set out in the 1967 White Paper, such as marginal cost pricing. 
Having, to its mind, strengthened ministerial control by these changes, the White Paper 
accepted that Ministers needed to be made more accountable for their interventions. Here it 
accepted the NEDO proposal that the Government be given additional powers of issuing general 
and specific directions, which, in the public interest, could overrule the decisions of a Board. But 
it committed the Government to using these powers sparingly and to compensating the 
Corporation for any cost involved. 
RESPONSES TO THE 1978 WHITE PAPER 
The immediate reaction to the new White Paper was mixed. The Select Committee 
appeared to take the view that the general thrust of the White Paper was to shift the relationship 
between Government and the nationalised industries in a more collectivist and corporatist 
direction, even though there were modifications to the relationship, such as over pricing, which 
lent the other way. Taking into account the major changes in the White Paper, such as the 
additional powers of issuing specific directives, and the Government's specific mention of the 
Post Office as a model of industrial democracy, it was not unreasonable to take this view. In 
response, the Committee felt the need to publicly reiterate their continuing support for the 
Morrisonian arms' length model. As reported by Anthony Cockerill, one of the specialist advisers 
ontheSCNI: 
During its final set of inquiries, therefore, the SCN1 reiterated the view it had 
held throughout its existence that the proper relationship between government 
and the nationalised industries was an arms' length one, in which policy was 
jointly agreed, but implemented by the corporations. The committee 
acknowledges that, to be realistic, this principle would have to be modified from 
time to time in the face of wider economic considerations and force of 
circumstances. It was, nonetheless, a desirable and feasible rule to follow. In 
taking this view, the Committee was running against the tide of comment and 
policy at this time. As discussed below, the NEDO report had concluded that 
an arms' length relationship was not appropriate in current circumstances, and 
in any event had never worked well, and this was the view taken by the 
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government.105 
The responses of the nationalised industries, tabled as an appendix to the the Select 
Committee's sixth special report of 1978, reflect, in the main, a similar unease with the White 
Paper's dilution of the arms' length relationship.107 In the light of these responses and its own 
strong misgivings about the general thrust of the White Paper, the Select Committee believed 
the situation warranted another parliamentary debate. Time, however, had run out for the 
nationalised industries. With the downfall of the Labour Government after the "winter of 
discontent" of 1979, in which the public sector unions played a key role, the nationalised 
industries were fast losing even some of their most loyal supporters. 
RICHARD PRYKE (1981) 
One of those formerly loyal supporters was Richard Pryke. His second major study of the 
nationalised industries, published in 1981, is a good measure of the general disenchantment with 
public ownership on the eve of privatisation. After another investigation of each of the 
nationalised industries' economic performance, his conclusion was that public ownership had 
contributed to their poor performance during the 1970s. In support of this conclusion, he gave 
two reasons which he claimed had been ignored up till then.108 
Firstly, he argued that the size and public character of nationalised industry invariably 
leads to the centralisation and politicisation of all decisions, even those of a local nature. He 
illustrated this point by drawing a comparison between the closure of corner shops and the 
attempted closure of unprofitable coal mines and train services; had retailing been nationalised, 
he argued, then even the closure of corner shops would have elicited public protest, activated 
pressure groups, and required a government policy; but because they were privately owned, 
hundreds were closing all the time without any fuss. 
Secondly, he argued that public ownership raises unrealistic expectations, based on the 
misunderstanding that the industries need not operate as commercial undertakings because they 
are backed by the limitless funds of Government; the result was that customers demanded * fair1 
1 0 6 Cockerill, A. op.cit. 
1 0 7 See further Sixth Special Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Comments by 
Nationalised Industries and Others on the Government White Paper on the Nationalised Industries (HMSO, 
1978). 
1 0 8 Richard Pryke (1981), op.cit., pp.265-266, 
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prices and the maintenance of unprofitable services, and workers demanded 'fair1 wages, 
irrespective of whether they have been earned, and also believed that they have a right to a job. 
On account of these fundamental problems, and the way the industries had been treated 
as instruments of economic and social policy rather than as commercial undertakings, Pryke 
concluded his study with an appeal for more competition as the way forward. In the case of the 
natural monopolies, he assumed that while they would remain under public ownership, their 
organisations could be decentralised. Significantly, these conclusions were in broad agreement 
with those of the then young Conservative, John Redwood, who, in 1980, had published a study 
which listed those industries which he thought should be denationalised and those, such as the 
natural monopolies, which should be retained under public ownership but be left to be 
self-financing, subject to investigations by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 1 0 9 
But as radical as these solutions may have appeared at the time, with the hardening of 
the ideological opposition to public ownership in the Conservative Party and the increasingly 
monetarist slant of economic policy, the stage was set for an even more radical response to the 
nationalised industries. 
THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 
Before we proceed to this final part of the story of nationalisation, we shall pause and 
reflect on the history we have reported. As we warned at the beginning, any exploration of 
experience is bound to be messy. It is also bound to be complicated because reality is always 
complex. It is therefore understandable at this stage to want to avoid arriving at any definite 
conclusions about the record of public ownership. Nevertheless, we suspect that some patterns 
do emerge from the many perspectives we have assembled to give the outline of an answer to 
the question with which we set out: does the experience of nationalisation support the negative 
case for privatisation, which claims that public ownership failed and therefore there was no 
practical alternative to privatisation? 
As we have mentioned, the fifties do not give a very helpful picture of public ownership 
because it was a starting=up period. However, the speed with which some of the industries fell 
into deficit from which some never climbed out may suggest something about the optimism of 
the original arms' length model. But then, in the light of the heyday of public ownership in the 
Redwood, J. Public Enterprise in Crisis (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980), p. 201. 
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sixties, this optimism looks to be well supported At the end of this decade, it is difficult to deny 
that Pryke's enthusiasm for public ownership was well-founded. As he judged it, public 
ownership was bom an economic and social success. 
From the social angle, the achievements of nationalisation were several: problematical 
industries, like coal, had been run down in an orderly manner, avoiding some of the social costs 
mining communities would otherwise have been forced to bear on their own; conditions of 
employment and standards of safety had been raised throughout the industries; improved 
industrial relations had contributed to substantially better labour productivity growth than those 
achieved by the same industries in the first half of the century before nationalisation;110 
monopoly profits in the public utilities had been avoided; and consumers had benefited from 
price restraint 
But few had ever doubted mat nationalisation would bring about social gains. Therefore 
it was the economic success of public ownership at the end of this decade that was the more 
satisfying for its supporters. After the poor start in the fifties, the record was of steady 
improvement in most industries after the first shocks of merger and reorganisation. This 
included the superior labour productivity growth mentioned above; the impressive gains in total 
factor productivity, possibly a more reliable indicator of productivity because it includes a 
measure of how labour productivity is affected by capital intensity;111 and, at a time when 
profitability was generally declining in the economy, the nationalised industries mostly enjoyed 
rising profitability. Consequently, in the absence of a counter-factual allowing a comparison to 
be made between the performance of the same industries under both private and public 
ownership, there was little the critics of nationalisation could seize on to support their case that 
nationalisation had either impaired the financial disciplines or the incentives Pryke claimed as 
explanations for the superior performance of nationalised industry. 
To this record, should be added the changes made to the organisational model of public 
enterprise. A continuous and bipartisan Parliamentary scrutiny of the industries had been 
introduced in the form of the Select Committee. In the White Papers of 1961 and 1967, to use 
Vickers and Yarrow's words, 'an intellectually coherent approach, derived from welfare 
1 . 0 See here Hannah, L. op.cit, Table 6.3. Labour productivity growth rates in the core nationalised industries, 
1948-85, p. 177. 
1 . 1 Ibid., Table 6.4. Total factor productivity growth rates in the core nationalised industries, 1945-88, p. 177. 
The Experience of Nationalisation (195 J - 1979) \ 52 
economics, to the problems of specifying objectives for public enterprises',112 including rate of 
return analysis, marginal cost pricing, cost-benefit analysis, and explicit subsidy, had been 
introduced Moreover, while admittedly the level of ministerial intervention had grown, and to 
a close observer posed the danger that the Select Committee warned of, given the public 
character of the industries it still remained within the bounds of the tolerable. And importantly, 
although there was already copious criticism, the nationalised industries enjoyed enough of the 
goodwill of the general public and of the workers to keep the experiment of public ownership 
on track. 
What then explains the increasing disaffection with public ownership in the turbulent 
seventies? As the NEDO, nationalised industry chairmen, and the 1978 White Paper perceived 
the fundamental problem, the nationalised industries were increasingly made instruments of 
economic and social policy by governments of both parties, struggling to maintain the post-war 
commitment to full employment This interference clearly wrecked havoc with the finances of 
the nationalised industries. It also meant that the much acclaimed economic and financial 
framework introduced by the 1967 White Paper was never really tried. It was suspended after 
the imposition of price restraint in 1973, and when that ended in 1975, was not reintroduced 
because of the change which made control of the PSBR through cash limits the dominant aim 
of policy towards the nationalised industries. Therefore, there is little truth in Patrick Jenkin's 
statement in the debate on privatisation in 1983: 
Anyone who argues in the light of nearly forty years' experience that there must 
be a way of managing State monopolies that will increase their efficiency, satisfy 
their consumers, and yield a return on the taxpayer's investment instead of being 
a burden on the taxpayer must believe in fairies. Successive governments have 
tried. Some of the ablest businessmen in the country have been put in charge of 
the nationalized industries and they have tried. There have been any number of 
cash limits, financial targets, required rates of return, and cost objectives. Every 
device has been tried and none has solved the fundamental problem of the State 
industries.113 
The failure of the main political parties to agree a bipartisan approach to nationalised 
industry, clearly demonstrated in the British Steel problem of over-manning, was also a major 
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. op.cit, p. 132. 
Quoted in Fry, G. op.cit., p. 20. 
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problem. Will Hutton blames this on the nature of the conservative British state, which has no 
institutional means of expressing the public interest outside of an all-sovereign Parliament.114 
Furthermore, as Pryke pointed out in his later study, with the expectation that the Treasury would 
always "pick up the tab", the trade union movement exploited their powerful political base in 
public ownership to oppose necessary cuts in manning and to push for ever higher wages. While 
this redistributive goal was justified, there was no doubt that the industries suffered from the 
conflictual nature of industrial relations. However, given the poor record of industrial relations 
prior to nationalisation, there is no good reason to think that industrial relations would have been 
any better had the industries been privately owned. Furthermore, with the full impact of 
monetarism on Britain's manufacturing and industrial capacity beginning to be recognised, a 
greater respect is being accorded Heath's commitment to full employment and, in particular, to 
his prices and incomes policy, which made the nationalised industries, with some success, a 
"loss-leader" in the campaign against inflation.113 In the light of this further history, and taking 
into account the poor record of the private sector in the 1970s, the verdict on public ownership 
has become much more complicated. 
The further point is worth making that we can only speak of the relative failure of 
particular nationalised industries. With the exception of British Steel, none of the industries 
failed absolutely, in the sense that, had they been in the private sector, they would have been 
forced into receivership. In this connection, what now tends to be forgotten is that the health of 
individual industries varied considerably at the end of the 1970s. It is true that a small cluster 
of industries, such as the railways, which had always proved troublesome industries under public 
ownership were performing very badly. They were a worrying drain on the public purse; at 1982 
prices, the cost of capital write-offs and grants to them amounted to £40 000 million. 1 1 5 However 
some of the nationalised industries were in very good health. They were fully able to pass the 
scrutiny of the Select Committee and even to earn its praise.117 Furthermore, immediately prior 
to privatisation the efficiency of a number industries, under the regime of cash limits, had 
1 , 4 See Hutton, W. The State We 're In, p. 50. 
1 1 5 See further, Stewart, M. Keynes In The 1990s, A Return to Sanity (Penguin: London, 1993), p.25 ff. for his 
discussion of the monetarist-Keynesian debate about a natural level of unemployment and the inflationary 
consequences of pursuing demand management policies which attempt to keep unemployment below the natural 
rate. 
1 , 6 Quoted in Fry, G. op.cit., p.21. 
1 1 7 See further Cockerill, A. op.cit., p. 13. 
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improved considerably. There is also no denying, given the interest shown in buying shares on 
privatisation, and by their subsequent performance as privatised industries over a period when 
it would have been impossible to have effected some miraculous turnaround, mat most of the 
UK nationalised industries were viable businesses at the time they were privatised. In this light, 
talk of the failure of public ownership is at best very misleading. 
There is also now no way of knowing with any confidence whether a more concerted 
approach to policy making, as proposed by the NEDO, and which the 1978 White Paper looked 
as if it was edging towards, might have worked better than the Morrisonian arm's length model. 
Certainly experience with Mitbestimmung (co-decision making between employee and 
shareholder representatives) in the Rhenish model on the continent has not been entirely 
favourable in recent years. Nevertheless, this is seen as part of an adjustment process, which is 
anticipated will weather the impact of globalization on account of the strong social bonds 
underpinning the model.118 Furthermore, the NEDO's criticism of the arms' length model for its 
exclusion of the other key players, government and the trade unions, from policy making as 
being unrealistic would appear to have been borne out by the experience of public ownership. 
A concerted approach may also have better retained the loyally of consumers, who make up most 
of the public, and on whom the success of the whole project of public ownership crucially 
depended. 
But as with most frustrating social experiments, they tend not to last long enough to 
provide adequate answers to all our questions. This is especially frustrating in this case because 
it is possible that the problems of public ownership were reformable without a change of 
ownership. As Foster, drawing on his enormous experience of nationalised industry, put this 
conviction again in 1992: 
The repeated failures of British governments actively to address the problems 
of public enterprise which had been analysed by a succession of official 
committees and academic commentators, or to effect the remedies they had 
suggested, help to explain why public enterprise in the UK was so enfeebled by 
the end of the 1970s that it enjoyed little active support, but these failures do 
not show that the problems were insoluble without a change of ownership."9 
1 1 8 See further Albert, M. and Gonenc, R. "Rhenish Capitalism , in Political Quarterly, Vol. 67/3, July -
September 1996, pp. 184-93. 
1 , 9 Foster (1992), op.cit, p. 8. 
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Vickers and Yarrow arrive at a similar conclusion at the end of their analysis of the 
steadily evolving economic and financial framework we have traced through successive White 
Papers, which increasingly gave the impression that the Government had in hand a more precise 
and yet flexible and therefore realistic means of control. To quote from their study: 
The crucial question, however, is whether or not significant improvements in 
performance could feasibly have been obtained whilst preserving public 
ownership of the industries concerned. As we have argued, the tighter financial 
controls that were developed in the late 1970s and 1980s do appear to have had 
some beneficial effects on certain aspects of performance and are indicative of 
the fact that ownership is tar from being the sole determinant of 
behaviour Our own view of the matter is that substantial improvements in the 
control system were (and still are) feasible, including reforms designed (a) to 
establish arrangements capable of sustaining an arm's length relationship 
between ministers and managements and (b) to improve the incentives for 
internal efficiency.120 
In the light of all the above, and bearing particularly in mind the achievements of 
nationalised industry in the 1960s and the heavy burdens the industries carried in the 1970s, we 
are not persuaded that public ownership failed. Indeed, we are inclined to think that Sir Peter 
Middleton, writing from possibly the best perspective from which to judge public ownership, 
mat of Permanent Secretary to HM Treasury, got it about right when he said, with classic British 
understatement, " I don't think the record of nationalisation is all that bad." 1 2 1 
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. op.cit., p. 151. 
Reported in Plender, J. 77K BigSellqff. 
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Chapters. 
THE ABANDONMENT OF NATIONALISATION (197*4989) 
Just as nationalisation was at the heart of the collectivist programme by which 
Labour Governments sought to remodel British society, so privatisation is at the 
centre of any programme of redaiming territory for freedom.1 
(Margaret Thatcher) 
The haemorrhaging of support for the nationalised industries by the end of the 1970s 
undoubtedly abetted the abandonment of public ownership in the 1980s. But the full story behind 
privatisation is much more complex and is the subject of considerable debate. Certainly our 
contention that economic liberalism played a decisive part in shaping the privatisation 
programme is contested. Indeed there are still those who argue either that the influence of 
economic liberalism on privatisation has been overstated and/or mat privatisation came about 
more for pragmatic reasons. 
David Marsh, for example, claimed that privatisation came about more for pragmatic 
political reasons in his review of the literature on privatisation in 1990. In the light of the 
emphasis on monetarism in the 1979 manifesto and the way the proceeds from asset sales are 
included in the public accounts as negative public expenditure, he concluded that the 
government seized on privatisation as an alternative way to control the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR). As he put this, 'selling public assets was politically much easier and more 
popular, than cutting public expenditure .2Then, for another example, Christopher Foster argued 
that the origins of privatisation have more to do with pragmatic economic reasons connected 
with the needs of the nationalised industries themselves than with any political motive or 
blueprint3 
1 Thatcher, M The Downing Street Years, p.676. 
2 Marsh, D. Privatisation under Mrs. Thatcher: A Review of the Literature, in Public Administration, Vol. 69, 
Winter 1991, p 461. 
3 Foster, C Privatisation, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992) 
p.l02ff. 
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Foster may be right in claiming that there was no political blueprint as such. Ami, as 
Kenneth Wiltshire points out, There was no green paper, no white paper, no definitive piece of 
legislation, no secondknsading speech, and the concept was not even contained in the manifesto 
of the Conservative Party for the 1979 elections at which the Tories came to office'.4 
Nevertheless, both Foster and Marsh's reconstructions of the origins of privatisation beg more 
questions than they answer and appear to overlook the key role played by right wing think-tanks 
in the genesis of privatisation. On the role of me think-tanks, Foster even appears to be unaware 
of their existence in Britain when he writes, 
But whereas in the United States in 1980 the incoming Reagan administration 
was embarrassed by the number of schemes proposed by think-tanks for 
deregulating monopolies, their equivalent did not exist in Britain, both because 
independent institutions of this kind did not exist and because politically 
motivated think-tanks in Britain have long been more interested in politics than 
detail.' 
As will be shown in the light of the important study of Richard Cockett, Thinking the 
Unthinkable, Think-tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983 (1994), Foster's 
reconstruction is almost certainly wrong because think tanks, such as the Institute of Economic 
Affairs (DEA), and closer to the Conservative parry, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), played 
a hugely important role. As Peter Jackson and Catherine Price comment, 'Much of the 
philosophy of the privatisation programme originated in a variety of think tanks in the UK during 
the 1970s. This philosophy was implemented in the UK in the 1980s and the lessons learned 
were shared with other countries'Moreover, it has now been admitted by one of the leading 
actors in the whole drama, Margaret Thatcher's former economic adviser, Sir Alan Walters, that 
the political objective of placing the former nationalised industries beyond the reach of 
re-nationalisation was always part of the original intention. At the World Bank seminar on 
privatisation in 1994 at Maryland, he explained that the original intention had been to put 
companies such as British Airways and British Steel beyond the reach of re-nationalisation by 
offering the bribe of popular capitalism to the people; this, he went on to justify on the ground 
* Wiltshire, K. Privatisation, the British Experience (Longman Cheshire: Melbourne, 1987), p.l. 
9 Jackson, P. and Price, C. ed., Privatisation and Regulation, A Review of the Issues (Longman: Harlow, 1994), 
p.ix. 
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mat it, "had forced fee Labour Party to reform itself, abandon its own re-nationalisation plans and 
to become more "social democratic" in its approach'.6 And supporting mis understanding of the 
political origins of privatisation, Alex Brammer reporting on the World Bank seminar writes, 
•Despite ms effort to portray privatisation as a sutional process which benefits the common weal, 
ths thread which connects many privatisation schemes is political' 
Of course we do not doubt that purely pragmatic motives, such as those linked with 
iredueing fee PSBR or the alleged failure of the aationalised industries, played an important part 
in the origins of privatisation. Nor would we want to discount the crucial part played by the 
success of me first big privatisation in 1983, that of British Telecom. Indeed, one might venture 
to say that the dramatic success of mis first privatisation, which was heavily over-subscribed, 
despite it being ten times the size of the average large equity offering on the London market, 
provided the blueprint for the remaining privatisations and gave the programme an unstoppable 
momentum To ignore these factors would be to make the mistake of thinking that privatisation 
was driven only by ideas, which, in any case, were not terribly original. As Dieter Helm reminds 
us,' nineteenth century liberalism provided the main political theories and, despite the advances 
in the formal theoretical framework of neo-classical economics, much of the focus of policy 
prescriptions could be (and indeed has been) traced back to Adam Smith'. 'Nevertheless, for the 
reasons we have given above, and which we shall further support below from a survey of the 
writings and speeches of the key theorists and practitioners of privatisation, we shall treat 
economic liberalism as a dominant influence on privatisation. 
Bearing in mind Kenneth Wiltshire's advice that' any analyst who wishes to understand 
the origins of mis concept [privatisation] is forced to rely on indirect sources, some intuition and 
a keen understanding of British politics of the post-war period',9 we shall begin our survey on 
the eve of privatisation by exploring how the electoral threat posed by Harold Wilson's Labour 
party started a radical reappraisal of public ownership by the Conservative's under Edward 
Heath. Next we shall consider the way Heath provided the Conservative parry with a winning 
proto-Thatcherite electoral formula and how he also demonstrated the difficulty of holding on 
6 Quoted in Brummer, A. "Policymakers ponder privatisation's pitfalls', The Guardian, 20 April 1994. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Helm, D. ed., The Economic Borders of the State (Clarendon: Oxford, 1989), p.2. 
9 Wiltshire, op.cit, p.ix. 
Tkz Absmkmtaml of Nationalisation! (1979 - 19S9) 159 
to power with & oommifeneaS to the post-was- political, economic md social consensus. Then we 
shall explore the revival of economic liberalism in the writings of its most influential theorists 
and how mis revival came to 'capture' the Conservative party under the leadership of Margaret 
Thatcher. Having by then attempted to live' in this rival moral Uraditson m order to learn its 
idiom as best we can, we shall conclude by judging this case for privatisation, in accordance 
with our method of enquiry, in the light of its own standards. 
HAROLD WILSON 
In post-privatisation Britain, it is easy to forget how credible a political alternative the 
Clause IV Labour party looked before 1979.10 In the preceding period Harold Wilson had 
inflicted four electoral defeats on the Tories. A possible fifth victory in 1970 was won by 
Edward Heath against all the odds. In mis period, it was Labour and not the Conservatives who 
could rightly claim to be the party of government Indeed, looking back over the whole post-war 
period until 1979, beginning with the dramatic defeat of Winston Churchill, in the 1945 election, 
it could be said of the Labour Party mat,were it not for its electorally damaging internal debates 
and the 1951 devaluation of sterling, it might have held power for the entire period. 
In Harold Wilson, Labour had a very skilful political leader. His experience of Whitehall 
(as a civil servant during the war), his experience of government (his first cabinet post was in 
the Attlee administration directly after the war), and his experience as an applied economist (the 
politically important new discipline), could not be matched by any would-be Conservative rival. 
Then, at a time when social attitudes were changing and hardening against the political 
amateurism and traditional deference paid to the British aristocracy, Wilson's background as a 
'commoner' from the North gave him the edge over the Conservative 'grandees' who were chosen 
to lead the Tories before their choice of Ted Heath. This background also helped the centrist 
Wilson unite a deeply divided Labour Party, itself a remarkable political achievement and 
another key to his electoral success. And not to be forgotten, there was the incomparable wit 
who out on the hustings could be counted on to floor hecklers with the double-edged repartee 
for which he was famous. 
But even more electorally important than the man was "Wilsonism1.11 This political and 
1 0 This section draws on Pimlott, B. Harold Wilson (Harper Collins: London, 1992). 
1 1 Ibid., p.68 ff. for a fuller discussion o f Wilsonism 
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economic philosophy was forged in the 1930s when the Labour Party shed some of its Utopian 
©ominitments and accepted a capitalist framework for the economy, while advocating socialist 
planning and Keynesian demand management within capitalism. Wilsoaism,' although not to 
be completely identified with the wartime economic management, had in some measure been 
tested in me achievements of the wartime economy, and had also proved itself capable of some 
achievement in the revitalisation of British industry in the 1960s. And, from hindsight, were 
it not for the crucial mistake not to devalue the pound in 1966, which cost the British economy 
one of its few last opportunities to reverse decline in the face of the ever stiffening global 
competition, *Wilsonism' may well have looked forward to further achievements in the 1970s. 
But i f this prediction must remain in the realm of conjecture, men it remains to be said 
that in the 1960s there was no popular alternative to 'Wilsonism'. In mis connection it is 
important to remember the role played by the myth of the success of Soviet central planning. 
This was widely believed. Thomas Balogh, the former Balliol fellow and Wilson's Economic 
adviser, expressed the belief in the following terms: 
There is no need to doubt the utter detemiination with which Russia will pursue 
the drive towards higher productivity. The central control of her economy is a 
powerful help in this field. All in all, it is likely that Russian output per head will 
surpass that of Britain in the early 1960s and that of the US. in the mid-1970s, 
unless our progress is speeded up.13 
Wilson, perhaps the British politician with the most personal experience of the Soviet economy, 
was certainly a believer. Indeed so widespread was the trust in the planning of the economy that 
Wilson's biographer, Ben Pimlott, remarks that a "parallel could be drawn with the embrace of 
monetarism in the 1970s, and with the fashionable rejection of collectivism in the 1980s. Just 
as it later became difficult, even on the Left, to question a market approach, so in the 1960s it 
became hard, even on the Right, to doubt the wisdom of some form of planning'.13 
Of course when planning was held to require the wholesale nationalisation of industry, 
then it did provoke widespread opposition, even in the Labour Parry which had amongst its 
members many former supporters of the Liberal Party. But fortunately for Wilson the 
Gartskellites had fought the Left over the issue of nationalisation in the 1950s and had won the 
party's backing for Anthony Croslancfs ethical socialism with its preference for state control 
BIbid.,p.276. 
"Ibid., p.276. 
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rather man state ownership of industry. It was therefore difficult to smear Wilson's Labour Party 
with the tar of further public ownership. 
But even more frustrating for the Conservatives was Wilson's pragmatism. This meant, 
for example, that while in 1959 he sided with the Left over Hugh GaitskeU's plans to drop the 
nationalisation of steel and road haulage, in the run-up to the 1974 election, he could oppose the 
Left with his rejection of the National Executive's proposal that the state take over twenty-five 
leading companies. As he expressed this pragmatism to Tony Benn at the time: 'who is going 
to tell me that we should nationalise Marks and Spencer in the hope that it will be as effective 
as the Coop?'14 While frustrating Benn, he was able to reassure sufficient voters to ensure the 
election of his party. 
Wilson's pragmatism also meant that i f he thought they would work, he had no 
compunction against stealing ideas from political opponents and putting them to work for his 
own party. A good example is his and Barbara Castle's proposals for the reform of the trade 
unions in In Place of Strife (1969). This poaching of his opponents ideas had the consequence 
that, provided the Conservatives stuck with the post-war consensus, both parties tended to tinker 
with political ideas mat appealed to the middle ground. And, as Harold Wilson was believed to 
have the safer pair of hands, the electorate tended to leave the tinkering to Wilson. This was the 
abiding frustration of the Conservative Parry faced with Harold Wilson. In some considerable 
measure it explains the right wing lurch of the Party away from the Middle Way of Harold 
Macmillan and the One Nation Toryism of R.A. Butler into Thatcherism. 
EDWARD HEATH 
The importance of Ted Heath as a transitional figure in the Conservative Parry's embrace 
of privatisation is that he both presented a winning proto-Thatcherite electoral formula and 
demonstrated the difficulty of holding onto power with a commitment to the "middle way'. 
Heath's early radicalism tends now to be obscured by bis public hostility towards 
Margaret Thatcher and his opposition to her brand of neo-Conservatism. However, in her 
memoirs Margaret Thatcher can rightly claim mat 'after the 1964 and 1966 defeats I joined with 
Ted Heath in a rethinking of party policy which seemed to foreshadow much of what we later 
1 4 Ibid., p.603. 
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came to call Thatchgrism".13 These were the years of opposition, when the desperation to oust 
Harold Wilson and the goading and electoral popularity of the maverick Conservative, Enoch 
Powell, pushed Heath towards 'Selsdon Man'. This was the term of derision coined by Wilson 
in the 1970 election campaign to denounce Heath's image of having repudiated the post=war 
settlement accepted by all his predecessors, Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, and Hume.16 
In his Selsdon Man rhetoric Heath certainly allowed himself to sound very radical on 
nationalised industry. His thinking appears to have drawn on the ideas of the Conservative Party 
Public Sector Research Unit (CPSRU) set up in 1967. The head of the unit David Howell had 
been influenced by Louis Kelso's The Capitalist Manifesto (19S8), in which the author 
recommended the mass ownership of industry and enterprise as the best alternative to the 
Keynesian state.17 In David Howell's own book, A New Style of Government (1970), Howell 
argued for a reduction of government and bureaucracy by transferring functions and activities 
[of government] back to the private sector or running them down altogether', describing the 
process in a footnote as 'privatisation'.18 
For a practical example of privatisation Heath could also draw on the CPSRU pamphlet 
DIAL ENTERPRISE 1971 - The Case for a Private Enterprise Telephone Service. For this the 
author, David Alexander, drew on the earlier Institute of Economic Amur's pamphlet by Michael 
Cane, Telephones = Public or Private?, and an article by Russell Lewis in the Daily Telegraph. 
In mis article, reflecting on the denationalisation of the German car-maker Volkswagen by the 
sale of 3.6 million shares to the l.S million individual shareholders, Lewis argued that i f the 
same method 'allied with tax concessions to lower income groups, were used to return 
nationalised industries to the private sector, this would have the advantages both of helping the 
creation of a capital-owning democracy and of creating a vested interest in favour of 
denationalisation.19 Apparently persuaded by these arguments, at the Selsdon conference Heath 
pledged: 'We will remove the shackles of government from industry. We will banish the 
regulation and control of business activities. We will withdraw the Government from holdings 
1 9 Thatcher, M. op.cit, p. 13. 
1 6 Campbell, J. Edward Heath (Pimlico: London, 1993), p. 239 ff. 
1 7 Cockett, R. Thinking the Unthinkable, Think-tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983 (Harper 
Collins: London, 1994), p.200. 
"Ibid., p.200. 
wIbid.,p.201. 
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in private firms. We will begin to reintroduce private ownership into nationalised industries/20 
And yet Heath's true colours were not those of a proto Thatcherite. As Opposition Leader 
he opposed Nicholas Ridley's radical denationalisation plans, and in office consented only to the 
denationalisation of the Carlisle State pubs and the travel agents Thomas Cook. Even more 
revealingly he nationalised the "lame ducks" Rolls Royce and the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
However, Heath's biographer concedes 'a limited degree of truth in this analysis, notably with 
regard to trade union reform and the intention to create an economic climate conducive to 
enterprise'. To a much greater degree,' John Campbell goes on to clarify, 'it reflects the 
misunderstanding which Heath allowed to arise ° indeed positively encouraged = by going along 
with an aggressively free-market rhetoric which he did not in his heart accept'.21 
Tragically for Heath, Selsdon Man was to prove his undoing. The political rhetoric 
helped alienate him from the trade unions. Then when he was forced to make his much derided 
U-turn and to embrace corporatism, having alienated the trade unions, he was unable to make 
the central plank of his anti-inflation policy, an incomes policy, work. As John Campbell passes 
his judgement: 
It was a fatal error for Heath to allow himself to be thought to have more 
radical intentions that in fact he had. He ended up between two stools, 
convincingly neither one thing nor the other: a fierce bark, with no real intention 
to bite - but the bite was enough to antagonise those he sincerely wanted to 
make 'social partners' in his new competitive/co-operative Britain. The result 
of his 'Selsdon' aberration effectively ensured that neither the initial policies with 
which he started out in government in 1970-1 nor those to which he turned in 
1972-4 when he repudiated 'Selsdon' carried sufficient moral or political 
conviction to succeed. Heath's failure in government stemmed from this 
confusion.22 
But Selsdon Man was not Heath's only handicap. Another was his failure adequately to 
prepare to deal with inflation. In 1972, when unemployment exceeded the politically 
unacceptable figure of 1 million, Heath's conventional Keynesianism prompted a dash for 
growth. This combined with other pressures on prices to push inflation beyond tolerable limits. 
Heath resorted to the conventional economic wisdom of an incomes policy. But even had he not 
2 0 Ibid., p.201. 
2 1 Campbell, J. op.cit, p.267. 
2 1 Ibid., p.267. 
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alienated the trade unions, he would have found it extremely difficult to make this anti-inflation 
policy work. As Campbell explains: I t is inherently difficult for a Tory Government to operate 
a successful incomes policy because Labour can always outbid it..This was the Catch-22 of 
British politics in the 1970s which Heath could not resolve' . B 
After Heath had been voted out of office in 1974, this Catch-22 was also to thwart the 
successful operation of an incomes policy by the incoming Labour administration. The Left of 
the party could always outbid those moderates wanting to take a stronger line on inflation. The 
failure, after 1974, of Wilson and Callaghan's social contract, which largely continued Heath's 
corporatism and incomes policy was to underline this uncomfortable fact and to strengthen the 
hand of those who advocated the abandonment of Keynes and the monetarist cure for inflation. 
And ironically, while Alan Walters was the first of the Conservative Party economic advisers 
to advocate monetarism only to find his advice rejected and himself relieved of his part-time job, 
by 1975 the Labour Chancellor, Denis Healey, was something of a convert As Peter Jay 
commented, since Christmas Denis Henley's basic strategy had been to make unemployment the 
automatic reward for excessive pay settlements by keeping monetary creation within 
pre-deteimined limits'* 
But for the monetarist cure to be applied to inflation, the patient had to be willing, at 
least initially, to accept higher unemployment, and, i f a complementary fiscal policy was to be 
applied, a reduction in social expenditure - the 'social' wage, or higher taxation. The last was 
politically very unpopular with already high levels of taxation. An indication of the difficulty of 
cutting the social wage is given by the major expansion of government expenditure on Education 
and the NHS under Heath, when, ironically, Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph were 
respectively heading those two government departments. It was these constraints on policy that 
led Labour to allow the nationalised industries rapidly to increase their prices as a means of 
raising public funds without raising taxes. 
Interestingly, mis use of the industries as a form of negative public expenditure may have 
presaged the end of public ownership in so far as it was not a big step to selling off entire 
industries in order to raise further funds for the exchequer.23 A Labour government was the first 
*Ibid.,p.541. 
MIn British government accounting procedures the proceeds of asset sales in the public sector count as negative 
public expenditure. 
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to take this step when, after agreeing a loan with the International Monetary Fund, instead of 
complying with the condition that it cut public expenditure, it chose instead to sell shares in 
British Petroleum (BP). Inadvertently therefore, although it can be countered that BP was a 
special case, Labour may be regarded as having initiated a process that would end in 
privatisation. As the dissident Labour Cabinet Minister, Tony Benn, noted in bis diary at the 
time: 'We have provided a blueprint for selling off public assets in the future and we will have 
no argument against i t It is an outrage/26 Benn was to be proved right when John Redwood, in 
his advocacy of popular capitalism, was able to claim a precedent for privatisation set by a 
Labour government As he put this: The precedent of the sale of BP shares was readily taken 
up by the Conservative government which found itself, in its early years, as impecunious as its 
Labour predecessor. 2 7 
Two further developments of the 1970s also heralded privatisation as an alternative to 
Tony Benn's siege economy with its extensive plans for nationalisation.28 One was the 
emergence of stagflation - rising prices with rising unemployment. This new phenomenon 
reflected business leaders' fears about the long term prospects of the British economy in an 
increasingly globalized market In this new situation, in which the scope for an independent 
national monetary and fiscal policy seemed much restricted or even non-existent, the Keynesian 
argument that public ownership could be used as one of the instruments of macroeconomic 
policy looked to be no longer valid. In any case, experience with fine tuning the economy 
showed mat it was virtually impossible to assemble adequate information to make the required 
calculations.29 
The second development came to be called the British disease' - endemic industrial 
action. This was inflicted on the British economy by the increasingly militant trade unions, who 
had defeated Barbara Castle's proposed reform of industrial legislation, thwarted Heath's 
National Industrial Relations Court and humbled bis government, reneged on Wilson and Foot's 
social contract after 1974, opposed the Bullock Report (1978), with its enlightened proposals 
for industrial democracy along the lines of the German mitbestimmung, and then, finally, had 
3 6 Benn, A.. The Bern Diaries (Hutchinson: London, 1995; this ed. by Arrow books: London, 1996), p.421. 
1 7 Redwood, J. Popular Capitalism (Routledge: London, 1989), p.72. 
" See further Pimlott, B. op.cit., p.639 ff. 
2 9 See further Healey, D. The lime Of My Life (Michael Joseph: London, 1989; this ed., Penguin: London, 
1990), p. 382. 
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helped bring down Callaghan's government in the "winter of discontent" of 1979. Their 
miUtancy imderlined the "Catch 22" of British politics by dmonstrating the futility of any future 
anti-iiifiationary prices and incomes policy which did not have their full cooperation. 
Furthermore, in the course of helping bring down the Labour government in the "winter 
of discontent" the trade union movement, with its power base in the nationalised industries, had 
also come to pose a threat to parliamentary democracy. In the course of this dispute the 
Government considered declaring A State of Emergency on several occasions. On one of these, 
in order to ensure supplies of essential drugs and medical equipment, Ministers even considered 
sending tanks into Id ' s medical headquarters, which was blockaded by striking workers.30 As 
Denis Healey, men battling, as Chancellor, to bring inflation under control, described the 
increasing disorder 'Each night the television screens carried film of bearded men in duffle 
coats huddled around braziers. Nervous viewers thought mat the Revolution had already 
begun."31 For ' Sunny Jim', the Labour Prime Minister who rose from the ranks of the working 
class, it was a personal crisis which he has reputedly never got over, because the only 
achievement of the militant shop stewards was to invite Mrs. Thatcher to 10 Downing Street to 
begin her revolution. 
THE RISE OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 
With this understanding of British politics on the eve of privatisation, we shall now 
explore how the political and economic crisis just sketched combined with the Conservative 
Party's electoral crisis to pave the way for the revival of economic liberalism that was to 
' capture'the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher. 
The story of this revival begins in the 1930s. At the time Harold Laski had pronounced 
liberalism dead 'we must, i f we are to be honest, admit that the liberalism for which Hobhouse 
battled so bravely has suffered an eclipse so startling and so complete as that which affected the 
doctrine of the divine right of Kings after the revolution of 1688'.32 However he had overlooked 
the few British economists and writers, such as Lionel Robbins and George Orwell, who were 
stubbornly keeping economic liberalism alive in Britain. They were soon to be joined by a group 
3 0 See further Dsvies, A. J. To Build A New Jerusalem, The British Labour Party from Keir Hardy to Tony Blair 
(Michael Joseph/Abacus: London, 1992/1996), p.365. 
3 1 Healey, D. op.ch., p 463. 
* Quoted in Cockett, op.cit., p.59. 
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of emigres fleeing either the collectivism of national socialism in Germany or communism in 
Eastern Europe.33 This group included the German economists Ludwig von Mises and his 
disciple Friedrich von Hayek, the Hungarian philosopher, Michael Polanyi, the Austrian 
philosopher of science, Karl Popper, and the refugee author from the former Soviet Union, Ayn 
Rand. 
Some of these were to battle on as very isolated figures in university departments over 
the next four or five decades before their work was to be fully recognised. But then in 1974 
Friedrich Hayek was awarded the Nobel prize for Economics. Two years later the award went 
to the monetarist Milton Friedman. James Buchanan, the 'founding father* of Public Choice 
Economics, had to wait until 1986 for his Nobel prize. The 1970s also saw the publication of 
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), widely acclaimed as a another challenge to 
the post-war egalitarian consensus. According to Dieter Helm, these four Hayek's 
constitutionalism, Friedman's economic liberalism, Buchanan's public choice, and Nozick's 
libeitarianism, represent the four distinctive schools of the New Right, a term coined by die 
Fabians for the diverse movement that unites the new economic liberals.34 
Friedrich Hayek. 
Of the emigres, Hayek, whose academic career spanned seven decades, has probably 
been the most influential in shaping right-wing policies, attitudes, and behaviour, particularly 
in Britain.39 Even those who radically disagree with him tend to concede the cogency of his 
economic philosophy.36 And, very important for practical men and women, his prediction in the 
1930s that Keynesian deficit financing would only debase the currency and in the long run be 
counter-productive appeared to have been substantiated by the inflation and the unemployment 
of the 1970s. For its prophetic value his argument with Keynes, which he later summarised in 
his Constitution of Liberty (1960) is worth quoting in full: 
The development of Lord Keynes theories started from the correct insight that 
3 3 See further, Graham, D. and Clark, P. The New Enlightenment, the rebirth of liberalism (Channel 4: London, 
1986). 
M See further Helm, D. op.crt, p.4 ff. 
3 5 Forrester, D. 'Political Justice and Christian Theology", in Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol.3., no. 1., p.6. 
3 6 Plant, R. Modern Political Thought (Blackwell: Oxford, 1991), p.90. See also Griffiths, B. Morality and the 
Market Place, p.33. 
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the regular cause of extensive unemployment is real wages that are too high. 
The next step consisted in the proposition that a direct lowering of money 
wages could be brought about only by a struggle so painful and prolonged that 
it could not be contemplated. Hence he concluded that real wages must be 
lowered by the process of lowering the value of money. This is really the 
reasoning underlying the whole 'full employment' policy now so widely 
accepted. If Labour insists on a level of money wages too high to allow of full 
employment, the supply of money must be so increased as to raise prices to a 
level where the real value of the prevailing money wages is no longer greater 
than the productivity of the workers seeking employment. In practice, this 
necessarily means that each separate union, in its attempt to overtake the value 
of money, win never cease to insist on further increases in money wages and 
that the aggregate effort of the unions will thus bring about progressive 
inflation.*7 
Understandably the stock of any person who had made this prediction in the heat of the 
great economic debate in the 1930s would have to rise in the economic conditions of the 1970s. 
Furthermore, in the political conditions of the 1970s, when Heath had been humbled by the 
unions and even Labour was unable to operate an effective prices and incomes policy because 
of the militancy of the unions, the threat to liberal democracy appeared to be about to fulfil 
Hayek's other main prediction that the middle way* of a mixed economy would lead to 'serfdom'. 
Although Hayek disavows in the 1976 preface to The Road to Serfdom, first published in 1943, 
that he had 'contended mat any movement in the direction of socialism is bound to lead to 
totalitarianism',38 the note of danger he sounded made this prospect and not only pauperisation 
the central message of the book: 
In the dozen years in which this country has now become his [die author's] 
home he has become increasingly convinced that at best some of the forces 
which have destroyed freedom in Germany are also at work here, and that the 
character and the source of this danger are, if possible, even less understood 
than they were in Germany. The supreme tragedy is still not seen that in 
Germany it was largely people of goodwill, men who were aarrrired and held up 
as models in this country, who prepared the way, if they did not actually create, 
the forces which now stand for everything they detest. Yet our chance of 
3 7 Hayek, F. The Constitution of liberty (Chicago University Press, 1960), p.280. 
" Hayek, F. The Road to Serfdom (Routledge: London, 1944; ARK paperback edition, 1986). 
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averting a similar fate depends on our facing the danger and on our being 
prepared to revise even our most cherished hopes and ambitions if they should 
prove to be the source of the danger. There are few signs yet that we have the 
intellectual courage to admit to ourselves that we may have been wrong.39 
The organising principle of Hayek's philosophy of economic freedom 'is based upon a 
profound insight into the nature and limits of human knowledge.'40 This insight is essentially 
a development of the calculation argument of Hayek's teacher Mises.41 As the historian of 
Liberalism, John Gray, explains the calculation argument: 
The Misesian insight is that in any modern economy there will be billions of 
market exchanges and therefore billions of prices. In the production of any 
consumer good, for example, producers will need the guidance provided by the 
prices of many capital goods and these prices will typically be subject to 
constant change. Because resources and preferences are not static, the structure 
of relative prices will itself be in a state of constant change. Mises's argument 
is that, without market pricing of assets, their relative scarcity is unknowable, 
since simulating market pricing is a calculations! impossibility in an economy 
where billions of market exchanges take place and pricing is in a state of 
dynamic flux. The limitation of human knowledge identified by Mises's 
argument is therefore a calculational limitation. For Mises there cannot be a 
socialist economy, since rational economic planning by individuals and 
enterprises is feasible only with the assistance of the information provided by 
market pricing.42 
Hayek went on to deepen this critique of socialism by arguing that the difficulty of 
central planning is more than a matter of calculation. Central to his argument is the idea of the 
economy as a spontaneous order, transmitting and generating dispersed information that allows 
production to be produced at the lowest possible cost Hayek even dispensed with the word 
economy. He argued that the use of the word involved a confusion of language because of the 
way it suggested mat the purpose of the market is the allocation of scarce resources to the most 
efficient ends, whereas no one person is in a position to know what these ends are, and therefore 
*Hrid.,p.2. 
4 0 Institute of Economic Affairs, Masters of Modern Economics, Economic Freedom, F.A.Hayek (Blackwell: 
Oxford, 1991), p.vii. 
4 1 See further Cockett, R. op.ch., pS2 ff. 
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any discussion in such terms is necessarily empty. In its place, Hayek preferred the Greek word 
katallaxy, on account of the way i t describes a spontaneous order. This he argued better 
expresses the only purpose of the spontaneous and ever evolving order of the market, which he 
understood to be that of exchange. As he explained in The Confusion of Language (1968), 
' Only because the market induces every individual to use his unique knowledge of particular 
opportunities and possibilities for his purpose can an overall order be achieved that uses in its 
totality the dispersed knowledge which is not accessible as a whole to anyone.4 3 John Gray 
again provides a helpful clarification of this aspect of Hayek's thought: 
The epistemic impossibility of successful comprehensive central planning is not 
for Hayek, at it was for Misca, chiefly a calculations! one; it is rather one that 
flows from the very nature of the knowledge possessed by economic agents 
This knowledge, Hayek insists is not only or mainly the prepositional 
knowledge of basic facts that can easily be theorised or quantified; it is local 
knowledge of floating economic environments, often embodied in skills or 
practices or expressed in entrepreneurial insights. This is knowledge that by its 
very nature cannot be collected by a central planning board.44 
The importance of the epistemic argument for privatisation is that it strongly calls into 
question the theoretical possibility of an efficient nationalised industry let alone an entire 
planned economy because the central planners and the managers of public enterprise simply lack 
sufficient information on which effectively to plan and to manage. As Gray comments on the 
further development of the insights of the Austrian School, they demonstrate that even i f the 
soviet leadership had been successful in creating a new homo sovieticus, who would not respond 
to the perverse incentive structure created by the planning institutions but would mechanically 
follow planning objectives, he would lack the knowledge needed to achieve the planners' 
goals. 4 5 Therefore, according to this insight, the free market not only protects individual 
economic freedoms by rejecting the notion that there is one purpose or a common set of 
purposes for economic activity, but it also offers the most rational allocation of resources 
possible, because it is only the market which can fully utilise all the information residing in the 
many individual consumers and suppliers to match supply and demand. 
** Economic Freedom, F.A. Hayek, p.373. 
4 4 Gray, op.cit, p.69. 
4 5 Ibid., p.67. 
The Abandonment of Nationalisation (1979 -1989) 171 
Furthermore, by utilising all the information available, and this is a crucial part of 
Hayek's defence of the market, the market economy not only rationally allocates scarce 
resources between competing uses, but also ensures that fresh wealth is created. Brian Griffiths 
explains this aspect of Hayek's thought by contrasting a positive=sum game, in which all the 
players gain and a zero-sum game in which some players are made better o f f at the expense of 
others.46 In Hayek's thought, the market economy is a positive-sum game because the way prices 
act as signals in a market economy, conveying information about consumer demands and the 
relative costs of different ways of supplying these demands, ensures that as soon as producers 
respond to price signals they are in effect creating new wealth by moving to supply a change in 
demand at the least possible cost By contrast, a planned economy is likely to be a zero-sum 
game because prices are not competitive and therefore do not convey all the information 
required to ensure the creation of fresh wealth at the least possible cost; as a result some players 
are always likely to be made worse off. 
Hayek's defence of the market economy therefore implies a 'general presumption against 
state enterprise'.47 However, it does not follow that he rejects any role for the state in the 
provision of economic goods and services. In this connection, it is important for the use of 
Hayek's thought to clarify the difference between his defence of the limited state and Nozick's 
defence of the minimum state. For Nozick, the only legitimate functions are those of the 
"night-watchman": national defence and the provision of a civil and criminal justice system. 
In contrast, for Hayek, The range and variety of government action that is, at least in principle, 
reconcilable with a free system is considerable.*48 The fundamental difference between these 
positions derives from the way Nozick bases bis theory of justice on a theory of rights, whereas 
Hayek bases his on procedural justice. Consequently, just as the rules of a game can always be 
changed to improve the game for all, for Hayek, property rights are reformable in the interests 
of procedural justice. 4 9 
Nevertheless, i f Hayek is less absolutist in his understanding of property rights than is 
Nozick, and, as a consequence, may allow some limited scope for nationalisation, for example 
4 4 Griffihhs, B. Morality and the Market Place, p.31 ff. 
4 7 Ibid, p. 138. 
4 1 Ibid., p. 136. 
4 9 Ibid., p. 136. Griffiths comments that Hayek treats property rights as artefacts, conventions necessary both for 
economic welfare and personal independence, rather than as eternal verities given us by natural law.' 
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in circumstances of massive economic disturbance, his philosophy of economic freedom 
provides a strong justification for privatisation in its defence of private property as the best 
guarantor not only of negative freedoms but also of positive freedoms. This aspect of Hayek's 
philosophy is often overlooked, and as a result he is often wrongly accused of a disregard for 
positive freedoms. In this connection, while accepting mat Hayek did not sufficiently emphasise 
the positive freedoms promoted by the market, Gray finds i t necessary to offer the following 
defence of the place of positive freedoms in his philosophy: 
It is not true of Hayek, even if it may be true of other thinkers in the classical 
liberal intellectual tradition, that the regime of property rights and free markets 
under a limited government is defended primarily on grounds of negative liberty. 
For in Hayek, as in Kant himself, freedom has two faces: it encompasses both 
protection against coercion and the possibility of self^ ieterrnination. In Hayek, 
again as in Kant, the freedom of self-detennination or autonomy is secured 
chiefly through the institution of private property. For his by using one's own 
property according to one's own values and goals, without the necessity for 
consultation with one's neighbour, or any collective authority, that one can most 
nearly approximate the status of an autonomous agent. In this (often tacit or 
implicit) defence of the market economy for its coiitribution to positive freedom, 
Hayek expresses a deep insight that is negated or misunderstood by most critics 
of classical liberalism....For this reason, the regime of private property and free 
markets is to be defended as the best embodiment of positive freedom in a 
context of value-pluralism and cultural variety - and not merely or primarily as 
the instrtutionalisation of negative freedom.50 
In addition to Hayek's intellectual achievements, he contributed the practical 
organisational skills to form a movement for the revival of economic liberalism. Richard 
Cockett identifies the beginning of the movement with the calling of the Le Colloque Walter 
Lippmarm on 26 August 1938, in Paris, on the eve of the war.51 The colloquium was called by 
the Frenchman Louis Rougier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Besancon in response 
to the apparently inexorable decline of liberalism in Europe. With Hayek in attendance, the 
conference proceeded to identify as a most dangerous illusion the argument for the mixed 
economy that mere is some 'middle way between the extreme Fascist/Communist collectivism 
"Gray, J. Hayek on the Market Economy and the Limits of State Action', in Helm, D ed., The Economic 
Borders of the State (Clarendon: Oxford, 1989), p. 141. 
5 1 This section draws on Cockett, R. op rit, p.ll ff. 
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and the individualism of classical liberalism.52 
After the disruption of the war, Hayek revived the idea of an international liberal forum. 
He proposed that die forum should wage a twenty year campaign using Fabian methods to win 
the intellectual war between collectivism and economic liberalism. As he explained the need for 
a long term outlook: What to the contemporary observer appears as a battle of conflicting 
interests decided by the vote of tile masses, has usually been decided long before in a battle of 
ideas confined to narrow circles.'53 His successful conference in 1948 spawned the Mont Pelerin 
Society, with its sole object the exchange of views among minds inspired by certain ideals and 
broad conceptions held in common, to contribute to the preservation and improvement of the 
tree society.154 
With the Mont Pelerin Society as the protected headquarters of the movement, operating 
as the forum for discussion of its basic philosophy, the campaign against the mixed economy 
was mostly fought at the level of practical policies put forward by think-tanks associated with 
the movement The earliest of these was the Institute of Economic Affairs (TEA) founded by 
Anthony Fisher in 19SS, with its first Director, Ralph Harris. The Institute's purpose was given 
it by Hayek who advised Fisher that he 'should join with others in forming a scholarly research 
organisation to supply intellectuals in universities, schools, journalism, and broadcasting with 
authoritative studies of the economic theories of markets and its application to practical 
affairs.'55 
hi keeping with this aim the TEA focused its efforts on a stream of publications applying 
economic liberalism to specific economic areas. In doing so, the TEA sought to shift the focus 
of economic interest to micro-economic issues in line with Hayek's complaint that Keynesian 
economics was mistakenly concerned with rnacro-economic aggregates that could not adequately 
represent the diversity and specificity of real economic exchanges.56 One of the earliest of these 
pamphlets to apply the theory of free markets to the public utilities was Michael Cane's 
Telephones - Public or Private (1966), which we have referred to earlier in connection with 
s HAL, p. u . 
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5 4 Ibid., p. 117. 
5 5 Ibid, p. 124. 
5 6 Ibid., p. 145. 
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Heath's Selsdon Man rhetoric. Cane's conclusion that the weight of quantitative evidence plus 
the impediments virtually inevitable to government-owned enterprise suggest strongly that the 
telephone service would be better o f f divorced from the public sector*,57 would doubtless have 
been read by Keith Joseph - the minister responsible in 1984 for the privatisation of British 
Telecom, the first big privatisation. Joseph is recorded as having first visited the BEA in 1964, 
then again in 1975 for 'a further course of education.'58 
Milton Friedman. 
In addition to the micro-economic studies of individual industries, the IEA made another 
major contribution to privatisation by its sponsorship of the monetarist cure for inflation. 
According to Cockett,' i f there is one central idea that the IEA can be credited with placing at 
the centre of British politics, it is the doctrine of monetarism, which started life in the late 1960s 
as a highly technical economic technique for achieving monetary stability, but which later 
became the highly politicised motivating principle of Mrs Thatcher's economic reforms of the 
early 1980s.59 
The leading figure behind the LEA's sponsorship of monetarism was not Hayek, who 
disputed the monetarist case, but Milton Friedman, who, according to John Kenneth Galbraith, 
is probably the most influential political economist since the Keynesian revolution.60 Friedman 
is another founder member of the Mont Pelerin Society and probably its most famous exponent 
of the free market His empirical studies had led him to conclude that inflation was always a 
monetary phenomenon. This explanation held out the promise of a cure which persuaded the 
IEA, who enrolled him in their campaign for monetary stability. Friedman was invited to give 
the first Wincote lecture of 1970, which he titled The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory. 
Following mis lecture, the IEA generally promoted his ideas throughout the 1970s, and assisted 
in preparing his television programme Tree to Choose' shown in six episodes in 1980. The 
programme was held to have had an enormous impact on British public opinion.61 
"Ibid, p. 146. 
n Graham, D. and Clark, P. op.ctt, p.20. 
5 9 Cockett, R. op.dt., p. ISO. 
4 0 Galbraith, J.K. A History of Economics (Penguin: London, 1987), p.274. 
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According to Foster it was Friedman who gave the decisive call for privatisation when, 
in a lecture in 1976 entitled Curing the British Disease, he advised that' the obvious thing to do 
with the steel industry, the railroads and all these industries currently government operated was 
to get rid of them by auctioning them off....One suggestion [for the steel industry] which I think 
makes a good deal of sense would not be to auction it off, but to give it away by giving every 
citizen in the country a share in i t / 6 2 Foster went on to comment: 
at the time, Friedman's suggestion seemed irrelevant. Yet policy change was 
imminent. One who was later close to Margaret Thatcher suggests that it 
probably dates from the end of the year in which Friedman spoke or the 
beginning of the next, soon after she became Conservative leader (in 197S).63 
As part of their sponsorship of monetarism, the EEA promoted the influential British 
monetarists Alan Walters and his student Patrick Minford. It was the latter who helped put the 
focus of an anti-inflation policy on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). In the 
IEA publication Is Monetarism Enough? (1980X Minford argued mat in order to reduce inflation 
the government had to reduce the PSBR by at least four percent as well as controlling the money 
supply.64 With privatisation being politically the easiest way of reducing the PSBR, it soon came 
to be viewed as an essential adjunct to the monetarist cure for inflation. 
Keith Joseph. 
Whereas the IEA was set up to influence the universities, the media, and policy makers 
in general, the hidden agenda behind the creation of the Centre for Policy Studies was the 
conversion of the Conservative Party. As Keith Joseph explained to Anthony Harris and Arthur 
Seldon of the IEA, Margaret Thatcher and his mink-tank was not intended 'as a rival to the IEA, 
but to do in political terms for the free market what the IEA had done in the wider intellectual 
community/63 As Joseph further confided to Cockett in 1991, 'my aim was to convert the Tory 
Party.'66 
Joseph's own conversion he dates from 1974. It was only then that he claims to have 
6 2 Foster, C. op.crt, p. 108. 
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understood that, despite having represented the Conservative Party for over twenty years, he had 
been a moderate Fabian. It was this self-understanding mat contributed to the famous mea culpa 
Upminster speech of 1974, in which he confessed mat the Conservative Party's "well-intentioned 
statism' was jointly to blame with Labour for the country's relative economic decline. As he 
confessed: 
Since the end of the Second World War we have had altogether too much 
Socialism. There is no point in my trying to evade what everybody knows. For 
half of that thirty years Conservative Governments, for understandable reasons, 
did not consider it practicable to reverse the vast bulk of the accumulating 
detritus of Socialism which on each occasion they found when they returned to 
office. So we tried to build on its uncertain foundations instead. Socialist 
measures and socialist attitudes have been very pervasive 6 7 
In his 1974 Preston speech Inflation is caused by governments, Joseph waded deeper into 
heresy. He questioned the post-war political commitment to ful l employment through the use 
of Keynesian deficit financing and urged mat the time has surely come to turn for advice to 
economists, critical but constructive, who proved painfully right in their forebodings.'68 These 
economists were of course the economic liberals who, like Hayek, had since the 1930s predicted 
the inflationary consequences of Keynesianism. More pointedly, Joseph appeared to align 
himself with a specifically monetarist counter-inflation policy by arguing that stable money 
growth 'gradually brought closer into line with the growth of our production was the essential 
prerequisite for tackling all the other ills of the British economy.'69 
For privatisation, Joseph's 1976 Stockton lecture, Monetarism is not enough, was perhaps 
even more important He used the occasion to claim that monetary stability provides only the 
framework for economic regeneration. He insisted that in addition to mis framework, the 
economic borders of the state needed to be redrawn so as to free more of the nation's resources 
for use in the private sector. In doing so, he sought to oppose the new cross-parry monetarist 
consensus which was gaining ground with the conversion of the Labour Chancellor, Denis 
Healey, and to ram home his message that there was no viable 'middle way*. As he put this 
challenge: 
417 Ibid., p.245. 
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Monetarism is not enough. This is not intended as a counsel of despair, but a 
warning note, Government's intention to contract the money supply is welcome 
and potentially beneficial to all. But it is not enough unless there is also the 
essential reduction of the state sector and the essential encouragement of 
enterprise.™ 
Margaret Thatcher. 
The CPS and Keith Joseph were also the decisive influence on the conversion of 
Margaret Thatcher. As she admitted in her memoirs: 
I had always been an instinctive Conservative, but I had failed to develop these 
instincts either into a coherent framework of ideas or into a set of practical 
policies for government And the faster the illusions of practical men crumbled 
before the onrush of reality, the more necessary it was developing such a 
framework. Keith and I established the Centre for Policy Studies to do just 
that.71 
And praising the economic liberalism of Alfred Sherman of the CPS, a few days after her first 
election victory, she wrote in a letter 'You have been a constant inspiration to Keith and myself 
in difficult times....None of us wi l l forget that There is one thing stronger than armies and that 
is an idea whose time has come.'7 2 
In the light of these statements, as we have previously mentioned, it is difficult to agree 
with Foster who, while admitting that Margaret Thatcher's 'strength of will ' to roll back the 
borders of the public sector was crucial for the whole privatisation programme, describes this 
determination as merely a Vehement i f unanalysed wish', which' cannot be described as being 
based on either political or economic arguments: rather, it was based on a powerful gut 
feeling.'73 She was clearly an early convert. I f her memoirs are to be taken at face value, she may 
even have been an economic liberal from birth as her linking of the influence of her father's 
grocery business with the calculation argument of the Austrian School suggests: 
My father's background as a grocer is sometimes cited as the basis for my 
economic philosophy... Before I read a line from the great liberal economists, 
7 0 Quoted in ibid., p.248. 
7 1 Thatcher, M. op.cit., p. 14. 
7 2 Quoted in Cockett, R. op.cit., p.265. 
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I knew from my father's accounts that the free market was like a vast sensitive 
nervous system, responding to events and signals all over the world to meet the 
ever-ranging needs of peoples in different countries, from different classes, of 
different religions, with a kind of benign indifference to their status. 
Governments acted on a much smaller store of conscious information and, by 
contrast, were themselves "blind forces' blundering about in the dark, and 
obstructing the operations of markets rather than improving them.74 
It should also be recalled that privatisation offered Margaret Thatcher a means of 
controlling the trade unions by offering workers the bribe of popular capitalism.75 Indeed, after 
Heath's drubbing at the hands of the unions and successive attempts to reform industrial 
relations had failed, it was possibly the only means left to a Conservative Government. Here the 
hope was mat once workers owned shares they would be reluctant to support militant trade union 
leadership threatening industrial action which might harm the industries they now partly owned. 
Although mis objective of privatisation could not then be stated publicly, 7 6 Lord Wolfson, Chief 
of Staff in Mrs.Thatcher's Policy Office at 10 Downing Street, has recently stated openly "The 
big issue was control of the trade-unions; privatisation was subsidiary to that" 7 7 
Furthermore, for what additional light it sheds on Margaret Thatcher's ideological 
commitment to privatisation, it should also not be overlooked that her government was possibly 
the best prepared in the Party's history. In Nicholas Ridley's policy group on the nationalised 
industries the new party leadership had explored the mechanics of privatisation as well as 
prepared for possible confrontation with the unions i f the policy were implemented.78 As Ridley 
reveals in his memoirs, his group's report was 'almost identical to the original 1970 one, suitably 
updated'.79 In any case, he did not think it "played a very important part in shaping the policies 
which were later to be implemented They were all there in Margaret Thatcher's head, and rather 
7 4 Thatcher, M op.ch., p. 14. 
7 5 See further Wiltshire, K. op.ch, p. 8. 
7 4 It is now generally listed in most text books on privatisation that one of the objectives of privatisation is to 
reduce the grip of the labour movement on the economy. See further Guislain, P. The Privatization Challenge 
(The World Bank. Washington DC. 1997), p. 19. 
7 7 Plender, J. 77K Big Setoff. 
7 1 See further Cockett, R. op.ch., p.267 
7 9 Ridley, N. My Style of Government, The Thatcher Years (Hutchinson: London, 1991), p. 16. 
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than wanting detailed blueprints for office, she wanted more ideas'.80 And, providing an 
explanation for the absence of any mention of privatisation in the 1979 manifesto, and a measure 
of the strength of the commitment to the mixed economy in the party and the country at the time, 
he writes, I t was natural that only those ideas which had electoral appeal found their way into 
the public domain/ 8 1 
In the tight of all this, and bearing in mind the admitted influence of Hayek's The Road 
to Serfdom on her political orientation in the 1950s,82 it is difficult to conclude otherwise than 
Margaret Thatcher came to power with a libertarian commitment to privatisation. For this 
reason her memoirs should be taken at face value where she writes that the 'fundamental 
purpose' behind privatisation is not to improve the performance of the industries involved but 
to promote freedom. As she expressed this commitment: 
Just as nationalisation was at the heart of the coUectivist programme by which 
Labour Governments sought to remodel British society, so privatisation is at the 
centre of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom. Whatever 
arguments there may - and should - be about means of sale, the competitive 
structures or the regulatory frameworks adopted in different cases, this 
fundamental purpose of privatisation must not be overlooked.83 
James Buchanan. 
While Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph were early converts to economic liberalism, 
the conversion of the Conservative Parry to privatisation, with so many "wets" still strongly 
committed to the mixed economy and occupying positions of influence, was never going to be 
easy without convincing arguments for the political advantage to be gained from privatisation. 
These came to be provided by the political analysis of the Adam Smith Institute (ASI). 
The ASI draws on the Public Choice Theory developed by James Buchanan, another 
member of the Mont Pelerin Society. As Buchanan explains his sub-discipline, 'all of public 
choice or the economic theory of politics may be summarised as the 'discovery' or 'rediscovery' 
that people should be treated as rational utility maximisers in all o f their behavioural 
wIbid.,p.l6 
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capacities.*84 The crucial word in this explanation is all", for Public Choice Theory assumes 
that people choose on the basis of their rational self-interest whether they are choosing in the 
economic or political sphere. The normative conclusion follows that, 'because people will tend 
to maximise their own utilities, institutions must be designed so that individual behaviour will 
further the interests of the group, small or large, local or national.' 8 5 As Buchanan expresses this 
purpose, it is to construct or reconstruct 'a political order that wil l channel the self-serving 
behaviour of participants towards the common good in a manner that comes as close as possible 
to that described to us by Adam Smith with respect to the economic order.'86 
As this quotation shows, Buchanan derives his inspiration from classical liberalism. 
Indeed he denies that public choice is in any sense original: 
ft represents rediscovery and elaboration of a part of the conventional wisdom 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and notably the conventional wisdom 
that informed classical political economy. Adam Smith, David Hume and the 
American Founding Fathers would have considered the central principles of 
public choice theory to be so elementary as scarcely to warrant attention. A 
mistrust of government processes, along with the implied necessity to impose 
severe constraints on the exercise of governmental authority, was part and 
parcel of the philosophical heritage they all shared. 
Buchanan's theoretical work has mainly concerned the application of these central 
principles in the design of political constitutions. Of this work, his defence of the balanced 
budget rule of the classical fiscal constitution and his criticism of Keynesianism for its 
asymmetry which 'naively presumed that politicians would create budget surpluses as willingly 
as they create deficits' 8 7 is especially important for privatisation by drawing attention to the 
theoretically insatiable fiscal demands of the nationalised industries. These demands, which 
allegedly make balanced budgets very difficult i f not impossible to achieve, arise from what 
Margaret Thatcher's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, dubbed their 'constitutional 
irresponsibility.' This, Howe explained, derives from the Morrisonian constitution which 'grants 
our nationalised corporations a degree of autonomy which is probably unique in the Western 
M Institute of Economic Affairs, Masters of Modern Economics, Constitutional Economics, James Buchanan 
(Basil BlackweD: Oxford, 1991), p.42. 
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World....The government's only real weapon is its threat to reduce or cut external funds. This 
is far too drastic to be effective/ 8 8 
Buchanan's theoretical work on constitutions has also sought to provide a defence of 
private property rights which has direct relevance to the subject of privatisation. On the basis of 
analysis which shows that majority voting could make everyone worse of f than they would be 
with no collective action he argued that American political history has been 'superior' to the 
British majoritarian democracy because the constitution of the United States prevents the 
economic disruption caused by politically motivated changes in the ownership of industry. As 
he commented, 'it would be difficult to conceive of an American cycle of nationalisation, 
denationalisation and renationalisation of a basic industry merely upon shifts in the legislative 
majority between parties.'8 9 In the light of this analysis, he espoused strict constitutional 
restraints as the means of halting the growth of the Leviathan state, which, i f allowed to go 
unchecked, wil l gobble up all the nations economic resources. 
Buchanan's fellow public choice theorist, Gordon Tullock, provided another level of 
critique of the Leviathan state with his analysis of bureaucracy. In his The Politics of 
Bureaucracy (1965), Tullock asked the simple question: What are the rewards and penalties 
facing a bureaucrat located in a hierarchy and what sorts of behaviour would describe bis efforts 
to maximise his own utility?*90 This subversive line of questioning has underrnined confidence 
in the public service ethos which provided part of the justification for public ownership. 
Tullock's analysis also supports the claim that bureaucrats in charge of the nationalised 
industries are bound to expand the size of the organisations they control well beyond any 
tolerable levels of efficiency. John Gray dubs this claim the 'incentive argument!, for its 
identification of the deficient structure of incentives in bureaucracies as an explanation of their 
inefficiencies.91 
In addition to introducing the general theory of public choice into the political debate 
over the nationalised industries, the ASI sought to supplement the work of the other think-tanks 
by applying public choice theory to show how free market policies could most fruitfully be 
a Quoted in Foster, C. op.ch., p. 114. 
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introduced into a hostile political culture. As Madsen Pine, President of the ASI, explained this 
task in his version of public choice Micropolitics (1988), The idea at the core of micropoMtics 
is that creative ingenuity is needed to apply to the practical world of interest group politics the 
concepts of free market theory.'9 2 For privatisation, the application of these ideas involved 
identifying the self-interest of those who stood to be affected by privatisation and to 
communicate the advantages of privatisation to each affected group. As Pine advised would-be 
privatisers, the first task when contemplating an act of privatisation is to list all those groups and 
to identify their advantage ...The golden rule about privatising is always to give people greater 
advantage than they previously enjoyed. In Britain, we say the rule is: never cancel a 
benefit...however unjust it is.... especially i f you can buy it instead.93 
So confident was Pirie in the benefits of privatisation mat by 1985 he wrote an article for 
the Institute of Public Affairs Review with the title, Privatisation Benefits Everyone. But perhaps 
more important for the conversion of the Conservative Party was his clear identification of the 
political advantage to the Party in privatisation. As Foster summarises Pine's argument: 
He pointed out that those who own shares tend to vote Conservative, as do 
workers who are given shares in the firm where they work. Managers in the 
private sector are more likely to vote Conservative than are those in state 
enterprises. Trade unions are more likely to vote Labour and they are more 
numerous in state enterprises than they are in private enterprises. And if there 
is less state enterprise, there need be fewer civil servants: they were more likely 
to vote Labour, so there will be a further reduction in Labour voters.94 
This finding of public choice would doubtless have made privatisation decidedly 
attractive to the average Conservative politician who in the mid-1970s found himself 
representing a parry once again shut out of power, and who would increasingly have been drawn 
from a new class of professional politician which Public Choice Theory assumes wil l adopt 
policies that will serve their rational self-interest. In this light, Foster's dismissal of Pine's 
micropolitics as an explanation of one of the motives of the Conservative Party in adopting 
privatisation is barely credible.95 Indeed so plain was the political advantage to be gained from 
9 2 Quoted in Cockett, R. op.cit, p.283. 
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privatisation that it hardly needed Public Choice Theory to point this out And, in any case, as 
early as June 1976, Russell Lewis, the influential contributor to the Conservative Party 
libertarian pressure group, the Selsdon Group, had already made the point about political 
advantage when he drew a comparison between the dissolution of the monasteries and 
privatisation: 'Just as Henry VHI assured the success of the Reformation by selling the 
monasteries to the gentry, so the Conservative revolution of the future may be made safe by 
parcelling out State concerns among the people."96 
John Redwood. 
The link between Henry VUTs selling of the monasteries to the gentry and 
privatisation, however, could not be relied upon to win the support of the wider public for 
privatisation. For this purpose a less Machiavellian sounding apologia was needed and was 
supplied in the rhetoric of popular capitalism. The author of the new rhetoric was the Head of 
Mrs. Thatcher's Policy Unit from 1983=85, John Redwood. In 1988 he published the distillation 
of his thinking in a cogency argued book with the title Popular Capitalism. The book claims to 
present a coherent economic and moral case for popular capitalism, which though 'much broader 
man the simple expansion of ownership by attractive share sales',97 includes privatisation as an 
essential part of a capitalism with a human face. 
Much of the book, in particular its criticisms of the inner contradictions of Marxism and 
Social Democracy, wil l by now be familiar territory as it draws on the main theorists of 
economic hberalism whom we have considered above. For instance, he argued the case for the 
limited state by pointing out that once governments accept the responsibility of ownership of 
industry, experience bears out the lesson that they will then be 'pulled into a vicious cycle of 
ownership, subsidy, fudged decisions, bad investments, more subsidy, more fudges and bad 
decisions leading to the debilitation of the underlying industrial or commercial strength of the 
country'.98 In an echo of Hayek, he warned that the end of this cycle, with i ts ' politics of a little 
bit more of that and a little bit less of this', can result in a free people being delivered into 
9 6 Cockett, R. op.ch., p.216. 
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' serfdom by the back door1.59 
Redwood also warned that experience with the mixed economy has shown that owning 
and directing industry seriously compromises the main task of government Again drawing on 
the theory of the limited state, he defines this task as involving the creation and policing of the 
legal, financial and economic framework in which industry can flourish. In this connection, he 
pointed out mat governments with large vested interests in public ownership cannot afford to be 
fair to private sector companies on the margin of a large nationalised industry. Furthermore he 
argued mat such a compromised government cannot possibly set fair tariffs or subsidies affecting 
nationalised industries, when it itself is the owner and is being constantly lobbied by the 
industries ? As he put mis in his own words: Tor governments should be the arbiters, the people 
above the factious disputes between industries, companies and individuals. Government should 
be the upholder of the law and the arbitrator in disputes over contracts. ..It is very difficult to 
carry out this role fairly or with impartiality i f at the same time government is acting as owner 
and manager of whole series of assets/ 1 0 0 
In addition to these standard economic liberal arguments for privatisation, Redwood 
made three distinctive contributions to the debate which are worth mentioning: Firstly, he traced 
the origins of privatisation, not to the failure of public ownership as such, but rather to the 
specific abuse of the monopoly power granted the trade unions by the Acts of Parliament 
nationalising their industries. In this connection, he wrote of the ideas making up popular 
capitalism that their 'origins lay first and foremost in the dreadful experiences during the last 
eighteen months of Edward Heath's Conservative government from 1972 to early 1974. That 
government was constantly being held to ransom by powerful trade union monopolies ...The 
Heath government fell because of the nationalised industry trade union problem... it was that 
major event in British politics of the early 1970s that led me to write and think and try and 
proselytise in favour of breaking up monopoly concentrations of power, wherever they lay, but 
especially in the public sector, and introducing private capital on some scale or other into these 
large public enterprises.'101 
Secondly, he was able to support the theoretical criticism of social democracy by drawing 
"Ibid., p.41. 
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on a survey of international political and economic trends to point out that in all those countries 
which have experimented with a mixed economy, experience has shown that the market system 
becomes progressively eroded and distorted with serious consequences not only for economic 
growth but also for democracy. On the basis of mis survey he concluded that public ownership 
had failed to better the lot of ordinary people and now only popular capitalism could deliver both 
economic prosperity and freedom for all. As he put this in a passage that provocatively draws 
on words from the now abandoned Clause IV of the Labour Parry: 
The opening up of a mass franchise to all those who toiled by hand or brain, but 
did not own their own house and had no share in their business, was a radical 
departure of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What the new 
Conservatives are saying is that it was right to enfranchise every man, but that 
he will only be truly enfranchised as a full citizen in the economic life of the 
country when he also has a stake in its land and in its means of production. 
Experiments by socialists to empower the people by nationalising the main 
assets of the country failed almost universally. Nationalisation not only failed to 
deliver the goods in an economic sense, unable to reassure employees, delivering 
a strike-torn present, never a strike-free future, but it also failed to give the large 
body of electors any meaningful say or choice over the way the business was run 
or the kinds of products an service it could deliver. m 
The third distinctive contribution of the book to the debate was to base the case for 
privatisation in what he claimed to be the ineluctable logic of the world economic system which 
he understood to be too much in debt by the end of the 1970s. According to Redwood, this 
imposed on governments everywhere the imperative of substituting equity for loan finance. Here 
he pointed out that the impressive record of growth in the 1960s and early 1970s had been in part 
fuelled by a major expansion in international credit Then, following the oil crisis of 1973, this 
steady expansion of credit was added to overnight by the huge transfer of income from the 
industrialised nations to the oil producing nations, which was almost immediately channelled 
back into the Western world and the developing world through further bank lending. After that 
major adjustment, the second oil crisis pushed the world economy further into debt For the 
developing world, already struggling to compete with the advanced production technology 
resulting from the revolutions of cybernetics and robotics, these events made their economies 
captive to world banking institutions and posed a further crisis of international aid. The 
m Ibid., p. 156. 
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developed world was more fortunate in that it at least owned much of the banking system in 
which the petro-dollars were deposited. Nevertheless, it too suffered from the way governments 
were farther forced to intervene in their economies either through deficit financing, to prevent 
the deflationary effects of the oil crisis, or with selective assistance to individual industries or 
regions. And, with the banks awash with money that they were ever finding new ways to lend, 
the private sector was unable to resist the temptation to take on more debt than was prudent. The 
outcome was, as one of Redwood's chapter titles reads, The Road to Ruin: The World in Hock 
to Bankers. 
For Redwood, popular capitalism is the only way out of this world predicament. The sale 
of state assets provide the public funds pecuniary governments, saddled with debt and fighting 
inflation, need to continue to maintain public services without raising taxes or adding to the 
national debt Privatisation encourages the expansion of stock exchanges which makes it easier 
for all companies to replace loan capital with equity or to raise new equity capital for economic 
growth. And, privatisation provides a means of tackling the huge debt mountain of the 
developing countries, without putting the international financial system at further risk, through 
the financial instrument called a debt swop. The last allows a foreign investor to buy a 
developing country's loans in exchange for the government cancelling the loan and issuing shares 
in a privatised industry in its place. In addition to reducing the interest that would otherwise have 
to be paid, Redwood explains that the further advantage to the developing country is that once 
foreign investors have a stake in the economy they are the more motivated to help make that 
economy work. And once the flow of foreign investment into a developing country becomes 
sustained, the more likely it is mat affluent nationals will invest their savings at home rather than 
finding means of escaping financial controls to invest their funds abroad In mis way a virtuous 
circle can be introduced leading to faster and faster economic growth. 
On the strength of its response to the moral crisis posed by the indebtedness of the poorer 
countries and its answers to the problems besetting the mixed economies of the developed 
countries of Western Europe, Redwood claims for the set of ideas making up popular capitalism 
a coherent world view*.103 As he elaborates: 
The ideas interlock. They address the core of the financial problem of the age, 
the over-indebtedness of governments and companies in many parts of the 
Ibid., p.32. 
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world They also address the core of the social problem of the age. Ever 
growing state intervention has created that very kind of alienation that Marx 
thought he saw in capitalism. The re-introduction of incentive, opportunity and 
self-enterprise is rebuilding the self-respect, as well as the economic strength of 
those countries that are trying it. This coherent set of ideas is linked to liberty 
and is the economic expression of democracy in all its manifestations. These 
ideas are the most powerful set the world has seen since state-based, 
nationalisation-based, go-for-planned growth strategies developed in die 
post-war consensus.IM 
But whether it is coherent or not, it is undeniable that the rhetoric of popular capitalism 
was very persuasive for it promised nothing less than liberation: For the army of small 
shareholders whom he described as turning up to the annual general meetings of privatised 
utilities with a whole new look in their eyes, it promised the economic enfranchisement which 
would at last make political enfranchisement meaningful. For employees, he referred to the new 
confidence and enthusiasm that comes from owning a share of the business. For the people in 
the developing world there was the hope that the burden of debt would be lifted and they too 
might have a share in property. With all of this to recommend it, Redwood hailed popular 
capitalism as 'a major world revolution'105 whose time had come. He warned that the'foolish 
politician who ignores the march to freedom'106 would be swept onto to the slag heap of history. 
He also confidently predicted, on the ground that popular capitalism is not only about wealth 
creation but also about the spread of wealth and ownership and the participation of employees 
in ownership', and is therefore 'a hybrid creed which is neither clearly of the right or of the left*, 
mat in time all political parties would be forced to accommodate its ideas.107 
John Moore. 
The political success of popular capitalism in forcing all the main political parties in 
Britain to accommodate many of its ideas and, in particular privatisation, cannot be questioned. 
But no matter how persuasive, ideas can fail without a firm hand to guide them through the 
political quagmire that is Westminster. Therefore at least part of the success of privatisation 
1 0 4 Ibid., p.32. 
1 0 5 Ibid., p. 157. 
1 0 6 Ibid., p.23. 
1 0 7 Ibid., p.45. 
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must be attributed to the minister Margaret Thatcher chose to be responsible for the initial stages 
of the British privatisation programme, John Moore, Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 
1983 to 1986. As becomes apparent from a reading of his paper, published by the Harvard 
Business Review in 1992, with the title, British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People, 
Moore fully succeeded in 'living* within the framework of economic liberalism and applying 
its leading ideas. As the final step in identifying the principal arguments for privatisation in the 
writings and speeches of its principal exponents, we shall now set out the main lines of his 
apologia for privatisation: 
Moore predictably began by claiming mat public ownership has failed along the lines of 
the Austrian School's epistemic argument for the market: without giving market signals the 
attention they deserve, the outcome is likely to be inadequately managed industries and 
enterprises, lacking the essential information needed for decision making. As an illustration of 
the economic inefficiency that results from allowing political considerations to override the 
market, he refered to the ramifications of the political decision in the early 1970s to hold down 
the price of gas in order to offset the effects of the OPEC oil price shocks. This he explained 
led to the undercutting of the competitive position of the electrical utilities that burn coal, 
producing excess electrical capacity, surplus coal production, and shortages of gas; in short, utter 
confusion in the energy sector. 
Moore then went on to provide another explanation for the failure of the nationalised 
industries along the lines of the incentive argument He prefaced his argument here by recasting 
the old view of self-interest as a vice into a virtue:' Self-interest is not some evil attribute to be 
repressed: it is simply the urge people have to improve their lot, to make things better for 
themselves and their families. It has been the engine of progress since the dawn of time, and to 
pretend otherwise is to ignore one of the most powerful forces available for improving the 
quality of life. 1 1 0 8 He then drew on the insights of the Virginia School of Buchanan and Tullock 
to argue that the denial of self-interest as a motive for managers and employees and the evasion 
of the discipline of the market place which means that 'industries do not have to succeed in order 
to survive' leads to 'inertia, inefficiency and scant attention to the wants and demands of 
consumers.'109 
1 0 8 Moore, J. "British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People', in Harvard Business Review, January-
February, 1992, p. 118. 
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Moore made no mention of the responsibility nationalised industries are supposed to 
have for inflation, as an argument for privatisation. This is no doubt due to his writing from the 
vantage of the early 1990s, by which time inflation had to some extent been tamed However, 
he did indirectly refer to the view that links privatisation with monetarism, as Keith Joseph did 
in his Monetarism is not Enough, and as Patrick Minford did in Is Monetarism Enough? by 
referring to the contribution asset sales made to the improvement of the PSBR. According to 
Moore, the £34 billion contributed by the time of his writing led to a dramatic improvement in 
the overall economy and a repayment of 12.5 percent of the national debt 
Next Moore deployed the argument linking privatisation with liberty: Both [the free 
market and individual ownership] are inseparable from liberty, democracy, and the improving 
living standards democracy requires to survive.'110 His warning here doubtless draws on the 
perceived threat to civil liberties posed by the trade union disturbances of the 1970s and the 
longer term danger from pauperisation that Hayek predicted would result from state interference 
in the economy. He also made much of the argument that privatisation, by extending share 
ownership in society and, therefore, individual human autonomy, promotes positive freedoms. 
In this connection, he wrote: 
People want to own property, and they fully appreciate the value of equity 
ownership as a flexible capital asset. Many people own very modest numbers 
of shares, but whatever they own often represents their first source of income 
beyond an otherwise total and, for many, frightening reliance on their weekly 
pay. The tiny group of individual shareholders in 1979 - barely 7% of the 
British population - has grown to more than 25% in 1991.111 
Significantly, Moore was sensitive to the criticism mat privatisation has contributed little 
to the alleviation of poverty by defending the British privatisation programme for standing 
'privilege on its head' by reversing proportional scaling to give absolute priority to the small 
investor. He also defended the practice of not merely giving away shares to the worse-off in 
society as a means of extending their positive freedoms by claiming that giving away shares 
misses Thomas Paine's point that "what we obtain too cheaply we esteem too lightly." And, 
understanding privatisation as an education in the principles of a liberal capitalist society, he 
claimed that individuals should be required to exercise their autonomy by making their own 
Ibid., p. 124. 
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decisions to buy shares and to commit some of their own resources to the choice. Hidden in this 
part of his apologetic is the New Right critique of social welfare, which, in books like that of 
Charles Murray's Losing Ground (1984), cannot lightly be dismissed as an explanation for the 
'dependency culture' that is widely believed to pose a grave threat to the future of the welfare 
state. 
Finally, in the special case of the former public utilities, Moore defends the substitution 
of ownership by control through licenses and regulatory agencies along the lines of the 
constitutional argument He claims that the main advantage of the change of role from owner 
to regulator is mat it frees the government to protect their constituents' interests, whereas before 
the needs of the industries and not the consumers' interests were paramount He also confidently 
claims that the creation of a regulator empowered to intervene to promote competition and, 
where this is not possible, to create and manage the mechanisms that must stand as proxies for 
competition, such as pricing formulae, and standards of customer service, is superior to the 
regulation of state ownership. In the case of uneconomic services, that Hayek allowed the state 
may provide, such as public telephones in sparsely populated rural areas, Moore argues that their 
supply can be adequately ensured by license. 
On the strengths of these economic liberal apologia for privatisation, Moore concluded: 
"In my view, the argument about state and private ownership of industry in the UK is over. 
Private ownership has won, and debate has to centre instead on the theory and practice of 
regulation/112 
THE ECONOMIC LIBERAL CASE EXAMINED 
Having at this point' lived* within the framework of economic liberalism in order to learn 
its idiom as far as we are able, such are the risks of venturing beyond what Atherton calls one's 
'traditional enclosures", that it may be difficult not to agree, at least provisionally, with Moore's 
conclusion. Indeed, as a general comment we have found that the case for privatisation in 
popular capitalism speaks eloquently of freedom and utilises an economic rationality which 
seriously challenges our more traditional Christian ethical framework. However, as we shall 
argue in what follows, the debate about public and private ownership of industry is far from over 
because the choice between these two is much more complex than the economic liberal case 
Ibid., p. 120. 
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makes out, even judged by its own standards. 
Consider, firstly, the epistemic argument for privatisation. This holds that the market's 
superior utilisation of information will ensure a more efficient and therefore more rational 
allocation of scarce resources than public ownership. After the failure of the Soviet command 
economies, few would contest the sufficiency of mis argument as an argument against the central 
planning of an entire economy. However, as an argument in support of privatisation in a mixed 
economy it is not necessarily true in those cases where there is significant market failure, such 
as when conditions of natural monopoly, economies of scale, and significant social costs apply. 
Moore's analysis of the energy sector is defective, for example, because he fails to take account 
of the social costs attaching to the use of coal in the generation of electricity, which provided 
part of the justification for tilting the market in favour of gas in the seventies. In this connection, 
supporting much of the post-war economic justification for nationalisation, Vickers and Yarrow 
comment that it is perfectly possible to argue within an orthodox microeconomic framework 
that in many contexts (of which natural monopoly conditions are the most obvious example) 
public management will do better in terms of economic efficiency than private management/113 
Secondly, consider the incentive argument This holds that privatisation promotes 
economic efficiency by doing away with the deficient structure of incentives that operate under 
public ownership. Here, while it is possibly too distrustful of the public service motives of some 
civil servants, we can begin by accepting the cogency of much of Tullock's analysis of 
bureaucracy. Furthermore we can accept Vickers and Yarrow's argument that 'the allocation of 
property rights does matter because it determines the objectives of the "owners" of the firm 
(public or private) and the systems of monitoring managerial performance. Public and private 
ownership differ in both respects. As a result, changes in property rights will materially affect 
the incentive structures, and hence the behaviour of managements.114 Certainly the almost 
continuous scrutiny of the stock market and the threat of a fall in share price and possible 
takeover can reasonably be assumed to be a far stronger negative incentive on management than 
the sanctions, such as the dismissal of a board chairman, that Foster considered to be wholly 
ineffective under public ownership. 
However, the question of whether the positive incentives operating under private 
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. op.cit., p.l. 
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ownership are always superior to those operating under public ownership is more complex. The 
size of the incentive schemes offered senior executives in the privatised industries must of 
course be a spur to improve economic performance. For this reason no management of a 
privatised industry is likely to be accused of opting for a minimising environment But it is worth 
pointing out that sizable monetary incentives for the attainment of short or medium term 
performance targets can jeopardise more important long-term business objectives, such as the 
maintenance of an adequate level of investment In mis connection, economists make the 
distinction between short term or static efficiency and long term or dynamic efficiency. And as 
Jackson and Price point out: 
In the privatisation literature static efficiency has been over-emphasised. Little 
discussion centres on whether or not there are significant market failure in the 
capital market and whether investment decisions made by public enterprises are 
more dynamically efficient than decisions made by private firms. Given the risk 
pooling advantages of the public sector and the public sector's access to future 
tax revenues to underwrite financial risks, then the case for private decision 
making need not be as dear cut as is often supposed if the argument is couched 
purely in terms of static efficiency.119 
Turning to the incentives operating at lower levels of the organisation, the extension of 
employee share ownership is likely to have strengthened the positive incentives operating 
throughout the enterprise because of the sense of ownership conveyed The threat of redundancy 
is certainly a much stronger negative incentive under privatisation in the context of mass 
unemployment and the massive downsizing1 programmes that have followed privatisation. By 
contrast the public enterprise culture of 'jobs for life', which was supported by strong public 
sector trade unions, and the nationalised industry role of' employer of last resort, which was 
supported by the post-war political commitment to full-employment, had few sanctions to deploy 
against underpeiforming employees. 
That said, there are limits to the efficiency gains from job insecurity. For one, increasing 
job insecurity has been linked with higher job related stress and, consequently, with higher levels 
of employee absenteeism Although it is virtually impossible to quantify this cost, when account 
is taken of the impact on family life of job related stress the economic costs may not be 
inconsiderable. For another, job insecurity could be self-defeating by strengthening the power 
Jackson, P. and Price, C. op.cit, p.8. 
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of trade unions. Consequently, although high levels of unemployment may prevent a return to 
the labour unrest of the 1970s, this cannot be ruled out because union leaders must recognise, 
as Vickers and Yamow have pointed out, that the privatised industries 'have fewer resources than 
the government to resist union pressures and could not ride a year-long strike as the government 
managed to do with the miners in 1984=85'.1,6 Taking all these factors into account, the 
incentive argument for privatisation which is otherwise strong, is made to look much weaker. 
Thirdly, consider the constitutional argument This holds that privatisation allows 
government to focus without the distractions and confusions of ownership on its central, 
constitutional, task of creating and upholding a legal framework within which industry can 
operate freely and fairly. Here we can begin by accepting the strength of this argument for 
limited government on account of the theoretical insight that governments fail as much as 
markets do, and that for every justifiable government intervention there are likely to be 
unforeseen adverse consequences. We would therefore not want to contest anything in Gray's 
general comment which we quote in full below: 
The political thought of the New Right also contained a powerful analysis of 
government failure in the Western democracies. The Virginia School of Public 
Choice gave intellectual rigour to arguments about governmental overload and 
over-extension by applying to the behaviour of democratic politicians and 
governmental bureaucracies the same economic models applied to behaviour in 
markets. It illuminated the absurdity of the conventional view of economics as 
being governed by an inexorable, impersonal logic of profit and loss, while 
political life was seen as a realm of volurrtaristic choice-making, and it revealed 
how far modem democratic states have been transformed into agencies for rent-
seeking by (often collusive) special interests. I f die Virginia analysis was sound, 
we could expect government activity always to be fraught with the risks of 
government failure, of capture by collusive interest groups and of bureaucratic 
expansionism. The economics of political life, as theorised by the Virginia 
School, suggested that for every instance of market failure there might be a 
corresponding instance of government failure. Skewed as public choice theory 
undoubtedly was by the corrupt and elephantine bureaucracies of the US 
government, which are nowhere else precisely replicated, it nevertheless gave 
a theoretical statement of the limits of the efficacy of government which 
Ibid., p. 18. 
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accounted for much in the post-war experience of the Western democracies.117 
However, we are led to qualify our support for the constitutional argument as a 
justification for privatisation in the light of what public choice theory would predict of the utility 
maximising behaviour of large, strategically important firms in the private sector: they would 
seek to capture' government for their own ends. In this respect public choice theory and the 
Marxist analysis of power in a capitalist democracy show a considerable convergence. It follows 
that, while one might like to think that the state's divestiture of its ownership of enterprises 
would allow it to focus on creating and policing a legal framework for the economy 
unencumbered with all the responsibilities and temptations of ownership, the reality is bound 
to be more complex for the reason that privatisation adds to the political power of private 
capital, which can be expected to behave in self-interested ways which may thwart the just 
exercise of power in a liberal democracy. Consequently, privatisation need not necessarily make 
fair government any the easier. 
We can treat the monetarist argument for privatisation as a variant of the constitutional 
argument for the reason that it enjoins governments to forgo the use of an interventionist 
monetary policy and to control money according to a clear set of rules. This argument holds 
that privatisation is an essential part of an anti-inflation policy on account of the fiscal 
irresponsibility of public ownership, which subverts control of the money supply. Here again we 
would not want to contest Gray's general comment that, 'In so far as economic growth had 
faltered in the Western economies in the seventies, and the Keynesian policies that had sustained 
it before then seemed to be self-limiting or misconceived, the monetarist analysis and 
prescription was a system of ideas whose time had come'.118 However, as an argument for 
privatisation it is weakened to the extent that the inflationary behaviour of the nationalised 
industries can be tackled by other means, such as the system of cash limits imposed after 1976 
and by allowing the industries greater freedom in setting their prices. 
The regulatory argument is another we can treat under the broad umbrella of the 
constitutionalist argument as its basic concern is also with limited government However, it also 
deserves special attention for the reason that advances in the theory and practise of regulation 
have been used to justify privatisation in their own right Much of the strength of this argument 
Beyond the New Right, p.vi. 
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relies on the experience of regulation in the United States and on the claims, initially made by 
Stephen LitUechild and Michael Beesley, for the superiority of price cap over rate of return 
regulation as a means of 'holding the fort' until the industry can be subjected to greater 
competition.119 The debate is admittedly complex and yet what it appears to overlook is the 
simple truth that regulation by agency, as originally proposed by Littlechild and Beesley was 
only intended to be an interim measure; these authors fully recognised that ultimately the success 
of privatising the former public utilities depended on the encouragement of competitors, and, 
therefore, that the main aim of regulatory policy should be to promote competition. It follows 
mat the strength of the regulatory argument has to be judged on two criteria: the effectiveness 
of the regulatory agency model as a holding operation and the scope for competition. 
With regards the former, the problem of the asymmetry of information, whereby the 
management of an industry withholds vital information from the regulator and thereby thwarts 
effective regulation already appears to have been borne out by experience. Littlechild, for 
instance, who was appointed the electricity industry regulator on the strength of his theoretical 
work on regulation, has been subjected to widespread criticism by the public and consumers for 
imposing a far too lax regulatory regime. In responding to this criticism by tightening the 
regulatory framework, he has also fallen out with the industry for introducing uncertainty by 
twice changing the price cap; this he previously taught was a 'one-off restriction which 
'preserves the firm's incentive to be efficient, because the firm keeps any gains beyond the 
specified level'.120 And it would appear that Littlechild's failure has been followed to a greater 
or lesser extent by all the other regulators in the light of the £8 billion of tax the new Labour 
Government has announced it will raise by a one off tax on the privatised utilities. Indeed, the 
size of this claw back of monopoly profit, which the privatised firms appear to have taken in 
their stride, is an indication of just how wide of the mark regulation has been in general. 
Nevertheless, as we have previously stated, too much should not be read into tins experience 
because just as the experiment of nationalisation initially got off to a bad start, so it can be 
expected that the initial experiments with regulation will not go smoothly.m 
1 1 9 See further Beesley, M. and Littlechild, S. "Privatization: Principles. Problems, and Priorities' in Bishop, M , 
Kay, J. and Mayer, C. Privatization and Economic Performance (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994), p.20 ff. 
m Ibid., p.21. 
1 2 1 This may be too generous to the case for regulation in the light of experience of regulation in the United 
States. See further the debate between Littlechild and the leading US expert on regulation, Gregory Palast in The 
Guardian Newspaper, Thursday January 18,1996. 
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This point also applies to attempts to introduce greater competition into the natural 
monopolies. However, in this case a worrying consensus appears to be emerging amongst the 
academic commentators that a great opportunity was missed to create more competitive 
frameworks for many of the industries in the rush to privatise. Vickers and Yarrow, for instance, 
maintain that, 'By failing to introduce sufficiently effective frameworks of competition and 
regulation before privatizing such industries as telecommunications and gas, the Government 
has lost a major opportunity to tackle fundamental problems experienced in the past under public 
ownership'.122 Making the same point, Bishop, Kay and Mayer complain that: 
The consequences of the failure to give adequate attention to the structure of 
industries prior to privatization has been that regulation has not been able to 
realize one of the advantages that it should have over public ownership - careful 
targeting on market failures. The areas of market failure in most utilities are 
quite narrow. In contrast, the scope of regulation in all cases has been very 
broad, encompassing entire industries. As a consequence, the job of regulators 
has been made impossible by the nature of the task that they have inherited, 
namely the stewardship of whole industries' m 
If these assessments are true, and regulation by agency should only be seen as 'holding the fort' 
until competition arrives, as Littlechild and Beesley originally envisaged, the prospects do not 
look good for effective regulation of the privatised utilities. 
Fourthly, consider the the argument from negative freedoms. This holds that 
privatisation promotes and safeguards civil liberties. It is held to do this by reducing the size of 
the state and the power of labour monopolies and by encouraging economic growth without 
which civil liberties are endangered. To the extent that privatisation enlarged the stock market, 
stimulated the entrepreneurial motive, supported a long over-due reform of the trade unions, and 
generally recognised basic commercial freedoms by promoting competition and the principle 
of comparative advantage, there is certainly a case to be argued here. Furthermore, we would 
accept that privatisation, by undercutting the power of the trade unions, has helped safeguard 
British democracy from a repeat of the threat posed by the "winter of discontent" of 1979. 
Although, as we shall explain further in our final chapter, a parliamentary democracy is not for 
us the whole of freedom, it is an essential part, and to the extent that privatisation has helped 
Ibid., p.429. 
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safeguard the social order and the civil liberties provided by parliamentary democracy from an 
illicit use of trade union power, this should be recognised. Nevertheless, even after conceding 
all we have, the argument from negative freedoms cannot be allowed to carry the day because 
the extent to which privatisation has helped safeguard civil liberties is more difficult to assess 
when account is taken of the greater centralisation of power which has accompanied the 
Thatcherite revolution. There is also the need to take account of the draconian changes in 
industrial relations legislation. Here it is difficult to deny that Jim Prior's 1980 Employment 
Act, which repealed most of Labour's pro-union Employment Protection Act, and Norman 
Tebbit's even more hardline change, which has made trade union funds liable to sequestration, 
have eroded the civil liberties of workers by limiting their right of association, right to engage 
in collective bargaining, and right to strike.124 
Fifthly, given the internal debate within liberalism over freedom, which looks to balance 
an emphasis on negative freedoms with an equal emphasis on positive freedoms, we ought also 
to consider the argument for privatisation from positive freedoms. This asserts that privatisation 
promotes freedom by extending share ownership in society to classes of persons who would 
otherwise be reliant on wage income or state welfare. The difficulty, however, with this 
argument is that it does not square with the reality of privatised Britain. For all the rhetoric of 
popular capitalism, it is impossible to deny that the major beneficiaries of privatisation were the 
financial institutions who were paid the substantial transaction costs incurred on privatisation, 
the new senior managements, and the new share owners, most of whom are part of comfortable 
Britain. In this light, the redistributive aspect of proportional scaling of shares appears to have 
been more of a ploy to gain popular support for privatisation than a genuine attempt to use 
privatisation for redistributive ends. 
Furthermore, the dramatic extension of share ownership following privatisation obscures 
the fact that most of those who bought shares for the first time ended up by owning a very small 
portfolio of shares (typically in one firm and worth less than £1000), which could in no way 
change their reliance on wage income or, if they were unemployed and somehow had managed 
to buy shares, state welfare. In this respect, the fiscal objective of successfully selling the firms 
and raising as much revenue as possible for the exchequer (to pay for the tax cuts of the 1980s) 
1 2 4 The complex subject of industrial relations legislation deserves to be considered in a separate study, hence the 
brevity of the comment here. 
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clearly overrode the principles of popular capitalism and did nothing to change the long-term 
decline in the proportion of the stock market owned by individuals. 12SIndeed, popular capitalism 
was always an unrealistic dream. As a report in the Economist explains, 'Individual direct 
investment is not worthwhile without specialised knowledge and we cash to build diversified 
portfolios. Most new investors lacked both investment skills and money. Better to pool the risks 
and leave the decisions to professional managers by investing through the institutions. A share-
owning democracy is a neat political phrase - but the market tells against i t ' 1 2 6 For all these 
reasons it can hardly be claimed for privatisation that it has met that fundamental wish of every 
human being, of which liberalism bears such eloquent witness, 'to be his own master'.127. 
The discrepancy between the theory and reality of popular capitalism pointed out above 
is a pity because the argument from positive freedoms could be one of the strongest arguments 
for privatisation. Although the use of privatisation to rectify injustice in the distribution of 
capital in society would undoubtedly clash with some of the New Right thinking on welfare, it 
is not alien to the thinking of the New Right As we have pointed out, although Hayek tended 
to neglect the importance of positive freedoms in his stress on the threat to negative freedoms, 
the importance of positive freedoms for human autonomy was always part of his defence of 
private property and free markets. Friedman likewise is not averse to some modification of 
property rights,128 and the notion of a negative capital tax is not far from his radical welfare 
proposal of a negative income tax. Nozick also shows some awareness of the need for a 
redistribution of capital in his proposal that Rawls' Difference Principle should be used as a 
basis for rectifying past injustices in the distribution of capital.129 However, if this commitment 
is obscured in these three theorists, from within the New Right the Public Choice School 
provides a clearer justification for using the proceeds of privatisation for the rectification of 
injustice in the distribution of capital with its proposal of a negative capital tax. As Gray makes 
this point: 
A more appropriate response to the reality of injustice in the distribution of 
1 2 5 See further Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. oprit , p. 190. 
1 2 6 "Risk Aversion', in The Economist, 6 November 1993, p.27. 
1 2 7 Berlin, I Four Essays On Liberty (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1969), p.131. 
1 2 8 See further Capitalism and Freedom, quoted in Brown, C.V. and Jackson, P.M. Public Sector Economics, 4*. 
ed (Blackwell: Oxford, 1978), p.55. 
129 Anarchy, State and Utopia, p.230-231. 
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capital is a redistribution of capital itself, perhaps in the form of a negative 
capital tax which would supply the propertyiess with a patrimony of wealth 
which would compensate them for the effects of previous injustices. It would 
be a virtue of such a redistributional policy, from a classical liberal viewpoint, 
i f it could be financed by the sale of state assets and so need not entail further 
governmental encroachment on private capital. Whether or not this proposal 
be accepted as practicable, it is a valid insight of socialist thought, and one 
recognised most fully by the theorists of the Public Choice School, that a 
restoration of economic freedom presupposes in justice a redistribution of 
capital holdings.130 
Sixthly, consider the development argument This holds that the privatisation of a 
developing country's nationalised industries, with the creditor countries swopping debt for 
equity, provides an appropriate means for a rich country, like Britain, to respond to the 
development crisis of the heavily indebted countries. This argument certainly provides a 
welcome recognition of the moral obligation of the rich nations to help solve the international 
debt crisis, for which they are mostly to blame. However, the difficulty with swopping debt for 
equity is that it is likely to result in the industrial assets of a poor country being wholly owned 
or mainly owned by foreigners. While this can bring positive advantages, both economic and 
political, it cannot be justified because it involves swopping a form of debt slavery for wage 
slavery.131 
Finally, in addition to the arguments we have summarised and evaluated above, we are 
reminded to evaluate the deeper level of argumentation underlying the economic liberal case 
for privatisation by the great champion of hl>eralism, Sir Isaiah Berlin. He taught that: The ideas 
of every philosopher concerned with human affairs in the end rest on his conception of what man 
is and can be',132 in other words, on some or other notion of the self. 
This part of our enquiry involves digging below the surface of the data we have up till 
now been working with because not all those whom we have surveyed are forthcoming about 
the model of human nature they assume. We should also not assume that they all subscribe to 
the caricature of the economic liberal self: economic man - essentially the autonomous, rational 
1 3 0 Gray, J. Liberalism (Open University Press: Milton Keynes, 1986). 
1 3 1 See further Spar, D "The Spotlight and the Bottom Line' in Foreign Affairs, Vol 77, No. 2, March/April 
1998. 
1 3 2 Quoted in Suggate, A. Hayek and Havel in a Christian Perspective, in Religion, State and Society, Vol. 20. 
Nos3& 4, 1992, p 305 
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self, whose rationality is narrowly defined in terms of self-interested economic behaviour. In our 
view, to criticise the economic liberal case for privatisation on account of this caricature of the 
self would be to attack a straw man because, in all but the most reductionist of theorists 
(possibly Hayek and Friedman), the notion of the self is richer man the merely libertarian and 
utilitarian in that it includes a raft of mainly Victorian values, such as hard work, thrift, and 
personal responsibility. There is also a recognition of the importance of culture to reinforce the 
values of the individual. Here one need only recall the popular term used to describe Thatcher's 
social revolution, 'the enterprise culture' and the high moral tone of what has come to be known 
as her Sermon on the Mound. Not without justification Preston described her as 'the most 
forceful Christian Prime Minister since Gladstone in her personal beliefs'.133 Furthermore, from 
the privatisation programme itself, there is the strong moral concern, expressed especially in 
John Redwood's writings, to provide an appropriate ethical response to complex national and 
international problems that goes beyond the purely libertarian and utilitarian simplicities. 
If we are right in mis, perhaps too generous, analysis of the self underlying privatisation, 
then i f what man is is that he is basically a competitive individual acting out of self-interest, 
what the privatisers assume he can be is an enlightened individual, acting out of a rational self-
interest, as an independent, responsible and productive member of a family. The question then 
is whether this conception of the self is still too thin to support the economic and political 
renewal promised by privatisation. In our view, this is still the case for the reason that in modern 
Britain, where the traditional moral constraints cannot any longer be relied upon to encourage 
the individual and his community to respect a set of reciprocal duties and rights which make for 
a natural, unenforced, equality, the individualist emphasis behind homo privates must lead to 
politically unacceptable levels of inequality. In this connection, Alan Suggate comments that 
'In society at large there is, amidst all its frictions, a network of organic elements of social 
cohesion. A free market has no respect for these organic relationships and their established 
institutions, and is liable to dissolve them into individuals and their market preferences.'134 As 
a result, while the initial impact of restoring commercial freedoms may see high levels of 
economic growth, the private affluence and public squalor associated with a privatised society 
m Preston, R. Religion and the Ambiguities of Capitalism (SCM: London, 1991), p. 78. 
m Suggate, A. "The New Right", in Crucible (Church of England Board of Social Responsibility: London, Oct. 
Dec. 1988), p. 158. 
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is bound to provoke a political reaction which will seek to restrict commercial freedoms. Thus 
the whole process is self-defeating, as the rejection of some of the more extreme aspects of 
Thatcherism in the 1990s already demonstrates. 
Furthermore, but less certainly, the short-term economic gains are likely to be eroded 
over the long-term as increasing levels of inequality and a corresponding climate of envy 
generate an adversarial, atomistic, competitive, and low trust culture.133 In this assessment we 
draw on the insight of institutional economics which points out the importance for economic 
efficiency of a culture of trust What mis simple insight claims is that optimum economic 
efficiency, what economists call a Pareto efficient outcome, when no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off, is only achievable through a socially cohesive, 
cooperative, high trust culture because the level of trust allows for low cost economic exchanges. 
In contrast, an individualistic, competitive low trust culture will incur high transaction costs, 
such as the legal costs of drawing up contracts, in its economic exchanges and therefore cannot 
be optimally efficient136 As Mark Casson explains: 
Overall economic performance depends on transaction costs, and these mainly 
reflect the level of trust in the economy. The level of trust depends in turn on 
culture, An effective culture has a strong moral content. Morality can overcome 
problems that formal procedures - based on compliance on contracts - cannot. 
A strong culture therefore reduces transactions costs and enhances performance 
- the success of a an economy depends on the quality of its culture.137 
If this highly plausible insight into the importance of culture and morality for economic 
efficiency is tine, and the evidence from relatively successful high trust business cultures such 
as mat of Japan and Germany suggests that it is, men in modern secular and pluralistic Britain, 
the low trust 'enterprise' culture encouraged by the notion of the self underlying privatisation 
is unlikely to sustain high levels of economic performance over the long term. In mis connection, 
bearing in mind his claim that the success of an economy depends on the quality of its culture, 
Casson concludes his book with the ominous warning: 
The 1980s witnessed a period of deliberate cultural engineering But whereas 
many firms under the influence of management gurus' opted for a high trust 
" 3 See here the critique of the trust thesis in Desai, M, 'Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues And The 
Creation Of Prosperity, in The Times Higher Supplement, 27 October 1995. 
1 3 6 See further Brown, C. V. and Jackson, P.M. op.cit, p. 28 ff. 
w Casson, M. The Economics of Business Culture (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991.), p.3. 
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culture, most governments did the opposite. Trusting no one but the ideological 
extremist, some of them unleashed as much power as they could muster against 
the institutions they considered to be infected with the post-war cultural 
legacy...With cultures so diffuse and fragmented, and with distrust a persistent 
theme, there is a danger that the 1990s could become a decade of despair, with 
no moral foundation by which even a basic code of business behaviour can be 
legitimated.m 
In the light of this evaluation of the main arguments for privatisation in economic 
liberalism, we are led to the overall assessment that, judged according to its own standards, the 
economic liberal case does not fully succeed as a moral justification for privatisation. To 
summarise our view of its strengths first: Its emphasis of the market, of the incentives operating 
under private ownership, and of government failure are all justified on the basis of theory and 
of experience. It is also difficult to deny the strength of the argument from negative freedoms 
in the light of the way privatisation has helped prevent the illicit use of trade union power by 
helping erode support for trade unionism. The argument from positive freedoms is also 
theoretically strong, provided democratically elected governments, with a much broader 
constituency than the poor, can be persuaded to place distributional considerations before fiscal 
ones and to use privatisation as an opportunity to rectify injustices in capital holdings. 
However, against these strengths we would offset the following weaknesses: Its highly 
individualist notion of tile self is too thin to sustain the quality of culture needed to support a 
high level of economic performance over the long term. The epistemic argument for 
privatisation cannot be relied upon in the case of those industries subject to significant market 
failure, such as natural monopoly, where public ownership is likely to do better. The incentive 
argument does not take sufficient account of the short-termism of the stock market, which can 
lead private sector management to ignore long-term investment, with consequent dangers for a 
firm's dynamic efficiency; although the investment record of the nationalised industries was far 
from satisfactory either, at least public ownership escaped this tyranny. The constitutional 
argument, in its central claim that privatisation frees the state to devote itself, without the 
encumbrance and distraction of managing industry, overlooks the extent to which privatisation 
adds to the concentrations of economic power held in private hands, which, by swopping one 
set of pressures for another, may not make it any easier for government to rule industry fairly. 
Ibid., p.262. 
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The monetarist argument is undermined to the extent that the inflationary behaviour of 
nationalised industries can be curbed by other means. The regulatory argument is weakened on 
account of the asymmetry of information in the relationship between regulator and the regulated 
and because of the difficulty of introducing competition on which effective regulation ultimately 
depends. The argument from negative freedoms has to be qualified to the extent that a privatised 
state needs greater centralisation of power in order to make competition work and has to curb 
the civil freedoms of workers. Finally, the argument from positive freedoms runs aground on the 
hard rock of reality in mat impecunious modem governments are never likely to use privatisation 
proceeds to rectify the injustice in capital holdings. 
This overall assessment of the economic liberal case for privatisation is consistent with 
Peter Jackson and Catherine Price's comment that 'Privatisation is not a panacea. It creates new 
problems while solving old ones or recreates the difficulties which nationalisation and increased 
public activity sought to solve/139 As such, we are reminded of Gray's criticism of the New 
Right for its 'rationalist attachment, inherited from the Enlightenment classical liberals in France 
and America, to systems and projects of world improvement/ His further comments also bear 
repeating as an epitaph to the privatisation project: 
The lesson of the bankruptcy of the New Right, intellectual as well as 
political,....is that political life is not a project of world improvement in which 
are invested the transcendental hopes of an age without faith. It is an almost 
desperately humble task of endless improvisation, in which one good is 
compromised for the sake of others, a balance is sought among the necessary 
evils of human life, and the ever present prospect of disaster is staved off for 
another day.140 
1 3 9 Jackson, P. and Price, C. Privatisation and Regulation, A Review of the Issues (Longman: New York, 1994), 
p. 27. 
140 Beyond The New Right, p.vii. 
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Chapter 6 
PRIVATISATION AND THE COMMON GOOD 
As regards the use of external things, a man ought not to possess them as 
exclusively his own («/ proprias), but as common to himself and to others (id 
communes), and thus he should be ready to put them at the disposal of others 
who are in need. (Thomas Aquinas)1 
At this stage, having explored the positive case for privatisation in economic liberalism 
and the negative case which claims mat the nationalised industries failed and therefore there was 
no moral alternative to privatisation, and having indicated why we are not persuaded by either 
case, it remains for us to give our evaluation of privatisation in the light of our liberal catholic 
moral tradition, with its central idea the common good. In what follows, bearing in mind the 
criticism that the lack of moral consensus in post- industrial and post- modern society means that 
there can be no such thing as the common good, we shall begin by justifying our theory of the 
common good2 We shall also set out the traditional Christian understanding of property, which, 
contrary to libertarian theories of justice, allows that property rights may be varied in the 
interests of promoting the common good We shall then apply our two main principles of the 
common good, social order and social justice, in dialogue with the relevant political, economic, 
and social circumstances surrounding privatisation. 
THE COMMON GOOD 
At the heart of the ecumenical (and secular) ethical tradition of the common good is the 
foundational belief in the dignity of the human person. In Christianity, belief in this inalienable 
dignity derives from the understanding that it was for each and every one that the pre-existent 
Son of God was incarnated, died, rose again and ascended to glory from where he shall return 
'Quoted in Evans, J. and Ward, L. The Social And Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritcdn, Selected Readings 
(Geoffrey Bles: London, 19S6), p.67 
2 As Malcolm Brown voices this criticism: 'In the face of the sustained demolition of the concept of the 
' Common Good' from Robert Nozick through Milton Friedman to Keith Joseph and beyond, it is just not 
sufficient to assert that such a thing as the'Common Good" exists and can be agreed upon.' See father his How 
Can We Do Public Theology Today? (The William Temple Foundation: Manchester, paper, July 1977), p.4. 
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to be our judge. It also derives from the Biblical belief in the creation of human beings in the 
imago dei. As recent Trinitarian theology has pointed out, the nature of this act of creation in the 
image of God has bestowed on human beings an individual and social nature, which adds further 
content to the notion of human dignity by insisting that we were made to be persons in 
community with one another.3 Perhaps the nature of this radical community, from which no 
person can rightly be excluded, is best illustrated, not by abstract theological ideas, but by the 
simple story of one of our Northern saints as retold by Basil Hume: 
There is an interesting story about Saint Aidan and King Oswin. Oswin gave 
Aidan a horse because the king thought it would be more suitable for a bishop 
to ride a horse than to go on foot. One day Aidan met a beggar, and having 
nothing to give except the horse, he gave the horse away. The king was not very 
pleased with this and rebuked Aidan. But Aidan was not to be swayed from the 
conviction of his faith. In a rather stem and direct manner, he responded to the 
king, 'Which is more important, this child of a mare or this child of God?' The 
king was covered in confusion, and it is said that he went down on his knees and 
asked Aidan forgiveness for his pride.4 
The idea of the common good follows from the recognition that the dignity of the human 
person needs to be protected and fostered by what John Finnis calls 'a whole ensemble of 
material and other conditions that tend to favour the realization, by each individual in the 
community, of his or her personal development'5 Understood against this theological and 
philosophical background, while the common good affirms the emphasis on the individual in the 
modern world, by insisting that the individual is anterior to society, it avoids individualism by 
also emphasising the sense in which the individual is dependent on society for his or her good.6 
As Thomas Aquinas put this finely balanced teaching: 
For ...if the good of one human being is the same good [i.e. human good] as the 
good for a whole cMtas, still it is evidently a much greater and more perfect 
thing to procure that state of affairs which is the good of a whole civitas than 
3 See for example Rasper, W. The God of Jesus Christ (SCM: London, 1984), p. 307, and Schwdbel, C. and 
Gunton, C.E. ed. Persons, Divine and Human (T&T Clark: Edinburgh, 1991), p. 59. 
4 Hume, B. Footprints of the Northern Saints (Darton, Longman, and Todd: London, 1996), p.33. 
'Ibid, p. 154. 
6 See further Alan Suggate's discussion of Maritain in his William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today, 
pp. 111-112. 
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the state of affeirs which is the good of a single human being. For: it belongs to 
the love winch should exist between human persons that one should seek and 
preserve the good of even one single human being; but how much better and 
more godlike that this should be shown for a whole people and for a plurality 
of cmtates...The good, the good common to one or many civitates, is what the 
theory, i.e. the artv which is called 'civil' has as its point {intendit} And so it 
is this theory, above all - as the most primary {prinripalissima} of all practical 
theories - that considers the ultimate end of human life.7 
The scope of this thesis will not allow us to apply all the conditions which make up the 
common good in the course of our evaluation. Therefore, we shall be selective and choose two 
conditions which are foundational, in the sense mat without them, it would be difficult or 
impossible for each individual to realise the other conditions. Here, in opposition to those who 
would deny the existence of a common good, we are ready to affirm that, while there will always 
be disagreement as to what constitutes its finer elements (and we would certainly want to widen 
the traditional understanding of the common good), there can be no denying that certain basic 
conditions or social primary goods are essential for human flourishing. For us, and here we 
follow the priority given these generally in political ethics, these foundational conditions are 
social order and social justice. While we are accepting that they are not the whole of morality, 
as it is not difficult to think of a long list of other conditions, such as aesthetics and virtue, which 
are also important for human flourishing, these two at least provide a minimum basis for making 
a moral judgement As John Lucas dryly reminds us, even 'Justice by itself is not enough. It does 
not make a man happy or fulfilled, and is no guarantee of salvation in this world or the next. 
There is no justification by justice alone. Nevertheless, it is not to be despised'8 
Although modernity has tended to emphasise social justice, in its reaction against the 
abuse of social order as an authoritarian and repressive principle, we shall begin by applying 
the principle of social order. This has often been given priority in Christian tradition on account 
of the belief in a divinely instituted, rational, social order, which has been obscured by sin, and 
which it is the task of the church to recover. As Paul Ramsey justifies an emphasis on social 
order, 'there will be an inner pressure within acts that seek to be concretely loving also toward 
7 Quoted in Finnis, J. Aquinas (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998), p. 114. 
* Lucas, J. On Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980), p.263. 
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order (and not only so far as it is just) as among the fundamental needs of men/ 9 The principle 
has also received emphasis as the primary end of the state on account of the horrors unleashed 
by the breakdown of social order, which can threaten a reversion to the state of nature where, 
according to Thomas Hobbes, 'every man has a Right to every thing; even to one another's 
body.'10 Indeed, as anyone who has lived through a revolution or natural disaster will doubtless 
agree, social order is so foundational to the common good that, except in rare circumstances 
when a given order is so intrinsically evil or bound to give way to disorder, practical 
reasonableness dictates that it should receive a proper emphasis if not always priority. 
But if we must begin with social order, social justice must not be left far behind. It 
requires we accept, as John Donne put it, that 'no man is an island, entire of itself; every man 
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main'11 Therefore it enjoins us not to think only about 
how we can foster our own good but also 'the other chap's good'.12 As such, it is opposed to our 
imposing a particular social order on society which is exclusively for our benefit, because this 
does not take into account the need of others for a social order which is also to benefit them. 
For this reason, John Lucas describes justice as' one of the cardinal virtues; for it is the bond of 
peace, which enables the individual to identify with society, and brethren to dwell together in 
unity.13 
The other-directedness of social justice has led many to assume that its essence is 
equality. Thus, while egalitarians, on the one hand, tend to equate social justice with equality 
of outcomes or opportunity, libertarians, on the other hand, tend to equate social justice with 
equal (negative) freedoms. For this reason, as Amartya Sen provocatively argues, even those 
libertarians who do not believe in social justice still believe in equality.14 However, as John 
Finnis explains, while equality is a formal principle of justice, because all members of the 
community are deserving of equal treatment in the distribution of goods, for resolving questions 
of distributive justice 'equality is a residual principle, outweighed by other criteria and 
9 Quoted in Childress, J.F. 'Order', in Macquarrie J. and Childress, J. A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics 
(SCM: London, 1967), p.439-440. 
1 0 Hobbes, T. Leviathan ( J M Dent &Son: London, Everyman's Library ed. 1987),p.67. 
1 1 Donne, J. 'Devotions: Meditation 17', in Rhodes, N. Select Prose (Penguin: London, 1987), p. 126. 
1 2 Lucas, J. On Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980/1989), p.3. 
1 J Ibid., p.263. See also John Finnis, op.cit., p. 161. 
1 4 See Sen, A. Inequality Reexamined (Oxford University Press. Oxford, 1992), p. ix. 
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applicable only when those other criteria are inapplicable or fail to yield any conclusion. For the 
objective of justice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all members of the 
community, and mere is no reason to suppose that this flourishing of all is enhanced by treating 
everyone identically when distributing roles, opportunities and resources/15 On this 
understanding, rather than beginning with equality, the catholic tradition derives social justice 
from the common good as that principle which gives to each member of the community what 
is his or her due. In deciding this, the tradition has tended to apply three criteria of distributive 
justice: right, merit and need. Although the adequacy of these have been much discussed, as 
Preston remarks: Christians have not ruled out any of these three altogether, and they have not 
produced a fourth.'16 
We are in basic agreement with the use of these three traditional criteria of distributive 
justice for we accept that justice should not be equated with a formal equality because some 
differentials are necessary in order to take account of differences in right, merit, and need. It 
would seem only fair, for example, that a diligent individual who contributes more to the 
common good than a lazy individual should receive a bigger share. Similarly, in order to fulfil 
a certain office in the community, which, for example, requires extensive hospitality or power, 
it is again reasonable that the office-holder should receive a larger share of consumer goods or 
power, as befits the office, than other persons in the community who are not required to provide 
hospitality or exercise power. Furthermore, it is reasonable to recognise, both as a requirement 
of social order and social justice, the limited rights individuals acquire over possessions through 
purchase, gifts, and, more controversially, inheritance, all of which is another source of 
inequality for the reason that most possessions have an individual character. 
Nevertheless, we think it essential that our understanding of social justice take account 
of the modern emphasis on equality for several reasons: Firstly, and this is an historical 
argument, the allowance for distributional inequalities in the traditional theory of justice has 
tended to be exploited in the past to justify unacceptable levels of inequality. Secondly, while 
the tradition has tended to respond to the claims of equality by giving the criterion of need 
primacy, this is inadequate when need is determined in accordance with some absolute measure 
of what an individual needs of the basic primary goods, and not in relation to the rough or 
1 9 Finds, J. op.cit, p. 173-174. See also Flew, A. The Politics of Procrustes (Maurice Temple Smith: London, 
1981), p 141 
1 6 Preston, R. The Future of Christian Ethics (SCM: London, 1987), p. 10. 
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approximate equality which a society is capable of. In this we are guided by the Catholic bishops 
of England and Wales where, in their document entitled, The Common Good, they insist mat, 
as a requirement of social justice, 'Governments cannot be satisfied with provision for poor 
people designed only to prevent absolute poverty' but must also address relative poverty.17 
Thirdly, we can no longer ignore the fact that distributional inequalities have consequences for 
wealth creation. Here we have in mind the report of The Commission On Social Justice set up 
by the then leader of the Labour Party, John Smith, which insisted on the close link between 
economic regeneration and social justice.18 Fourthly, it is a true insight of utilitarianism that, 
on account of the law of diminishing returns, a more equal distribution of social goods will 
increase the total welfare. As Roy Jenkins has put this case for equality: 
A modicum of redistribution would obviously have increased the total welfare 
of the individuals who made up the nation. The liberal view that every individual 
has an equal right to his own happiness and the MarshaUian concept of 
(ftnmishmg marginal utility, amounted between them, to a very strong levelling 
case.19 
For all these reasons, we shall evaluate privatisation in terms of whether it improves or worsens 
the inequality of wealth and income in society. 
The second criterion of social justice we shall apply is freedom. By including an 
emphasis on freedom, we are responding not only to criticism that traditional Thomism is 
unacceptabry authoritarian and repressive in its interpretation of the common good but also to 
a type of Christian socialism, which has emphasised equality at the expense of freedom. What 
we have in mind here is the image of social justice described by The Commission on Social 
Justice as 'a subtractive and inhibiting force which busies itself, for reasons ranging from 
asceticism to sheer envy, in taking away things from successful people and giving them to the 
unsuccessful (minus the considerable bureaucratic costs of doing so)/2 0 That said, our 
understanding of freedom is not the freedom to do as one pleases within the law, as is upheld 
by procedural theories of justice, such as those of Hayek, Friedman and Nozick, who reject the 
1 7 The Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, The Common Good (19%), p. 17. 
1 8 The Report of The Commission on Social Justice, Social Justice, Strategies Jbr National Renewal (Vintage: 
London, 1994). See especially p.97. 
1 9 Quoted in Plant, R Modem Political Thought (Blackwell: Oxford, 1991), p. 158. 
2 0 Ibid., p. 19. 
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idea of social justice as a left-wing plot to subvert freedom. In contrast with their view, which 
only looks to maximise an individual's freedom of choice, our Christian understanding of 
freedom looks to each person to work out their individual life plan reasonably and responsibly 
in relation to what fosters the common good. 
Thus our understanding of freedom has both a social and an individual dimension. Here 
we are informed by Oliver O'Donovan's concept of a Christian liberal order in which freedom 
is conceived as both a' social reality' and an individual reality in so far as a free society depends 
upon the 'free-self giving of each member'.21 In this connection, he goes on to write of the 
Christian paradox of freedom perfected in service' that 'Christian thinkers could, perhaps, allow 
a sense in which the individual must be the measure of the social good; but this would need to 
be balanced dialectically by the assertion that society is the measure of the individual good'22 
Although this conception is undeniably opposed to the individualist understanding of freedom 
in liberalism, it can still respect a legitimate pluralism on account of its affirming of the 
individual and its recognition that 'it is essential to our humanity that there should always be 
foreigners, human beings from another community who have another way of organising the task 
and privilege of being human, so that our imaginations are refreshed and our sense of cultural 
possibilities renewed.'23 
Of course there is no practical way of applying this ideal type of Christian freedom. 
Therefore, in the absence of a better alternative, our choice is to apply the tests of democratic 
freedom and consumer choice, and, where it is not always practicable to provide choice in the 
provision of public services, the test of whether there is effective consumer representation in the 
regulation of monopoly services. Although democracy is a far from perfect ideal of freedom, and 
is particularly vulnerable to the criticism of majoritarianism, that democratic freedoms are 
insufficient to protect the rights of minorities, there is some evidence to support Henson's 
argument, which we reported in chapter 3, that the supreme merit of democracy is that it 'it 
cannot ignore the wrongs and hardships of the people.' There is also the wisdom of Reinhold 
Niebuhr's Christian realism: 'man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; man's 
210'Donovan, O. The Desire of the Nations, Rediscovering the roots ofpolitical theology (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1996), p.255. 
B Ibid., p.275. 
» Ibid., p.268. 
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capacity for injustice makes democracy necessary.'24 Furthermore, while it is true that many 
churches are opposed to democracy as a form of church governance, as John De Gruchy has 
pointed out in his study of Christianity and Democracy, there is a convergence between the 
democratic system and its vision, and the ecumenical koinonia, its holistic missionary paradigm, 
and its vision of shalom."25 And although, as we have mentioned above, we do not accept that 
freedom can only be understood as a matter of free choice, we still think consumer choice is one 
important dimension of freedom, when it is understood in its proper relation to the common 
good as the freedom to pursue a purpose. 
THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF PROPERTY 
In addition to applying our two main principles of social order and social justice, we shall 
also draw, as a general framework, on the understanding of property in the catholic tradition. 
The great merit of this teaching is that it avoids, to use Temple's words, 'the unsocial outlook 
of the individualist and the socialist's check upon initiative.'26 To this end, it begins with the 
reminder that all property belongs, not to individuals, nor to the state, but to God. Here it draws 
on the emphasis in the Old Testament on the dependence of the Israelites on God for their land. 
Indeed, this Biblical tradition insists that the status of the people with regard to the land is no 
better than tenants who have no security or inheritance.27 As Charles Gore summarised this 
radical Biblical doctrine of stewardship: 
God the Creator is the only absolute owner of all things or persons - that "all 
things come of Him" and are "His own," and that we men hold what we hold 
as stewards for the purposes of His Kingdom, with only a relative and 
dependent ownership limited at every point by the purpose for which it was 
entrusted to us.2* 
It follows that human beings can only use property as a social trust for the promotion 
2 4 Niebuhr, R. The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (James Nisbet: Hitchin, 1945), p.vi. 
2 5 De Gruchy, J. Christianity and Democracy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995), p.276. 
2 6 Quoted in Suggate, A. op.ctt., p. 112. Temple praised Aquinas' defence and limitation of the rights of property 
as 'a most wholesome doctrine much needed in our day/ 
2 7 For a fuller account of the Biblical teaching on property see further Hay, D. Economics Today, A Christian 
Critique p.33 ff, in which he quotes Leviticus 25:23 (Revised Standard Version of the Bible): The land shall 
not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine; for you are strangers and sojourners with me.' 
3 8 Gore, C. ed., Property, Its Duties And Rights (Macmillan: New York, 1922), p.xi. 
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of the common good There can therefore be no absolute right over property, as for example 
accorded by Roman law. Neither can the argument for a private enterprise economy be 
sustained, as Brian Griffiths attempts to do, which claims that The justification of private 
property rights....is rooted in creation . , 2 9 
Nevertheless, the catholic understanding of property is opposed to the denial of 
individual property rights altogether. The ordering of property in the Old Testament clearly 
respected a limited right of private ownership. The prohibition against moving a neighbours 
boundary stone,30 the Jubilee laws,31 and the story ofNaboth's vineyard32 provides some of the 
evidence for a system of inalienable private property rights in ancient Israel. In the New 
Testament, while the examples of Jesus, as living out of a common purse,33 and the early 
church, as practising a community of property,34 may be taken to support a radically new 
understanding of property in Christianity, which dispenses with private property altogether, this 
interpretation has not been widely supported The exceptions are Christian monasticism, where 
the renunciation of property has tended to be seen as a voluntary ideal and not the pattern for 
social order, and Christian millenarian movements, where the attempt has been made, always 
unsuccessfully, to impose a radical community of property on society.33 
In the development of the biblical teaching in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, private 
property has been understood as necessary for human flourishing in community. In this 
connection, in his contribution to Gore's collection Property, Its Duties and Rights, regarded by 
Preston as still an indispensable treatment of the subject,36 L.T.Hobhouse defends Aristotle's 
correction of Plato's communism on account of its emphasis of unity to the exclusion of a 
diversity that recognises the need for each individual to have some freedom in which to develop 
personality. As Hobhouse put this understanding of social reality, "unity is only one feature of 
^Hay.D. ap.ciL, p.78. 
3 0 Deuteronomy 19:14; 27:17. 
"Leviticus25: 8-13. 
5 2 1 Kings 21 
5 3 Luke 22: 36. 
3 4 Acts 4: 32. 
3 3 See further Cohn, N. The Pursuit of the Millennium (Seeker & Warburg: London, 1957), p. 13 ff. 
3 6 Preston, R. Explorations in Theology 9 (SCM: London, 1981), p.77. 
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social life, and that the true community must be a whole of many parts/ "However, he then goes 
on to criticise Aristotle's theory as individualistic, on account of his over-emphasis of the role 
of property as an expression of personality. As he put mis;' In emphasizing this side of the matter 
it may be allowed that Aristotle lets the communal principle evaporate into a mere pious 
aspiration/38 But this interpretation is too severe on Aristotle because, as Finnis points out, 
Aristotle sums up bis teaching on property in the apparent paradox that 'possessions should be 
privately owned, but common in use'.39 What Finnis takes this to mean is that while it is in the 
interests of the common good that property should be privately owned, for the reason that in this 
way it will allow for the development of personality and be best cared for, nevertheless the 
legitimate use to which property is to be put is always decided with reference to what promotes 
the common good.40 For this reason, for example, a private owner has no right to dispose of 
property as he pleases and he has no right not to use it if someone else can use it in order to 
promote the common good.41 As John Paul n sheds further light on this paradox in his encyclical 
Labor em Exercens( 1981): 
The right to private property is subordinated to me right to common use, to the 
fact that goods are meant for everyone ...They cannot be possessed against 
labour, they cannot even be possessed for possession's sake, because the only 
legitimate title to their possession, whether in the form of private ownership or 
in the form of public or collective ownership, is that they should serve labour 
and thus by serving labour that they should make possible the achievement of 
the first principle of this order, namely the universal destination of goods and the 
right to common use of them.42 
Nevertheless, if there is some truth behind Hobhouse's criticism of the Aristotelian -
Thomist tradition's understanding of property as individualistic, as Hobhouse went on to show, 
this tradition has intrinsic to itself a radicalism which stands opposed to a social order based on 
a grossly unequal distribution of property. Here he drew on the Christian correction of Aristotle's 
1 7 Hobhouse, L.T. The Historical Evolution of Property, In Fact And In Idea', in Charles Gore ed, Property, Its 
Duties and Rights (Macmillan: London, 1922), p.29. 
3 8 Hobhouse, L.T. op.cit, p.29. 
w Finnis, J. op.cit., p. 171. 
4 0 Ibid., p. 173. 
4 1 Ibid., p. 172. 
4 2 John Paul H, Laborem Exercens (Incorporated Catholic Truth Society: London, 1984), p.30. 
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acceptance of the way non-Greeks, women, and slaves, were excluded from participation in the 
polis, on account of their lack of ownership of property, by the ethical universalism which insists 
that all people, on account of the belief that they are all children of God, have the right to be 
citizens and not to be treated either as slaves or as wage-slaves, and therefore have the right to 
fulfill themselves. As he explained the radicalism of the principle that property is necessary for 
the development of personality: 
But as a basis of the institution of property this principle carries with it 
consequences which seem too often to be overlooked. On the one hand it carries 
the condemnation of a social system in which property of the kind and amount 
required for such development of personality is not generally accessible to all 
citizens, who do not forfeit their right by misfeasance. A society which should 
accept mis principle, could not tolerate anything like the existing distribution of 
wealth, could not permit those methods of accumulation which concentrate 
wealth in the hands of the few and leave the many - so far as the practical object 
of earning their living is concerned - as naked as they were born. Cherished as 
a Conservative principle, it has in it the seed of Radical revolution.43 
On account of this radicalism, Hobhouse advocated the widest possible distribution of 
property. There is the basis in the catholic tradition, therefore, of a Christian liberalism, which, 
for example, Michael Novak comes close to espousing in his criticism of a monotheistic 
impulse which looks to impose a unitary conception of the common good on society at the 
expense of individual freedom.44 But what Novak, in common with much Protestant and 
Enlightenment individualism, loses sight of is the need to hold diversity together with unity in 
such a way that the need for social solidarity is also respected45 It is also worth pointing out that 
Christian advocates of democratic capitalism tend to lose sight of the general disparagement of 
possessions in Christian tradition. This warns of the way materialism can be harmful to the 
soul. We need only recall here Jesus' teaching about how it will be 'easier for a camel to pass 
through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God",46 to find the basis, 
as Temple did in bis response to the Malvern debate, of a Christian opposition to private 
holdings in excess of that needed to ensure personal freedom and to promote personal fulfilment. 
4 3 Hobhouse, L.T. op.cit, p.30; See further Fiimis, J. p. 170. 
4 4 See further Novak, M. The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, p. SO ff. 
4 5 See further here Harries, R., Is There A Gospel For The Rich?, p.97. 
"Mark 10: 25. 
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In connection with this traditional Christian reticence about possessions, we had also 
better consider here the psychological justification for private property which maintains that a 
capitalist society will be more efficient and stable than a socialist one because private ownership 
recognises the reality that most human behaviour is based on self-interest rather than altruism. 
The argument is generally but anachronistically credited to Adam Smith, on account of his 
famous saying, I t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest We address ourselves not to their 
humanity but their self-love."47 An awareness of the psychology underlying this argument is of 
course not absent from Christian tradition. Aquinas inferred it when he taught that something 
which is personally owned is likely to be better cared for.48 Temple, as we have mentioned, also 
recognised the need to take self-interest into account when constructing social order. And, as 
John Finnis argues, practical reasoning has to proceed on the basis of what people ^actually 
are" , 4 9 However, too much should not be made of this argument for private enterprise in the age 
of the modern publicly quoted company, where ownership and management has become 
separated and where the pressure to satisfy shareholders and deter predator companies favours 
decisions which generate short-term at the expense of long-term results or what economists call 
dynamic efficiency. As Will Hutton has argued in support of the Stakeholder Economy, this 
"casino capitalism" and predator capitalism has introduced a degree of instability which poses 
a direct threat to the future viability of British enterprise.30 Furthermore, as Donald Hay points 
out in his criticism of Brian Griffiths, "Many people are highly responsible stewards of resources 
in which they have no property rights: the examples of Christian ministers, hospital doctors, and 
university professors come to mind/31 
Finally, mis discussion of the understanding of property in Christian tradition would not 
be complete without addressing the question whether the state can ever be justified in 
nationalising the property of a citizen, which they have acquired through due process. One part 
of a response has already been stated in the principle that though property may be privately 
4 7 Smith, A. 77K Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations (PenguinLondon, 1986), p.l 19. 
** See further Evans, J. and Ward, L. op,cit., p.66 ff. 
4 9 Finnis, J. op.cit., p. 170-171. 
5 0 Hutton, W. The State We 're In (Jonathan Cape: London, 1995), p. 134. 
5 1 Hay, D. op.cit., p.78. 
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owned it should be in public use. Consequently, if, for any reason, a private owner is not putting 
his or her property to use in the interests of the common good, men, public authority can rightly 
redistribute or expropriate the property in question.52 Another part of a response can draw on the 
understanding in this tradition that property is not part of the natural law but of positive law 
(there is no labour in the garden of Eden and therefore the fruits of the earth belongs freely to 
all). As such, property is intrinsically related to the good of social order by offering a means of 
controlling sin (in the fallen order which has followed the banishment of humanity from the 
Garden of Eden). It does this by excluding those who seek to accumulate property either for 
personal consumption or to gain power over another by setting limits to how much property they 
can claim for themselves. But because, in a fallen world, inevitably some will succeed in gaining 
sufficient power to acquire property which is the rightful possession of others, it is necessary for 
the state to be accorded the power to rectify injustices in holdings. For this reason, Hobhouse 
makes the distinction between property for use, which is the legitimate possession of the 
individual, and property for power, which ought to be under the control of the democratic state. 
Although he understands this power as vesting in the state ' ultimate ownership of the natural 
sources of wealth and of the accumulations of past generations, together with the supreme 
control of the direction of industrial activity and of labour contracts,' 5 3 the exercise of this 
power is properly understood to be limited in catholic tradition by the principle of subsidiarity 
asserted by Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno (1931). 
It follows that, in contrast with the theory of a limited state in Hayek and the minimum 
state in Nozick, the state in the Aristotelian- Thomist tradition has a positive duty to vary 
existing property rights in the interests of the common good, within a framework which respects 
the need for each individual to own a limited amount of property for self-development and which 
respects the principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, within this tradition, it is perfectly 
legitimate for the state to meet a threat to social order or to promote social justice by employing 
a range of means, including various kinds of taxation and the nationalisation and 
denationalisation of property, provided this respects individual freedoms and the principle of 
subsidiarity. That said, it stands to reason that interventions in the economy involving substantial 
changes to property rights should not be undertaken lightly for they are bound to be taken as a 
See further Finnis, J. op.cit, p. 173. 
Ibid., p.33. 
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political, economic, and social revolution, and, as such, pose a degree of change which is in 
itself a threat to social order. For this reason, it would always seem desirable to limit this kind 
of intervention to that of a last resort. 
In the light of all the above, the understanding of property in the catholic tradition can 
be summed up in the wisdom that there is no one normative model of ownership and mat what 
is appropriate will depend on what best fosters the common good in a particular concrete 
situation. 5 4 As John Paul n, stated this wisdom in Centesimus Annus (1992): 
The Church has no models to present: models that are real and truly effective 
can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the 
efforts of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems in all their 
social, economic and cultural aspects as these interact with one another.55 
As a final word on our evaluative framework, in deciding what best fosters the common 
good in a particular historical situation, what we shall be looking to do is, in the words of Alan 
Suggate, bring alongside one another an analysis of the empirical situation and a total Christian 
understanding of l i fe / 3 6 Accordingly, we shall seek to keep in close dialogue the social 
principles and Christian understanding of property we have discussed above with an analysis of 
the political, economic and social circumstances which are relevant to an evaluation of 
privatisatioa As we have encountered some of this analysis already in our narrative history of 
nationalisation, where appropriate we shall refer here only to the relevant conclusions. 
Having now set out our evaluative framework as best we are able, we shall now proceed 
with our evaluation. As we proceed, it is worth bearing in mind not only that the 'all-round 
5 4 It was this basic understanding of the tradition which allowed William Temple to state in Christianity and 
Social Order (pp. 99-100): 
To put it shortly, we have talked in a doctrinaire fashion about socialism and 
individualism long enough; it is time to try and get the best out of both. The 
question is not - Shall we be Socialists or shall we be individualists? But - How 
Socialist and how individualist shall we be? 
5 9 John Paul D", Centesimus Annus (Incorporated Catholic Truth Society: London, 1991), p 31. Finnis, J. 
representing the secular exponents of the traditional, makes the same point, only adding that it is not unreasonable 
that systems of ownership should combine elements of both public and private ownership. As he explains in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, p.171: 
For regimes of property are very various and, usually, complex; and not 
unreasonably so, since what combinations of private and public ownership 
reasonably answer to the requirements of general justice varies with time, place, 
and many different circumstances: indeed the very distinction between 'public' 
and 'private' may reasonably be treated in some systems as not exhaustive. 
5 6 Suggate, A. op.cit., p.223. See further p. 207 ff. 
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flourishing of human beings in community is indefinitely many-sided'," but also Aristotle's 
dictum that one should not demand too much precision from practical reasoning.58 
SOCIAL ORDER 
The image of public ownership as the agent of social justice has tended to obscure the 
sense in which it was intrinsically bound up with the preservation of social order. As we have 
reported in our narrative history of the nationalisation programme of 1945-51 (Chapter 3), the 
overriding political justification for public ownership was that it would undercut socialist 
agitation by supporting a gradual and democratic redistribution of power and wealth to the 
working class. The economic justification essentially consisted in the belief that the daunting 
task of post-war economic reconstruction could not be left to the market, on account of the 
inefficiency of private enterprise. The moral justification tended to see public ownership as an 
opportunity to cement the fragile human solidarity brought about by the war. What we need to 
enquire into now, in the different circumstances of the eighties and nineties, is whether the 
justification of public ownership in terms of its contribution to preserving social order still has 
validity as an argument against privatisation. 
At the outset of this enquiry, we cannot avoid the fact that the multifaceted concept of 
social class still presses itself on us because Britain is still criticised for being an especially class 
ridden society. The extent to which this is true is of course the subject of ongoing debate. Stein 
Ringen, who is currently Professor of Sociology and Social Policy at Oxford University, comes 
down in favour of Peter Bauer's pamphlet Class on the Brain, the new edition of a pamphlet 
published twenty years ago by the Centre for Policy Studies. According to Bauer, 'Class 
distinctions exist,' but 'they are not particularly strong and there is nothing exceptional about 
Britain in tins respect Britain is a pretty open society without strong barriers to social or 
economic mobility, and it has become more open in recent decades. The British, however, 
punish themselves by believing that their society is one of unusually strong and rigid class 
5 7 Fiimis, J. op.cit, p. 174. 
5 8 Ibid., p. 176. In this connection, Finnis writes 'Aristotle's famous and often overworked dictum about not 
demanding too much precision in ascertaining the demands of practical reasonableness has an important 
application.' 
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distinctions/39 However, the authors of three recently published books on class in Britain 
disagree.60 They all conclude that British society is riven by class and that class divisions have 
remained relatively stable.61 
Without entering into this debate here, it is worth making the point that even i f public 
ownership did not significantly alter British class divisions, as the stability theory of class 
inequality maintains, public ownership certainly provided, at least initially, a means of upholding 
social order by containing and moderating class conflict It did this principally by continuing the 
corporatist relations between the labour movement, government and management of the wartime 
economy and by providing a cultural sphere in which the aspirations of working class people 
could find expression and at least some limited fulfilment. Here one need only recall, for 
example, how British Rail encouraged a railway family, in which there was a strong sense of 
belonging to a distinctive social group within society.62 Public ownership also contributed to a 
moderation of class conflict to the extent that it was only very opaquely an extension of the 
welfare system by helping maintain an artificially high level of employment, either as the agent 
of Keynesian demand management or as employer of last resort. And, not to be underestimated, 
experience with running the nationalised industries impressed on socialists the difficulties of 
making public ownership work and perhaps gave them more of an appreciation of private 
enterprise.63 
Of course it is impossible to say exactly to what extent these factors contributed to the 
relative peace of the post-war period. There is also the counter-argument to consider that the 
nationalised industries became something of a focus for class conflict in the sixties and seventies 
by providing the trade unions with a strong political base, which they employed to block even 
Labour Party attempts to reform mem. Nevertheless, i f the coal strike, which led to the General 
5 9 Ringen, S. The Great British Myth, Why the claims of continuing class inequality fail to take account of social 
change", in The Tones Literary Supplement, January 23 1998, p.3-4. 
4 0 Brook, S. Class, knowing your place in modern Britain (Gollancz: London, 1998); Adonis, A. and Pollard, S. 
A Class Act, England's new class structure (Hamish Hamilton: London, 1998); and Marshall, G., Swift, A. and 
Roberts, S. Against The Odds, Social class and socialJustice in industrial societies (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). 
6 1 "The stability thesis of class inequality in, for example, Against the Odds, argues that there has been no 
essential change in class inequality in Britain since the war. 
6 2 Interview with Dr. Margaret Armstrong, former Economics Adviser to British Rail. 
4 3 As we reported in chapter 5, Harold Wilson, for instance, in his last term of office, took a far more pragmatic 
approach to the question of whether industry should be publicly or privately owned than he had done in earlier 
administrations. 
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Strike of 1926, is anything to go by, the class conflicts that marked these later decades might 
have been significantly worse had the industries been privately owned. And without the 
nationalised industries providing a strong base for the labour movement to challenge for political 
power through the Labour Party and to insist on a measure of corporatism from whichever party 
was in power, it is possible that the movement would have resorted to non-democratic means. 
As it happened, in contrast with the aftermath of the First World War, when revolution looked 
imminent, by 1950, British communism was in inexorable decline, with the two Communist 
Party of Great Britain MPs losing their seats and with membership of the Party dropping to 
under 40.000.64 
In the light of the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the mixed economy made an 
important contribution to upholding social order in the post-war period. Given the ongoing 
debate about class in modem Britain, it is therefore also reasonable to speculate that public 
ownership may still offer an important means of avoiding the kind of class conflict that could 
undo many of the economic gains promised by privatisation. In this connection, the pitched 
battles fought on the streets between the police and angry protestors in the 1980s are a reminder 
that, even for the relatively law abiding British, there is a point when resentment can be fanned 
into violent opposition. However, before accepting this argument for public ownership, we need 
to engage with the complex and much altered social and economic circumstances of modern 
Britain, which makes it less plausible to see public ownership operating in exactly the same way 
as it did in the past 
One of the most disturbing features of modern Britain is the growth of an underclass. 
This is suggested by statistics which reveal that in 1975 6.S per cent of non-pensioner households 
in Britain had no actively employed members of the British workforce;65 ten years later, by 1985, 
this percentage had more than doubled to 16.4 per cent; by 1994, the percentage increase had 
slowed but was still up at 19.1 per cent. As a further indicator of the growth of this class, there 
was a 15 per cent increase in unemployed lone parents between 1992 and 1997. There has also 
been a dramatic increase in Britain's prison population, making Britain's incarceration rate 
higher than that of any other country in the European Union. Between 1992 and 1995 the 
increase was nearly a third. Figures for the rates of serious crime show a similar rise. These grew 
4 4 See further Porter, B. Britannia's Burden, p.268. 
6 5 Drawn from Gray, J False Dawn, the delusions of global capitalism (Granta Books: London, 1998), p.30-31. 
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from 1.6 million in 1981 to 2.8 million in 1981, then to 4.3 million in 1990. Expenditure on law 
enforcement increased correspondingly throughout the Thatcher administration. Together these 
statistics reveal an extent of social exclusion and a threat to civil society, which can be 
described as a time bomb waiting to explode. 
Privatisation has undoubtedly contributed to the growth of this underclass. Most 
privatised companies announced massive redundancy programmes soon after being privatised. 
The loss of those permanent and semi-permanent jobs have not been made up elsewhere in the 
economy. Many privatised companies have also adopted employment practices which have 
casualised labour and added to the insecurity of workers. Privatisation has also contributed to 
the break up of industrial communities, such as the railway and coal mining families. It has also 
been accompanied by 'cherry picking', whereby services are aimed at the more affluent 
customers and the poor tend to be neglected or lose their services altogether. As a result, an 
increasing reality of post-privatisation life is that a minority of citizens now live without those 
basic services, clean water, adequate hearing and light, and a telephone to connect themselves 
with other members of their family, friends, and to the outside world, which have long been 
taken for granted in the West as necessary for a civilised life. But privatisation cannot be held 
entirely responsible. Much of this social change has been driven, not by free markets but by 
technological change and globalization. The growth of an underclass would therefore have 
occurred regardless of whether privatisation had been implemented or not In support of this 
conclusion, John Gray writes: 
However, the dislocations of social and economic life today are not cause solely 
by free markets. Ultimately they arise from the banalization of technology. 
Technological innovations made in advanced western economies are soon 
copied everywhere. Even without free market policies the managed economies 
of the post-war period could not have survived - technological advance would 
have made them unsustainable. 
New technologies make full employment policies of the traditional sort 
unworkable. The effect of information technologies is to throw the social 
division of labour into flux. Many jobs are disappearing and all jobs are less 
secure. The division of labour in society is now less stable than H has been since 
the Industrial Revolution. What global markets do is to transmit this instability 
to every economy in the world, and in doing so they make a new politics of 
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economic insecurity universal.6* 
Furthermore, the growth in the underclass might have been worse were it not for the 
modernisation of Britain, which globalization demands and which privatisation is held to have 
encouraged.67 Here we have to do with the criticism of social democracy (or welfare capitalism) 
for its emphasis of the distribution of wealth at the expense of wealth creation. As John Milbank, 
taking up Henson's criticism of Christian socialism, points out,'sufficient state welfare provision 
and trade union rights are predicated upon capitalist growth;'68 in other words, nemo dot quod 
non habet; you can't give what you haven't got Public ownership was particularly vulnerable 
to this criticism on account of the way social expectations were allowed to distract the industries 
from their primary commercial purpose. Furthermore, it is difficult to deny that, by providing 
a strong political base for the trade unions, public ownership assisted the unions in their 
damaging adversarial relationship with capital. 
Much of this criticism of social democracy is strong, as we have admitted in our 
recognition of the strengths of the economic liberal case for the market in chapter 5. There was 
also an undeniable logic in the sequence of events leading up to privatisation. As Tony Benn 
rightly pointed out, the deepening economic and political crisis appeared to signal the end of the 
"Wilsonist" corporatism, which had held workers, business and government together up till then, 
and to demand a clear choice be taken between the kind of siege economy with further 
nationalisation, which he advocated, and the neo-liberalism which Heath had espoused in his 
Selsdon Man phase and which Margaret Thatcher was then Deginning to cautiously embrace.69 
However, granted that we shall never know whether Benn's economic ideas would have proved 
successful, cutting Britain off from the global market was a high risk strategy, i f not impossible. 
Raising import controls was bound to invite retaliation from Britain's trading partners. This 
could have led to a reduction of world trade and thereby further weakened Britain. Furthermore, 
in the straightened circumstances Labour inherited from the Heath administration, Benn's 
proposal that the government should take into public ownership a further string of "lame ducks" 
was highly implausible. Where would the money come from for their rescue and modernisation? 
** Gray, J. False Dawn, p.20. 
"Ibid., p. 16. 
6 1 Milbank, J. The Word Made Strange (Blackwell: Oxford, 1997), p.268. 
" Benn, T. 77K Bern Diaries (Hutchinson: London, 1995; this ed. By Arrow; London), p. 370. 
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Theoretically, his siege economy also went against the two fundamental principles of classical 
economics, comparative advantage and competition, which have proved to be the most reliable 
route to improving living standards. This left the neo-liberal route. As we have shown, the first 
steps on mis road were forced upon the government by the conditions the IMF placed on the loan 
it granted in 1976. Then once the precedent of selling shares in BP had been made, as Benn 
predicted, further asset sales were bound to follow as a means of avoiding cutting social 
expenditure. All that remained to happen was the "winter of discontent", which threatened to 
fulfill Hayek's prophecy that the mixed economy would lead to serfdom. 
To the political and economic crisis leading up to privatisation we have sketched above, 
we need also to add the difficulties experienced by some of the nationalised industries. 
Although, as we concluded our chapter on the experience of nationalisation (chapter 4), we are 
not convinced that public ownership failed, we can not deny that those industries with a 
consistently poor economic and financial record were cause for serious concern. They placed 
a burden on an already hard-pressed exchequer and their inefficiency had a knock-on effect on 
the rest of British industry, further undermining its waning international competitiveness. British 
Steel was of course the glaring example. The way the corporation had rapidly run up seemingly 
uncontrollable deficits made the finances of a state such as Britain, with so large part of its 
economy under public ownership, look precarious to potential investors. The industries 
dependent on large subsidies, such as the railways, were also a worry. They presented a 
seemingly bottomless drain down which state finances were being pored, adding to the 
indebtedness of the state and also to inflationary pressures in the economy. There were also the 
successful public corporations, such as British Telecom, who were in need of substantial new 
investment in order to remain internationally competitive, and who stood to lose out in the race 
to form large international companies, capable of effectively competing in a global market. In 
each of these cases, it would have been irresponsible to rule out the option of de-nationalisation. 
In the light of our evaluation so far, we are therefore bound to conclude that, on account 
of the difficulties facing social democracy, in general, and the nationalised industries, in 
particular, a substantial but selective divestiture of state industries was justified on the basis of 
the principle of social order. Indeed, given the constraints imposed by globalization, either 
continuing to try and make the post-war settlement work better, in the manner of Harold Wilson, 
or attempting the radical alternative proposed by Tony Benn may have been a great deal riskier. 
Furthermore, to the extent that popular capitalism has succeeded in extending share ownership 
Privatisation and the common good 225 
and in giving the working class a stake in industry through employee share schemes and through 
investment by the pension funds of employees in the shares of privatised companies, there is a 
case for arguing that privatisation has left Britain's liberal democratic order more secure man 
it was before. It can also be claimed that privatisation has bought time and provided the 
resources for the state to continue to fund high levels of social welfare and to respond 
specifically to the needs of the underclass by, for example, the social exclusion unit set up by 
the present government. 
Ironically, therefore, whereas nationalisation helped preserve social order in the post-war 
period, when the task of economic reconstruction and the threat of communism were the 
dominant concerns, in the altered circumstances of the seventies and eighties, when the impact 
of globalization and the threat posed by the underclass are the dominant concerns, a substantial 
programme of de-nationalisation was justified on the basis of the principle of social order. This 
irony supports the wisdom of the catholic tradition, in its insistence that no one economic system 
should be held to be normative, and that what economic model is appropriate depends on what 
will promote the common good in the particular political, economic and social circumstances 
of the time. 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
But this judgement is only half of the picture. We cannot be sanguine about the long-term 
stability of a post-privatisation social order where privatisation has contributed to a grossly 
unequal society becoming even more unequal and to the erosion of certain fundamental civil 
liberties. Nor should we accept that the principle of social order provides us with a sufficient 
justification for a substantial programme of de-nationalisation, because, as we explained in the 
introduction to this chapter, while the principle of social order is deserving of special emphasis, 
and perhaps should be accorded priority in most cases, it should always be held in tension with 
social justice, for justice is itself a cardinal virtue, which under certain conditions is deserving 
of a higher priority man social order. 
With mis tension in mind, and consistent with our understanding of social justice, in what 
follows, we shall begin by exploring whether privatisation has improved or worsened the 
inequality of wealth and income in society. Then, as the second part of our enquiry into the 
impact of privatisation on social justice, we shall consider the question whether privatisation has 
increased or decreased the level of freedom in society. 
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Equality 
On the state of inequality in Britain today, Ringen is in agreement with the authors of 
the three books on class mentioned earlier. He writes that 'Widening inequalities in Britain 
(since about 1975) have been solidly documented in studies of its tangible manifestations - such 
as income.'70 According to the recent Rowntree Report on Income and Wealth, for instance, 
since 1979 the share of the lowest income group fell, whereas the richest one fifth of the 
population saw its share of after-tax income grow to 43 per cent by 1984-85, the highest level 
since the war.71 However, Ringen then takes issue with the authors he reviews when they claim 
that egalitarian policies have failed: 'As long as egalitarian policies were pursued (1945-75), 
inequality narrowed dramatically. When egalitarian policies were abandoned (from about 1975), 
inequalities widened even more dramatically.'72 
If we are to accept this analysis of inequality since 1945, then it is tempting to jump to 
the conclusion that public ownership made a significant contribution to closing the inequality 
gap. Certainty any reading of the political diaries of those close to the centre of political life in 
the post-war period suggests that the labour movement wielded considerable power over the 
formulation of economic and social policy. And, even i f Ringen's analysis is faulty and there 
was in fact no significant change in inequality over the post-war period, as the authors reviewed 
by Ringen claim,73 the conclusion may still hold that public ownership contributed to reducing 
inequality because, without the strong political base provided the trade unions in the nationalised 
industries and the way the industries supported full employment policies by acting as employer 
of last resort, inequality may otherwise have widened over this period. 
However, this view of public ownership and inequality does not go uncontested. Leslie 
Hannah, for one, challenges the argument that the act of nationalisation directly affected a 
redistribution of wealth on the ground that the compensation paid to the former owners left the 
distribution of wealth unaffected.74 He also questions the extent to which the nationalised 
industries affected a redistribution to the poor by means of the subsidies paid to them in order 
70 The Great British Myth, p. 3. 
7 1 Hills, J Income and Wealth, The Latest Evidence (Joseph Rowntree Foundation York, 1998). 
7 1 Ibid., p.3. 
7 3 See also the study by Atkinson, A B On Unequal Shares (Harmandsworth; Penguin, 1972). 
7 4 Ibid., p. 193. 
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for mem in turn to subsidise public services. He writes,' The case was frequently advanced, for 
example, that subsidising railways would benefit the poor yet empirical analysis showed that 
the beneficiaries of rail subsidies were those on above-average incomes: overwhelmingly the 
poor travel by bus or not at all. The state is frequently the tool of powerful pressure groups other 
than the poor/75 This criticism is well-founded, and it is worth noting that Hannah is supported 
by a considerable body of research, in particular mat of the Public Choice School, which 
questions the redistributive impact of state intervention on account of the capture of the state by 
powerful pressure groups, particularly the articulate and politically skilful middle class.76 
Nevertheless, we do not think it seriously undermines our view that public ownership provided 
an effective political base for the labour movement to advance the egalitarian policies which 
either reduced inequality or kept it from getting any worse between 194S and 197S, and that this 
remains one of the strongest moral arguments in favour of public ownership. 
In contrast to the record of nationalisation, privatisation has undoubtedly contributed to 
worsening inequality since 197S. We ought to discuss this in relation to both society and the 
individual corporations, because public ownership promoted egalitarianism not only in society 
at large but also in each of the nationalised industries in so far as it kept pay differentials 
relatively close together and rewarded meritorious public service by a system of honours. Indeed, 
it has been the rapid increase in executive pay in the privatised utilities, which has created wide 
differentials between the highest and lowest paid employees, that has provoked some of the 
bitterest controversy surrounding privatisation, leading to some annual general meetings 
becoming uncharacteristically heated affairs. Although the standard defence of the increased 
differentials in pay, that in order to recruit the most able managers the company has to pay the 
market rate, cannot responsibly be dismissed as a ground for some convergence between what 
managers used to be paid in the nationalised industries and the market rate, we cannot accept 
either that it is necessary to offer the excessive rates of pay or that they can be justified in terms 
of the common good, for excessive differentials of pay erode trust within a company and society 
and demean the lower paid employees. As Charles Handy, in the spirit of Tawney's Equality, 
puts this deontological and consequential criticism of excessive inequality within the firm: 
When senior executives of companies earn fifty, sometimes even one hundred, 
7 5 Hannah, L. op.cit, p. 193. 
7 6 See further Gray, J. Beyond The New Right, p.vi. 
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times the pay of their own workers, it is hard not to feel that it is an affront to 
those workers. The executives compare their exotic salaries and benefits to the 
rewards given to the stars of sports or films or music, but these have earned 
their rewards by their own individual efforts, whereas the executives are 
supposed to be members of a team. Would the team, one often wonders, do so 
much worse if that particular player was absent?77 
Sadly, one of the most disillusioning aspects of privatisation has been the way the image of 
public service, which for all their failings still attached to the managers of the nationalised 
industries, has so quickly been replaced by the popular one of greed.78 
Although the rhetoric of popular capitalism has done much to colour the reality of 
worsening inequality for society at large, the true picture here is closer to that of legalised theft 
than about empowering the proverbial' Sid'. This is supported by the analysis which finds that 
privatisation has involved the sale of national assets, in which every citizen had a share, at 
discounted prices to a proportion of the population, giving this group a net increase in wealth 
(with the entitlement to a future flow of income in the form of dividends). Unfortunately, it is 
very difficult and perhaps even misleading to attempt to calculate the total increase in inequality 
from the discounts given investors in all privatisations, because of the different investor groups 
involved and because the shares have fluctuated in price since privatisation. As a result we can 
only have a very impressionistic picture of the increase in inequality. But this is still very 
revealing. In the case of the first big privatisation, British Telecom, for instance, investors paid 
£3,750 million for assets the stock exchange valued at £7,470 million, giving investors a net 
increase in wealth of £3,720 million.79 Thus for every share they bought they got one free. To 
give some idea of the increase in wealth over time resulting from the increase in the value of 
privatisation stock, the case of the Atomic Energy Authority Technology, recently criticised by 
the Public Accounts Committee, serves as a good example: in 1996 the shares were floated at 
280 pence a share; the next day they were valued at 323.5 pence, an instant profit of 43.5 pence; 
7 7 Handy, C. The Hungry Spirit (Hutchinson: London, 1997), p. 117. 
7 1 The report of The Commission on Social Justice refers to 'the stupid respect for greed which helps some to 
believe (despite die evidence) that talented top managers will do their best only if they are paid fifty or a hundred 
times more than their employees.' See further p.6. 
"Galal, A. et.al., Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises, An Empirical Analysis (The World Bank: 
Washington DC., 1994), p.6. 
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in May 1998 the price had risen to 777.5 pence a share.80 That is a more than doubling of value 
in only two years. Were these the only mistakes made in the valuation of shares at flotation, they 
might be excusable on the basis of fears that BT, being the first big privatisation, could not be 
allowed to fail and that, in the case of AEA Technology, it was difficult to value the assets of 
a subsidiary company. However, the undervaluing of shares and the failure to include adequate 
claw back provisions to allow the state to recover unfair capital gains and excess profits,81 was 
repeated in every privatisation. This handed to private and institutional investors large windfall 
gains, without their taking any risk, and therefore rules out the moral justification for 
privatisation which claims investors earned their gains on account of the risk they took.82 
In this light, there is no denying the truth of Tony Benn's judgement that the British 
privatisation programme can be described as a plunder of national assets. Whatever the "spin," 
there is no denying that part of the public which did not invest in privatisation shares has not 
received fair compensation for the loss of their share of these former national assets. 
Furthermore, die majority of people who were left out or chose to remain out of the privatisation 
bonanza have lost not only the entitlement to the wealth conveyed by the shares, but also to the 
major part of the future income flows attaching to it. As a result all they are effectively left with 
now is an entitlement to part of the future flow of income through company taxation,83 which 
in the case of some of the enterprises sold, is a lot less than what they contributed to the 
exchequer as nationalised industries,84 and to what the regulators can claw back for them in the 
form of lower prices and better quality. 
However, as blatantly unjust as this outcome is, we accept, in theory, that an evaluation 
of the social justice of privatisation has to go beyond the question of inequality to look at the 
8 0 See further the Public Accounts Committee report on the privatisation of AEA Technology. 
" See further Ramanadhan, V.V. ed., Privatization and Equity (Routledge: London, 199S), p.24 for a discussion 
of claw-back provisions. 
8 2 See here also Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. 'Privatization in Britain", in MacAvoy, P. Sainsbury, W.T., Yarrow, 
G. and Zeckhauser, R. Privatization and State-Owned Enterprises (University of Rochester: New York, 1989), 
pp. 220-224. In addition to the loss to the Exchequer of the windfall gains, Vickers and Yarrow draw attention to 
the substantial cost of flotations (advertising, advisory fees, etc.). 
8 3 Of which the poor will receive a disproportionately low share given the way the middle and upper classes tend 
to succeed in gaining control of the use of tax revenue. 
8 4 To give some idea of the loss involved, for the four years 1987-1991, the net contribution to the Government 
of the Electricity Industry in England and Wales amounted to £5,998 million, compared with a total tax take for 
the four years after privatisation of only £3,103 million, a loss of just under £3 billion. See further Wilson, B. 
'Blowing a ruse', in 77K Guardian Newspaper, 26 September 1995. 
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total welfare gains from privatisation. This might justify privatisation on the basis that the 
increased inequality fosters the common good by making everyone better off. As such, it is a part 
of our evaluation which cannot responsibly be omitted. In this respect, because it is not primarily 
concerned with equality but with the common good, the catholic tradition is not necessarily 
opposed to a utilitarian welfare analysis, although it must find its criterion for a moral 
judgement, the maximization of utility or happiness, far too narrow. Neither is it necessarily 
opposed to an application of the celebrated Rawlsian difference principle, which allows that 
greater inequality may be compatible with social justice, provided everyone is made better off. 
The problem, though, with this kind of empirical study is that the method employs so many 
questionable assumptions and predictions and involves calculations based on a counterfactual, 
that it is difficult to take the results seriously; they are too open to the charge that the figures 
have been plucked from thin air. 
A good example is the welfare study of privatisation by economists of the World Bank, 
who to their credit are aware of some of its limitations, although this does not seem to have kept 
them from using it prescriptively for policy recommendations.85 The fly jacket boasts that it is 
'the first comprehensive empirical study to measure the effects of divestiture on sellers, buyers, 
consumers, workers and competitors'. Its method involves measuring changes in consumer and 
producer surplus as a means of answering questions about who gained and who lost The 
application of this method in one of twelve case studies, that of British Telecom, reveals, 
according to the authors, that the world is £10 billion better off. 8 6 This is broken down to a gain 
of £1 billion for foreign investors, £2.72 billion for nationals, £2.25 for government, £4.15 for 
consumers, and a loss of £0.12 billion for competitors. On the basis of these figures the report 
concludes that "The distribution of the welfare gain comes as close to a Pareto improvement as 
possible.'87 On the face of it, this would seem to be a sufficient vindication of the decision to 
privatise. However, on closer investigation, one finds that no calculation is included of how 
workers fared, which is a glaring omission given the massive programme of redundancies 
following privatisation and, given the unemployment in Britain in the 1980s, cannot be excused 
on the assumption that those laid off found alternative employment Furthermore, the study made 
8 5 Galal, A. et.al., Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises, An Empirical Analysis (The World 
Bank: Washington DC., 1994). 
8 6 Ibid., p.6. 
"Ibid., p.7. 
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no attempt to forecast how markets or technologies are going to change,88 whereas the reality 
has been dramatic changes in the market, with telecom companies merging into giant 
international companies. There has also been dramatic changes in telecommunications 
technology, bringing with it, as Brian Wilson, then Labour's Trade and Industry spokesman, 
pointed out, 'the potential for massively increased profitability, no matter who owned i t ' . 8 9 
The weakness of this kind of study has also been widely demonstrated by the record of 
regulation. This has underlined the difficulties of predicting the economic performance of the 
privatised utilities. Indeed the imposition of a windfall tax on the utilities, in order to claw back 
excessive profits, has not only savaged the reputation of the regulators but has also laid bare any 
pretence that these companies will ever enjoy full commercial freedom within a regulatory 
framework. As a result, a further level of uncertainty has been introduced into attempts to predict 
their future performance because any forecast must now include the question: what will a future 
government do? One should also not leave out the latest irony in the story of privatisation, which 
is the trend for privatised companies to buy back their own shares in contradiction of the goal 
of extending share ownership. Will this action prompt a further tax to mop up the surplus cash? 
In addition to this kind of imponderable, there are the questions which arise with foreign 
ownership, such as what will happen when such a company begins to withhold taxes or thwart 
the regulator or be broken up by its foreign parent. 
And of course the greatest imponderable of all is: what will the poor do in response to 
the worsening inequality? Perhaps with the end of the Cold War and the triumph of capitalism 
the poor no longer pose a threat. However, one dare not be complacent As John Gray warns: 
The regime of laissez-faire is bound to trigger counter-movements which reject 
its constraints. Such movements - whether populist and xenophobic, 
fundamentalist or neo-coirtmumst - can achieve few of their goals; but they can 
still rattle to pieces the brittle structures that support global laissez-faire?0 
And, echoing this warning across the Atlantic, the former Secretary of Labour in the first Clinton 
Administration, Robert Reich, writes: 
Unchecked, the disintegration of the social compact threatens the stability and 
moral authority of the industrialised countries. It even threatens continued 
w Ibid., p.5. 
** Blowing a ruse. 
"False Dawn, p.20. 
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economic growth. Those who bear a disproportionate share of the burdens and 
risks of growth, but enjoy few, if any, of the benefits, will not passively accept 
their fates. Unless they feel some stake in economic growth, they are likely to 
withdraw their tacit support for aspects of open economies that generate growth 
but simultaneously impose losses and insecurities on them 
When the current expansion slows, those who are barely staying afloat or who 
are sinking will not remain silent. Yet by that time, their voices may resound not 
to progressive ideals but to the politics of resentment. History yields ample 
warnings.91 
In the light of all the above, it is prudent to conclude that, while history may yet prove 
privatisation made every one better off in the long term, what really matters for the present is 
the injustice that has made an already grossly unequal society more unequal. Privatisation 
therefore fails one of our basic tests of whether it promotes the common good. Here, in the 
absence of hard facts, we are guided by catholic social teaching in its emphatic rejection of 
extreme inequality and of the so-called trickle down theory, which holds that an increase in the 
wealth of the rich will eventually make the poor better off. As this teaching is expressed in the 
Common Good: 
But there must come a point at which the scale of the gap between the very 
wealthy and those at die bottom of the range of income begins to undermine the 
common good. This is the point at which society begins to be run for the benefit 
of the rich and not for all its members. 
There are some ideological thinkers who advocate this approach. We would 
question their proposition that the further enrichment of the already wealthy 
must, as the inevitable result of economic laws, eventually also improve the lot 
of the less well-off and poor. This proposition is contrary to common sense as 
well as to experience. Some of those who employ it may merely be seeking 
justification for the pursuit of their own economic interests. Even from the point 
of view of the wealthy this is self-defeating. Jesus in the Gospels repeatedly 
warns about the dangers of over-attachment to material riches. Those dangers 
are not just to the individual, but also to the community.92 
Freedom 
We can afford to be more brief in the application of the second of our two principles of 
9 1 Reich, R. Light Blue Touchpaper", in The Guardian, IS March 1998. 
92 The Common Good, p.17-18 
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social justice for the reason that we have already discussed privatisation in relation to the 
argument from negative freedoms in economic liberalism in the previous chapter. There we 
expressed a basic agreement with the argument that public ownership had come to pose a threat 
to civil liberties at the end of the seventies by virtue of the close link between trade unionism 
and the nationalised industries. In this connection, there may be a germ of truth in Heath's 
criticism of Temple's social Christianity where he wrote that Temple placed too little emphasis 
on the need to maintain personal freedom; that in his wish to redress the balance of power 
between those who own and those who produce he failed to see that in so doing some would 
seek not justice but power for themselves for its own sake/93 
To that earlier analysis of public ownership and negative freedoms, we should add the 
mounting consumer dissatisfaction with the monopolistic and bureaucratic service provided by 
the nationalised industries. Although consumers benefited from price restraint and from the 
cross-subsidisation of services, and it should not be lost sight of that every consumer is also a 
voter, the nationalised industry's general lack of responsiveness to consumers frustrated 
individual freedom. They were never given an effective voice in the regulation of nationalised 
industry, and, because there was no competition, could not take their custom elsewhere. As a 
consequence, while, admittedly more in theory than in practice, the consumer is king in the free 
market, the reality of public ownership was that the interests of the state, management and the 
workers generally took precedence over that of the consumer. 
In the light of this record, it is difficult to deny that experience has disappointed the 
hopes of social democrats that public ownership would always promote freedom. But, on the 
other hand, it is equally difficult to deny the basic Marxist insight that concentrations of 
economic power in private hands can be used to oppress the poor and powerless and to thwart 
genuine democracy. Faced with this impasse, the seemingly inconclusive debate over private and 
public ownership has moved on to explore positions between the entrenched neo-liberal and 
mixed economy positions. This has come to focus on the role of civil society, understood to 
include intermediate organisations and 'soft' institutions, such as collective beliefs, customs, 
routines and habits. Proponents of this new Third Way, such as Anthony Giddens, claim that 
* Foreword to Christianity and Social Order (Shepherd and Walwyn: London, 1976), p.2, See here also 
Sedgwick, P. 'Freedom, Wellbeing and the Enterprise Culture', in Studies in Christian Ethics Vol. 3 No.l 
(T&T.Clark: Edinburgh, 1990), p.56 where he writes of an emerging consensus 'which affirms the creation of 
wealth in a market economy, not simply because it increases wealth, but because of intangible but real values such 
as freedom and democracy.' 
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these intermediate organisations and institutions can be used to promote a more genuinely free 
'associative' democracy. However, and here we follow Ash Amin, who, after thoroughly 
exploring this new debate and giving it his qualified support, concludes that' no matter how out 
of date the discussion might appear, the question of socialising ownership and control of the 
economy cannot be ducked i f the concentration of property-based power is to be avoided.'94 
hi the light of mis conclusion, we cannot find otherwise than that privatisation also fails 
the second of our two tests of social justice. Despite the rhetoric of popular capitalism, it has 
undoubtedly subtracted power from Labour and added this power to the already substantial 
property-based power of Capital. This is amply supported by the fact that the Thatcherite 
industrial relations legislation has succeeded in limiting certain fundamental civil liberties, such 
as the right of association, the right to engage in collective bargaining, and the right to strike, 
whereas attempts to change industrial relations legislation in the 1960s and 1970s all failed on 
account of opposition from the trade unions. Furthermore, by weakening the public sector 
unions, privatisation has paved the way for the adoption of unemployment as a permanent proxy 
for an incomes and prices policy. While this expedient may be justified as a temporary measure 
on the way back to full employment, it cannot be morally justified as a permanent response to 
inflation and globalization on the principle that i f the market economy, as the direct employer, 
cannot provide employment for every one who wishes to work, then the government, as the 
indirect employer, has an obligation to endeavour to do so.95 
Privatisation has therefore been one of the means of placing Labour back in the servile 
relationship with Capital which Tawney's advocacy of public ownership sought to end. Once 
more, as Maritain put it in his indictment of capitalism, 'the poor man exists only as an 
instrument of production, a 'hand', not as a person.'96 As such, although he is better supported 
by social legislation in Europe, he is still vulnerable to the kind of management who Morrison 
described will 'take it out on the men'; more likely they will not bother because it is easier to 
either casualise his labour or export it to countries where it can be had cheaper. Looking back 
9 4 Amin, A. 'Beyond Associative Democracy, in New Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 3,1996, p.323. See here 
also Preston, R. A Response To Ulrich Duchrow', in Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 3 No. 1 (T&T Clark: 
Edinburgh, 1990), p. 97, where he acknowledges that Duchrow makes a strong point about the 'political 
inequalities produced by economic inequalities, and the necessity of trying to establish countervailing power.' 
* See here Brown, D. Choices, Ethics And The Christian (Blackwell: Oxford, 1983), pp. 63-64, for a discussion 
of the principle of the state as indirect employer, as declared in John Paul H's encyclical Laborem Exercens. 
96 True Humanism, p. 107. 
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on the heyday of the nationalised industries, not a golden era but nevertheless one which 
succeeded in raising the status and conditions of workers and which accepted that the state had 
a responsibility to provide employment as employer of last resort, it is no wonder that Maclntyre 
has described the triumph of liberal capitalism in our day as a new dark ages. 
But what should we now do? Maclntyre, on the understanding that the modern liberal 
state is beyond redemption, would exhort us to discover a new StBenedict in order to keep alive 
the moral life in community. This vision, however, is too pessimistic for us, given all that public 
ownership was able to achieve for the working class. And yet, i f we must continue to engage 
with the modern liberal state, we now accept mat an extensive programme of re-nationalisation, 
with the aim of returning the privatised industries back to public ownership, is no longer 
practicable. As our application of the principle of social order would suggest, that is no longer 
an option in the globalized market of today. Indeed, in this context, it would seem that we have 
no choice but to accept the sense of Henson's argument that the material advantages of 
capitalism cannot be done without and therefore, as he put it, the ethical problem is presented 
in an economic framework which leaves little freedom to the Christian moralist. Necessitas non 
habet legem.'97 
Furthermore, in the light of experience with public ownership, it must be pointed out that 
the application of the test of freedom cuts both ways: whereas privatisation promotes 
concentrations of property-based power, nationalisation promotes concentrations of labour 
power and favours the producer over the consumer. Consequently both privatisation and 
nationalisation tend to work against the promotion of freedom for all citizens. Nevertheless, on 
the understanding that nationalisation is the more justifiable on account of the imbalance of 
power it seeks to right and on account of the way it seeks to elevate the status of Labour to that 
of a partner with Capital, we would keep nationalisation as a last resort, while, as we shall 
outline in our postscript which follows, striking out in new directions in order to promote the 
common good. 
Here we recognise that any social project looking to challenge entrenched power has to 
carry a realistic threat. Of course, in the context of the global market, it will not always be easy 
for the nation state to make the threat of nationalisation real. Nevertheless we are not persuaded 
that the nation state, increasingly supported by regional agreements, such as the European Union, 
97 Christian Morality, p.282. 
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is powerless. That said, we favour a selective approach, which would limit any nationalisation 
programme to those industries which can effectively be managed as public enterprises.98 
Furthermore, on the understanding that the Morrisonian statutes were unrealistic to exclude 
representatives of government, workers and consumers from policy making, we would also opt 
for more of a concerted model of public ownership along the lines proposed by the NEDO. In 
the interests of social order we would also insist on appropriate industrial relations legislation. 
We draw support here for our continued, but qualified, support for public ownership, not 
only from the catholic tradition but also from the radical strand in Christian social ethics, 
represented in this thesis by Tawney and by Liberation Theology. This prophetic tradition rightly 
emphasises the evangelical imperative of liberation by insisting that a due share of the good gifts 
of creation be restored to the poor and powerless.99 It will be recalled here that Tawney, in an 
echo of the violent language of the psalmist,100 justified nationalisation on the ground mat,' The 
blow needed to liberate them from the property owners must come from without' 1 0 1 Although 
Tawney may be vulnerable to the criticism that he was a high-minded moralist102 and Liberation 
Theology vulnerable to the criticism that it has misread Marx and belongs to a heretical 
millenarianism,103 the indispensable contribution this radical Christianity makes is to force us 
to confront the reality of power. In so doing, those of us who have the time and resources to 
write about change instead of changing the world, are compelled to look at the world from the 
other side and so to come to see that sometimes what passes for order actually hides a radical 
disorder. As Christopher Rowland writes of this tradition in his book, Radical Christianity, 'It 
has protested against those arrangements which have the appearance of order but which in reality 
have brought about the prosperity and progress of some at the expense of others/104 
9 8 For instance we would avoid nationalising a complex manufacturing industry such as British Steel. 
9 9 See further 0'Donovan, O The Desire of the Nations, p.3, and Forrester D. Theology and Politics, pp. 168 
171. 
1 0 0 See, for example, Psalm SO. 22. 
101 The Acquisitive Society, p i l l . 
1 0 2 See further Atherton, J . R.H. Tawney As A Christian Social Moralist (PhD Thesis: University of 
Manchester, January 1979), p 465 ff. 
m See further Kee, A. Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology (SCM: London, 1990) and Cohn, N. The 
Pursuit of the Millennium (Seeker and Warburg: London, 1957). 
I ( H Rowland, C. Radical Christianity (Orbis: New York, 1988), p. 160. 
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A NEW PROJECT 
Then the wilderness will become garden land 
and garden land will be reckoned as common as scrub. 
Justice will make its home in the wilderness, 
and righteousness dwell in the grassland (Isaiah)1 
As the conclusion of our thesis, in the brief space we have left, we shall sketch the 
outline of a new project which looks to promote the common good by building on the strengths 
of both nationalisation and privatisation while avoiding their weaknesses. 
Before we proceed, in the light of the dashed hopes of so many projects of social 
improvement and the intractable problems besetting all modern societies, it is important we 
begin by explaining that we advocate a gradualist approach, which understands that social justice 
is best promoted in a programme of incremental change rather than by means of a political 
revolution. A failure to respect mis principle of social order, the second of our two foundational 
principles of the common good, would be to repeat the mistakes of millenarian movements and 
of the Enlightenment, with its secular versions of the Christian hope of a world transformed. 
Accordingly, and consistent with John Gray's warning mat political life is an almost desperately 
humble task of endless improvisation , 2 we have devised our project with a view to it being 
implemented by a gradual process of reforms to the existing system; to borrow some words of 
William Temple, we are wanting' transformation by adaptation, not by destruction . 3 
With these prefatory remarks in mind, in what follows we shall elaborate on the four 
parts of an organic programme of reform: the renewal of civil society, the re-distribution of 
wealth, the adoption of the stakeholder corporation, and the strengthening of global and regional 
governance. In our view, mis new project is essential i f we are to move beyond the simplicities 
of bom nationalisation and privatisation to promote a more inclusive society and an international 
order which works for all its citizens. 
1 Isaiah 32:15f.' A passage read at the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa on 10 May 
1994\ quoted in De Gruchy, J. Christianity and Democracy, p.278. 
2 Beyond The New Right, p.vii. 
» Christianity and Social Order, p. 113. 
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THE RENEWAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
As the first part of this new project, we would wish to support the renewal of civil society 
in the programme for a new 'associative democracy' and in the overlapping assortment of 
proposals making up Anthony Giddens' third way . This fresh attempt to overcome the 
difficulties of social democracy includes proposals for new public-private partnerships, the 
encouragement of voluntary associations, an emphasis on the family, renewing communities 
through local initiatives, and positive welfare.4 These proposals are too many and varied to 
discuss in detail here and it will have to suffice to say that the importance of building the 
capacity of civil society to challenge concentrations of property-based power and generally to 
promote social justice by insisting on responsive, transparent, and accountable government 
cannot be exaggerated in the light of the failure of both statist solutions, which have sought to 
expand the state, and laissez faire solutions, which have sought to shrink the state. 
It may be worth further elaborating here that, by making freedom one of the pillars of a 
new project, we are looking to build on the strong democratic traditions of the British state. 
These were wisely respected by the architects of the Labour Party's post-war nationalisation 
programme and rightly championed in the 1970s, when British democracy was threatened by 
a militant trade unionism, for democracy is the most popular and durable form of political 
governance in the modern world5 Nevertheless, as strong as these traditions doubtless are, there 
is a pervasive feeling that there is something wrong with British democracy - it is not democratic 
enough. This disquiet is not only a response to the low voter turnout in elections but also relates 
to the sense in which we are still subjects of a largely intact feudal constitutional order, with its 
top-down system of government in hock to property based power. What is needed is a new 
public involvement in democracy, such that it will produce more government by the people and 
for all the people. As Jonathon Freedland puts it: 
we need to sweep away a post-feudal order and declare, like the new South 
Africans, Mi Smo Narod - a phrase which means both' we are a people' and 
'we are the People". Then we can engage together in the adventure they call 
masakane, the building of a new nation.6 
4 See farther Giddens, A. The Third Way (Polity: Oxford, 1998), particularly pp. 69 - 128. 
5 See further Held, D. Democracy and the Global Order (Polity: Oxford, 1995), p. 3 
6 Freedland, J. Bring Home the Revolution, the case for a British Republic (Fourth Estate: London, 1998), p.228. 
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THE RE-DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 
As important as democracy is for the common good, however, it has shown itself to be 
insufficiently attentive to the needs of the minority of the poor in a modern, liberal capitalist 
society. Therefore, as the second part of our project, consistent with our understanding of social 
justice as requiring the promotion of greater social equality, we advocate extending the already 
existing re-distributive programme of the state by imposing a wealth tax in addition to the 
present inheritance tax.7 
We of course accept that the imposition of a wealth tax involves trade-offs between 
economic equity and efficiency and that experience with wealth taxes in Scandinavia, in some 
of the continental European countries, and in Ireland has been mixed.8 Nevertheless, we believe 
these inefficiencies outweighed by the threat to social order posed by the underclass, which i f 
left to grow any larger, could result in the kind of social conflagration which would destroy all 
the political, social, and economic progress promised by our post-nationalisation and post-
privatisation order. Furthermore, granted the mobility of capital is a constraint, we follow Tony 
Atkinson, President of the Royal Economic Society, who, in his proposals for a reform of 
welfare, insists that the economic constraints are exaggerated and politicians have more room 
to manoeuvre than they admit As he argues: 
Developments in the world economy, and the completion of the European 
marketplace, all shape the context within which social policy has to be formed. 
But they are not aU-detennimng. Politicians cannot abdicate responsibility. 
There are important choices to be made, both nationally and at European level, 
and they will determine the kind of society in which Europeans will live in the 
next century.9 
We can also justify our advocacy of a redistribution of wealth on the ground that it is 
essential for the project of modernizing Britain, which Thatcherism started but which failed to 
address the root cause of the problems of the British state. Here we draw on Avner Offer's 
7 Exactly what kind of wealth tax would be appropriate is a subject for further research. See Brown, C. V. and 
Jackson, P.M. Public Sector Economics p.567 ff. and Flemming, J.S. and Little, I.M.D. Why We Need a Wealth 
fov(Meuthen: London, 1974). 
8 Not surprisingly the Select Committee on the Wealth Tax has produced five different reports but failed to agree 
any of them. 
9 Atkinson, A. "Whither Welfare? in Oxford Today, Vol. 10, No. 2, Hilary Issue, 199S, p 11 
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criticism of Will Mutton's modernizing thesis which points out mat Hutton is perhaps not radical 
enough by failing to address 'the large inequalities of wealth (going back to industrial land 
ownership) that largely determine the lhands-aff risk preferences which drive Button's story.'10 
To our mind it is this feature of the still largely intact British feudal system, with the immense 
investment opportunities opening up abroad, such as in China, which accounts for the lack of 
British investment in manufacturing. I f this analysis is correct, then one essential part of a 
strategy for national renewal must be a redistribution of the wealth currently controlled by the 
gentlemanly capitalism' of the City. Although this will not stop much of this wealth being 
reinvested in the City, it would provide start-up capital for individual entrepreneurs looking to 
supply the enlarged domestic market and create the opportunities for many more people to 
develop the 'human capital', both knowledge and services, which, in a post-industrial society, 
' is increasingly identified as the source of the wealth of nations.'11 
THE STAKEHOLDER CORPORATION 
As the third part of a new project to promote the common good, we advocate the 
stakeholder model of the firm proposed by John Kay in preference to either the public 
corporation model of nationalisation or the publicly quoted company of privatisation. 
The essential difference between this model and that of the shareholder agency model 
of Anglo-American capitalism is that, in looking to make accountable the power of the large 
business corporation, it adopts a trusteeship approach to corporate governance. As such, it limits 
the property rights of shareholders by allowing 'managers to pursue multiple objectives, yet 
holds them responsible for their performance'.12 This means that, whereas the responsibility of 
the manager as agent- principal in the publicly quoted company is to maximise the value of the 
shares, a duty which may conflict with what is in the best interests of the corporation, the 
responsibility of the manager as a trustee of the stakeholder corporation is to sustain all the 
corporation's assets, both tangible and intangible, such as the human resources of a corporation 
and the goodwill it enjoys in a particular community. As Kay explains this, The objectives of 
managers as trustees therefore relate to the broader purposes of the corporation, and not simply 
1 0 Offer, A. "The State We're In \ in Oxford Today, pp. 12-13 
"Ibid., p. 13. 
1 2 Kay, J. The Stakeholder Corporation', in Kelly, G , Kelly, D , and Gamble, A., Stakeholder Capitalism 
(Macmillan: London, 1997), p. 136. 
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to the financial interests of the shareholders/13 With all this to commend it, the stakeholder 
corporation has justifiably been called a form of Kantian capitalism, in that it looks to treat all 
those whose lives are affected by a particular business as persons: not only as a means but also 
as an end.14 
Once again, the adoption of this reform would be 'transformation by adaption, not by 
destruction . As Kay points out, the stakeholder model more closely mirrors the reality of 
corporate governance in the large publicly quoted company, where the notion that shareholders 
own the corporation is a fiction.19 Furthermore, although its understanding of business social 
responsibility is wider than that of Anglo-American capitalism, where, as Milton Friedman put 
it in the title of his celebrated article, the social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profit,16 the stakeholder model nevertheless accepts that the discipline of the market provides a 
necessary commercial framework within which it has to operate and be regulated. This has the 
important advantage over the public corporation in that, because it has to operate in the market 
and is a separate legal entity, it is less susceptible to government interference. Here it will be 
recalled how the almost unceasing interference by Ministers in the affairs of the nationalised 
industries contributed to low management morale, made effective regulation difficult, and 
eroded the financial disciplines of the industries. And, while we accept that there may be 
extreme situations which might justify making industry an instrument of economic and social 
policy, such as in the case of Heath's price and incomes policy and, more recently, in that of the 
windfall tax levied on the privatised utilities, experience bears out the wisdom of respecting the 
independence of corporations on the understanding that their primary contribution to the 
common good is to be effective businesses. Finally, against those who deny any legitimacy to 
the market, we would also argue that accepting the discipline of the market can be morally 
justified on the understanding that business values, such as profit and efficiency, can also be 
1 3 Ibid., p. 135. 
1 4 See further Freeman, W.&A. 'A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism', in Tom 
Beauchamp and Norman Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1988), p. 92 ff. 
1 9 Ibid., pp. 128-131. See also here Williamson, J. 'The Road to Stakeholding', in Political Quarterly (Blackwell: 
Oxford, 1996), p.210 for her discussion of the passive shareholding of institutional investors. See also Hay, D. 
The Public Joint- Stock Company: Blessing or Curse ?' (Paper: Tyndale Ethics Meeting, 1990), for a 
distinctively Christian advocacy of the public trust company. 
1 6 The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits', in New York Tones Magazine, September 13, 
1970. 
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human values, in the sense that they provide valuable information to managers, to professional 
investors and other decision makers, which allow them to promote the good of the corporation 
and the common good.17 
Of course, just as with any large, complex organisation, with operations touching the 
lives of millions of people, it will not always be easy to reconcile all the stakeholder interests 
in the commercial framework set by the market. Therefore constructive compromises will have 
to be struck. But there is no good reason to think, as Elaine Sternberg does, that stakeholder 
theory would in practice be unworkable because it reduces corporate governance to a 
complicated procedure of balancing the competing claims of various stakeholders', ruling out 
the pursuit of any specific objective, commercial or otherwise.'18 In any case, in response to the 
unprecedented power of the modern large business corporation, which it can use for good or for 
il l , society has begun to rewrite its mandate for business by demanding a greater responsiveness 
to a wide range of social and environmental concerns. This changing mandate, with its 
increasing emphasis of social justice, is making it increasingly difficult for managers to dismiss 
the legitimate concerns of omer stakeholders 
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
As the fourth and final part of our new project, we join those who advocate strengthening 
the capacity of already existing regional power blocs and international institutions to act as 
countervailing powers to the unprecedented property-based power of the global market. 
In mis connection, it is worth recalling that not so very long ago the market was a simple 
mechanism for dealing with the economic surpluses of a subsistence economy. Later it allowed 
a limited division of labour and specialisation. Even as late as the Middle Ages, when there 
were already a number of market towns, the market was still such a minor part of the structure 
of human life that it scarcely drew any systematic reflection. For this reason, as John Kenneth 
Galbraith explains, 'economics as now known still did not exist'20However, since the Industrial 
1 7 See further Mahoney, J. 'Christian Perspectives On Business Ethics', in Studies in Christian Ethics, p.27. Also 
see John Atherton, Christianity and the Market, p. 219 ff for his discussion of the virtues of the market. 
1 8 Sternberg, E . 'Stakeholder Theory: The Defective State Its In', in Hutton, W. Stakeholding and its Critics 
(Institute of Economic Affairs: London, 1997), quote taken from the back cover. 
1 9 See further Mahoney J. Teaching Business Ethics, p.ix ff. for a discussion of the changing mandate of business. 
2 0 John Kenneth Galbraith, A History of Economics (Hamish Hamilton/Penguin: London, 1967/1969), p.25. 
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Revolution, the volume, value and complexity of market transactions have grown on a staggering 
scale such that now the main economic players are no longer individual buyers and sellers but 
transnational corporations, exploiting every marketable resource and technological invention 
available world-wide. In this light, what Alan Booth has to say about the consequences of the 
development of nuclear weapons also applies in the case of the market:' We have got to learn 
to live with the fact that we are now powerful creatures ." 
Our predicament though is mat our ability to control these new powers has not kept pace 
with their development As a result we have entered an era increasingly plagued by anarchic 
forces.22 These now include international terrorists, suspected to be armed with nuclear weapons 
and biological weapons of mass destruction, and increasingly unstable free market forces, which 
are exhausting the capacity of international institutions, such as the United Nations, the IMF, and 
World Bank, to sustain world peace and economic stability.23 In this global context, what cannot 
be afforded is exactly what privatisation is doing, dividing the world into two camps: the few 
who own most of the world and die many who own nothing and are prey to all the vicissitudes 
of an amoral world order. These are the classical conditions for violent revolution, which, in a 
world armed with weapons of mass destruction, will be unimaginably worse than any the world 
has yet witnessed. As John Gray warns,1 It beggars belief to suppose that these weapons will not 
be used in the coming decades, with incalculable cost to human and other l i fe / 2 4 
In this increasingly dangerous and anarchic world order, while there can be no prospect 
of planning economic life along the lines advocated by state socialists,29 it is a matter of survival 
that we should gain control over the market forces which threaten either to end history or to 
2 1 Alan Booth, Not Only Peace, Christian Realism and the Conflicts of the Twentieth Century (SCM: London, 
1967), p.91. 
2 2 See further John Gray, False Dawn, p.206 ff. 
M See further Martin Fddstein, Refbcusing the I M F , in Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998 Vol. 77, No. 2), p. 
20 ff. See also Kung, H. A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (SCM: London, 1997), p. 218 for his 
description of the instability of the world economic order of which he remarks, Tor any one who is not an 
economist, a cursory glance at the globalized financial markets on which several hundred billion dollars are traded 
every day (only a fraction of this trade in commodities) can give the impression in the 1990s of being another 
dance around volcanoes, as in the 1920s ("the roaring twenties'), with excessively high share prices and a highly 
irrational hunt for records on the stock exchange. 
24 False Dawn, p. 174. 
2 5 See further Kung, H. A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (SCM: London, 1997), especially 
p.215 - 216, where he argues for a 'global, competitive, social and environmental order', in place of a world 
planned economy. 
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plunge us back into a Hobbesian state of nature. It is therefore crucial we understand, as 
Nicholas Boyle points out, mat the principal effects of privatisation has been to transfer yet 
more of the local workforce to a global jobs market, and to reduce the sovereignty of the national 
government by transferring to multinational companies such strategic responsibilities as the 
supply of water and power, waste disposal, communications, and transport/ Consequently, in 
this new privatised, global order, as he goes on to comment, "There is something odd afoot i f a 
"privatizing" administration also complains about a supposed loss of powers to extraterritorial 
political and legal institutions which are at least either elected or directly or indirectly 
responsible to elected bodies.'26 
On this further understanding of the consequences of privatisation, we can conclude that 
there is now no alternative but to share more of the power of national governments with regional 
democratic assemblies, such as the European Union, and accountable international institutions, 
such as the United Nations. The profound irony of privatisation, with its concern to shrink the 
state for the sake of the individual, therefore, is to make us more aware of the need to expand 
our individual horizons to embrace the challenge of regional and global governance, without 
which there can be no realistic hope of building the vision of a 'peaceful global order, freely 
chosen by all its citizens/27 
26 Who Are We Now?, p. 317. 
"Ibid., p.321. 
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